ROUNDUP (As of 0830, 18 May 1953)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000100190012-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: May 18, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
ROUNDUP
(As of 0830, 18 May 1953)
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
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GENERAL
Moscow has not yet commented on Prime Minister
REACTION TO Churchill's speech and the parliamentary debate
CHURCHILL SPEECH which followed. Satellite propaganda pointed out,
however, that the Churchill and Attlee speeches
mark "Britain's first open rebellion" against the United States and "will have
a favorable effect on the cause of peace and understanding." 25X1
In France, the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs
Committee reacted by unanimously adopting a motion urging the government
propose early four-power talks. This was a reversal of its vote of two months
ago.
President Auriol told Ambassador Draper on 15
May that he favors talks with the Soviet Union without either prior conditions
or an agreed agenda.
French foreign minister Bidault and West German
chancellor Adenauer reportedly are apprehensive that the USSR may now make
a tempting offer on the reunification of Germany. 25X1
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SOVIET UNION
Thus far, the Soviet Union has not responded to a
AUSTRIAN British invitation for a four-power meeting of the
'TREATY Austrian treaty deputies on 27 May, but there is
no reason to expect a refusal. Before the invita-
tion was sent, Soviet UN delegate Vishinsky had commented to the Austrian
UN observer that there should be a good chance for a treaty agreement since
the United States appeared willing to withdraw the abbreviated draft. The
purpose of this statement probably was to encourage Western European opti-
mism on the chances of an agreement with the Soviet Union, but it may also
indicate a serious interest in exploring the bargaining position of the Western
powers.
EASTERN EUROPE
The release of William Oatis looks like another
OATIS RELEASE conciliatory gesture to the free world at little
cost to the Soviet bloc. Moscow's hand in this
decision is suggested by Pravda's prompt reprinting of the Czech news
release and the fact that t e pardon came four days after Ambassador Bohlen
discussed the case with Foreign Minister Molotov. The Prague government
probably hopes to obtain tangible advantages by releasing Oatis, such as the
lifting mmercial sanctions which have hurt the Czech economy.
Rumanian willingness to negotiate an agreement
ORBIT-YUGOSLAV with Yugoslavia for the re-establishment of a
RELATIONS joint administration for the Iron Gate stretch
of the Danube is primarily a reflection of Orbit
economic interests and will hardly be viewed by Tito as indicating a major
change in Orbit policy. The Orbit has so far not mentioned the negotiations.
Contrary to Western press stories, Cominform propaganda continues to
attack Tito and there has been no perceptible decrease in border incidents.
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FAR EAST
The Communists will probably persist in rejecting
KOREAN the current UN proposal to release the Korean
TRUCE prisoners who are unwilling to be repatriated as
soon as an armistice is signed. Although they may
compromise on other points, it is extremely unlikely that the Communists will
agree to any arrangem nt which event the repatriation of a substantial
number of prisoners.
Prime Minister Nehru, who feels that the United
Nations 13 May counterproposal diverges from the terms of the Indian UN
resolution of last December, nevertheless is doing his utmost to obtain a
settlement. He urged China, as well as the United States, to continue negotia-
tions. The approach to China was made despite Nehru's feeling that the Chinese
proposal a etter basis for negotiation than the UN counter-
proposal.
KOREA
President Rhee apparently is becoming more
reconciled to an armistice based on the 7 May
UN counterproposals, but his support remains
doubtful unless the United States agrees to some sort of defense arrangement.
INDOCHINA
Most of a Viet Minh division remains in Laos,
probably to prepare for a renewal of operations
next fall. The enemy has increased his activities
in the Tonkin delta in what appears as an effort to capture part of the spring
rice harvest.
French devaluation of the Indochinese piaster has
brought strong protests from all three Associated States and has put a serious
additional strain on French-Indochinese relations. 25X1
The anti-Yoshida forces have been gaining momentuT5X1
JAPAN and it is now no longer certain that Yoshida will be
elected prime minister. In any event. the new
government is likely to be unstable.
