THE ITALIAN NATIONAL ELECTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000100140007-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2000(
80R01443R000100140007-
THE ITALIAN NATIONAL ELECTION
The Italian national election on 7 June will probably
be the most important election anywhere in Europe over the
last five years. At stake is the survival of the pro-American
De Gasperi government, facing a. challenge by the largest Com-
munist party outside the Orbit in alliance with the Nenni
Socialists and assisted by the Soviet Union's current "peace"
gestures. Unlike similar groups elsewhere, this pro-Communist
bloc has actually increased its voting strength over the past
five years, polling 31 percent of the total vote in the 1948
elections and about 35 percent in the 1951 and 1952 local
elections.
In recent weeks there have been various indications of
dissension within the Communist party itself but this will
probably be more than compensated for by a. swing to the Nenni
Socialists of depressed middle class elements exasperated by
the government's failure to solve the country's economic
problems. Unemployment, for example, is still close to the
two million figure and the standard of living remains low,
despite some $1.5 billion of American aid which Italy has
received since the 1948 election.
The government coalition (Christian Democrats plus the
small Republican party) has, on the other hand, suffered both
from its failure to improve Italy's economic situation and
from the revival of the extreme right-wing parties since the
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1948 election. While the Christian Democrats and their
electoral allies fell from 63 percent of the total vote in
1948 to a bare 51 percent in 1951-52, the Monarchists and
the neo-fascists increased from 5 percent to about 12 in the
same period -- mainly by attacking the government on ultra-
nationalist grounds such as De Gasperi's failure to achieve
a satisfactory Trieste settlement.
Though advocating a strong repressive policy toward
Communism, the rightists are very lukewarm toward NATO and
EDC, insisting that Italy's status in the European integra-
tion picture is second-rate and humiliating. They are evi-
dently making every effort to prevent a. clear victory by the
government electoral bloc, thus giving themselves a balance-
of-power position in the new parliament.
The government electoral bloc suffers further from its
heterogeneous character, which has been one of the factors
responsible for the government's failure to push needed
economic and social reforms. The Christian Democratic party,
which polled 37 percent'in the 1951-52 elections, has suffered
serious dissension between its right and left wings. The
three small democratic parties, polling 14 percent of the 1951-
52 voters, are suspicious of many government policies and tend
to support De Gasperi only to defeat the Communists.
De Gasperi's chief hope of maintaining a stable govern-
ment after the vote depends on the new election law, which
will give his coalition nearly two-thirds of-the seats in the
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lower house if it wins a bare popular majory..This law
does not, however, apply to the Senate.
The American Embassy in Rome at present expects the
De Gasperi bloc to attain a. slim majority at the polls.
Since the pro-Communist bloc has for some months been stress-
ing the peace issue, his chances will, however, probably be
much affected by the western response to any Soviet overtures.
De Gasperi's own recognition of this factor was strikingly
illustrated in his remark to the Embassy on 16 April that
President Eisenhower's speech would greatly assist him in
his electoral campaign.
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