VIET CONG COVERT AGENCIES IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE TERRITORY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000100020004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 1, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
BACKGROUND USE ONL Y
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Viet Cong Covert Agencies In South Vietnamese Territory
Top Secret
ER IM 70-63
May 1970
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
May 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Viet Cong Covert Agencies
In South Vietnamese Territory
Introduction
Viet Cong military victories have been few and
far between since the arrival of US ground forces
in early 1965. Yet five years later, the Communists,
with the aid of the North Vietnamese Army, are still
hanging on. Among other reasons, their survival in
the South is abetted by the presence in government
territory of an extensive subversive apparatus.
Save for a scattering of agents, the South Vietnamese
have no covert organization in Communist territory,
and the "secret war" is largely fought in areas
nominally controlled by the government. This gives
the Viet Cong four powerful advantages over the
Allies.
First, Viet Cong local intelligence
is superior in quantity, quality, and time-
liness. The most obvious manifestations of
the superiority are in the field of tactical
warning, and in the ability of Viet Cong
political operatives to target and reach
specific individuals and groups. The imbal-
ance in intelligence is less telling than it
once was, but continues tilted in the Commu-
nists' direction.
Second, Viet Cong internal security is
considerably tighter than that of the South
Vietnamese. The Communists' large counter-
Note: This memorandum was produced soZeZy by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current In-
teZZigence and the Director's Special Assistant.
for Vietnamese Affairs.
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espionage network planted in South Viet-
namese intelligence and security organi-
zations has helped to keep Allied agent
penetrations to a minimum and has prevented
the growth of a South Vietnamese subversive
apparatus in Viet Cong areas.
Third, the Communists are able to
impede or undermine South Vietnamese pro-
grams, particularly those aimed at the Viet
Cong themselves.
Fourth, they can take advantage of and
exacerbate South Vietnam's chronic political
weaknesses, both on the local and national
levels.
The purpose of this memorandum is to describe
the Communists' subversive organization and to as-
sess how the Viet Cong are using it under their
current strategy.
The Viet Cong Subversive Organization
1. The Communist Party runs the Viet Cong
organization, both in its own and government terri-
tory. Its controlling body at each echelon is a
Current Affairs Committee, invariably located in
Viet Cong territory. The Committee conducts its
business through a number of agencies, or bureaucra-
cies. At the upper levels, the agencies are formal,
highly structured, and manned by full-time person-
nel. At the lower levels, they are less formal and
depend on the activities of large numbers of part-
timers in the villages and hamlets. The chart de-
picts the organization of a typical Viet Cong pro-
vince.
2. Although all Viet Cong agencies, usually
translated as "sections," run operations in South
Vietnamese territory from time to time -- including,
for example, the Civil Health Section, which buys
many of its medicines in South Vietnamese drug-
stores -- six are more heavily involved than the
others in intelligence and subversion. The six
agencies are:
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The Military Proselyting Section;
The Security Section;
The Military Affairs Section
(labeled "Province Unit Head-
quarters" on the chart);
The Propaganda and Training Section;
The Political Struggle Section; and
The Civilian Proselyting Section
The first three agencies are largely targeted
against the South Vietnamese government and army.
The second three are primarily aimed at the popula-
tion at large.
Agencies Targeted Against the South Vietnamese
Government
3. The Viet Cong Military Proselyting Section,
the Security Section, and the Military Intelligence
Service each run agent penetrations within the South
Vietnamese government.
4. The Military Proselyting Section is directed
by the Enemy and Military Proselyting Directorate
of the Political Staff of Hanoi's Ministry of De-
fense. The military proselytors, who are present
at each echelon (village level and above), seek to
undermine the morale and effectiveness of the South
Vietnamese army and government security organiza-
tions. Primarily oriented toward subversion rather
than espionage, the military proselyting agents --
called "fifth columnists" and "sympathizers,"* ac-
cording to the degree the Communists trust them --
try to foment unit rebellions, encourage desertion
and defection, and set up accommodations whereby
South Vietnamese units refrain from actively partic-
ipating in the war. The Military Proselyting ap-
paratus also performs acts of sabotage and assassi-
nation, primarily for their psychological effect.
Although a fair percentage of the agents are officers
and noncoms -- often in sensitive posts -- they are
usually less proficient than their security or mili-
tary.intelligence equivalents, because criteria
for recruiting them are less strict. Also, because
the agents are often required to proselyte South
Vietnamese soldiers and policemen directly, they
necessarily operate under lax security conditions.