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BURMA
The problem of evacuating Chinese Nationalist
troops from Burma shows no signs of an early
solution.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Official reaction to Secretary Dulles' visit has
ARAB been favorable, but the popular mood remains
STATES negative. The public is suspicious of the secre-
tary's motives, condemns American support of
ritain in the Supzl ispute, and generally is against peace with Israel.
The Communist Tudeh party is no longer illegal
IRAN and can now engage in overt activities following
an Iranian court ruling of 16 May. Some im-
prisoned members have already been released. It is not clear whether or
not this action was approved or sponsored by Prime Minister Mossadeq's
government; in any event, it permitted the decision to stand.
Mossadeq continues to consolidate his position
against the shah, who announced on 11 May that he was turning over the
crown lands to the government. In return, the shah will receive an annual
income which he will devote to charitable purposes.
The opposition to Prime Minister Malan's
SOUTH Nationalist government is splitting up. Three
AFRICA groups have formally broken away from the United
Party and formed new parties in the past week.
The immediate future of these parties is uncertain, but a political realignment
based more strictl on cultural and racial divisions appears to be under way.
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WESTERN EUROPE
Bundesrat ratification of the EDC and contractual
EDC treaties on 15 May completed West German parlia-
mentary action on the treaties but left them still
facing the Social Democratic Party's challenge before the Constitutional
Court. President Heuss is committed not to sign till after a court ruling on
their legality, and such a decision is not expected before late summer..
Other developments connected with EDC ratifica-
tion were largely unfavorable. In France, the sentiment for holding four-
power talks before proceeding further with EDC was encouraged by the
Churchill speech. Last week's high-level efforts to reach a French-German
understanding on the Saar, which Premier Mayer has made a prerequisite for
EDC ratification, were unproductive, and no solution is now anticipated before
the September German elections, 25X1
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LATIN AMERICA
President Peron's recent speeches, the anti-
ARGENTINA American press campaign of the past fortnight,
and the investigation of American news agencies
in Argentina suggest that Peron is reassessing his earlier overtures for
improved relations with Washington,
There are indications that the 15 April bombings
and the advice Peron received since then are part of a Communist-inspired
plot to prevent such a rapprochement. It has become apparent that Peron
had nothing to do with the placing of the bombs, which sparked the officially
condoned reprisal burning of all political opposition headquarters except the
Communist, and led him finally to charge the United States with inspiring
this plot as well as a "defamation campaign" throughout the hemisphere. His
extreme rightist and leftist advisers, anticipating American press reaction
to such violence, exploited Peron's well-known sensitivity to the American
press.
Peron told Ambassador Nufer on 14 May that he
still wants improved relations with the United States and that his 1 May
speeches were directed only against elements of the American press and
certain individuals who were "conspiring" in the United States against
Argentina. If the extremist advice prevails, however, there will be not
only an increase in anti-American influence in Argentina but also a revival
of an aggressive anti-American campaign throughout Latin Americas
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THE SITUATION IN EGYPT
20 May 1953
Two weeks ago Egyptian spokesmen announced that talks
with the British over the Suez and defense problems had been
suspended indefinitely. At the personal request of British
ambassador Stevenson, General Nagib agreed for the time
being not to break off the talks formally. Ten days ago
Nagib also assured Secretary Dulles that he would keep the
situation under control until the matter could be reviewed
by the secretary in Washington. He presented a pessimistic
picture, however, and once again outlined the Egyptian posi-
tion as he underscored the gravity of the situation. Nagib
also insisted that the proposed Middle East defense organiza-
tion which was being urged on Egypt was unacceptable.
What does Egypt want and what is the actual situation
there? Egypt wants Britain to agree to get out of the one
and a half billion dollar Suez Canal base unconditionally.
This was also the demand of the nationalistic Wafd party when
it abrogated the Anglo-Egyptian treaty in October 1951. Popu-
lar sentiment on this point is so strong that, despite some
moderate statements in private, Nagib and his fellow officers
have never dared publicly to hint that they would settle for
anything less.
