MAY DAY FLY-BY RAINED OUT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000400010002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 5, 1955
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING 5 May 1955
MAY DAY FLY-BY RAINED OUT
I. Moscow's weather on May Day was so miser-
able that it cancelled the air parade,
and even washed out the grand march of
"joyous" citizens.
A. Rehearsals for the air parade, however,
were flown almost to the last. minute
and our observers have now actually
EN (the 25X1 D
seen
25X1 D
Soviet heavy jet bomber) in flight
together and, as a result of photo-
graphy, have established the fact
that at least 13 of the jet heavies
have now been flown.
B. Tentative reevaluation of
estimates on Soviet heavy bomber pro- 25X1D
duction, undertaken when only 10 _
were known to exist, showed that
r~~RTHE~/
the USSR's bomber program was
*USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File*
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1 1-09 10
C. Confirmed existence of 13 of the jet
heavies, which we now possess, further
emphasizes the extent of this unexpected
Soviet advance.
II. Air Force evaluators are even now making
new computations.
A. As a preliminary summary of Air Force
findings, however, we can say that--
using the US B-52 program as a yard-
stick--the Soviet heavy bomber program
is running a good bit ahead of ours.
25X1 DOa
awi e i - 7 RQ B-521- ax dua".
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NSC BRIEFING 4 May 1955
ITALIAN GOVERNMENT EXPECTATIONS
I. Italy's new President, Giovanni Gronchi, will take office
on 12 May at end of anti-clerical 81-year-old Luigi
Einaudi's 7-year term, Custom demands that Italian
premier Scelba tender his resignation by that date.
A. Gronchi has been president of Italy's chamber of
deputies since 148: is leader of the lefter of the
two "left wing" factions in Christian Democratic
Party.
B. An anti-Communist, who favors Italy's pro-Western
alignment, Gronchi advocates a Christian Democratic
government based on collaboration with, support
from all "democratic" factions, Reported, upset
by "bad" US press on his election, which implied.
he was leftist tool.
C. In his view, "democratic spectrum" ranges from
Nenni Socialists on left through Monarchists on right.
D. He is anxious to split Nenni Socialists away from
Communists, get them into a left-center coalition
which would. then have majority sufficient to push
through needed socio-economic reforms.
E, As titular head, of Italian Republic, however, Gronchi
will be removed from political arena.
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II. Gronchi may refuse Scelba's resignation, in view of:
A. Imminence of Sicily elections (5 June). These are
first important elections since '53, and relative
strengths of Italy's 8 major parties should be
clarified.
III. Another factor favoring Scelba's continuation is need
for time to iron out problems of badly split Christian
Democratic Party.
A. New rifts revealed in course of Gronchi's election,
when Party's right and left wings (natural enemies)
ganged up to defeat the candidates of both Scelba
(center)and Fanfani (moderate left).
Although Party's right and left wings still clash
over question of social reform, they were united
in demand that new president be a Catholic.
C. Finally, Scelba's continuation would provide needed
time for re-examination of Christian Democratic re-
lations with minor parties now in CD coalition who
growing increasingly restive.
IV. Should Gronchi accept Scelba's resignation, probabilities
are against Italy's new government (which will still be
CD-dominated) repeating present CD centrist immobility.
Policies could shift to right, but more likely to go to
left in view of:
A. Strength of left both in CD Party and in country;
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B. Common fear that Scelba government's failure to
carry out reform program is giving strength to
Communists.
Whether to left or right of center, new government's
international orientation would remain same.
V. Whoever is next premier, he will be Christian Democrat.
Possible candidates currently mentioned. by Italian press:
A. Giuseppe Pella, former premier, right-wing CD econo-
mist who temporized. with Communists while in office,
B. Adone Zoli, CD Party president, considered "non-
controversial,"
C. Budget Minister Ezio Vanoni, whose name given to
large-scale 10-year Italian economic plan currently
under consideration by OEEC. Vanoni has previously
been mentioned as possible head of transition govern-
ment between Scelba and CD Party Secretary Fanfani,
currently in bad. odor.
