LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM JOHN A. MCCONE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01580R001603430010-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2013
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 30, 1965
• Content Type: LETTER

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/11/20: CIA-RDP80R01580R001603430010-6
Ea:pouting Begiatni
30 March 1963
Deer Mr. President:
Attached is a copy of my memorandum for the
record of my talk with General Eisenhower on Sunday
afternoon. I extended your greetings and he responded
in the warmest and friendliest manner.
With respect to his very strong feeling concerning
the absolute necessity of the people of South Vietnam
supporting their government's efforts, the General
intended to call you on Monday and express his views
directly to you. However, he has been suffering from
a virus and his secretary called me on Monday morning
and told me his doctors had urged him to spend a few
days off the telephone and away from work in the interests
of a quick recovery from the flu, and therefore he would
not call you.
Respectfully yours,
John A. McCone
Attachment
The Presidente
The White House
Washington, D. C.
JAM/mfb
gefOn w/orig of attch - addressee
1 - DCI White House file w/cy attch
cc - DCI chrono - no attch.
I, GC 96 71
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBSECT: Discussion with General Eisenhower at his residence at
Palm Desert, about 7:00 p.m., Sunday. March 28, 1965
1. I reviewed in considerable detail the reactions to our program
of consistent bombing of North Vietnam 1 noted the reactions in
South Vietnam at the military and political levels, in friendly Far
Eastern countries, in Hanoi. in Peiping and in Moscow. In doing so
I used the briefing paper I read at the NSC meeting on Friday, 26 March.
24 General Eisenhower had been fully briefed on our operations
as General Goodpaster had seen him two days earlier (this I did not
know). He expressed approval of the operations and felt they should be
continued on a regular and dynamic basis. He made no recommendations
concerning bombing of industrial targets, harbors, population centers,
etc. Gen. Eisenhower noted that there was no apparent reaction from
the North Vietnam leaders as yet. He also noted the slackening of
Viet Cong activities in the past 10 days and I said this could be the
result of the bombings, but more probably was a cyclical matter of
the type we had witnessed before.
3. Gen. Eisenhower then spoke at length of the necessity of
creating an attitude among the people of South Vietnam at all levels
and in all parts of the country, cities, towns, villages, hamlets,
rural areas, etc.. to the effect that this war is their war and must be
won with their assistance. U the people do not support the government
in this effort, the government will fail and we will fail with it, in
Gen. Eisenhower's opinion. If, on the other hand, the people are
behind the efforts of the government and the military, then the Viet Cong
can be ferreted out and destroyed; also warnings will be received of
impending strikes such as those made on U.S. installations.
4. Gen. Eisenhower was very positive that this work involves
political and civic action and cannot be done by the military -- it must
be done by the civilian agencies. He expressed himself as feeling
(and I do not know the source of his information, although he has
talked to me along this line on many occasions) that we are not
conducting an aggressive information service, that we are not reaching
the mass of people by radio, by speakers in to meetings, by leaflets
and other forms of printed propaganda, and by doing a great number of
things which will let the people know that the government is interested
in them and their welfare and th s encouraging their support of the
government.
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5. General Eisenhower was particularly critical of USIA.
Indicating he had been in touch with a member, or members, of
the USIA Advisory Committee who had expressed great
dissatisfaction over the conduct of our information program. The
General had few facts to support this position but he does feel
strongly on the subject.
6. In summary, the thrust of General Eisenhower's
recommendations were to get a dynamic program going at once,
designed to make the people feel their responsibilities toward the
government, understand the horror of Viet Con/Communist control
and participate actively in their own defense of their own country.
7. Following this discussion. briefed General Eisenhower on
the most recent developments in the Congo, Indonesia and Cyprus.
SOHN A. McCONE
Director
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/11/20: CIA-RDP80R01580R001603430010-6