CURRENT CHINESE COMMUNIST CAMPAIGN IN THE TACHENS AREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200300007-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 27, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING 27 May 1954
CURRENT CHINESE COMMUNIST CAMPAIGN
IN THE TACHENS AREA
1. Background
A. Northern group of Nationalist-held islands off
southeast coast of China is centered on Tachen
Islands, 280-30' North.
B. Between 1949 and spring 1953 Communist forces
occupied a few islands of this northern group
evacuated by Nationalist forces, occupied cer-
tain undefended islands near Nationalist-held
islands of this group, and captured one
Nationalist-garrisoned island.
C. In May and June 1953 Communist forces occupied
13 islands of northern group, later abandoning
three of these. Two of islands abandoned at
that time, Kinmen and Tienao, are among the
four or five islands occupied by Communist forces
in the past two weeks.
II. Current Off-shore Island Clashes
A. Since 15 May Communists have occupied at least
four and possibly five islands within 20 miles
of Tachens. These are Kinmen, Toumenshan,
Tienao, Shihtan, and perhaps Tungchi.
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B. Naval and air activity by both sides has been on
a larger scale than in previous clashes. Late
reports indicate that Nationalist forces are
becoming, less aggressive, presumably as result
of losses to stronger Communist forces.
C. Nationalist reports, probably exaggerated, claim
three Communist vessels have been sunk and at
least four damaged. Nationalist fighters (F-47's)
are said to have shot down one MIG-15, damaged
two others.
D. Nationalists have admitted severe damage to two
of their destroyer escorts and two planes.
Actual naval and air losses are probably higher
than stated.
E. There are reports of Communist troop concentra-
tions in coastal cities of-Chekiang province,
opposite Tachens, of the massing of 21 LST's at
Shanghai, of concentration of 1,000 Communist
junks within 35 miles of Tachens, and of intensi-
fied Communist air reconnaissance and patrols
in area.
III. Communist Capabilities Against Tachens
A. Communist strength in East China is more than
sufficient to capture Tachens at any time.
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B. Communists have between 250,000 and 320,000 troops
in East China, many of whom have seen action in
Korea. Of this strength, approximately 150,000
troops are between Shanghai and Foochow,
C. Communists have nine air divisions in East China,
mostly at Shanghai and Hangchow. These include
125-150 jet fighters, 125 conventional fighters,
and 75 conventional light bombers. Other jet
fighters and conventional light and medium
bombers are based in interior within range of
Tachens.
D. Communists have stationed along East China coast
at least five frigates, 50 motor torpedo boats,
six gunboats and about 40 LST's and LSM's, as
well as hundreds of armed junks.
IV. Nationalist Strength in Tachens
A. Ground forces include 10,000 regular troops,
mostly of 46th Division, one of Taipei's best,
and 5,000 guerrilla troops. Other guerrilla
troops on nearby islands number 3,000 to 4,000.
Combat status excellent, but vulnerable to
Communist air attack and seaborne invasion at
night.
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B. Naval forces include two destroyer escorts
(replacing two others badly damaged in battle
on 15-16 May) and about ten small patrol craft.
Naval forces vulnerable to Communist air attack.
In first few days of operations, navy showed
surprising aggressiveness, but lack of friendly
air support has led to decline in aggressiveness.
C. Air support is provided by Formosa-based conven-
tional fighters (F-47's), far from a match for
Communist jets.
D. Nationalist Ministry of Defense on Formosa has
promised all-out effort to reinforce land, sea
and air forces to protect Tachens if invasion
comes. Air forces will have to continue to
operate from Formosa, additional ground forces
would be shipped from Formosa, and naval rein-
forcements would come from two destroyers,
three destroyer escorts and about 100 patrol
craft now at Formosa.
V. Nationalist Response to Current Campaign
A. Tachen Island command is preparing to withstand
attack and has expressed confidence in its
ability to hold Tachens.
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B. Ministry of National Defense in Taipei has blown
hot and cold. Early statements predicted
imminent amphibious attack on Tachens with co-
ordinated air attacks on Formosa. Later state-
ments assert that situation is "not critical."
C. Tachen Command expects invasion of two other
islands nearby. One is located to south of
Tachens, and invasion could signal Communist
plan to cut supply lines from Formosa, thus
isolating Tachen garrison.
D. Taipei requested on 6 April, before the current
island campaign began, that U. S. 7th Fleet
protection be extended to include all Nationalist-
held off-shore islands. General Chase, chief of
the American military advisory group on Formosa,
recommended at that time that such protection be
extended without delay. So far as we know, the
request has not been answered; earlier press
reports indicating that it had been answered
in the negative are believed to have been false.
E. Nationalists may choose to remove crack 46th
Division from Tachens, rather than risk its
loss, if U. S.. protection not extended.
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VI. Significance of. Tachens
A. Valuable listening post, as intelligence on
Communist activity in East China is collected
regularly by Tachen-based guerrillas who raid
mainland.
B. Strategically located 230 miles north of Formosa,
Tachens could provide advance warning of Commu-
nist air and sea attacks on Formosa and other
islands to south.
C. Limited offensive base for Nationalists to
conduct sea and air operations against Communist
shipping, naval and air activity in coastal
area. This capability has not been fully
exploited to date due to vulnerability of
Tachens to Communist air power and difficulty
in providing logistic and tactical support.
B. Tachens not of strategic importance to Commu-
nists, but successful Communist assault would
enhance Peiping's prestige and reduce prestige
of Nationalists and U. S. Chou En-lai recently
stated at Geneva that American "occupation"
of Formosa "cannot be tolerated." As Commu-
nists are unable to take Formosa, they may
be willing to pay price of taking Tachens in
order to give some substance to their threat.
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