INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200370010-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 1998
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: July 21, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 200
NSC BRIEFING 21 July 1954
I. With armistice achieved, main French effort apparently to
maintain "presence" in south, to detriment of possibly
more effective and popular type Vietnamese government,
able rally nationwide support.
A. Strong indications French hope establish "new"
Vietnamese government in south, dominated by
unpopular pro-French Cochinchinese.
1. Baudet, high official of French
Foreign Office, recently advocated
25X1X64
such a plan
25X1X6
2. Some French officials in Indochina
even promoting "Cochinchina Repub-
lic," discredited concept which
still believed to have backing of
powerful commercial interests in
south.
3. French Deputy Commander Salan
reported plotting with Cochin-
china leader Tam--former premier--
and Tam's ambitious son, Chief of
Staff Hinh, to unseat Bao Dai, set
up new regime under Hinh.
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4. Tam, Hinh, and other French favorites,
notably Tran Van Huu and General Nguyen
Van Xuan, are all French citizens by
naturalization.
B. French are cool toward Diem government and fear
Diem's public outcries against abandonment of
Tonkin may unsettle truce.
1. At Diem's direction, Vietnam delegation
at Geneva has formally protested truce
25X1X6
2. General Ely told
25X1X6 - that he would take strong action
against any Vietnam-incited disorders,
even to extent of arresting Diem if
necessary.
3. Diem has already organized anti-
partition demonstrations in Hanoi
and Saigon. Demonstrations were
orderly.
4. High Vietnamese official at Geneva has
warned that any French repression of
"genuine nationalists" would force
nationalists into coalition with
Communists against France, as primary
obstacle to independence.
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TOP SECRET
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II. Even under optimum conditions, Vietnam government will
be hard put to pose serious challenge to Viet Minh in
scheduled 1956 elections.
A. Present Diem regime, long on zeal, is short
on administrative ability.
B. Tremendous problem of rooting out corruption
aggravated by Bao Dai's continued profitable
association with corrupt police force.
C. Assets in political warfare against Viet
Minh, most notably issue of Chinese
Communist domination latter, more than
offset by Vietnamese fear French intend
to remain on top in what's left of Vietnam.
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TOP SECRET
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I
These figures represent estimates based on French
sties of 1951
Hanoi
Haion
Sailion
Metropolitan French
4,000
000
18,000
Asian !'ranch
75
25
1.000
4.075
3,025
19,000
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