INDICATIONS OF AN IMMINENT ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200360015-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 1998
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: July 13, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING NOTES 13 July 1954
WESTERN DIVISION
Indications of an imminent attempt to overthrow the Costa
scan government
(see Appendix for background)
I. The Venezuelan government appears most determined of the
REGiq(c-s
several rightist^in the Caribbean area seeking to cause
the overthrow of the Figueres administration in Costa
Rica by supporting a movement ostensibly composed of
Costa Ricans.
A. As early as mid-May plans were being discussed in
Caracas for the overthrow of the Guatemalan and
Costa Rican governments.
1. Venezuelan president Perez and, security chief
Estrada reportedly discussed the plans with
emissaries from Nicaragua, Panama, the Dominican
Re ublic Cuba a A H rill
n
o
r
P
,
n
as.
2. In early June Estr..a :'.visited. Panama and
Nicaragua reportedly reviewing the plans.
3. On 22 June a poorly-disguised Venezuelan
plane dropped anti-government leaflets over
the Costa Rican capital.
B. Venezuela first opposed an OAS meeting on Guatemala-.
because of fear that such a meeting might jeopardize
these plans.
1. When the OAS meeting on Guatemala was finally
postponed on 2 July, however, the Venezuelans
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were very angry because this denied them the
opportunity to air the "Communist problem"
in Costa Rica before the assembled foreigg'
ministers.
C. Venezuela apparently continues determined to oust
Figueres
1. The Venezuelan president, who dislikes the US,
is extremely angry at what he feels is US
support for Costa Rica.
2. On 9 July security chief Estrada said he hoped
an attack would take place. He said he would not
inform the US if he learned any details.
II. Panama seems involved with Venezuela in the plot.
A. President Remon thoroughly dislikes and distrusts
Figueres.
B. Very close military relations between Panama and
Venezuela have developed this yearn
1. Remon is obligated to Venezuela for a large
shipment of arms and a military mission. No
Panamanian compensation has been reported.
2. Venezuelan arms have reportedly been taken to
David. near the Costa Rican border and. ]Venezuelan
military have been active in the area.
III, Nicaraguan threat to Costa Ricaxf now seems less imminent
but potentially still exists
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A. The US embassy in Nicaragua on 10 July discounted.
reports that an armed, group was preparing to invade
Costa Rica from Nicaragua.
B. Nevertheless, Nicaraguan president Smmoza bitterly
25X1 X6
hates Figueres- he
would personally kill Figueres if he could.
C. Relations between Costa Rica and. Nicaragua have
appeared close to the breaking point since April
when an attempt was made to assassinate Somoza
by persons coming from Costa Rica.
IV. Guatemalan junta president Castello Armas, according to
persistent reports reaching Costa Rica is committed to
assist in an anti-Figueres move in return for aid received
from Venezuela and Nicaragua in his own rebellion.
Arms and planes used. then would be diverted against
Costa Rica.
A. An unknown number of Costa Rican exiles joined.
Castillo Armas' rebellion and. are now reportedly
organizing against Figueres.
B. Though Castillo has denied. any intention of aiding
in an attack on Costa Mica, he strongly implied at
a press conference on 1 July that such a move would
be justified.
V. Costa Rican people would strongly defend their government
against any attack now likely, but the government lacks
the means for defens
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A. The 1400-man Civil Guard, Costa :Rica's only armed
force, is organized only as police force and cannot
even patrol the country's borders.
1. It kias only small arms and a few anti-aircraft
guns.
2. Has no planes.
B. In response to urgent Costa Rican appeals, the
United States permitted the purchase of a few
small arms in the US.
1. The shipment is to arrive on.l4 July.
VI. Hemisphere reactions to overthrow of 15igueres regime would
be strongly adverse to US interests.
A. Costa Rica widely regarded as a liberal democratic
country.
B. Since even friendly Latin Americans are convinced
Washington backed Guatemalan revolution US would be
held responsible for - ~ ' overthrow.
ET
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 '"Approved For Release IVAPWP%nFSECRFTIA-RDP801pq4iMMtUM0036M&O Costa Rica
astern Division-13 July 54-
Appendix: BACKGROUND IN CENTRAL AMERICAN POLITICS
I. The Venezuelan, Nicaraguan and other Carribean
dictatorships have long considered the Figueres govern-
ment in Costa Rica a threat because of the revolutionary
activities of political refugees who receive asylum there.
II. Costa Ricans available for a foreign-supportedmove
to overthrow Figueres would be adherents of ex-dictator
Rafael Angel Calderon Guardia.
A. Calderon (president 1940-44) cont4olled the
Communist-supported Picado administration (1944-48)
which was overthrown by Figueres in 1948.
B. Communists became very powerful under Calderon
and Picado and their "shock troops" fought the
Figueres forces in the 1948 civil war.
C. Calderon had the open backing of Somoza in
an abortive attempt to regain control in Costa
GArc~
Rica in 1948 and has since been on friendly terms
with the Venezuelan government.
D. In 1948 and 1949 Figueres backed the "Carib-
bean Legion" which engaged in several plots agtnst
the Nicaraguan and Dominican dictatorships.
E. After relinquishing the presidency to Otilio
Ulate, in 1949, Figueres was elected presidentin
1953 over Cald.eronista and Communist opposition
by an overwhelming popular vote.
F. Figueres gave moral andprobably material aid to
the Nicaraguan exiles who tried to assassinate
Somoza in April 1954 and is on ii
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Venezuelan ex-President Betancourt #ho hopes to oust
the present Venezuelan dictatorship.
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