* These are the most frequently used translations
of terms used by the Viet Cong.
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The Military Proselyting Section has, in addition
to the agents, a large support apparatus in South
Vietnamese territory. It includes recruiters,
couriers, safehouse keepers, and agent spotters.
Many belonging to the support apparatus are rela-
tives of South Vietnamese soldiers and officials.
Most are women.
5. The Security Section is controlled by Hanoi's
Ministry of Public Security. It directs the Viet
Cong internal security and counterintelligence
effort in South Vietnam, and mounts agent penetra-
tions against the South Vietnamese police -- partic-
ularly the Special Branch -- against ARVN's Military
Intelligence and Military Security organizations,
and against the South Vietnamese Central Intelligence
Organization. In recent years, the Section's main
success has been against the lower levels of the
police and all levels of the military agencies.
Security Section operatives are also targeted at
the South Vietnamese political parties and religions
and are responsible for most political assassina-
tions.* Perhaps because its agent handlers are
among the Communists' best, the South Vietnamese
have uncovered few penetrations run by the Security
Section. No important security agent has yet been
reported caught. that the espionage
and subversive effort o the Security Section in Sai-
gon is large and is aimed at high-level targets. In
addition to its agent penetrations, the Section runs
large informant nets in South Vietnamese territory.
These informant nets compile blacklists, which the
Section uses to target operations and to prepare
for such contingencies as a coalition government or
ceasefire.
6. The Military Intelligence Service is con-
trolled by military headquarters at each echelon
(village and above) and is ultimately directed by
the Research Agency (Cuc Nghien Cuu, or CNC) of
Hanoi's Ministry of Defense. The Military Intelli-
gence apparatus has both "strategic" (high-level)
and "tactical" (low-level) branches. It is primarily
an intelligence-gathering organization targeted at
the South Vietnamese military establishment. How-
ever, some of the strategic operatives appear to
For example, Security Section assassins made un-
successful attempts to kill ex-Prime Minister Huong
and US Ambassador Bunker.
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be politically oriented and are assigned as "agents
of influence" to manipulate policy. A preliminary
analysis of what is believed to remain of the CNC's
strategic espionage apparatus in Saigon suggests
that South Vietnamese security agencies have appre-
hended less than half of high-level CNC nets operat-
ing there. Recent reporting indicates the CNC also
has a large COMINT apparatus -- perhaps with some
access to South Vietnamese cryptographic key-lists* --
and an extensive organization which manufactures
forged documents. The documents are used by Commu-
nist "legalized" cadres operating in South Vietnamese
territory. Like the Security Section, the Military
Intelligence Service has a large informant network
in areas controlled by South Vietnam.
7. Evidence is lacking on which to make a firm
estimate of the number of agents the Viet Cong carry
on their rolls as serving in the South Vietnamese
armed forces and government structure. However, an
analysis of captured documents, POW reports, and
suggests there may have
been on the order of , agents in early 1969.
The total, as shown in the tabulation, can be broken
down roughly as follows (see also the table):
Military Proselyting Section agents
(estimate based on extrapolations
from Viet Cong agent rosters)
Security Section agents
(estimate based on the size of the
Section's agent-handling apparatus)
Military Intelligence agents
(estimate based on ratios between
types of agents)**
Total
20,000
3,000
7,000
30, 000
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8. Such an estimate represents a spectrum
rather than a homogeneous group. It conceals enorm-
ous differences in agent quality.
9. The low-quality end of the spectrum includes
several thousand operatives who are inept and un-
enthusiastic. They cooperate with the Viet Cong
sporadically and often have little motive other than
a desire to string lines out to both sides. Although
they may comprise as much as half the estimated
agent total, they continue on Viet Cong rolls because
of administrative inertia, because of the ability of
some of them to gull Communist case officers, or,
most important from a numerical point of view, be-
cause of padding by Viet Cong agent-handling
bureaucracies. Although often slipshod in the oc-
casional performance of their duties, the lower
quality agents are potentially dangerous should Viet
Cong fortunes improve.
