CRISIS IN EAST PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200310009-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 1998
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: June 2, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

04NMMeIease 2000/08/30: CIA- OR01-4-43HO00200310009-8
2 June 1954
CRISIS IN EAST PAKISTAN
1. Current Situation
A. On 30 May Prime Minister Mohammed Ali announced dismissal
of East Pakistan provincial government (identical with
East Bengal) and institution of "governor's rule" there
under tough, able Iskander Mirza, Pakistan's defense
secretary.
B. "Governor's rule" means that until further notice province
will be administered by Mirza appointed from Karachi,
rather than by locally elected officials. East Pakistan
legislature is theoretically untouched but now without
power.
C. Troops patrolling principal cities of province, and
widespread arrests, begun after jute mill riots at
Narayanganj on 15 May, are continuing. Former East Paki-
stan cabinet head, 82 year old Fazlul Huq, is under house
arrest, and at least four members his cabinet detained.
Approved For Release 2 0200310009-8
 SECRET - US EYES ONLY
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200310009-8
D. Mohammed Ali says he intends to institute propaganda
campaign and economic program to mitigate military rule.
II. Background
A. Mohammed Ali's 30 May announcement cited three factors
leading to governor's rule:
1. Inability Huq government to maintain order, failure
of local police and military to take action during
15 May riots, when several hundred people killed.
2. Evidence deliberate attempt outside forces--presumably
Communist and Indian--to provoke disorder.
3. "Traitorous" attitude of Huq, as illustrated by NY
Times interview saying his objective is independence
for East Pakistan.
B. Mohammed Ali's case is strong, since Communist infiltra-
tion and agitation are certain, though Huq's "treason"
may be senility.
- 2 -
SECRET - US EYES ONLY
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200310009-8
 SECRET - US EYES ONLY
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000200310009-8
C. Karachi took decision reluctantly, apparently fearing
political repercussions in East Pakistan, where Huq's
United Front won overwhelming election victory over
Moslem League last March.
III. Prospects
A. Decision in essence means Karachi will attempt to hold
East Pakistan by force until situation cools. Central
cabinet reported to believe this period may last a year--
probably until nationwide elections, due for 1955.
1. Short term prospects favorable, since army is believed
capable of keeping order.
2. Army strength in East Pakistan by early June estimated
at 13,000.
B. Karachi's ability to hold East Pakistan is enhanced by
removal of present three principal recognized leaders of
United Front;
1. Fazlul Huq - 82 years old, unstable, now under house
arrest. Symbol of East Pakistan's "liberation" from
Karachi last March.
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000200310009-8
 SECRET - US EYES ONLY
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200310009-8
2. H. S. Suhrawardy - "national" leader, reported
seriously ill in Karachi and probably out of politics
for some time.
3. Maulana Bhashani - fellow traveling demagogue, now in
East Berlin after attending Communist Peace Congress
there. CIA reports he will be arrested on return to
Pakistan.
C. Elimination of these figures probably decapitates United
Front leadership - few if any second-liners known to be
available. Danger here is that outright and underground
Communists--of whom 24 are now reported in East Pakistan
legislature--will be residuary legatees of United Front
unless sweep of arrests is thorough.
D. Prospect locally is thus for temporary calm, followed
by gradually increasing agitation in coming months.
Intensity and tempo of this development depends on success
of Karachi's conciliatory program, which seems likely to
be fairly small.
Approved For Release 2000-GtR, 80R01443R000200310009-8
S ONLY
 SECRET - US EYES ONLY
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200310009-8
E. While there will be no major effect on Pakistan's
attitude toward US aid or Western orientation, Karachi's
preoccupation with East Pakistan problem is expected to
preclude for some time its active participation in
international problems--e.g., supervision of Indochina
settlement or additional efforts at "northern tier"
defense pacts.
Approved For Release 20000 Jp 0i Ci~i -'R Y$ F 4y43R000200310009-8