1. AS A FOLLOW UP TO THE DCI'S CONCERN LEST CIA AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BE CAUGHT BY SURPRISE OVER ANY SUDDEN AND MAJOR REVERSAL IN SOUTH VIETNAM, EITHER THROUGH INTERVENTIOIN OF NORTH VIETNAMESE AND/OR CHICOM TROOPS OR BY A GOVERNM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01580R001603430016-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2013
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: February 26, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

C.'"A?e.77 I Eicecutive Aogistry
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26 February 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
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1. As a follow up to the DCI's concern lest CIA and the Intelligence
Community be caught by surprise over any sudden and major reversal
in South Vietnam, either through intervention of North Vietnamese and/or
ChiCom troops or by a Government upheaval in South Vietnam, the DDCI
called a meeting in the DCI Conference Room at 3:00 p.m. today.
Attending were virtually all of the Agency officers dealing with the Vietnam
problem as well as DD/P, Chief, FE, Acting DD/I, Acting AD/CI, and the
Chairman of the Board of National Estimates. General Carter read
verbatim minutes from the 25 February USIB meeting during which
Mr. McCone had charged all of USIB with remaining especially alert. (The
USIB minutes on this subject are attached.)
2. General Carter then covered the points, numbers 1 through 6, in
his memorandum of 24 February which is also attached.
3. After a discussion of various aspects of the Vietnam problem,
it was agreed that analysts must not ignore intelligence indicators, no
matter how wild they may seem, that current SNIE's and NIE's be updated
and revised as necessary, that analysts state'. their requirements and
tailor their requirements to collection vehicles.
4. Gteneral Carter asked all at the meeting not to hesitate in
requesting DCI and/or DDCI help in taking steps to closing gaps in our
knowledge that now exist.
Distribution:
0 - DDCI files
- ER
1 - EA /DDCI
H. Knoche
EA /DDCI
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?L; 1CRET
USIS -M-374
25 February 1965
6. Chairman's Alert Regarding
Ominous Developments in
South Vietnam
In connection with the discussion of the Watch Report. Mr. McCone
said that he wished to stress again the extremely important responsibilities
of the intelligence community in regard to South Vietnam. He indicated his
grave concern that a situation might develop which would be relatively as
dangerous to US interests in 1965 as Dien Bien Phu was to the French in 1954.
He asked all the members to assure that the closest attention is given to every
available indicator, nonratter how tenuous, which might suggest in any way
the possibility of a serious reversal of the situation in South Vietnam. The
Chairman noted that he had asked CIA to be particularly alert to the situation
and requested that USII3 members alert all relevant components to the problem,
including MACV. He emphasized the particular responsibilities of NSA,
CIA and DIA.
In his review of the situation Mr. McCone noted that, in addition to
possible Communist moves against Americans and American installations on
a much larger scale than any previous attacks, there were two other very
serious possibilities:
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USIB -M-374
25 February 1965
a. Preparationt-for a massive Viet Cong military effort, with
the support of the North Vietnamese and possibly even the Chinese Communists)
to cut South Vietnam in half, separating land connections between the
northern provinces and the rest of the country.
b. Regarding the internal political situation, Mr. McCone stressed
the need to be particularly alert to the attitude and frame of mind of the
South Vietnamese generals, who conceivably could be planning actions
inimical to US purposes. In this connection he noted that some of the generals
now in positions of power do not have unblemished backgrounds.
Mr. IvicCone concluded his remarks by stressing again the very great
responsibility that the intelligence community has to be particularly
sensitive and alert to every possible indicator regarding the developing
situation in South Vietnam.*
*As a separate action dated 25 February. the Director of Central Intelligence
has requested the Critical Collection Problems Committee to review all
resources for intelligence coverage of indications of possible large-scale
intervention in South Vietnam by military forces of North Vietnam alone or in
connection with the Chinese Communists, and to make appropriate recommendation
for improvement of our capabilities for such kunst coverage.
