FRENCH RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA AN INTERIM ESTIMATE OF ITS SIGNIFICANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000200010004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 13, 1964
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
13 February 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: French Recognition of Communist China: An Interim
Estimate of Its Significance
Page
I. French Motives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. General Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
III. Implications in the Par East . . . . . . . . . . 4
IV. Impact on the USSR . . . . . . . . . . 0 0 0 0 0 8
V. Effects on the Western Alliance . . . . . . . . 9
VT. Implications in Africa and Latin America . . . . 1,1
VII. The Problem of UN Membership . . . . . . . . . . 13
VIII. Effects on US Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
I. FRENCH MOTIVES
1. We believe that de Gaulle moved to recognize Communist
China for a complex of reasons, which include both long-term
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political-strategic calculations of a fundamental sort and more
immediate or secondary motives. These considerations cannot be
assigned an order of importance, but they include:
a. The assertion of French independence of US leader-
ship. In de Gaulle's view, the West as well as the
Communist World is, and should be, coming to the end of the
bipolarism of pearly 20 years of cold war, and returning
to greater emphasis by the principal nations on the
independent pursuit of their own policies.
b. The desire to demonstrate France's intention to
have a more important voice in world affairs, in much the
same fashion that de Gaulle's veto of Britain's Common
Market application manifested French intention to play a
central role in Europe.
c. The belief that the Sino-Soviet dispute means the
end of the Communist Bloc as a monolithic structure, a
development to be welcomed by France and the West generally,
and encouraged and exploited by state-to-state relations
with an independent China.
d. A Judgment that the problems of Southeast Asia,
in which France should rightfully have a voice, cannot
be solved by present US lines of effort, but require a new
approach, broadly called "neutralization,' which would
require Chinese Communist participation.
# De Gaulle has almost certainly not formulated with any
precision what he means by "neutralization." He could mean
something like what obtains in Laos. He could have in mind
the sort of thing Sihanouk is advocating for Cambodia. He
almost certainly does not contemplate a state or states that
would be mere puppets of Communist China. It would be quite
in character for de Gaulle, having sponsored this vague con-
cept, to wait for time and circumstance -.** D .t 3iIr4e
further definition before committing himself.
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e. A hope that the expanding French economy can find
new markets in China, and can obtain commercial advantages
through diplomatic recognition.
2. How de Gaulle's move will affect patterns of inter-
national relations is not yet clear, even for the short term,
since the interactions of French, Communist Chinese, and National
Nationalist Chinese policies in the immediate situation have still
to work themselves out. One short-term question, however, has
already been answered; any hopes that the French action would pave
the way for general acceptance of a "two Chinas" solution proved
ill-founded. Peiping had no interest in playing it this way and
the French did not try for it.
3. There is no blinking the fact that French recognition
constitutes a distinct political victory for Peiping and a most
serious blow for Taipei. It represents a major breach in the
line which the US has successfully held since 1950, that
Communist China should, as an aggressive and lawless regime, be
denied international recognition at all levels. The French action
is therefore a setback for the US. The extent to which it will
involve lasting damage to US prestige, to US authority, to US
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interests is not easy to determine. In the first tnstance, it
depends on how a number of US allies, US adversaries, and neutral
nations view the new situation and react to it.
III. IMPLICATIONS IN THE FAR EAST
k. Communist China. Peiping looks on recognition by France
as the harbinger of recognition by other states, membership in the
UN, and the end of Communist Chinese isolation. Coming at a time
when Communist China's isolation from both the West and the Soviet
Bloc was being underscored by the fight with Moscow, it has
clearly given Peiping's morale a significant boost. In addition,
Peiping probably hopes to use its new relationship with France to
win more immediate and tangible goals. The Chinese leaders are
already giving wide circulation to the claim that extensive trade
relations are possible between China and other countries, and
that these will be made easier if political relations are
established.' Mao and his associates may also hope for some form
Prolonged and widespread shopping inquiries by Peiping in
Western Europe and Japan appear to have raised much higher
hopes among Free World traders than are justified by Communist
China's actual trading potential for at least the next few
years. It should be stressed, however, it is the hopes not
the realities which govern the pressures toward recognition
in the various capitals.
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of French help in the atomic energy field, where both countries
have been denied significant help by their respective allies.
5. But above all, the Chinese Communists welcome the
French action as a blow against the US and the GRC. To Peiping,
the course of events gives promise of fatally damaging the morale
of the Taipei government and advancing the day when mainland
China can gain Taiwan, thus taking a long step toward its aim of
expelling US power from the Far East. But even short of this
development, Peiping sees clear advantage in the damage done to
the US effort to contain Communist China. The new French approach
to Southeast Asia is also attractive to Peiping, which will hope
to see it complicate US problems in the area and spread doubt and
confusion among the local anti-Communist forces, especially in
South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.
