SINO-BURMESE RELATIONS AT NEW HEIGHT OF CORDIALITY
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80R01443R000300190011-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 12, 2000
Sequence Number:
11
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 4, 1954
Content Type:
BRIEF
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
,0V/X// 2001009a"NOWNW144
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL
NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.
2001/09/01 :CIA-RDP801
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NSC BRIEFING 4 January 1954
I. Peiping apparently successful in coloring views of Burmese
Premier Nu.
A. Before his trip to China, Nu had often indicated
concern over Chinese Communist intentions towards
Burma.
B. Upon return to Rangoon, he publicly extolled
the Communist government and interpreted its
assurances of noninterference in Burmese affairs
as a triumph of Burma's neutral foreign policy.
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D. Nu's reaction contrasts with that of Nehru who
returned from a similar trip convinced that
China's rulers were both doctrinaire and ruthless.
II. Peiping's prestige and influence in Burma is rising rapidly.
A. Chou's "five principles" which are merely the
"coexistence" idea split five ways are becoming
household terms.
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B. Burma's acceptance of Chinese and Orbit area
goods in payment for rice and willingness to
inaugurate air service as well as restore
highway traffic gives the Communists a
highly exploitable economic toehold.
C. Burmese agreement to the establishment of a
Chinese Communist consulate general at Lashio-
southern terminous of the Burma Road--will give
latter a legal outpost in area where they have
been actively subverting ethnic minority groups.
D. Nu's public promise that Burma will do nothing
to offend Peiping will make it difficult for
the West to help Burma improve its defensive
capabilities.
III. Burmese somewhat taken in but expediency dictated their
position.
A. Chinese Communists were evasive on all sensitive
political matters brought up by the Burmese.
1. Professed complete ignorance of
Burmese Communist leaders.
2. Observed that Chinese maps--which
show large chunks of Burma as part
of China--were not official but they
cannot so state publicly since such
a statement might be interpreted as
their acceptance of Burmese maps.
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3. Stalled on question of future status
of Overseas Chinese.
B. The Burmese continue to indicate interest in
receiving economic aid from the US.
C. U Nu extremely interested in visiting US,
although, on advice of the Burmese ambassa-
dor here, he has decided not to seek an early
invitation.
IV. Underlying factor governing Burma's relations with Peiping
is fear.
A. Cabinet officer recently stated that since
Geneva Burma had lost hope of Western support
for a strong stand against Peiping and there-
fore had to "play safe."
V. In any event, Communist China gained an effective champion
for its participation in the forthcoming Afro-Asian confer-
ence in Indonesia.
A. Chou told Nu of China's desire to attend.
B. Immediately afterwards, Nehru--undoubtedly
informed--changed his attitude of indifference
to one of warm support for such a conference.
C. At recent Colombo power conference last week,
Nu was most outspoken advocate of invitation
to Peiping--even to point of refusing to
attend if it were not extended.
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VI. Seems apparent that India, Burma, and Indonesia, in addition
to their announced aims, see conference as a dramatic device
to get Peiping into wider international setting.
A. Peiping has hailed Bogor decisions as "major
step to strengthen peace."
B. As yet, anti-Communist invitees have for most
part taken noncommittal attitude re attendance.
VII. After slow start, idea of Afro-Asian get together finally
got a full blow up.
A. Indonesians thought up the idea nearly a year
ago as something "new" to bolster their prestige.
B. Colombo powers cool to idea at meeting last
April, but accepted concept and left follow-up
to Indonesia.
C. Feelers by Indonesia brought generally indif-
ferent reactions from Arab and African states.
VIII. But at Colombo powers' meeting last week, with knowledge
Chinese Communists wanted invitation, things proceeded
with dispatch; conference set for last week in April
at Bandung.
A. Stated purposes:
1. To demonstrate desire African and
Asia nations to work for common
aims and increase mutual understanding.
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2. To discuss social, economic, and cultural
problems and such problems of special interest
as racial and colonial issues.
3. To discuss ways Afro-Asian nations can contribute
to maintenance of world peace.
B. Conference would include--
1. From Africa: Central African Federation,
Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, Libya, Liberia,
Sudan
2. From Middle East-South Asia: Afghanistan,
Ceylon, India, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon,
Nepal, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey,
Yemen
3. From Far East: Burma, Cambodia, Communist
China, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Philippines,
Thailand, North Vietnam, South Vietnam.
C. Some talk before conference of inviting Australia
and New Zealand but no action taken.
D. Japan, not yet technically at peace with certain
invitees including Indonesia, invited to counter
reaction to invitation of Peiping.
E. After meeting, Colombo delegates explained:
1. USSR left out because politically it is a
part of Europe.
2. South Africa out because of racial views.
3. Nigeria considered but no one at conference
knew its status.
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4. Israel qualified for invitation but excluded
because of Arab attitude.
5. Korea in "fluid state": (Nehru noted that
Indochina was also but Colombo powers have
'Special responsibility" there)
6. No one at conference raised question of inviting
Formosa.
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