FRENCH MOROCCO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200310010-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 1998
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: June 2, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

NSC BRIEFING IWLT
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2 June 1954
FRENCH MOROCCO
I. Current Situation
A. Extensive anti-French terrorist activity, which began
with the deposition of pro-nationalist Sultan Sidi
Mohamed-ben Youssef in August 1953, shows signs renewed
intensity despite extremely vigorous French counter action.
B. In exiling, and imprisoning moderate leadership of dominant
Moroccan nationalist party, Istigial (Independence),
French handed nationalist movement over to party extremists.
C. Terrorist activity includes: assassinations, bombings,
arson, train derailments, and communications sabotage--
averages one attack per day past nine months.
D. Recent shift in direction of terrorist attacks:
1. Has been directed against pro-French Moroccans--now
being turned to include the French themselves. Recently
terrorists attempted assassinate General Guillaume.
On 15 May killed a prominent local French official.
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2. Has been primarily centered in urban areas--particularly
Casablanca--is now being turned also into rural
communities.
E. Anti-US sentiment among Moroccan nationalists has increased.
1. Due to US support of France in 1953 UN General. Assembly,
and US support of France during deposition of sultan.
2. Terrorist attacks have not yet been directed against
US air bases, or American nationals, but
3. There is growing nationalist tendency to link US to
French colonial policy.
F. Development of passive resistance movement.
1. Concurrent with continuing terrorist activities.
2. Emerged in early April.
3. Designed as a nationalist show of strength, but has
serious economic overtones.
4. Has taken form of a native economic boycott aimed at
French monopolies.
(a) Nationalists forbidden to smoke French tobacco or
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(b) Expected to soon extend to milk and sugar.
(c) Moroccan farmers have been warned to stop use of
modern machinery or their crops will be burned.
Later intelligence reports indicate crop burning
may be extended to French settlers.
(d) Boycott enjoying considerable success in Casablanca
and Rabat, and appears to be extending to other
cities.
II. Indochina affects North Africa
A. As the position of France in Indochina deteriorates
political situation in French North Africa likely to
worsen.
1. Nationalist parties can be expected to exert every
effort to obtain objectives.
(a) Though nationalists realize they are unable to
throw out the French, they are capable of forcing
France to maintain large detachments of troops in
the area and thus seriously hamper French military
c mmitments elsewhere.
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(b) Nationalists are continuing to seek, and.are
getting, the support of Arab Asian states.
2. On other hand, French, who value North African
territories more than Indochina, will be more determined
than ever to maintain their hold.
(a) While France would like to maintain position with
cooperation of native population, its actions
indicate it will hold by force if necessary.
3. Communists can be expected to take every advantage of
France's weakening position in Indochina.
(a) On 27 May an Orbit transmitter in Budapest was
heard for first time in Arabic broadcasts beamed
primarily to French North African territories.
(b) While nationalist parties have, in hope of US
support, carefully rejected offers by Communist
parties in French North Africa for joint action
against French, extremist situation increases
likelihood of Communist participation.
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III. Prospects
A. French increased concern with situation demonstrated 20
May with removal of General Guillaume as resident general
and appointment of career diplomat, Francis Lacoste.
1. No indication as yet of nature of Lacoste's program.
2. He is believed, however, to personally favor more
moderate policy.
3. A change of resident general's will not in itself,
absence of bold new policy, resolve impasse.
B. Lacoste's task will be difficult.
1. Constant friction and frustration has hardened positions
of both protagonists, French and nationalists.
(a) Mutual distrust.
(b) Real French concessions, even in unlikely possibility,
would probably be viewed with scepticism by
nationalists.
2. The small conservative influential French settler
group in Morocca has not changed its basically anti-
nationalist osition
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3. The nationalists, on other hand, would probably not
settle for anything short of French public promise
of independence with definite timetable and immediate
steps toward autonomy. Even change of sultans alone
would probably not save situation.
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NSC BRIEFING NOTES 2 June 1954
(Biographic Sketch) BACKGROUND
Francis LACOSTE - new Resident General French Morocco
Appointed Resident General of French Morocco, 20 May, able
experienced career diplomat. French Foreign Ministry's delegate to
French Residency in Morocco from 1948 to 1950, under Marshal .ruin.
Handled North African problem in United Nations.
Staunch advocate French presence in North Africa, believed
exponent more moderate policy, and might be able reconcile French
and Moroccan views. Reliably understood to have strongly advised
against deposition of former Sultan last year.
US officials who know Lacoste well generally agreed that ex-
treme cleverness and abbition are dominant characteristics. Pro-
fessional achievements due solely to own merits. Reportedly has
intense will to succeed, is flexible, and willing to conciliate.
49 years old, entered diplomatic service in 1931. Until
a
appointment as resident general was7principal member of French dele-
gation at Geneva conference.
SECRET
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