NOTES ON NSC MEETING 11 MARCH 1954

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200180013-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 1998
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: March 11, 1954
• Content Type: MF

`''~-QddFor Release 2000/08/04 :
11 March 1954
MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Notes on NSC Meeting 11 March 1954
Read quotes from Bulganin and Voroshilov speeches -- latter
at Admiral Strauss' suggestion since it referred to economic uses of
atomic energy in the USSR.
Decision of the Central Committee of CPSU -- 2 March on
Agriculture -- Soviets also having their troubles with agriculture --
problem is not enough -- particularly in grain crops. Up 'till recently,
had been calculating crops on basis of what was standing in the fields --
not accounting for losses in thievery, bad harvesting and weather.
Now calculating what is in the barn -- and are shocked to discover how
much less it is.
(Read from Decision re assignment of technical and
agricultural personnel to MTS and re serious failures in tractor pro-
duction) tractors a serious bottleneck -- mentioned efforts to cultivate
30 million acres of marginal land with 100, 000 youth from cities.
Failures in grain production resulted in decline in grain
exports -- particularly to UK -- great Soviet efforts to improve situation.
Decision of 2nd of March a very significant and revealing document on
a crucial Soviet problem.
Indochina -- Viet Minh 308th Division has pulled back to around
Dien Bien Phu -- but French garrison at Luang Prabang could be flown
in to bolster French at Dien Bien Phu. Most serious threat is in the
Delta where Viet Minh have skillfully infiltrated and at Hanoi blew up
10 transports, and at Haiphong, 4 B-26's and 10 liaison aircraft, obviously
trying to create an incident involving U. S. airmen at fields.
We have a French estimate of Communist tactics which
may be followed at Geneva:
- They will probably claim that only the Viet Minh
represent the Vietnamese -- to embarrass the
French if they don't bring Vietnamese to the con-
ference.
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- They will probably call for elections right after a
ceasefire -- this is one area where the Communists
probably feel they can win an election.
- They will maneuver to put the blame for any failure
of the conference on the U. S.
French expect that if the Geneva Conference fails, the war in
Indochina will be intensified -- Communist aid to the Viet Minh will
be increased.
Italy -- Premier Scelba has won a narrow margin of 17 votes
in a vote of confidence establishing his government -- a very delicate
government -- a shift of 9 votes would wreck it -- but on the other
hand, it could last a long time. Scelba has been a vigorous opponent
of the Communists, but because of the slim majority of his government,
he may not be able to proceed as vigorously in the future.
Approved For Release 2000/08/04: CIA-RDP80R01443R000200180013-8