INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200100002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 14, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 1999 DP80R01443R000200100002-8
NSC BRIEFING 14 January 1954
I. The trend in Indonesia favoring the
Communists is continuing uninterrupted
as prospects for the cabinet's over-
throw by parliamentary action or a
rightist military coup fade.
A. The Communists are infiltrating
the government and subverting the
National Party which heads it.
B. They are also undermining the
political opposition in Parliament
and anti-Communist elements in the
army.
C. Soon this process will eo firmly
establish their over-all position
that it will be almost impossible
to reverse their progress toward
seizure of full control.
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000200100002-8
 Approved For Release 1 P80R01443R000200100002-8
II. The cabinet seems certain of maintain-
ing indefinitely a parliamentary
majority.
A. There is no immediate prospect
of any issue that will cause
defection of its small party
supporters.
B. Even if these small parties defect,
the government could rely on the
Communist vote to insure a majority.
III. Anti-Communist elements in the army
appear dnable to organize for force-
ful action.
A. They lack political support.
B. Several anti-Communist terri-
torial commanders are also cautious
because of disunity in their
commands.
- 2 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000200100002-8
 Approved For Release 199 80R01443R000200100002-8
IV. Major factor in present situation is
President Sukarno's full support of
government.
A. In past, he has not been thought
Communist or even pro-Communist.
B. He has been considered only as
being naive in his confidence to
use and control the Communists.
C. But his recent actions and reported
contacts with the Communists
suggest he has a closer relation
to them than heretofore believed.
1.
25X1X6ed?^ the parliamentary
leader of the Communist Party
is now Sukarno's chief adviser.
2. Sukarno dealt heavy blow to
25X1X600100002-8
anti-Communists in army by siding
with pro-Communist defense min-
ister in dispute over latter's
Approved For Release 1S999&8 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000200100002-8
 Approved For Release 199 P80R01443R000200100002-8
V. Other strong men in Indonesia, notably
Vice President Hatta and a former
defense minister, the Sultan of
Jogjakarta, staying aloof in present
situation.
A. Reported they hope to create
popular impression they are
above politics.
B. But it is lack of leadership, which
such men could provide, that leaves
government's opposition ineffective.
25X1 X6RD
VI. next
move of Communists to disrupt security
forces will be to tamper with the Mobile
Brigade of the Police, now under anti-
Communist leadership.
A. Mobile Brigade, with American
equipment and training, is most
effective security force in
Indonesia.
Approved For Release 1999/09/08-: GlA-RDP80RO1443R000200100002-8
 Approved For Release 199970 43R000200100002-8
!VII. Before present government took office,
had been hoped that first national
elections, then scheduled for this
year, would give moderate parties
clear mandate.
A. Elections now tentatively scheduled
for 1955.
B. Chances for moderate parties get-
ting progressively worse.
C. By next year, National Party and
Communist will probably have things
well organized enough to insure
their success at the polls.
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000200100002-8