PROBABLE FRENCH REACTION TO FALL OF DIEN BIEN PHU

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200190009-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 1998
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: March 18, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING 18 March 1954
PROBABLE FRENCH REACTION TO
FALL OF DIEN BIEN PHU
I. Assembly pressure for immediate negotiated
settlement with Ho would assume critical
proportions.
II. In any event, greatly increased demand
for solution at Geneva.
1. Greater pressure for American con-
cessions to Communist China because
French military position weaker.
III. Intensified pressure for UN or US military
intervention, if Geneva fails.
IV. Some qualified American observers expect
Laniel to fall immediately if Dien Bien
Phu is lost, because of pressures listed
above.
V. Nevertheless, Laniel government would
probably survive because:
1. Imminence of Geneva talks.
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a. Laniel bluffed assembly before
Berlin conference on threat of
difficulty in forming new
government.
b. Hope of solution at Geneva
definite in comparison with pre-
Berlin situation.
2. Present pro-EDC majority in assembly
would try to retain Laniel, believing
it impossible to form new government
if Laniel falls now.
3. Fall of Laniel could precipitate new
elections under 18-month clause in
constitution.
2 -
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I. Vietnamese fears of ultimate
Communist victory will be
sharply aggravated by fall of
French strongpoint.
Reaction will be compounded
by knowledge of effect
of loss in France.
2. Supporters of Bao Dai
government will diminish
to negligible group.
3. Anti-Communist Vietnamese
look to US as only effective
source of support.
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