MOLOTOV'S 8 JUNE SPEECH AT GENEVA (BASED ON PRELIMINARY PRESS REPORTS)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200330012-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 1998
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: June 9, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING 9 June 1954
MOLOTOV'S 8 JUNE SPEECH AT GENEVA
(Based on Preliminary Press Reports)
I. Reiteration of the line taken by Communists in restricted ses-
sions on Indochina in past three weeks.
Again demonstrates Communists see no need for an early
cease-fire on terms other than their maximum demands,
B, Indicates that they are more certain than ever that con-
tinuing military successes in Indochina and political
situation in France will force French to move closer to
Communist position.
II, Molotov's proposal again maintains military and political settle-
ments are inseparable and both must include Laos and Cambodia.
A, Communists have all along insisted "at least some" poli-
tical problems must be connected with truce.
B. Only new proposal is for Indochina participants to dis-
cuss political and military problems on alternate days
and for representatives of the two commands to discuss
political questions just as they have been discussing mili-
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C. In restating Viet Minh proposal of 10 May, Molotov speci-
fically suggested that talks consider the "true indepen-
dence" of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, "free" elections
in those states, and withdrawal of foreign troops.
III. Acceptance of Molotov's terms would mean:
A. Withdrawal of all French troops from Indochina
A built-in veto power in election committees as well as
in armistice supervisory machinery assuring the communists
that their aims would be upheld.
C, A communist-dominated government in Vietnam, and communist
participation in governments of Laos and Cambodia.
D. Establishment of a precedent which could be followed
by Communist sponsorship of "governments" for Burma,
Thailand and other states in South East Asia,
IV, Effect on French government (always unpredictable)
Nruauut c;ommunist price
for peace would ultimately result in loss of Vietnam and
probably Laos and Cambodia as well, Opeech may convince
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the majority of the Assembly that Bidault has done his
part at Geneva and thus help keep Laniel government in
power temporarily. It will also probably have effect of
increased pressure on French government for appeal to UN
and greater military assistance from US and Britain,
B, Long run--Polarization of positions and resultant pessimism
in France regarding cease-fire may have damaging effect,
F
particularly i accompanied by more communist military gains,
It may eventually lead to formation of a new government and
French capitulation in Indochina,
V. Molotov added warning that US expansion of Indochina war might
have "dangerous consequences,"
A. This is toughest Communist statement on this issue in past
four weeks.
B, Chinese Communist spokesmen issued warnings similar to
Molotov's on 21 and 28 April and again on 12 May,
C. Communist statements are still much less menacing, however,
than Peiping's propaganda just before Chinese intervention
in Korea.
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D, The Communists do not seem to believe that international-
ization of the war is imminent,.
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