AFGHANISTAN - PAKISTAN MERGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000300080015-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: October 14, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

Will 1ULn I INL
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000300080015-6
NSC BRIEFING 14 October 1954
AFGHANISTAN -PAKISTAN MERGER
l
Afghanistan Foreign Minister requests
U. S. aid to bring about Afghanistan-Pakistan
merger. He claims this is only way to keep
Afghanistan out of increasing Soviet economic
envelopment and matter of life and death for
his country. However, Pakistan Prime
Minister, Mohammed Ali, who has already been
approached, reportedly suspicious of this plan.
Approved''. For Release 2000/08/ 1PR41 43R000300080015-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : C
PROSPECTS FOR AFGHAN-PAKISTAN CONFEDERA-
TION FROM NIE-AFGHANISTAN
ACTUALLY SOME TALK IN AFGHAN AND PAK-
ISTANI OFFICIAL CIRCLES OF SOME FORM
OF CONFEDERATION
(THIS PLAN URGED ON PAKISTAN BY AGHA
IiAN)
I- OWEVER, RESPONSIBLE KARACHI AND KABUL
AUTHORITIES UNLIKELY TO AGREE ON MERGER
BECAUSE OF BASIC INTERNAL COMPLICATIONS
AND SOVIET AND INDIAN OPPOSITION
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000300080015-6
 Approved For 00/08/30 01443R000300080015-6
NIE - AFGHANISTAN
Principal Conclusions
1. AFGHAN ROYAL FAMILY CAN PROBABLY MEET ANY
CHALLENGE TO ITS AUTHORITY IN FORESEEABLE
FUTURE.
2. AFGHAN SHORTAGE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE MAY
BECOME CRITICAL IN NEXT THPM YEARS. IF
FOREIGN EXCHANGE DIFFICULTIES SURMOUNTED,
AFGHAN WOULD HAVE REASONABLY GOOD PROSPECTS
FOR MODEST DEVELOPMENT.
IS
3. AFGHANISTAN/STGNIFICANTT,Y STRATEGIC
BUFFER STATE, SEPARATING USSR FROM NON-
COMMUNIST WORLD BUT DOMINATED BY NEITHER.
4. HOWEVER, AFGHANISTAN IS HIGHLY VULNERABLE
TO SOVIET PRESSURES.
Approved For Release 2000/O8/3 -ORO1443R000300080015-6
 Approved For I%gg.,2Q00/08/30 : CIA- ' R000300080015-6
6.
SOV ATTENTIONS TO AFGHAN PARTICULARLY
ECONOMIC INCREASED IN LAST YEAR. THIS
PART OF GENERAL EFFORT TO COUNTER WESTERN
GAINS ELSEWHERE IN AREA. SOV ATTENTIONS
LIKELY TO INCREASE, ESPECIALLY IF AFGHAN
PARTICIPATES IN WESTERN DEFENSE ARRANGEMENT
OR ACCEPTS SUB STANTIAL WESTERN MILITARY
AID.
GROWTH OF SOV INFLUENCE WOULD REDUCE AFGHAN
FREEDOM OF ACTION, BUT USSR WILL PROS NOT
GAIN CONTROL OF COUNTRY WITHIN NEXT FEW
YEARS. SMALL AFGHAN PRO-COW ELEMENT TOO
WEAR. TO OVERTHROW REGIME. USSR COULD
TAKE OVER AFGHAN, BUT OVERT AGGRESSION
WOULD ENTAIL ANJI-SOV REACTIONS ELSEWHERE
IN AREA WHICH USSR WOULD AVOID.
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000300080015-6
 .-rn?r..rlu ...
Approved For Release 2000/08/3
Afghaf--3
7.
AFGHAN WILL SEEK WESTERN ECONOMIC AID TO
COUNTERBALANCE THAT RECEIVED PROM USSR.
HOWEVER, UNLIKELY THAT AFGHANS WOULD JOIN
WESTERN DEFENSE ARRANGEMENT.
8. AFGHAN WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO ACCEPT
SOV AID AND MAY MISJUDGE ITS ABILITY
TO CURB ACCOMPANYING SOV SUBVERSIVE
ACTIVITY. MAY ALSO OVERESTIMATE WESTERN
ABILITY AND WILL TO ASSIST THEM IN EVENT
OF MILITARY OR DIP CRISIS.
9. It 'ROVE 14T IN PAK AFGHAN RELATIONS,
DOMINATED BY AFGHAN--INSTIGATED PUSH-*
TUNISTAN CONTRO]SY, UNLIKELY.
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 :