THE CURRENT VIET MINH OFFENSIVE IN LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200080008-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: December 28, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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1 28 December 1953
THE CURRENT VIHT MINH OFFENSIVE IN LAOS
The Viet Minh forces involved in the present offensive in
central Laos are believed to total at present about nine bat-
talions or 7,200 men.
These forces consist mainly of 5r& battalions of the 325th
Division, which is regarded as a second line unit and has always
been based in the Vinh area of northern Annam rather than in
Tonkin. They also include one regiment from the first line 304th
Division, the bulk of which is located to the west of the Delta
perimeter in Tonkin. This regiment of the 304th Division prob-
ably serves as the spine of the present attacking units.
The Viet Minh occupied Thakhek, on the Mekong River, on 26
December, after three French companies evacuated that post.
Only one of these three reportedly reached Savannakhet, 50 miles
southward. Reinforcements are now being flown to this point by
the French, and total forces there are now believed to be eight
battalions (about 6,500 men).
The Viet Minh forces may remain in the Thakhek region,
astride French communications along the Mekong River, which
supplied 20 percent of French needs in northern Laos. They
could move southward, but the French garrison at Savannakhet-
should be able to hold off a strike there. They could also
advance up the Mekong to attack the capital at Vientiane, but
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this movement would probably not attain success unless undertaken
in conjunction with a much larger Viet Minh assault on Laos from
the north.
The major threat to Laos is still posed by four enemy
divisions located in Tonkin, all or part of which could quickly
move into northern Laos and eventually overrun large parts of
this area.
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They are so located that they could not only
move into northern Laos, but could also be employed further to
consolidate the enemy hold on northwest Tonkin, or to attack
the delta where French reserves have been reduced to 27 battalions.
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IThey could only reinforce
threatened posts by depleting their delta reserves or their
forces in south Vietnam. They have already weakened their delta
strength by the transfer of 12 battalions to Dien Bien Phu, in
northwest Tonkin, a move which in effect has nullified the in-
crease in strength of nine battalions from France last fall.
French forces, numbering 171,500, cannot be removed without a
resurgence of activity by the 40,000 enemy troops there.
There is little prospect that the Viet Minh forces at
Thakhek will at this time attempt to cross the Mekong into
Thailand. In any case, the Thais appear capable of meeting such
a move. They have 15,000 police, tantamount to regular armed
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forces, in the border region.
The state of emergency declared by Bangkok was a precaution-
ary measure intended primarily to screen refugees crossing the
Mekong. The, Thai government is sensitive over this problem
because "thousands" of Vietnam refugees already within its
border have strong sympathies with the Viet Minh and facilitate
Communist subversive activity.
Simultaneous with the Viet Minh advance into central Laos,
the Moscow radio repeating an IZVESTIA editorial, attacked
Thailand as a base for American supply to the puppet government
of Indochina. There was nothing new in these charges, which
probably are intended to disrupt Thailand's close cooperation
with American policy in the area. During the Viet Minh invasion
of Laos last spring, Thailand permitted limited French supplies
to move through its territory.
Aside from the military advantage to be gained by a dis-
persion of French forces, Viet Minh penetration of Laos gains
them considerable prestige in the eyes of the Indochinese
peoples on both sides of the conflict.
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The best available information indicates about 240,000
Chinese Communist troops in south China with 50,000.of these
along the Indochina border. No threatening movement or prepara-
tions by any of these forces has been reliably reported, and
there has been no significant change in these dispositions
since the cease-fire in Korea.
The Prime Minister of Laos has appealed to the free world
for support in helping Laos to resist aggression. The Laotian
government, as well as Thailand, was prepared to appeal the
Viet Minh's invasion of last spring to the UN, but objections by
the French forestalled such action. The French embassy in Wash-
ington has just stated that Paris continues to oppose any appeal
to the UN either by itself or any other country.
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It is possible that any major Viet Minh campaign now would
be connected with the Ho Chi Minh peace feeler on 29 November
and subsequent Orbit emphasis on the desirability of negotia-
tions. Such military pressure would be designed to force France
to negotiate as well as to put the Viet Minh in a better position
in the event of any negotiations.
Ho Chi Minh's statement on 27 December ordering his army
"to destroy the enemy" does not necessarily indicate a lack of
willingness to negotiate. It was quite possibly intended to
underscore to the French and Vietnamese peoples the desirability
of ,peace,. It may be the forerunner of a heavy attack from Tonkin
to capture northern Laos and further incline Paris and Saigon
toward negotiations.
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