Nagib probably gave the tip-off on the situation in Egypt
when he told Secretary Dulles: "an agreement I could make
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with the United Kingdom now, I will not be able to make in a
month or two." In other words, Egyptian popular opinion is
rapidly hardening against the British.
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resurgence of activity
by the Wafd party, which has plugged Egyptian independence
for the last 30 years. Despite the ban against political
parties, the Wafd is still believed to have an organization
that extends down to the village level. The Wafd is awaiting
an opportunity to take over the moment Nagib falters on the
issue of uncompromising nationalism.
Moreover, the present regime has promised to improve
the lot of the comman man, to stamp out corruption, and to
requisition land from the wealthy for the benefit of the
poor. Almost nothing has been done, Instead, low cotton
prices have helped weaken seriously the Egyptian foreign ex-
change position, with adverse internal reactions. The Commu-
nists, whose party is banned and
threat in Egypt, are making overtures to the Wafd; the extreme
rightists, such as the Moslem Brotherhood, are ready for di-
rect action against the British. The rising count of incidents
involving Egyptian and British troops in recent weeks is indic-
ative of the new mood.
Britain maintains a firm position in the face.of all this.
Physically the base is secure against anything Egypt could do.
Britain?s current force there is over 70,000; the depots at the
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base are large and can be supplied and reinforced by air and
sea indefinitely. Egypt?s army of about 65,000 may at best
be rated third class. Guerrilla activity, boycotts, and mass
disturbances could seriously harass and hamper; they cannot
change the basic picture.
is more tense than at any time since the Cairo riots of
January 1952.
At the conference table Britain insists that in refer-
ence to the Suez and defense talks five points must be agreed
on before action is taken on any single part of the problem.
These are: 1) phased evacuation of the base; 2) provision
for its joint maintenance; 3) provision for its air defense;
4) Egyptian acceptance of MEDO, and; 5) economic and mili-
tary aid for Egypt from Britain -- and presumably also from
the United States,
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The British government insists that maintenance of the
Suez base is essential to Western defense in the Middle East.
It relies on American endorsement of its general principles
and is anxious to secure complete American diplomatic sup-
port of the British position in negotiations. The Foreign
Office has stated that it is willing to resume the suspended
talks if Cairo indicates a more flexible attitude.
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London?s attitude is simply that the base is too important
to give up or to let deteriorate. It is also clear that the
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British feel keenly the sharp decline of their prestige in
the Middle East, and believe that it's time to call a halt.
The Churchill government would also face determined opposi-
tion at home if it agreed to the Egyptian demands.
British determination to retain the Suez area as a base
may in part also be strengthened by the widely-held strategic
concept that, using Turkish military forces and UK troops and
aircraft based on Suez, any Soviet drive into the Near East
could be contained and neutralized.
Egyptian stubbornness in demanding full sovereignty over
the Suez base may also have been encouraged by Soviet and Indian
support.
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What can be expected under the current circumstances?
It is unlikely that Nagib will accept anything less than
public agreement to unconditional evacuation. If he did,
his government's internal position would deteriorate sharply;
he might, in fact, not be able to maintain himself. There
is still the slim possibility that were London to agree to
unconditional evacuation, Cairo, having exploited it publicly,
might let the full implementation drag indefinitely. In
other words, some British maintenance troops, particularly
in mufti, might continue. Every passing day, however, makes
Egyptian willingness to permit such a possibility less likely.
There is no reason to doubt, on the other hand, that
without a compromise settlement along the lines London has set
forth, Britain will remain in Egypt by force of arms. There
is accordingly the grave possibility that as the Egyptian in-
ternal situation worsens in the coming weeks, the Nagib
regime ?-- or any successor government -- will tacitly or overtly
encourage guerrilla action against the British. Under such
circumstances the situation could get completely out of hand,
with antiforeign sentiment running amuck. British occupation
of the delta would in turn arouse such violent Arab hatred that
the West would no longer have any useful influence in the Arab
world.
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