6. Nationalist China.* In the aftermath of this bitter
experience, Chiang might withdraw or be overthrown, but we think
these contingencies are unlikely. We also think it unlikely that
he will launch an attack of desperation against the mainland, or
# A national intelligence estimate, "Prospects for the Govern-
ment of the Republic of China," is in preparation.
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that he will yield to Peiping's claims. But even though a collapse
of the GRC and a takeover by Peiping are not probable in the near
future, the GRC faces a painful and testing period of attempting
to stem an accelerating erosion of its international position while
seeking to work out, with US help, the least unsatisfactory of a
variety of unpalatable solutions. Trying times for US-GRC rela-
tions are in prospect. US facilities on the island are accord-
ingly not as seeare as before, but we do not consider them
seriously threatened, at least in the foreseeable future.
7. Japan. There is an increased potential for trade between
Japan and Communist China. Trade has been inhibited by political
considerations and by inability to agree on terms and conditions.
Nevertheless, the desire to "regularize relations" is strong in
Japan, and will receive a new impetus from the French action.
Some increased trade and other contacts are likely. Chinese
attempts to parlay this into broader political relations will be
met by some wariness in Tokyo, steaming partly from Japanese
scepticism as to how extensive the Chinese trade will in fact
prove to be, and partly out of deference to the policies of the
US, Japan's dominant trading partner.
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8. Other Far Eastern States. US allies in the area -- South
Vietnam, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines -- are chronically
nervous about US strength and steadfastness. They are obviously,
though in varying degrees, distressed that Washington has not been
able to keep de Gaulle in line. Their fundamental interest,
however, is in the nature and firmness of the support they receive
against the Communist threat. Hence their attitudes will be
particularly affected by the development of de Gaulle's
"neutralization" proposition, and by US reactions thereto. The
same general considerations apply to Malaysia, though of course
US attitudes toward Indonesia will be a more important concern
for some time to come.
9. De Gaulle's initiatives have surely increased Hanoi's
hope for a neutralized South Vietnam as a way station to a
Ccimunist takeover of all former French Indochina, and the Pathet
Lao and Viet Cong must be likewise encouraged. Sihanouk is
probably gratified by French endorsement of "neutralization,"
which he will equate with his own proposals. Sukarno is likely
to look on the French action as something not directly relevant
to his own near-term objective of "crushing Malaysia," but as
certainly no hindrance to it..
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IV. IMPACT ON THE USSR
10. Although publicly welcoming the French move, Moscow
must in fact view it with mixed feelings. It weakens any hope
Moscow might have that China's isolation could some day, possibly
after Mao goes, lead Peiping to turn back toward the USSR. Since
last July the Soviets have be1a''ored the Chinese Communists as
outlaws because of their refusal to accept the test ban and
because of their vicious attacks on Khrushchev. This charge has
now not only failed to stick, but French recognition, not to
mention Oki En-tai's extensive visits in Africa and the Middle
East, demonstrates that Soviet efforts to ostracise the Chinese
have been unavailing. That the Chinese are inspired by their
success with de Gaulle is most recently evident in the confident
tones of their renewed, open attacks on Khrushchev in the past
few days. Though the Soviets will of course continue to support
Peiping's claim to the Chinese UN seat, they almost certainly
look with dismay at the possibility that this bid might succeed
this fall.
11. On the other hand, the Soviets are beyond all question
gratified at the increased strains within the Western alliance,
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and particularly between France and the US. These they must
count on to provide divers opportunities for future exploitation.
12. With respect to Southeast Asia, de Gaulle's pronounce-
ment on "neutralization" is probably attractive to the Soviets,
who have no wish to further either US or Chinese influence there.
They have already sounded out the French informally on ideas for
neutralization of South Vietnam, and have urged both the US and
French to move in this direction while Ho Chi Minh is still in
power and before pro-Chinese elements completely dominate the
North Vietnamese regime,
V. E~FTCTS ON THE WESTE;3N ALLIANCE
13. The French act has served to underline de Gaulle's
propensity for acting unilaterally and without regard for the
sensibilities of the US and other allies. It has been sharply
criticized on these grounds, notably by the West Germans and by
Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak. The Belgian Government's request
that the recognition issue be aired in the North Atlantic Council
is probably an effort to stave off domestic pressure for an early
decision to follow the French lead. On the whole, de Gaulle's move
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helps to sharpen the differences already existing among the West
European countries -- most of them arising out of issues far
closer to home.
14+. The principal long-term effect of French recognition
is likely to be a further undermining of inhibitions on the
development of commercial and diplomatic relations with Communist
China on the part of other NATO countries. Communist China already
has diplomatic relations with seven European countries -- the UK,
Holland, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland -- and the
predominant opinion in the others, however much they may criticize
the timing and, manner of de Gaulle's move, is that a general
recognition cf Peiping as a political reality is inevitable and
even desirable.
