PROPOSALS FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01580R002004200009-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2013
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 1, 1965
• Content Type: MISC

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PROPOSALS FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE
NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM
Set forth below are certain basic assurnptions'which determine
the organization appropriate for the administration and direction of
the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP). These assumptions
reflect .a general consensus of opinion of qualified individuals from
the intelligence and scientific communities who have observed or
participated in the National Reconnaissance Program since 1956.
? A. The national character of this essential intelligence
enterprise must be maintained through a joint endeavor on the
part of Don and CIA.. -
B. The potentialities of U.S. technology must be aggressively
and imaginatively exploited to develop systems for the collection
of intelligence which are fully responsive to intelligence needs and
objectives. In the development of new systems maximum use must'
be made of the experience, resources, facilities and technical
competence of appropriate components of the Defense Department
and CIA.
C. Scheduling and targetting of satellite and manned aircraft
reconnaissance missions over denied areas should be the responsi-
bility of the DCI and the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).
D. A new organizational framework is required which,
particularly in the field of satellite reconnaissance operations
and systems development, will: (1) provide a clearly established
delineation of the roles and responsibilities of components of the
Government engaged in these activities, and (2) ensure effective
coordination of these activities under centralized policy guidance
and control,
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Alternatives.
Alternative organizational proposals con idered include:
A. Allocation of exclusive responsibility for the develop..
mont and operation of satellite reconnaissance systems to:
(I) an existing component of the Defense Department, or (2) CIA,
or (3) some new agency to be created along the lines of NSA.
B. Authorization to CIA and DOD and its components to
continue independently the development and operation of satellite
reconnaissance systems subject to arrangements for levying
intelligence requirements and the exchange of information and
provision of mutual support, with decisions concerning systems
allocation and utilization to be made ad hoc by the Secretary of
Defense and the DCI or the 303 Committee.
C. Esta.blishment of an institutional basis for. centralized
control and direction of the program based on: (I) an Executive
Committee, consisting of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the
DCI, responsible for the formulation of basic policy, budgetary
decisions and the broad allocation of program responsibility;
(2) a Director of National Reconnaissance responsible to the
Executive Committee for coordination of the entire program
with staff responsibility for all components engaged in reconnais-
sance activities other than such elements of the Defense Department
or the Armed Services as may be assigned to his direct supervision
by the Secretary of Defense; and (3) recognition of the DCI and
USIB responsibility for determining requirements for mission
coverage and frequency and establishment within CIA of facilities
for the formulation and transmission of guidance governing
intelligence targets and objectives insofar as these determine
the ephemeris of all satellite reconnaissance missions.
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III. Discussion of Alternatives.
A decision to assign exclusive control of the operations and
development of all satellite reconnaissance systems to the Defense
Department would obviously be incompatible with the assumption that
It is essential to preserve CIA's technical competence and experience
as a contributing factor in the satellite program. Moreover, active
participation by C/A in the research, development and production
phases of satellite reconnaissance sensors would seem highly desirable
for the purpose of ensuring that development or improvement of
satellite payloads for reconnaissance.purposes is fully and exclusively
responsive to intelligence needs. Because of its charter responsi-
bilitiesb CIA's participation in reconnaissance systems development
provides assurance that payload designs will not be diverted or degraded
to accommodate non-intelligence gathering purposes.
Allocation of an exclusive franchise to CIA for all phases of
satellite reconnaissance would place responsibilities on CIA which
exceed its capacities and provoke strong opposition, particularly on
the theory that this would create a third agency in space with undesirable
consequences. A decision giving CIA exclusive responsibility for
payload development would deprive the program of resources under
DoD control and eliminate desirable competition.
The proposal to create a new NSA-type organisation responsible
for all reconnaissance activity offers few advantages. Implementation "
of such a proposal could involve the establishment within a new, quasi-
autonomous agency of all the facilities and authority necessary to. carry
out all aspects of the entire reonnaissance program, such as launching.
tracking, recovery, and other operational, procurement and R&D
facilities, including assumption of CIA's present responsibilities for
covert relations with foreign governments in connection with U-2 operations
and the DCI's authority to expend unvouchered funds under Public Law 110.
