RIVALRY FOR PHILIPPINE PRESIDENCY BECOMING INTENSE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80R01443R000100070007-8
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
November 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 5, 1998
Sequence Number:
7
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 3, 1953
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP80R01443R000100070007-8.pdf | 139.85 KB |
Body:
Approved Relea 200, 05/2I to
1443R000100070007-8
MAR 3 1952
RIVALRY FOR PHILIPPINE PRESIDENCY BECOMING INTENSE
The resignation of Philippine Defense Secretary Magsaysay
heightens the political turmoil that will continue in the
Philippines until next November's presidential elections.
repetition of the coercion and fraud that accompanied the 1949
election would seriously endanger Philippine stability and there
are many indications that President Quirino will attempt such
means to obtain his own re-election.
Magsaysay's break with Quirino followed a secret agreement
of last November with Nacionalista Party leaders to accept the
nomination at their convention, set for 12 April. The Nacional-
ista commitment to Magsaysay was not accepted by all Party
leaders and Magsaysay's relative inexperience in the unprincipled
politics of the Philippines leaves him vulnerable in the current
maneuvering. One party to the agreement, however, estimates
that Magsaysay's nomination on the Nacionalista ticket is 99%
certain.
For several months, President Quirino has been working,
with little success, to counter the popularity that Magsaysay
achieved by his successes against the Huks. In early 1950 the
Huks numbered some 20,000 and were gaining support as a result
of popular disillusion with the government and the ill-
disciplined armed forces. They were able to carry out well-
coordinated raids reaching to within a few miles of Manila
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and had spread their organization from Central Luzon to the
southern part of the island and to the island of Panay. They
were reportedly in liaison with the Communists in China. Mag-
saysay took the defense portfolio in August 1950 and within
less than a year had restored discipline to the armed forces.
By late 1951 the Huk organization had been severely hurt and
its armed strength had fallen to less than 10,000)largely
Magsaysay's campaign against the Huks caused his emergence
as the one Filipino leader who appeared to represent a clean
break with the reactionary and corrupt politicians characteris-
tic of both parties. Dealing directly with the Army Chief of
Staff, Quirino has effected the reassignment of certain army
and constabulary officers with the apparent purpose of putting
his proteges in a strategic position to control the elections.
While Quirino has not revealed how he will counter Magsay-
say's resignation, it has been reliably reported that the Army
Chief of Staff will soon charge that the Defense Secretary had
been guilty of gross malfeasance, claiming that armed forces'
funds were diverted to further Magsaysay's political aspirations.
The current Nacionalista Party leadership offers little
better prospect of good government for the Philippines than
the Liberals. Jose Laurel, the wartime puppet president, is
the party's most powerful figure; Senator Claro Recto, who
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periodically makes anti-American pronouncements.has been
mentioned as a possible Nacionalista foreign secretary. How-
ever, with Magsaysay at its head there would be a good possi-
bility that the Party's old guard would gradually be supplanted
by younger, more progressive men.
The crucial problem this year, however, is whether the
electorate will be permitted a free choice. Popular dis-
illusion following the fraudulent elections of 1949 enabled
the Huks to make their greatest gains, whereas the relatively
clean elections of 1951 contributed directly to their present
weakness. The widespread popular interest in clean elections
which was developed in 1951 continues unabated. Many observers
believe that fraudulent elections next fall might so disgust
the electorate that a serious rebellion against the present
form of government would result.
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