SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000100180001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 11, 1953
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC Briefing 11 May 1953
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SOVIET UNION
We recently have had the first evidence that the Central Committee
of the Communist Party itself may be undergoing a re-organization
somewhat similar to the major re-organization of the administrative
units in the government. This re-organization in the party appar-
atus will consolidate functions, reduce the number of personnel,
and should improve the Party's ability to supervise governmental
and economic operation.
FAR EAST
In foreign policy the Communist attitude in the Far East
KOREA
shows no significant change. At Panmunjom the Chinese
Communists have offered minor clarifications of their 8 point
proposal but still show no disposition to compromise on the
critical issue--the final disposition of the prisoners of. war 25X1
who refuse to return.
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Syngman Rhee recently has made threats, backed up by
ostensible popular demonstrations, to withdraw his troops from
UN command and stage an independent offensive should the UN
agree to a divided Korea. Rhee's attitude is believed to be
largely a bluff and when the chips are down he is not expected
to pursue any policy that might undermine a truce.
In Indo-China the military situation in Laos remains
INDOCHINA
quiet. Only small-scale Viet Minh attacks against
isolated French outposts have been reported. The Communists,
who have withdrawn the bulk of their forces toward the Tonkin
Delta, may leave only enough troops in Laos to consolidate
their territorial gains and pin down French forces for the
rest of the summer, after which a new Communist attack against
Laos may take place. The French, meanwhile, are still con-
fronted with the political problems caused by the invasion of
Laos. Paris indicates that it would not oppose a move by
Thailand to put the Laotian case before the UN. The French
apparently believe that an appeal by a fully independent Asian
country such as Thailand would not stir up international
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attack on French Union policies, particularly by the Arab-Asian
Bloc, as would be the case if France herself raised the Laotian
issue in the UN. We believe the French are overly optimistic in
this line of reasoning. Thailand, in the meantime, has urgently
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requested additional shipments of American arms. This reflects
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Bangkok's immediate concern over the Communist advance toward
the Thai border, as well as its long-range concern to obtain a
more definite American commitment in Southeast Asia.
France also has offered some concessions to the Cam-
bodian government to quiet that country's demand for complete
independence. However, the concessions offered are not suffi-
cient to eliminate the basic complaints against French domination.
The King of Cambodia, who is now in Tokyo, is displeased with a
US press report that said the King's criticism of his relations
with the French were a "shock" to the American State Department.
The King has asked for diplomatic representations to the State
Department calling attention to the seriousness of these
assertions.
MIDDLE EAST
In the Middle East, Communist policy in Syria, Lebanon,
Jordan, and Egypt calls for demonstrations by the local Com-
munist parties during the present tour of Secretary Dulles.
These local parties, however, are relatively weak and such
demonstrations should be controllable by the security forces
of those countries. Some type of protest demonstrations by
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Arab refugees from Palestine also are expected.
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The principal pressure on Secretary Dulles, it would
EGYPT
appear, will come through General Nagib in Egypt. Last
week the British-Egyptian talks on the Suez were suspended over
the issue of unconditional British evacuation of that area.
Egyptian diplomats have indicated that this suspension is a
delaying action so that pressure may be brought to bear on Mr.
Dulles while he is in Cairo to endorse the Egyptian position
against the British. The Cairo position is full evacuation
followed by full Egyptian control of Suez.
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The measure of the deep-seated Arab antipathies to
the French in North Africa is once again evidenced in the vio-
lence and blood-letting of the Tunisian municipal elections
which concluded Sunday.
In Iran Premier Mossadeq also hopes to involve the US
IRAN
in a dispute with the British, this time, of course,
on the issue of the Anglo-Iranian oil negotiations. Mossadeq
has suggested that he and the.Ir anian parliament would be
bound by the ruling of the President of the US should the
President accept the role of negotiator. The possibility of
Mossadeq guaranteeing anything from the Iranian parliament
is best seen by the riots and confusion which marked the re-
opening of the Majlis on Sunday.
