UNREST IN FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200380009-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 1998
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: July 28, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING 28 July 1954
UNREST IN FRENCH NORTH AFRICA
Ferment continues in two French protectorates in North. Africa,
Morocco and Tunisia. While Marocca was until this spring
the scene of greater violence, present situation there under
new Resident General Francis Lacoste has become one of mar.~euver
and negotiation by moderately nationalistic leaders. In con-
tract, problems faced by French in Tunisia are worsened by
upsurge of terrorism fallowing mass resignation of Tunisian
eabinet>
II. Recent pattern of "terrorism" in Morocco has included success-
ful economic boycotts and destruction of crops. New element
this week in open letter to Resident General from some hundred
Moroccan notables:
A. Urging reinstitution of elementary civil liberties and
frank discussionof current problems.
B. This letter, together with similar communication from 75
French residents of Morocco, could provide basis for
selection of "moderate" negotiators to assist in formulation
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C. In any event French troop strength of l~'S,000 should be
sufficient to maintain status quo.
D. French government withholding action on Morocco until
Tunisian problem is settled.
III. Despite strict French. security measures and military rein-
forcements, terrorism continues in Tunisia.
A. After Tunisian cabinet resigned en masse 5 July, Bey
appointed interim body headed by Frenchman, thereby
triggering flareup of violence.
B. .Latest assassination victim (95th fatality since mid-March)
was French commandant of Bey's guard (shot in back 24 July).
IV. Terrorism Tunisia stems from three sources:
A. Fellaghra(traditional bandits, variously estimated at
1,000 to 10,000. outlaws, inhabiting desolate interior
hill region; exist by raids upon population. Ranks now
allegedly swelled by nationalists and military deserters,
Big upsurge May 1954 when groups moved northward.
1. Fairly well equipped, probably from abroad--possibly by
nationalists or sympathizers in Libya.
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2. Effectiveness as quasi-nationalist force limited by
unreliability, lack central direction.
~. Latest intelligence indicates retreat back into hills,
under heavy gavernmer~t pressure.
B, Sporadic killing, such as that of commandant, and sabotage,
1, Apparently motivated more by anti-french feeling than
by pro-nationalist< or Communist sympathies.
2. Difficult to control by milita~-y means~alane.
C. Counter-terrorism by French settlers,
1. Example: such retaliation as filling by settlers of
five natives at Djemmal and El Rattan 11 July.
2. Connivance of law enforcement officers makes control
difficult.
V. Prospects in Tunisia:
A. In short term, present French control measures should
reduce frequency of sporadic attacks.
1. Include imposition strict curfews, body search, military
trials for illegal possession of arms, etc.
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2. Arrival hoops from French West Africa, Algeria,
bloroceo, France, in past month has raised forces in
Tunisia from estimated 16,400 to 26,000.
B. In long term, however, restoration order dependent upon
definition French policy by Faris.
No specific policy yet; government action expected 31
July, to be based following points:
a. French ministry considers Tunisians able to
administer internal affairs.
b. France to retain control over foreign affairs,
defense, finance.
c. Rights and status of French in Tunisia have to
be assured.
C. Although nationalist opinion has hardened since 1952,
leaders would consider this an appropriate settlement.
1. Demand real gains, genuine self-government.
2. However, lack disciplined following of 1952; may not
be able to control all anti-French factions.
D. Settler opposition also hardened;- would oppose all concessions
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to nationalists.
1. S~~'ong pressures on French government and National
Assembly to be expected.
2, Settlers likely to resort to direct action against
leading nationalists. ?
3. Emergency of small organized moderate settler group,
however, one new and hopeful factor.
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