D. Fanfani, himself, without benefit of deorderizer.
Any but Pella, might win Nenni support--or at least
settle question of his sincerity--by pushing through
long-delayed reform legislation.
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4 May 1955
ITALIAN GOVERNMENT EXPECTATIONS
67
I. Italy's new President, Giovanni ronchi, A.
will take office on 12 May at end of anti-
clerical 81-year-old Luigi Einaudi's
7-year term. Custom demands that Italian
premier Scelba tender his resignation by
that date.
A. Gronchi has been president of Italy's
chamber of deputies since '48: is
leader of the lefter of the two "left
wing" factions in Christian Democratic
Party.
B. An a4*i-Communist, who favors Italy's
pro-Western alignment, Gronchi advo-
cates a Christian Democratic government
based on collaboration with, support
from all "democratic" factions. Re-
ported upset by "bad" US press on his
election, which implied he was leftist
tool.
1C;;-... C" 4' y a t L
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C. In his view, "democratic spectrum"
ranges from Nenni Socialists on left
through Monarchists on right.
D. He is anxious to split Nenni Socialists
away from Communists, get them into a
left-center coalition which would
then have majority sufficient to
push through needed socio-economic
reforms.
E, As titular head of Italian Republic,
however, Gronchi will be removed from
political arena.
II. Gronchi may refuse Scelba's resignation,
in view of:
A. Imminence of Sicily elections (5 June).
These are first important elections
since 153, and relative strengths of
Italy's 8 major parties should be
clarified.
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III. Another factor favoring Scelba's continua-
tion is need for time to iron out problems
of badly split Christian Democratic Party.,
A. New rifts revealed in course of
Gronchi's election, when Party's right
and left wings (natural enemies) ganged
up to defeat the candidates of both
Scelba (center) and Fanfani (moderate
left).
B. Although Party's right and left wings
still clash over question of social
reform, they were united in demand
that new president be a Catholic.
C. Finally, Sclba's continuation would
provide needed time for re-examination
of Christian Democratic relations with
minor parties now in CD coalition who
growing increasingly restive.
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IV. Should Gronchi accept Scelba's resignation,
probablities are against Italy's new govern-
ment (which will still be CD-dominated)
repeating present CD centrist immobility.
Policies could shift to right, but more
likely to go to left in view of:
A. Strength of left both in CD Party and
in country;
B. Common fear that Scelba government's
failure to carry out reform program
is giving strength to Communists.
C. Whether to left or right of center,
new government's international orienta-
tion would remain same.
V. Whoever is next premier, he will be
Christian Democrat. Possible candidates
currently mentioned by Italian press:
A. Giuseppe Pella, former premier, right-
wing CD economist who temporized with
Communists while in office.
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A ~
B. Adone Zoli, CD Party president, con-
sidered "non-controversial."
C. Budget Minister Ezio Vanoni, whose
name given to large-scale 10-year
Italian economic plan currently under
consideration by OEEC. Vanoni has
previously been mentioned as possible
head of transition government between
Scelba and CD Party Secretary Fanfani,
currently in bad odor.
D. Fanfani, himself, without benefit of
.
deoerizer.
E. Any but Pella might win Nenni support--
or at least settle question of his
sincerity--by pushing through long-
delayed reform legislation.
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NSC BRIEFING 4 May 1955
BACKGROUND--VOTING FOR ITALIAN PRESIDENT
I. Constitution provides election of new president every
seven years,
A. President is elected by both houses of parliament,
(total: 833) plus representatives from each of
Italy's 19 "Regions", specially elected. by each
regional council in proportion to local party
strength.
B. Because only four "regions" have been established
since constitution drawn up in 1948, only ten re-
gional "electors" voted on this occasion: three
each from Sicily, Sardinia, and South Tyrol; plus
a single "-elector" from Aosta Valley, which rates
only one.