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Mossadeq has improved his position relative to the Shah,
who on Monday agreed to turn over the royal lands to the Mossadeq
government. However, the aged Premier still has a battle on his
hands among the Iranian politicians. In addition to the rioting
in'the Parliament, which indicates that the Mossadeq forces still 25X1
have not achieved legislative control,
Mossadeq's own man in the royal court, that is, Acting Minister
of Court Amini, is maneuvering to replace with a man of his
own choosing the Iranian Army's Chief of Staff, who takes his
orders from Mossadeq. Amini also suggested that Mossadeq might
be encouraged to retire after a successor such as Amini has
received the necessary political build-up to take over the
premiership.
In Western Europe Communist policy towards the question
GERMANY
of German re-unification has shown no identifiable
change. The Moscow press on the recent anniversary of the
German surrender set forth a "socialized East Germany" as the
model for a unified Germany. This may be an attempt by the
authors of the articles, East German leaders Grotewohl and
Ulbricht, to show that rumors of a Soviet policy change on
Germany are without foundation.
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With regard to EDC ratification in France, Foreign
FRANCE
Minister Bidault has urged a Western offer of four-power
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talks on disarmament as a means of convincing French public
opinion that ratification of EDC is necessary. Socialist Leader
Mollet also has called for four-power talks on Germany prior to
French action on EDC. Ratification prospects are unlikely to be
affected by the split between General De Gaulle and his followers.
However, the life of the Mayer government may be somewhat pro-
longed while the other French political parties compete for the
allegiance of former Gaullist deputies.
On the Austrian question, a Soviet spokesman in Vienna
AUSTRIA
has said that an agreement on Korea is a prerequisite
to the signing of an Austrian treaty. This attempt to link the
two issues, if persisted in by Moscow, may afford the Soviets
the chance to use a stalemate in Korea as a reason for stalling
on Austria and other major issues.
France still remains in some disagreement with the
United States on the tactics the West should pursue on the
Austrian treaty, which is scheduled to be the subject of four.-
power discussion next week. Paris fears Soviet propaganda
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would exploit American insistence on revising Article 35 of
the old draft treaty, which calls for a $150,000,000 reparations
for the USSR. The French would agree to reopen discussion on
this article only if the Russians attempt to reopen some other
item previously agreed upon.
On the question of Trieste,
the Communists, with an eye on the Italian elec-
tions, may be preparing an announcement that the Soviet Union now
supports the return of Trieste to Italy. Premier De Gasperi has
attempted to soften the propaganda impact of such a Communist
move by publicly inviting the USSR to adhere to the Western
Tripartite Declaration of 1948, which first proposed the return
of Trieste to Italy.
At the same time, the Communists have made a
YUGOSLAVIA
gesture toward the second party in the Trieste
dispute, Yugoslavia. For the first time since 1948, the Yugo-
slav ambassador in Moscow recently was received by the Soviet
foreign ministry in a state visit. The Yugoslav diplomat,
however, said the conversation with Molotov was entirely formal
and general. On the broader issue of Soviet-Yugoslav relations,
Yugoslav leaders have consistently indicated they will not
accept gestures of reconciliation unless there is a concrete
reversal of Soviet policy toward their country.
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In Latin America, Peron's recent curtailment of the
ARGENTINA
US news agencies in Argentina suggests that he has
abandoned his policy of attempting to improve relations with
Washington. Pressure for such a change in policy has come from
both the extreme left and right in Peron's own camp as well as
from his fear that the political opposition will exploit current
economic and political unrest.
Bolivia also has shifted its policy on a major issue and
BOLIVIA
may now be prepared to pay compensation to the owners of
the three nationalized mining companies. However, the money for
such payment, as well as the revenues necessary for survival of
the government, must come from US purchases of Bolivian tin.
Accordingly, Bolivia has enlisted the active cooperation of
Brazil, Chile and Ecuador in making representations to the United
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States on the question of renewing RFC purchases of tin.
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