INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000100290012-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: August 5, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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Security InformatiorT
5 August 1953
I. Nature of crisis.
A. New Communist-influenced cabinet is widening
cleavage between right and left.
B. This causing political confusion which
Communists exploit.
C. Other results may be increasing lawlessness,
a military coup, rebellion in East Indonesia,
and serious economic deterioration.
II. How this situation developed.
A. Split between two largest parties paved
way for this cabinet.
1. These parties, Masjumi and National,
broke over latter's cooperation with
Communists.
B. Cabinet created only through Communist support.
1. Communists have no posts but key
ministries filled by Communist
sympathizers.
2. Communist vote in parliament
necessary to cabinet's parlia-
mentary support.
III. Vulnerability of government to Communist strategy.
A. Report of Communist program.
1. Create a political impasse and then
propose a "national front."
2. "National front" eventually will be
replaced by a "peoples' democracy."
3. Communist program well under way.
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B. Extent of Communist influence in cabinet.
1. Defense, Justice, Finance and
Economics headed by pro-Communists.
Perhaps also foreign affairs and communications.
2. Moderate premier All a front --
he probably cannot control his colleagues.
C. Probable Communist-influenced cabinet policies.
1. Anti-western acts like cancellation
of TCA.
2. Cessation of war on Communist guerrillas.
3. More trade with Soviet Orbit.
4. Closer diplomatic relations with
Moscow and Peiping.
IV. Coming tensions
A. President Sukarno's role and rift with Vice
President Hatta.
1. Sukarno's acceptance of cabinet
unexpected; looks like he more
leftist than hitherto thought.
2. Pro-US Vice President Hatta may
break with Sukarno and rally
moderates to halt leftist trend.
B. Masjumi will probably try to overthrow cabinet
in parliament. Its success uncertain.
C. Prospects for 1954 elections.
1. This cabinet would try to rig or
postpone them.
2. Nationalists and. Communists know
Masjumi more popular and fear
defeat in elections.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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D. Military coup attempt is possible.
1. Rightist army and police officers
might try a coup or league with
Moslem insurgents, the Darul Islam.
2. In event of a coup attempt, however,
certain military commands, particu-
larly in East Indonesia, would remain
loyal to Sukarno.
E. Greatest danger is that no political or military
action will unseat the cabinet.
1. Communists could then consolidate
control over the cabinet and
eliminate the opposition piecemeal.
V. Economic situation is also gloomy.
A. Economic deterioration is result of falling
world rubber prices.
B. New cabinet expected to pass nationalization
and labor laws crippling to industry.
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