10. In any case, recent roll-ups of agents by
the South Vietnamese security agencies indicate
Communist operatives have occupied a number of key
posts. Among those captured or tentatively identi-
fied as Viet Cong agents in 1969 and 1970 were an
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E g o
Agencies Targeted Against Nongovernmental Organi-
zations and South Vietnamese Civilians
11. The Propaganda and Training Section, the
Political Struggle Section, and the Civilian Proselyt-
ing apparatus are the three agencies targeted against
the general population. Each has substantial compon-
ents in South Vietnamese territory. The components
aim at subverting nongovernmental organizations
and the "masses." The number of persons employed is
indeterminate, because so many are part-timers, often
merely members of the National Liberation Front.
12. The Propaganda and Training Section produces
propaganda, provides entertainment in Viet Cong
territory, and runs the Viet Cong school system.
Its operatives in South Vietnamese territory distrib-
ute pamphlets, give lectures, and try to recruit
teachers, journalists, and entertainers to the Viet
Cong cause. The evidence suggests that there are
substantial numbers of Viet Cong-trained teachers
serving in South Vietnamese schools and that several
South Vietnamese newspapers employ Viet Cong reporters
and editors.
13. The Political Struggle Section, where it
formally exists, is designed to foment mass political
disturbances in South Vietnamese territory, particu-
larly in the cities.* Ordinarily, the number of
full-time Political Struggle operatives is small
because most of its cadres are on loan from other
bureaucracies. In times of political strife, how-
ever -- for example, the Buddhist Struggle Movement
of early 1966 -- the operatives are heavily rein-
forced. Recent documents suggest the Viet Cong's
Political Struggle mechanism is undergoing consid-
erable expansion in many areas.
14. The Civilian Proselyting apparatus is'not
a formal unitary bureaucracy, but a collection of
agencies targeted at different groups. The agencies'
main purpose is to provide manpower and other sup-
port for the Viet Cong organizations such as the
army or the Military Proselyting apparatus. They
do so working in the name of the associations of
* In some areas, such as Saigon, there is no formal
Political Struggle bureaucracy and its functions are
performed by other agencies.
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the National Liberation Front (NLF).* The appara-
tus also has a critical role in generating support
for, and lending legitimacy to, the Communists'
Provisional Revolutionary Government, announced in
June 1969.
15. The NLF associations have both overt ele-
ments -- based in Viet Cong territory -- and secret
components which operate in contested areas or those
controlled by Saigon. Some associations -- for
example, Peasants, Womens, Youths, and Labor -- have
many members. Other proselyting organizations are
relatively small -- for example, Intellectuals.
Their effectiveness varies widely both by area and
by type. For example, Communist reports claim that
they are faring well among the students and Khmer
Buddhists but are "failing to meet their require-
ments" among certain types of workers.
Communist Policy and Plans
16. Communist documents make it clear that the
Viet Cong have greatly increased emphasis on their
subversive structure in the last few months. The
new emphasis is rooted in decisions apparently made
in early 1969 by the Communist Politburo in Hanoi.
At that time, Hanoi decided to scale down military
activity in South Vietnam and to increase emphasis
on the political side of the war. The change has
been reflected by three major phenomena: a shift
from large Main Force operations to small-unit war-
fare; a transfer of experienced cadres from the
military to political and subversive tasks; and the
going underground of large numbers of cadres, often
into South Vietnamese territory.
17. Hanoi's decision to change the Communist
army's mode of warfare became evident on the battle-
field after the Viet Cong winter offensive in early
1969. Since then, the enemy military activity has
largely consisted of skirmishes, stand-off artillery
bombardments, sapper raids, and acts of terrorism
At one time, the chief of the COSVN Civilian Pro-
selyting Section was Vo Chi Cong, who was also deputy
chief of the NLF. As a COSVN Section Chief (and
concurrently a member of the COSVN Current Affairs
Committee), he was a more important figure than
Nguyen Huu Tho, the NLF's chairman. Civilian Pro-
selyting Sections are sometimes called "Front Sec-
tions."
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and sabotage. Parallel with the decline in large
unit warfare has been a decrease in the rate of in-
filtration of troops from the North and a consequent
shrinkage of their military forces. The Communists
have adapted their army to follow the new mode of
warfare -- several large units have split up into
smaller formations, and the Communist sapper (or
special action) organization has been strengthened.*
A COSVN Directive of early 1970 indicated that the
purpose of most current Communist military activity
is to support their Political Struggle and Military
Proselyting operations.