Or it could involve retention of some of these responsibilities and
facilities in CIA and existing components of DoD. This alternative,
therefore, either involves creation of a formidable new agency with
far reaching jurisdictional implications in the space, intelligence and
R&D fields. Or it only serves to complicate rather than resolve the
problem of achieving a coordinated program under centralized direction
and control.
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The alternative under which CIA and DoD would independently
continue development and operation of reconnaissance systems under
a loose coordinating arrangement simply perpetuates the existing
unsatisfactory and chaotic situation.
Some solution along the lines of alternative C (paragraph II)
appears imperative. The broad outlines of such an arrangement
have been suggested by the DCI from time to time and were discussed
by him with the Secret ary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of
Defense on 27 February. The details of the proposed institutional
arrangements are described and explained in some detail in a
memorandum outlining CIA organizational proposals for the
organization of the National Reconnaissance Program (annexed as
Tab 1). By way of introduction, however, it may be helpful to
Identify some of the major organizational features of the proposed
arrangement and discuss very briefly some of the considerations
which the organization suggests.
a.- Executive Committee. The proposal to confirm and
formalize this committee reflects recognition of an inevitable
duality of responsibility as between DoD and CIA for the program
as a whole. This device appears to be about the only way to
ensure contributions on a fully coordinated basis by subordinate
elements of CIA and DoD to a highly complex program, which
involves very substantial operational, developmental and pro-
curement responsibilities., without doing violence to the integrity
of managerial lines of command. Given the importance and
character of the program, it can confidently be expected that
officials at the level represented on the Executive Committee
will reach agreement on all issues submitted to the committee,
provided they are properly staffed and presented. The
most serious objection to the arrangement is the demand
which it creates on the time of the two officials involved. This
burden, however, will be reduced as the committee succeeds
in establishing broad guidelines governing the allocation of
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research and other responsibilities and to the extent that the
DNRO (contemplated in the proposal) succeeds in gaining the _
confidence of the committee and of participating agencies.
b. DNRO. Considerable concern has been expressed
with the need to define the precise authority, and responsibilities
contemplated for this official. The proposal is that he would
function in a manner and with authority substantially commensurate
with that of an Assistant Secretary of a large department. He
would have full access to all details of all activities and the
right inherent in any staff officer to question programs. proposals
or decisions; to suggest alternatives and to require review through
the appropriate command line or through appeal to the Executive
Committee. on whose behalf he functions. To the extent that
the Secretary of Defense deems appropriate, he would also
assume direct managerial responsibility for components of the
Defense Department involved in the program.
c. Intelligence Input. Orbital plans for satellite missions
must be designed to assure:
(I) that, to the extent that intelligence targets
determine an orbital mission plan, these targets will be
Identified by USIB, and incorporated into the flight plan
through an instrumentality of CIA; and
(2) that the intelligence community will be Iii a
position to be aware of the degree, if any, to which intelli-
gence considerations are subordinated to other non-intelligence
considerations in the planning or execution of an orbital
flight plan and to protest, if necessary ex post facto. U
such subordination appears unreasonable or improper.
Guidance determining the ephemeris of a mission ultimately
assumes computerized form. It is here proposed that, insofar
as the ephemeris is established by intelligence objectives, corn-
puterized guidance for the mission will be formulated by a
'Satellite Requirements Program Center'( analogous to the
present SOC) under CIA control. The process by which the
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ephemeris of a satellite mission is determined is complicated
by the necessity to incorporate guidance to accommodate
considerations not related to intelligence, such as R&D, weather,
"the health of the bird." etc. The intelligence and non-intelligence
inputs into the over-all computerized guidance have to be related
in a complicated process reflecting a complex interrelationship.
