SUMMARY OF SNIE 100-6-54, 28, NOV'54, 'WORLD REACTIONS TO CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNIST CHINA'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000300160010-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: November 30, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

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11S0 BRIEFING 30 November 1.954
SUMMARY OF SNIE 100-6-54, 28 Nov 154, "WORLD
REACTIONS TO CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO C024MUNIST CHINA"
I. Problem: To estimate Communist and non-Communist
reactions to US blockade of Communist China in
retaliation for sentencing of US Nationals.
II, Effect of Blockade on Communist China
A. Blockade would cut off all seaborne trade and
regime would be seriously concerned over
economic effects.
B. However, sum of adverse economic effects small
in relation to gross national product.
C. Adverse effects overcome gradually by expansion
of own production and assistance from the Bloc.
D. If either Port Arthur-Darien or Hong Kong
excluded economic effects would be reduced.
III. Communist Reactions
A. Pei'ping would feel that prestige challenged
and blockade would not induce Pei'ping affect
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B. If blockade extend inshore Peiping would
attempt reduce its effectiveness by hit and
run raids.
C. Peiping and Moscow would attempt use issue
of blockade. to isolate US.
D. Pei'ping might expect that US would eventually
agree to a compromise solution which did not
involve loss of face for Pei'ping.
E. USSR would counsel caution and attempt localize
incidents.
1. Would raise issue in UN
2. Might attempt to breach the blockade
3. Would be unlikely to initiate general war
solely because of incidents, but would not
be deferred from counteraction by risk of
general war.
IV. Non-Communist Reactions
1. South Korea, Nationalist China, probably
Manila Pact countries of Southeast Asia would
approve US action.
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2. India would almost certainly strongly oppose
and attempt promote solution favoring Peitping.
3. Certain non-Communist countries would critically
reappraise confidence in US leadership. Would
almost certainly be sharp rise in neutralist
sentiment among states now allied with US.
L,. UK would probably acquiesce in blockade, but
would attempt convince US it was destroying
free-world. unity and bringing on general war.
. If blockade included Hong Kong would be
severe strain on US-UK relations.
Would be strong adverse popular reactions in
Japan; Government would probably seek avoid
use of Japan as base for blockading forces,
7. If not large-scale warfare developed, free-
world would probably in varying degrees adapt
themselves to US action while continuing to
attempt mediation.
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