15. Even those governments under greatest internal pressure
to follow the French example -- notably Belgium, Luxembourg, and
Canada -- will probably be restrained from doing so at any early
date by desire to spare the US Government further embarrassment
on this issue during an election year and by the blow that has
been dealt to hopes of a "two Chinas" solution. However, most of
our allies would welcome a change in the US position and in the
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meantime probably will display increasing interest in development
VI. IMPLICATIONS IN AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA
3.6. In Africa, only Ethiopia, which has heretofore had
relations with neither Chinese government, is currently moving
to recognize Peiping. For the rest, Taipei is recognized by 19
states -- most of them the Brazzaville group of former French
colonies. (The former British possessions have generally followed
London in recognizing Peiping.) Some of the present Brazzaville
governments would probably not recognize Peiping under any
circunstences; most would prefer to recognize both Chinas. Fail-
ing this, we expect that a few will sooner or later follow the
French lead, though de Gaulle is apparently not encouraging
them to do so. We do not anticipate any early bandwagon sweep --
partly because of concern that Chinese Ccinziunict establishments
would be points for subversion. This -_once- vn is shared by
many Brazzaville leaders and the French who advise them, and it
is strengthened by apprehensions over Chou's recent visit and
evidences of ChiS:~r:se implication in current East African unrest.
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17. The impact in Latin America will not be great -- beyond
a certain gratification in some quarters at seeing the US dis-
comfited. Generally, there is probably much less interest in
French recognition of Peiping than in de Gaulle's concurrent
indication of intention to seek an enhanced French role in Latin
America; this French gambit would appeal to many goverrAents in
the area as a chance to play off France against the US.
18. On the China issue, however, none of the Latin gover,-
ments yet sees anything significant to be gained by recognition
that would not be more than offset by adverse effects on its
relations with the US, and each is reluctant to be the firat to
take the step. Nonetheless, there has for some time been a move
toward certain practical trade arrangements and limited cultural
exchanges between Communist China and those larger Latin American
states seeking additional markets for basic commodities, e.g.,
Argentina for wheat, and Mexico for wheat and cotton. Other
states, notazaiy (i11le and Brazil, are likely to show interest in
similar arran em.an to which may sooner or later lead to full
relations with the Chinese Communists.
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VII. THE PROBLEM OF UN Mg3EBSr?IP
19. The prospects for Comtaunist China's admission to the UN
have been advanced, but there remain a variety of complicated
questions relating to the circumstances and the form in which the
issue is raised. Furthermore, the 196+ UNGA session will also be
confronted with problems of dues in arrears, voting rights,
proposals to enlarge the Security Council and to revise the already
somewhat battered "gentlemen's agreement" on the apportionment of
seats. All these are or can be related to the issue of Chinese
Communist membership. Thus Peiping's admission this fail is by
no means inevitable, but the problems of the US in blocking it
have been increased.
VIII. EFFECTS ON US INTERESTS
20. A number of factors have combined to undermine the
policy of maintaining Communist China in a state of political,
econosric, and moral isolation -- a policy which worked for more
than a decade. To a considerable extent, these factors are of a
kind beyond the paver of US policy to control: the wino-Soviet
rift; the widely-held belief that a nuclear stalemate permits a
loosening of the tight alliances designed for a bipolar world;
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the growing strength and affluence of Free World states (not just
France alone) which permits them to pursue independent policies;
and the sheer passage of time since Communist China's defiance
of the UN in Korea put it in the position of an outlaw.
21. In these circumstances, we believe that it will soon be,
if it is not already, impossible to persuade a number of states,
which have hitherto gone along with the policy, not to modify
their attitudes. Many friends and allies of the US have long
felt that the effort to isolate China was unrealistic, unproduc-
tive, or at least outmoded, but by themselves lacked the stature
to break ranks until de Gaulle stepped out on his own. The
proposition that Peiping will become more responsible if its
isolation is ended has considerable appeal, at least among the
uncommitted states, and this hope will not die until it has been
tested. Although no rush to recognize has developed in the wake
of de Gaulle's move, something like a bandwagon psychology may in
time develop, as various states decide to avoid being last in
line -- particularly if trade opportunities are thought to be
important, and to be tied to diplomatic relations.
22. in shorn, we foresee that a good many nations will on
this issue tend to feel more free than in the past to pursue what
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they conceive to be their own particular economic and political
interests, and will be less disposed to abide by US wishes out
of gratitude, political loyalty to the US as leader of the Free
World, or ideological hostility to Chinese Conunism. In most
cases, the trend does not reflect ill-feeling or disillusion with
the US, but a conviction that the developing world situation has
outmoded some long-standing policies, and now calls for modifica-
tions. In this process, the US may be able to mitigate but cannot
avoid damage to its prestige and authority.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
SHERMAN I ;1'T
Chairman
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