18. The transfer of cadres from military to
political and subversive endeavors began in earnest
about the middle of 1969, apparently in response to
a key COSVN directive, Number 88, of early May. The
transfer involves both a physical shift of cadres
from the army to political agencies and a shift of
responsibilities within the army itself. It has
been evidenced since then by several lower level
reports, and represents a reversal of policies
extant since the middle of 1965, which had sent
political cadres to military units. This policy,
designed to counter the US troop buildup by streng-
thening the Viet Cong military structure, had over
the years weakened the Viet Cong political agencies
and left them with insufficient cadres to fulfill
their expanded role under the new strategy. As
noted below, the Military Proselyting apparatus,
and particularly its agent network within the South
Vietnamese governmental structure, has been a prin-
cipal recipient of the newly assigned Viet Cong
functionaries.
19. Directive 88 also called for sending large
numbers of cadres into South Vietnamese territory.
Viet Cong documents ordinarily describe the process
as that of "legalization": that is, the acquisition
by the cadres of legal South Vietnamese papers.
Substantial evidence indicates that.a large-scale
"legalization" of cadres has been going on since the
middle of 1969, and perhaps longer in some areas.
The shifted cadres have included Security police,
Military Intelligence agents, Military Proselyting
operatives, political agitators, and teachers.
* The strength of the average maneuver battalion
has declined, while the size of the military struc-
ture has increased somewhat.
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Significantly, Communist decrees on implementing
the "legalization" campaign, which a recent report
called "Can Dan Hoa Hoan Dan" ("Transformation of
Party Cadres into Innocent People") insist that a
substantial percentage of the infiltrating cadres
should be Party veterans of several years' experi-
ence.
20. The Viet Cong have sent "legalized" cadres
into South Vietnamese territory with a variety of
instructions. In areas where US troops have left,
or where the South Vietnamese control is weak, most
cadres have been assigned short-term missions
designed to disrupt government control. In areas
where there are still large numbers of US soldiers,
or where the South Vietnamese position is relatively
strong, most "legalized" cadres have been assigned
longer term tasks. Recent directives indicate that
legalized cadres in some of these places have been
instructed to join the South Vietnamese government,
to rise as high as they can in the governmental
structure, and then to sit tight without rocking
the boat.* Presumably, they would be activated as
the opportunity arose. In any case, a province-
level circular of February 1970, almost certainly
reflecting recent COSVN directives, stated that
primary Viet Cong efforts this year would be politi-
cal, aimed at "promoting the revolutionary movement"
in South Vietnamese controlled areas.
2.1. The best-documented method the Communists
are using to obtain legal papers is false defection
through the Chieu Hoi program, although many other
methods -- notably forgery -- are used as well.
During 1969, reports of substantial numbers of false
defectors were received from more than half the
provinces in South Vietnam. These reports suggested
that the overall total of false defectors last year
reached into the several thousands.
A recent report indicated that an entire South
Vietnamese village council in I Corps was arrested
for working for the Viet Cong. Captured Viet Cong
documents show certain areas (for example, Ba Tri
District in Kien Hoa Province, and Quang Long Dis-
trict in An Xuyen Province) have unusually large
numbers of "legalized" cadres.
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22. Although the reporting was not always clear
as to the ralliers' ultimate destination, it did.
suggest that many were slated to join the South
Vietnamese Army as Military Proselyting operatives.
In line with COSVN directives calling for an "Ac-
celerated Military Proselyting Campaign,"* several
documents suggest that the Viet Cong hope to raise
the total number of Military Proselyting agents,
roughly estimated at 20,000 as of early 1969, to
50,000 in the not-too-distant future. Although such
atarget is almost certainly unrealistic, it indi-
cates the stress the Viet Cong have placed on their
subversive effort.
Conclusions
23. The Viet Cong subversive and espionage net-
work is one of the major factors explaining the
Communists' ability to survive in the face of
enormous Allied military pressure. Their virtual
monopoly in the field of subversion has given them
the ability to exploit even minor South Vietnamese
weaknesses and is one of the reasons why the South
Vietnamese control in many areas seems so fragile.
The fact that the Communist structure is almost
wholly free of Allied subversive penetrations helps
to explain much of the Viet Cong's resilience.
24. The network's continuing existence also
helps illuminate the state and strength of many
political allegiances in South Vietnam. If large
numbers of people or officials felt bound to report
Viet Cong agents and agitators to South Vietnamese
authorities,** the network's effectiveness would be
severely curtailed. However, the vast majority has
chosen to remain silent. Whether the silence stems
from fear, admiration, or apathy is moot. The re-
sult is the same; Viet Cong subversive operations
continue.
