SOVIET BLOC NEED FOR COPPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200370006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 21, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Relea a 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP80R01443F 000200370006-5
25X1
NSC BRIEFING 21 July 1954
SOVIET BLOC NEED FOR COPPER
I. Copper's importance to Soviet Bloc is such that no other metal
has been so actively and so persistently sought by clandestine
trade.
A. Shipment of copper to Bloc embargoed by COCOM countries
since fall 1951.
B. Intensity of Bloc efforts circumvent controls reached peak
in 1951-52, when world demand at highest (following Korean
outbreak).
25X1
25X1
procurement efforts are still at.a high level:
evidence shows increasing interest in copper wire and
electrolytic copper in all forms.
25X1
NSA review completed
Approved For Release - 00200370006-5
25X1
 Approved For Relea
II. Copper is essential in industrialized economy: vital to
production of military equipment and materiel, industrial
machinery and equipment needed for modern war economy.
(Used in ammunition, vehicles, artillery, aircraft, naval
vessels, communications and fire-control equipment, etc.)
A. Bloc countries in 1953 produced estimated 13% of world
copper ore. However, Bloc consumes 18% of world copper.
Gap can be met only by imports from free world.
B. Example, estimated Bloc copper requirement 1953 was
670,000 m.t.
1. Bloc production - 422,000
2. Imports - 100,000
3. Total 522,000
25X1
25X1
4. Thus, unsatisfied requirement of 148,000 m.t.,
despite imports.
C. Bloc utilized 1953 total of 522,000 m.t. as follows:
1. Munitions, military equipment - 20%
2. Direct support of military - 17%
3. Stockpile - 10%
4. This roughly half available copper, say 250,000 m.t.
III. Bloc copper production now hampered by general need for advanced
technology, and by lack of extensive natural resources in
certain areas.
25X1
Approved For Release 4003/08/26 : CIA-RDP80RO1443ROgO200370006-5
 Approved For ReleaO
A. In USSR, limit on expansion largely due approaching
exhaustion of relatively rich Ural ores, slow develop-
ment of new production from extensive deposits in
Kazakhstan and Central Asia.
ores present metallurgical problems..
3R000200370006-5 25X1
lExploitation Central Asia areas complicated by
25X1
water shortage, harsh weather.
B. However, gap between Bloc need and production is
estimated to be narrowing. Example (thousands metric tons):
1953 1954 1955
(Require) 670 700 780
(Produce) 422 480 600
Deficit: 248 220 180
IV. Most of free world has cooperated in controlling Bloc purchases
of copper. However, problem is complicated by complexity of
multiple trade transactions and lack of controls in "free ports"
of world.
25X1
Approved For Release
 25X1
Approved For Release
25X1
25X1
C. Same US analysis indicates Bloc efforts procure additional
J.92,000 tons, with success possible for half this amount.
Deals for other half stopped or disrupted by COCOM
administrative action.
D. Control problem during this period was aggravated by
slump the free world demand for copper since early 1953,
resulting in accumulation large unsold stocks.
Situation especially bad in Chile,
total 175,000 tons unsold.
where by March 1954
2. US then purchased 100,000 tons from Chile, leaving
75,000 on market.
E. At present, there are no sizeable stockpiles of copper
available for sale on the word market (Chile even has some
unfilled orders). This should eliminate some of the pressure
for sales to Soviet Bloc.
Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200370006-5