I HAVE BEEN GIVING THOUGHT TO THE PAPER THAT WE DISCUSSED IN YESTERDAY'S MEETING, WHICH UNFORTUNATELY I HAD LITTLE TIME TO STUDY, AND ALSO TO THE DECISION MADE TO CHANGE THE MISSION OF OUR GROUND FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM FROM ONE OF ADVICE A

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01580R001603430005-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2013
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 2, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/11/20: CIA-RDP80R01580R001603430005-2
"ran' "sr,
StE14011ANDVad TOM:
2 April 1965
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Special Assistaat to the Presides!
for National Security AITairs
Asnhassader Maxwell D. inter
I have ben giving Owen to the paper that we discussed In yesterday's
soitetiet which Oeforticastely 7 had little time to *tidy, sad also to the
decision made to Osage the Kass ton of ear grand forces ia South Vietnam
!ramose of advice sad *tans defense to seed active combat operations against
the Viet Com guerrillas.
I feel that the Latter decision is correct only U our air strikes stalest
the North are sufficioetly heavy tad damaging realty to kart the North
Vietatamese. The paper we examined yesterday den act anticipate the type
of air operation against the North necessary to force the NVN to reappraise
their policy. Oa the contrary, it states, "We skald castiane roughly the
present slowly *steeling asps of ItOLL/340. TEttINDIR operations
and later, in outlining the types of targets, states, "The target systems
should sestinas to avoid the effective (ICI rano of WC's, and these
costliness Witte restraints which will net be persuasive to the NVN sad
would probably be read is evidence of a LS, desire to tensporist.
I have reported that the strikes to date have not canted a change in
the North Vietnamese polity of directieg Ina Cent instirgency, lefiltrating
cadre. and supplybig material. If anything, the strikes to date have
hardened their attitude.
I have new had a chasms to examine the 12-week program referred to
by General Wheeler and it is my persona/ *pintos that this progress is
net soffitiently severe or damaging to the North Vietnamese to cause them
to compromise their present policy.
On the other kind, we must look with care to oar posilims under a
program of slowly as-needing twain of air strikes. With the passage of
each day and each week, we can expect increasing pressers to step the
Per DCI: copies given to William Bundy, Chet Cooper, Gen. Wheeler and a copy
placed in. President's night reading file. 4/2/65.
? /1 t_tr--Aht Te9:6
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bombing. This will come from ratios Massa of the America
from the pros, the United Nations ad world apneas. Therefore time
will in against es in this operatien and I think the North Vietnamese are
counties on this.
Therefore I think what vs ars doing is etarting on a track Which
Involves ground forte operations which, in all probability, will have
United effectiveness against guerrillas, although admittedly sill restrain
tome VC attunes. However we can expert requirements in an
ever-increasing cattnitnentt of U.S. personnel elitist materially
improving the chances of victory. I import sod agree with this decision
but I must paint oat that in say tedgurset. forcing submisstes of the VC
an only be brought about by a decision In AMA. Since the contemplated
actions against the North an modest in sale. they will not impose
unacceptable damage on It, sr will they threaten the DRIP. vital interests.
Hence, they will not present them with a siteation with Which they cannot
Uwe, though sock actions will cause the DRY pain and btativenience.
I believe our proposed tack offers great danger of simply
actteragleg Chinese Connsmalet and Soviet support of the DRY and YC
? anise if for no other reason than the risk for bca will be minimup.
envision that the reaction of the NVN and Chinese Cammanists will be to
deliberately. carefully, and probably gradually, build up the Viet Cons
capabilities by covert infiltration of North Vietnamese and, possibly,
Cls.baese cadres and thus bring a ever- Increasing pressure en our fortes.
In effect, we will find ourselves mired Sint in combat in the jungle in a
military effort that we cannot win, and Iron Which we will have extreme
difficulty in extracting ourselves.
Therefore it is my judgment that if we *re to change the mission of
the ground forces we at also amigo the ground rules of the strikes against
North Vietnam. We mast hit them harder, more frequently, and inflict
greater damage. blend of *voiding the lease, we must go in and take
them out. A bridge here and there will not do the job. We east strike
their air Holds, their petroleum resources, power stations and their
military compounds. This, in my opinion, most be dose promptly and
With rednintnna relent/do
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pet
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REI A./
man tan ttd ate
OEN A, IttirCOUR
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/11/20: CIA-RDP80R01580R001603430005-2