* COSVN Directive CTNT 105. of June, amplified by
Directive CTNT 124 of October, Directive CTNT 136
of December, and Directive CT 1 of January 1970.
** For example, Military Security Service statis-
tics indicate that only 348 South Vietnamese Arm
personnel reported /footnote continued on p. 12_j
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25. As US troop withdrawals proceed, the Viet
Cong, by increasing the assets of their political/
subversive apparatus, are strengthening their
strongest suit. The Viet Cong clearly hope to shift
the focus of the contest increasingly to the politi-
cal arena, in which they have historically performed
much more effectively than the South Vietnamese.
Thus, as the hot war simmers down or is carried out
with less US assistance, the Communists undoubtedly
feel that the prospects are high that their strategy
will succeed.
Viet Cong approaches during an 18-month period end-
ing in June 1969. Viet Cong documents suggest that
the number of approaches made to South Vietnamese
soldiers and policemen during the same period prob-
ably reached into the hundreds of thousands.
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A COMPOSITE VIET CONG PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATION
PROVINCE PARTY
COMMITTEE
FORWARD
CURRENT
AFFAIRS AD
MIN
SUPPLY
COUNCIL
2
COMMI
OF
TTEE
FICE
I
FOOD
CIVILIAN
PLANNING
ASSAULT
CLERICAL SIGNAL
CRYPTO
SECURITY
PROCUREMENT
LABOR
OFFICE
YOUTHS
COMPONENT COMPONENT
COMPONENT
GUARD
PROVINCE
UNIT
HQS
r COMBAT
PROVINCE
INFANTRY
BATTALION
MILITARY POLITICAL
STAFF 1 STAFF
REAR
SERVICES
STAFF
HOS
INTEL
RECON
ORGANI-
SIGNAL
INTELL
ZATION
RECON
PERSONNEL
MILITARY
SPECIAL
MILITIA
PROSE-
ACTION
LYTING
I
I
PROPAGANDA
HEAVY
COMBAT
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS
SUPPORT
TRAINING
TRAINING
CIVILIAN
PROSE-
SCHOOLS
LYTING
MILITARY
CRYPTO
POLITICAL
SCHOOL
QUARTER
MASTER
WORK
SITES
FINANCE
MEDICAL
CONVA-
LESCENSE
SCHOOLS
SAPPER
L-STAFFS & ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS---j
ORGANIZATION
SECTION
MILITARY
POST OFFICE3
PROVINCE
P.O.
RECON/
ESCORT
TEAMS
CIVIL
HEALTH
SECTION
ADMIN
TREATMENT
PHARMA-
CEUTICAL
DISEASE
PREVENTION
MOBILE
SURGERY
TRAINING
PARTY COMMITTEES
SECURITY
SECTION
SUBSECS
INTERNAL
SECURITY
LEGAL
AFFAIRS
MILITARY
PROSELYTING
SECTION
ADMIN
PROPAGANDA
OFFICER
FIFTH
COLUMNIST
DETENTION
FOOTNOTES
1. Some components displayed here as subordinate to the staffs would be better
described as "associated" with them.
2. In some provinces, the Forward Supply Council has been abolished, its functions
having been taken over by other bureaucracies.
3. In some provinces, the Postal Transport and Communication Section, a civilian
bureaucracy directly subordinate to the Current Affairs Committee, performs the
functions of the Military Post Office.
4. The relationship of the Civilian Proselyting Section, the National Liberation Front
(NLF) Committee, and the Associations under them, as displayed here, is schematic.
In some provinces, there is no Civilian Proselyting Section, and the Association
Subsections have Section status. In any case, the NLF at province level is almost entirely
a paper organization.
PROVINCE DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT
CAPITAL A B C D E F
PROPAGANDA FINANCE
POLITICAL CIVILIAN NLF
& & STRUGGLE PROSELYTING COMMITTEE
TRAINING ECONOMY SECTION SECTION
4
4
SECTION SECTION
SUBSECS
ADMIN
FARMER'S FARMER'S
PROPAGANDA
YOUTH YOUTH
FARM
'
TRAINING
S
WOMEN'S ---- WOMEN
PRODUCTION
EDUCATION
OTHER - - OTHER
PROCURE-
PRINTING
MENT
ENTER- COMMENTS
TAINMENT This chart represents a composite Viet Cog organization at province level. No province
organization is exactly like the chart. All resemble it.
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