SECilt:"T
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The Intelligence Community, and particularly CIA, must ensure that
all of the collection and analytical machinery is well oiled and cranked up
in order to provide the earliest possible warning of any major movement
related to the Vietnam crisis. In essence, what we need to be on our
guard for involves sudden movements into Southeast Asia of large numbers
of ChiCom or North Vietnamese ground forces; a sudden collapse of the
resiste.nce in South Vietnam arising from increased infiltration, terrorism,
and the like; or a sudden collapse of allied Government in South Vietnam
with a sudden advent to power of a regime bent on anti-U.S. policies. We
need also, of course, to continue to watch carefully for any Communist
preparations for major outbreaks elsewhere as a diversion, such as an
increase in military pressure in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and even Berlin
and other pressure points.
The DCI DCI and I al- taking steps to inform the Community of our concern
about all this. USIB i"%elaeil advised and the Critical Collection Problem";
Committee will do a survey of Community resources available to ensure a
successful watch on all these contingencies. In addition, of course, the
USIB Watch Committee will continue to shoulder much of the load in
assessing the indicators and reporting them out.
I am not trying to tell you analysts that you must flood the market with
alarming assessments. We all need to remain cool and objective, but there
are a number of things that we must do.
1. You can't afford to ignore any report, no matter how wild it
may seem, and you must make a special effort to look behind the
surface of the reporting we do get.
2. It is absolutely essential that the analysts state their require-
ments, indicate the importance of each of these requirements, and
do all that is necessary to tailor them to specific collection vehicles,
whether U-2's, SIGINT, agents, or otherwise. (ACTION: DDI)
3. In this connection, I expect analysts to be in the closest
touch with collectors in DDP and DDS&T. DDP and DDS&T must
take steps to ensure that analysts know enough about the collection
systems available to formulate their requirements intelligently.
(ACTION: DDI, DDP, and DDS&T)
4, We need to match the SNIE's and NIE's now on the streets
with current information so as to be able to update and warn in
national intelligence publications. (ACTION: DDI and ONE)
Tog SECRET
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5. The Agency must keep the NIC and the Watch ComMittee
supplied with information and assessments. (ACTI ON: DDI and
DDP)
6. Query: Should we broaden the CIA Task Force now
working almost exclusively on Vietnam so as to charge it with
responsibility for looking at Communist developments throughout
the Far East and perhaps in Europe as well? (ACTION: DDI
and DDE')
In the final analysis, it is you analysts and experts who are in the best
position to crank up all the machinery that is necessary. You know your
problems, your lacks, your strengths, and your weaknesses. Advise me.
Let me know what actions I can take that will be helpful to you in the light
of this very important problem we face.
InP SFCR Fr
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ren2) ,
24 February 1965
General Carter:
Concerning the charge you got this morning to look into
intelligence machinery to guard against any surprise developments
in VietNam, there are two major areas to be examined. One is
collection, the other is analysis. In turn, the problem divides
itself into what is to be done in-house within CIA, and the other
what to do to crank up the entire community.
Sheldon and Bross have discussed the subject and they
recommend that General Reynolds', CCPC be brought together to
survey the extent and capabilities of the community's resources
? ? dealing with the problem. As a practical matter, the primary
areas for concern is SIGINT which Sheldon believes is the only
really effective and credible source of warning of any major
military development.
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The following are my suggestions for your consideration:
(1) Make a personal appearance before- a special meeting
of the Watch Committee to charge the Watch Committee
with the importance of the matter and to lay on special
reporting procedures from the NIC to you, DCI, and
other USIB principals as necessary.
(2) Discuss the matter for the record and for help at
tomorrow's USIB meeting.
{(3) Assemble a group of senior' and junior Agency analysts th
. involved in e VietNam problem and to include such people
as Sheldon (in his capacity as Watch Committee Chairmah)
Colby. and Myers, Sherman Kent, Ray Cline, and the CIA
Task Force, to inform them of the problem, seek their
advice on current problems, shortages, and otherwise get
the ball rolling.
After all these things have taken place you will have a better
feel for levying actions. At the moment, other than directing the CCPC
to get into the act, I think there are few actions you can take.
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E. H. K.
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