INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000100290007-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 5, 1953
• Content Type: BRIEF

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SECURITY INFORMATION
NSC BRIEFING 5 August 1953
The establishment in Indonesia on 30 July of a cabinet
strongly influenced by the Communists is sharpening the
differences between left and right, and producing political
confusion verging on chaos. In this situation the Communists
have the opportunity to make considerable headway. Other
possible consequences are increasing lawlessness, coup d'etat
by the army and police, rebellion by East Indonesian separatist
groups and serious economic deterioration.
This unhappy picture came about because the two largest
political groups, the Masjumi and the National Parties, which
had hitherto cooperated in forming cabinets, have finally split,
chiefly because of the latter's increasing cooperation with
the Indonesian Communist Party,
The new cabinet, which excludes the Masjumi, was created
by the National Party with Communist support. While no Communist
party members hold posts, the Nationalists were gnlyable to
form a cabinet by naming representatives from several Communist-
dominated parties and by the promise of the Communist party
vote in Parliament. The government is thud completely dependent
on this Communist support to maintain its majority.
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We have obtained a report of Communist strategy, as out-
lined to a party meeting at Djakarta in June. It calls for
the establishment of a national front government to bring order
out of a purposely created political impasse, The'inevitable
"peoplek''s democracy" is scheduled eventually to succeed this
national front. This Communist Program for Indonesia seems
well under way.
Pro-Communists have been appointed to the ministries of
defense, justice, finance and economics. The new ministers
of foreign affairs and communications have extreme leftist
views. The premier, former Ambassador All, is a moderate
Nationalist appointed as "window-dressing." He will probably
try to curb his pro-Communist colleagues but his influence
may not be very effective.
Anti-Western policies such as cancellation of TCA aid
and pressure on foreign companies can be expected. Cessation
of military operations against Communist guerrillas is another
probability. Trade with the Soviet orbit, including the sale
of rubber to China, will increase, along with closer diplomatic
relations with Moscow and Peiping.
President Sukarno's acceptance of the cabinetwas unex-
pected and suggests that his leftist sympathies are stronger
than hitherto believed. His decision appears to mark a break
between him and the pro-US Vice President Hatta, which may have
far reaching consequences. Hatta will in all likelihood become
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the rallying point for the moderates and he has the greatest
capability of any Indonesian leader for halting the disturbing
leftist trend.
The Masjumi, supported by Hatta, will try to overthrow
the cabinet by subverting its non-Communist support in
Parliament. Its success in such an attempt cannot be predicted
now but it is certainly possible.
If this cabinet stays in power, Indonesia's first elections,
now scheduled for 1954, will either be rigged or indefinitely
postponed. Both the Nationalists and the Communists recognize
that they have less popular support.than the Masjumi and are
fearful that their representation in the present appointed
Parliament might be greatly redaced.
Another contingency would be a coup attempt by the rightists
officers who dominate the army and police at Djakarta. These
might even league with the 4,000 man Darul Islam rebels who
are fighting to create a theocratic Moslem state.. In the event
of a rightist coup, certain areas under the command. of military
leaders supporting President Sukarno, notably East Java and
South Celebes, could be expected to declare their allegiance
to Sukarno alone.
The greater danger is that no positive political or military
action will be taken by the anti-Communist forces. This would
give the pro-Communists in the new government time to consolidate
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their control over vital ministries such as Interior, Defense
and Foreign Affairs. Then the Communists could proceed to
eliminate their opposition piece-meal.
The present political situation as a whole, therefore,
looks very gloomy. It is further darkened by deteriorating
economic conditions mainly caused by the continuing fall of
world rubber prices; rubber is Indonesia's largest export
product. The present cabinet is expected to pass nationalization
and labor laws which would cripple Indonesian industry and
further aggravate the economic slump.
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