By reserving to CIA the authority to develop the computerized
guidance relating to the intelligence objectives of a particular
mission, it is not intended to pre-empt or denigrate the authority
of the Defense Department over launching, inflight or recovery
aspects of a mission.
d. R&D. The research, development, testing and production
responsibilities reserved to CIA in the proposed arrangement, to
ensure utilization of CIA's special competence, are also not intended
to impair the authority and responsibility of the Defense Department
for assembling, launching, orbital control and recovery of
reconnaissance satellites. The agency responsible for exercising the
Defense Department's authority in this respect can (it seems
reasonable to assume) be so organized as to accommodate CIA
representation, in conjunction with their contractors, at the point
of assembly of a payload into a launch unit. It can also, during
the test stages of a new payload, accommodate the presence of
engineering and technical representatives of CIA and their con-
tractors, as consultants to ensure that the flight is responsive to
the technical and engineering objectives of the test.
e. Budgeting. The entire process by which CIA obtains
its appropriations and by which funds are authorized and allocated
to the "black budget" for all purposes. including the funding of
national reconnaissance projects, is complicated and probably
deserves review. To the extent that the present organizational
proposals involve budgetary procedures the intent is to make sure
that funds will be allocated in bulk and in amounts roughly commen-
surate with the estimated costs of programs responsibility for
which has been allocated as between agencies.. The purpose of
this is to encourage rather clear cut allocations of program
responsibility (after adequate study and evaluation) and discourage
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any propensity on the part of subordinate echelons to nullify or
erode decisions awarding program responsibility by withholding
funds required for incremental aspects of a program the over-all
desirability of which has already been approved at a policy level.
Nothing in this proposal is intended to limit the right, or the
responsibility, of the DNR to review program accounts, cost
estimates, or budget, or to initiate reprogramming exercises org
at any time, to propose review, modifications, or termination of
program decisions through the line of command or the Executive
Committee.
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PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF CIA ORGANIZATIONAL PROPOSAL
A. ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:
An Executive Corrunittee, consisting of the Deputy Secretary of
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, will be established
to formulate, guide, and regulate the NRP. Specifically the Executive
Committee will:
I. Examine the reconnaissance requirements provided
by USIB against technical and fiscal capabilities, so as to
establish an appropriate level of effort for the NRP. In this
role it will rely largely on cost estimates and technical
feasibility analyses prepared by the DNR and the component
elements of the NR Organization and USIB views expressed
with knowledge of cost factors.
Z. Approve or modify the consolidated NR program and
its budget as forwarded by the DNR.
3. Acting through the DNR, allocate responsibility
to CIA and/or DOD for research and preliminary design
studies -for new systems.
4. Allocate development responsibility for specific
reconniassance programs to DOD or CIA. and establish
guidelines for mutual support where appropriate. It shall
be free to use technical advisory groups as necessary. ?
5. Assign operational responsibilities to either DOD
or CIA for various types of manned overflight missions,
subject to the concurrence, as appropriate, of the 303 Committee.
6. Review periodically the essential features of the
major program elements of the NRP.
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B. ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE:
To insure the coordination of CIA and DOD reconnaissance
activities a Director of National Reconnaissance will be appointed by
the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the Director of
Central Intelligence. He will provide a single point of integration
for the planning and budgeting of the National Reconnaissance Program
and will be responsible to the Executive Committee for the execution
of the program. Specifically, he will:
I. Assume such command responsibilities over DOD
elements of the NRP as the Secretary?of Defense may designate.
He will establish suitable lines of coordination with those line
components which do not respond directly to him.
2. Be kept fully and completely informed of all reconnais-
sance activities in CIA and DOD.
3. Schedule the use of the space launching. tracking and
recovery facilities.
4. Review budget proposals submitted by appropriate
elements of CIA and DOD and prepare and submit a consolidated
budget for examination and approval by the Executive Committee.
5. Ensure the flow of funds from the NRP appropriations
to CIA and appropriate DOD elements in lump sum transfers
each fiscal year. Incremental funding from reserve or re-
programming sources will be used for supplemental programs
approved by ExCom.
