PRINCIPLE REASONS FOR FAILURE OF ITALIAN CENTER PARTIES TO WIN A MAJORITY IN THE RECENT ITALIAN ELECTIONS

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80R01443R000100280009-3
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RIPPUB
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K
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 24, 1998
Sequence Number: 
9
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REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80R01443R000100280009-3.pdf109.04 KB
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Approved For Release 2000/09/12 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000100280009-3 'LINCIPAL REASONS r'OR FAILU., E OF ITALIAN CENTER PARTIES TO IN MriJORITY IN THE RECENT ITALIAN ELECTIONS General: Failure of DC Party in past five vearg to overcome hnormous difficulties im o d by sort sigrTed oppos rrom e right wing in us r a s s w in its own party and the rightist parties, and the deliberate and constant obstructicnism from the extreme left; fa+1~re. to bring about badly needed social, fiscal, and governmental reforms. The PCI was able to take credit for much that was done, claiming it had forced the concessions from a reluctant government. 1. Election-Law, o "Swindle Lawry _rnug_t badly needed cohesion and fighting snirit to rank and file of T'CI. S -..'nlit PF`I and PLI, some of whose leaders refused to go along with the law. -,-.iienated many otherwise center sympathizers and strong anti-communists, for example, the widely read satirical paper "Candido." - "rovided an authentic basis for attacking the DC party as being undemocratic. 2. Lack of Permanent party s--(DC, erals, Fepublicans, and Saragat Socialists) which can translate the daily life and interests of the average person into political values. This meant the campaign orcanizations were forced to rely largely on imnrcv.sation. Con- versely, this is the greatest strength of the PCI as a political force, as well as of the MSI. isin tide of social discontent in Ita as elsewhere in the wor . Although politically Italy responds well to democratic processes--almost 94% of the electorate voted in June--socially it still retains many of the influences and usages of feudalism. Approved For Release 2000/09/12 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000100280009-3 Approved For Release 2000/09/12 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000100280009-3 25X1C10b industrialized north has been in social ferment since the turn of the century. Feudal scuth, where wealthy landowners have in na.st practically "owned" thepolitical support of their down trodden farm workers (for '4onarchist party) was for the first time strongly breached by the left. The center parties all lost ground in this area. hussian "peace offensive" and Churchill s eec . 'Peace offensive" made possible aaophion of sheep's clothing. Churchill advocacy of rapprochement with iussia gave extremists effective ammunition against lie Gasperi's Atlantic Pact, ELC,, 9ATO, pro- U.s. rolicies. 5. L,ivalries in some areas between local center candidates - primary and general election held together - resulting in splitti_. of center vote and victory o opr~es ion candi a es. pro a 1 we over 5O%, of electorate, and weakness of non-clerical center parties. :swindle law seemed, and was, calculated to perpetuate DO control over center minors, driving many voters to extreme parties to express anti-clericalism. to Jugoslavia. 8. Basic anti-clericalismcf large r centage 6. Failure of government to cope with une two men t, particularly in providing jobs or youth. 7. Failure arrive at satisfactory solution Trieste question--attendant concern over U.S. .support Approved For Release 2000/09/12 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000100280009-3 Approved For Release 2000/09/12 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000100280009-3 lo. Uncertainty over strengtr of isolationist senti- .nent in U.S., and consequent mistrust of validity of ;~merican world leadership. 'Contributing to this uncertainty: Deep cuts portended in foreign aid and defense spending, with talk of more to come. Tndi3criminate investigation of overseas activities. hestrictive U.S. immigration and entry rolicies. ~xlt~remi~ t parties berated De Gasperi govt fT its subservience to U.S. Approved For Release 2000/09/12 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000100280009-3