OUTLINE OF ONE MEMO OF 9 NOVEMBER: 'THE SHORT TERM POLITICAL OUTLOOK IN ITALY (THROUGH 1955)'

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80R01443R000200020004-5
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 7, 1998
Sequence Number: 
4
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 12, 1953
Content Type: 
BRIEF
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80R01443R000200020004-5.pdf124.52 KB
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Approved For Release 2000 P80R01 3F000200020004-5 SECURITY INFORMATION t ,~l Outline of ONE memo of 9 November : "THE SHORT TERM POLITICAL OUTLOOK IN ITALY (through 1955)" Impact of Trieste. Developments on Pella Governmen A. Owing to center parties' weakened con- dition since the June elections, Pella's government is avowedly "transitional" and was to have expired on 31 October. Pella has sought a political victory on Trieste to strengthen his position. B. Minimum Italy would probably accept at any Five Power conference would be re- turn of bulk of Zone A. Concessions Italy would probably make to Yugoslavia include: (1) Exchange of some predominantly Slovene areas on edge of Zone A for comparable cessions in Zone B Approved For Release 2000/08/30 ? C - DP80RO1443R000200020004-5 UA_na Approved For Release 2000 %P ff.,,tff~gR~80R01443ROO0200020004-5 but Italy would not cede port of Zaule (Servola), except possibly for major concessions in Zone B. (2) Extensive port and access rights in Trieste city, and mutual minority guarantees. (3) Demilitarization of both zones. C. Early solution on these lines would al- most certainly keep Pella,in power, but only if Italian public considered it as satisfactory as the 8 October declara- tion. D. Pella's fall on Trieste issue would fur- thur strengthen left and right extremes at expense of center. II. Longer Term Outlook A. Even if Pella survives on Trieste issue, political instability will continue and present government will probably not sur- vive next two years. Approved For Release 2000/08/30 G IA-RDP80R01443R000200020004-5 SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08 c RDP80R01443R000200020004-5 SECURITY INFORMATION (1) Popular demands for social and economic change are growing with major strikes possible. (2) Monarchists, now supporting Pella cabinet, will eventually insist on participation in it. B. Communist accession to power in next two years not likely (1) Italian security forces could and (2) C. Any and would suppress any attempted coup. Elections not scheduled before 1958 coalition between Nenni's Socialists center parties unlikely in this per- iod because of. deep differences between him and Christian Democrats. D. Most likely successor to Pella would be center or center-right government, pro- bably involving continued Monarchist support. Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200020004-5 SECRET Approved For Release 2000/0~8 PC~RDP80RO1443R000200020004-5 (1) Differences between Monarchists and reformist Christian Democrats pro- bably easier to-reconcile than those between Christian Democrats and Nenni's Socialists. (2) Monarchists, though eventually de- manding inclusion in government, are not likely to demand vote on restoration of Monarchy as price of their participation. E. A moderate rightist government might eventually become more authoritarian in methods, but a right dictatorship is highly unlikely in next two years, since support of moderate groups would still be essential. III. Implications of Fall of Pella Government A. if Pella fell on Trieste issue, any new government would be more nationalistic and less disposed to cooperate with the Approved For Rease 2000/08/30-: CIA-RDP80RO1443R000200020004-5 SECRET Approved For Release 2009MAK EQNP80 R01443 R000200020004-5 (1) Domestic support for Italy's NATO effort would be greatly weakened. (2) Prospects for Italian EDC ratifica-_ tion would be diminished. B. Rightist governments might be less able to cope with Italy's social and economic ills, thus enhancing popular appeal of Social-Communists. 5 - Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200020004-5 SECRET