C. Vote is by secret ballot: two-thirds majority
(562 of total possible 843) is required to win
on first three ballots, after that, an absolute
majority (422) sufficient.
II. Candidates for presidency in 1955 election were:
A. Luigi Einaud.i, Italy's President from 1948 to 1955.
He was originally supported by Premier Scelba's
center faction of CD's, plus minor democratic
parties.
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1. Supporters believed a non-CD President could
better represent the coalition government.
Cesare Merzagora, an independent who was elected
deputy in 1953 on CD ticket. He was the official
CD candidate, but was opposed by minor parties and.
CD center as being a crypto-CD,
1. Apparently also opposed by right and left CD's
as not being CD enough.
C. Giovanni Gronchi, a Christian Democrat and. presi-
dent of chamber of deputies. He was the candi-
date of extreme ''left" faction of CD's.
D. Ferruccio Parri, a former Action Party Premier
(1945), now considered non-party man, He re-
moved his support from De Gasperi's center coali-
tion government at time of '53 elections, in pro-
test against CD-sponsored "bonus" electoral law
(general unpopularity of which was factor in govern-
ment's electoral defeat).
1. He was the announced presidential candidate of
both Nenni Socialists and Communists, but only
as a first ballot demonstration.
III. There were four ballots.
A. On first ballot:
Parri got 308 (apparently Communists, and. Nenni
Socialists and some Republicans).
Merzagora--228 (apparently some CD's).
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Einaud,i--120 (apparently some CD's, plus minor
democratic parties).
Gronchi--30 (apparently far "left" wing of CD's).
Blank ballots--89 (apparently Monarchists and
neo-Fascists).
Remainder (68) scattered, void. or absent.
B. On second. ballot, Parri withdrew. Vote:
Merzagora--225
Einaudi--80
Gronchi--127 (gains apparently from right CD's).
Blank ballots--332 (mostly Communists and Nenni
Socialists)
C. on third. ballot:
Merzagora got 245 (reportedly some Monarchists).
E inaud.i--61
Gronchi--281 (Nenni Socialist and some more CD's
threw him their support).
Blank ballots--195 (apparently Communists).
D. On fourth ballot, Merzagora said. he would withdraw.
Gronchi was elected by 658 (reportedly some Monarchists
--including Covelli (leader of National Monarchist
Party)--some Social Democrats and most CD's, plus Nenni
Socialists and Communists. Communist last-minute switch
is said to have been attempt to avoid isolation.
1. Einaudi got 70 (reportedly Liberals and some Social
Democrats), and 92 blank ballots were cast (report-
edly some Monarchists, and Fanfani group in CD).
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IV. Duties and powers of Italian President:
A. Head of state; commands armed forces; declares war,
on decision of parliament.
B. May dissolve one or both chambers, except during
last six months of term.
C. Nominates Premier (although Premier's actual in-
vestment depends on formal parliamentary approval).
D. Can veto laws on own initiative.
E. No other acts of the President are valid unless
countersigned by the Ministers proposing them,
who thereby assume responsibility for them.
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NSC BRIEFING
0_1 "POW"b
4 May 1955
I. Constitution provides new president every
7 years.
A. Elected by both houses of parliament
(total: 833), plus representatives
from each of Italy's 19 "regions."
B. Only four "regions" actually estab-
lished to date: thus, only ten re-
tional "electors" voted on this'
occasion (three each from Sicily,
Sardinia, South Tyrol, one from
Aosta Valley).
C. Ballot is secret: two-thirds majority
(562 of total possible 843 this time)
required to win on first three ballots.
After that, absolute majority (422)
sufficient.
II. Candidates this time were:
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A. Luigi Einaudi, incumbent. Support--
Premier Scelba's center CD's, minor
democratic parties.
B. Cesare Merzagora, Independent (became
deputy in 1953 on CD ticket). The
official CD candidate, he was opposed
by minor parties and CD center as
being a crypto-CD, by right and left
CD's as not being CD enough.