6. Deal with the operating head of the CIA or his designated
alternate on all matters of policy, coordination, or guidance.
He will not exercise command control over subordinate elements
of CIA or its personnel.
7. Sit with the USIB for the matters affecting the NRP.
8. Appear before the 303 Committee to the extent desired
by the DCI or the Deputy Secretary of Defense to secure approval
for overhead reconnaissance missions.
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C. RESEARCH AND PRELIMINARY DESIGN:
I. Research on reconnaissance' technology and preliminary
design of .new systems will be, encouraged and supported in both
CIA and DOD. It will be supported by a lump sum allocation from
NR.P funds to each group at a level to be established by the
Executive Committee.
Z. A prescribed amount of these resources will be allocated
for support of basic research on reconnaissance technology to
stimulate and assure the future vigor of this field. The DNR will
? be kept fully informed of all activities and developments in this
connection for the purpose of ensuring appropriate coordination
and preventing unwitting duplication as well as encouraging joint
exploitation of new techniques.
3. Preliminary design and mat technical feasibility,
demonstrations of new reconnaissance systems will also be funded
from this innovation 'resource. Such, work can grow out of re-
quirements originating with ITS113.* the ExCom or the DNR for
Improvements in existing capabilities. or Call result from spontaneous
initiative in the CIA and DOD participating elements. However, it
is important that the DNR and ExCom receive each 4..nlonth
comprehensive report on the initiation, status, or conclusion of ?
such efforts. In this way, competitive study efforts will be -
recognised, approved or discouraged..and-synchronised for
later decision actions.
4. It is intended thitt these funds and their products represent
the flexible cutting edge of the reconnaissance program. They
should not be used to fund actual development or operational
activities:
D. SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT:
1. When a new system concept has been sufficiently well
defined and its technical feasibility establishedb the satisfaction
? of the ExCom. it would be included in the inventory of the NR.P.
At this pOint, it should receive necessary funding from line items
In the budget identified with these systems. These funde would
then be allocated to CIA and/or DOD. to whom specific develop-
mental responsibility has been assigned by the ExCom. '
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2. The element of CIA and/or DOD assigned development
responsibility for a new system will be responsible for - selecting
and supervising capable contractors; for establishing such
systems engineering support as they deem necessary; for
rendering periodic reports on program progress to the DNR
and F.xCom and 'generally for the success of the program.
3. Satellite reconnaissance systems are characterized
primarily by the payload (cameras, spacecraft, data recovery
system) as well as by their boosters. The interface between
the launch system and the payload is of critical importance
and planning for compatible checkout and launch facilities.
boosters, tracking and recovery must proceed with the payload
development The DNR will be responsible for the success of
this interface.
? 4. As a matter of principle, in order to avoid duplication
and promote efficiency and economy, development responsi.
bilities will be assigned with a view to utilizing, to the fullest_
extent possible, established competence and available resources
in such areas as spade and resentry vehicles, boosters, and
related equipment. No hard and fast rules can govern decisions
allocating responsibility for development of systems or compo.
nents of systems and general principles of efficiency. based
'on informed common sense, must prevail.
5.? A normal phase of satellite development programs
is the initial flight testing in orbit and engineering proof
of the completed payload system. These flight tests will be
conducted by the element of DOD responsible for assembly,
launch and ',alight control of the vehicle (presumably under
the direct supervision of MR) with due regard to the advice.
a the representatives of the element in CIA or Dor) which has
developed the payload. Flight testing must obviously be
performed under circumstances which afford an appropriate
opportunity foi- those who have developed the payload to be
heard on matters which may affect their engineering or
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technical interests. Flights would be expected to include
as many intelligence targets as are consistent with the
primary development objective so that any film recovered
would have intelligence value. When a system had been
successfully demonstrated and declared operationally
reliable, it would enter the operational phase.