C. Giovanni Gronchi, CD president of
chamber deputies. Candidate of CD
extreme "left" faction.
D. Ferruccio Parri, former Action Party
Premier (1945), now considered non-
party man. Candidate of both Nenni
Socialists and Communists, but only
as a first ballot demonstration.
III. There were four ballots.
A. On first ballot:
Parri got 308 (apparently from Com-
munists, Nenni Socialists, some
Republicans).
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Merzagora--228 (apparently some
CD's).
Einaudi--120 (apparently some CD's,
plus minor democratic parties).
Gronchi--30 (apparently far "left"
wing of CD's).
Blank ballots--89 (apparently
Monarchists and neo-Fascists).
Remainder (68) scattered, void or
absent.
B. On second ballot, Parri withdrew. Vote:
Merzagora--225
Einaudi--80
Gronchi--127 (gains apparently
from right CD's).
Blank ballots--332 (mostly Commu-
nists and Nenni Socialists).
C. On third ballot:
Merzagora got 245 (reportedly some
Monarchists).
Einaudi--61
-3-
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__ SO "Waff6wd"
Gronchi--281 (Nenni Socialist
and some more CD's threw him
.their support).
Blank ballots--195 (apparently
Communists).
D. On fourth ballot, Merzagora said he
would withdraw: Gronchi elected
by 658.
E. Landslide reportedly included some
Monarchists--among them, Covelli
(leader of National Monarchist Party)--
some Social Democrats, most CD's,
plus Nenni Socialists and Communists.
F. Communist last-minute switch is said
to have been attempt to avoid isolation.
G. On this ballot, Einaudi got 70
(reportedly Liberals and some Social
Democrats).
92 blank ballots were cast (re-
portedly some Monarchists, and
Fanfani group in CD).
-4-
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5. May 1955
SOVIET-IRANIAN SETTLEMENT
I. USSR has finally okayed long-negotiated
financial and border agreements with Iran.
A. Presidium of Supreme Soviet approved
agreements on 25 April (Iranian
parliament had approved in February):
formal ratification expected shortly.
B. Border deal will demarcate 11 areas,
one of them (in Azerbaijan) under
dispute since 1829.
C. Most territorial rectifications are
tiny, but USSR is net loser by few
dozen square kilometers.
D. Financial deal provides for payment
$21 million USSR owes for services
rendered71ran during World War II.
E. Agreement requires that 12 million of
this be paid in gold bullion, but--
contrary common belief--gold is NOT
something Soviets swiped during war.
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II. Soviet "magnanimity" provides "peaceful
coexistence" campaign with demonstration
of settlement is terms not-exclusively
favorable to USSR.
A. Iran, pro-West but formally uncommitted,
is only major gap in "northern tier"
defense line (from Turkey to Pakistan).
B. Although Soviet settlement will not
affect Iranian Government's pro-Western
attitude, Iran will probably drag feet
on adherence to "northern tier" during
the months it will take to carry out
agreement.
C. Thus, in effect, USSR has bought 18
months of Iranian "neutrality" at modest
cost.
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NSC BRIEFING 4 May 1955
BACKGROUND--DETAILS OF AGREEMENT
I. USSR will pay Iran some $12 million in gold,
$8.6 million in commodities:
A. Payment, due Iran under terms of 1943
financial agreement with USSR, is in
compensation for currency furnished to
Soviet forces stationed in Iran during
World War II.
B. Repayment was to be made 60% in bullion
and 40% in US dollars.
C. Settlement switched dollar payment to
payment in kind.
D. Gold is due within two weeks of effective
date of agreement; commodities will be
forthcoming within one year.
II. The entire Iranian-Soviet border is to be
re-defined:
A. Most of border will remain substantially
as at present: significant adjustments
were made in eleven places (map), most
of them--and net result--in Iran's favor.
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B. Re-demarcation of border is to be
completed by joint commission within 18
months of agreement's effective date.
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