E. ROUTINE OPERATIONAL PHASE:
I. When the satellite payload has been successfully
developed, it becomes a part of the operational assets of the
NRP. The payloads, together with appropriate boosters,
launchers and tracking stations, represent the NRP capability
to obtain orbital photography, and accordingly represent part
of an orderly program to acquire intelligence in response to
?USIB requirements, target lists and priorities. The DNR
must play the central role in planning this program. It
involves far-sighted budgeting for payload production as well
as booster procurement and modification. It involves judicious
scheduling of operational launches from fixed resources, in
addition to development flight tests. It requires a plan with
sufficient flexibility to respond to changing world situations
and the corresponding intelligence needs. It is a complex
managerial task for which a single individual must in the last
analysis be responsible.
2. Both the long range requirements for satellite missions
and the shifting targets for specific flights come properly from
the intelligence community in which all elements of the Government
have a voice. The community has named COMOR as the staff
to provide these requirements in an orderly way, subject to
approval by USIB.
3. The Satellite Requirements Program Center, formerly
known as the Satellite Operations Center, is the next step in
that sequence of events. Its function is to plan specific mission
coverage in light of COMOR target requirements. It does so
by first studying the spectrum of orbital choices available.
These are supplied by various groups on the West Coast and
represent specific launch vehicle propulsion capabilities,
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current range safety restrictions, etc. These feasible '
orbits are then computer analyzed in Washington to optimize
target coverage in light of sun angle, predicted weather
conditions and target priorities. An orbit is selected and
camera programs established for this mission. This is
basically an intelligence function.
4.. In the case of CORONA coverage. the Satellite
Requirements Program Center has played a central role
in determining the ephemeris of the mission and transmitting
computerized guidance to the launch authority. Until the
spring of 1963, the Center was located at CIA Headquarters
next to COMOR, where it was used exclusively in CORONA
and ARGON flights and was in immediate communication
with the West Coast facilities. It was then moved to the
Pentagon, with a view to ex-tending its functions to include
GAMBIT, although mission guidance to this program is not
yet determined by the Center largely because flights in this
system continue to be classified as R&D flights. The Center
should be used to provide the intelligence input for mission
guidance of all satellite operations recognizing that procedures
will differ between system due for example to the on-orbit
loading capacity of GAMBIT.
5. Although most of the responsibility of the developing
team is fulfilled when a satellite payload is declared operational,
there are persuasive arguments why those responsible for
development should continue to have a certain role in the
operational phase. The most compelling argument is that
payloads systems are being continually improved ? and
should be. The remarkable improvement of CORONA from
monoscopic to stereo and then to doubled film capacity via
double recovery vehicles is an example. Furthermore, these
are extremely delicate instruments and no two payloads from
a given system are quite alike. This does not mean that the
camera contractor should fire a THOR or ATLAS. Quite to
the contrary such operational activities must be under a single,
not a divided authority. It does mean that there is no
point in the procurement, production or operational sequence
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.at which one can entirely eliminate the payload team completely.
Payloads will be delivered in accordance with agreed schedules
for assembly into the launch vehicle. During the assembly of
booster and payload, there must be adequate representation
for purposes of advice and consultation from the Government
agency as well as the contractors responsible for developing
the payload. The DNR, dealing with the Defense Department
agency responsible for booster, assembly and launching (over
which he presumably has managerial authority) and given
'staff authority on behalf of the Executive Committee should be
able to see that this interface works.
6. Once a satellite payload is launched in orbit, it
enters a crucial period of real time tracking, monitoring and
control. Tracking and telemetry recording from low altitude
photography is accomplished by Air Force stations. This data
is transmitted to Sunnyvale, California, where the operation is
run. "alight decisions include decisions to recover if a mal-
function is suspected and transmissions of camera program
changes to the satellite so as to take advant age of changing
weather or other opportunities. The presence of an intelligence
representative available for consultation to the authority
responsible for inflight control of the vehicle will help to
ensure that these decisions are taken with appropriate regard
for intelligence interests.
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