USSR NOTE ON SURPRISE ATTACK CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01441R000100010016-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: November 12, 1958
• Content Type: PREL

Approved For Rele se 000/08/30: CIA-RDP80R01441 ROg,"O 010016-6
USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Nov. 12, 1958
USSR NOTE ON SURPRISE ATTACK CONF;A;ENCE
Moscow, TASS, -.Radiote.letype in Russian to Europe, Nov. 12, 1958,
1010 GY2--L
(Text) Moscow--On Nov. 7, 1958, the U.S. embassy in Moscow sent a note
to the USSR Foreign Ministry regarding, the convocation of a conferance
experts on the problem of prevention of a sudden attack which is a rep.:;
to the note of the USSR Foreign Ministry of Nov. 1.
On Nov. 10 the USSR Foreign Ministry sent a reply note on this prob:..e:;l
the U.S. embassy.
We now transmit the full text of the note of the USSR Foreign Miaistr;
of Nov. 10:
The USSR Foreign Ministry presents its respects to the U.S. embassy,
and referring to the note of the embassy No. 447 of Nov. 7, 1958, has the
honor to state the following:
The ministry takes into consideration the statement contained in the note
on the composition of the delegation of the United States, Great Britain,
France, Canada, and Italy to the Geneva conference of experts on the
problem concerning the prevention of a sudden attack opening on Nov. 10.
In accordance with the principles of equal representation of member
countries of the Atlantic pact and member countries of the Warsaw treaty,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that the countries of the Warsaw
treaty will be represented at the conference on behalf of the Soviet
Union by V. Kuznetsov, Col. Gen. A. Gryzlov, I.G. Usachev, Maj. Gen.
A.V. Fisarev, and Maj. Gen. S.D. Romanov;
On+behalf of Poland, by M. Naszkowski, M. Blusztajn, Brig. Gen. J. Dzi.ewecki.
and Brig,, Gen. T. Piuro;
On behalf of Czechoslovakia, by J. Gajek, Maj. Gen. V. Glavaty and
Col. M. Broz;
On behalf of Rumania, G. Nicolae, Maj. Gen. S. Constantin and Ma j . K.
Nicolae;
On behalf of .Albania, Nesti Nase, Gen. Arif Hasko, col. Dilaver Poci and
Lambi Becini.
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01441 R000100010016-6
 Approved For Ree 2000/08/30 CIA-RDP80R01441 X100010016-6
BR 2 - USSR IW1.F~P,NATIONAL AFFAIRS
Nov. 12, 1958
Regarding the main problem of the conference, the Soviet Government, as has
already been pointed out in the message of the Chairman of the Council of
Ministers, N.S. Khrushchev, to U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower of July 2,
and in the notes of the ministry of Se yet . 15 and Nov. 1, 1958, proceeds
from the fact that this problem should consist in that practical recommenda-
tions should be worked out on the measures concerning the prevention of a
sudden attack combined.ryrithcertain steps in the sphere of disarmament
without the implementation of which the consideration of the problem on
the prevention of a sudden attack is u8e,less.
Moscow, Soviet European Service in English, Nov. 10, 1958, 2145 GMT--L
(Text) Speaking at the Geneva conference for the prevention of surprise
attack, attended by the experts of 10 Warsaw pact and NATO countries,
V. Kuznetsov, the chief Soviet delegate, declared the:taak of the conference
to be the joint drafting of practical measures to be taken at once to
prevent a surprise attack by one state against another and thereby (avert?)
the danger of a new war. Kuznetsov said that reliable steps for preventing
surprise attacks could be worked out only if a complete ban was placed
on atomic and hydrogen weapons, if they were withdrawn from the armaments
of states and their stocks destroyed, if war bases on foreign territories
were abolished and conventional armaments and armed forces were reduced.
He assured the conference that the Soviet delegation would do all it
could to assure its success.
The chief U.S. delegate, Mr. Foster, made no mention in his speech of
disarmament or important political issues relating to the possibility of
a surprise attack and endeavored to fix the attention of the conference
on the technical aspect. In fact the U.S. delegate called it a conference
of technical experts and in speaking of the aims of the meeting, he insisted
on using the word "reducing" instead of "preventing" the danger of a
surprise attack.
SUDDEN ATTACK PREVENTION URGENT TASK
Moscow, Soviet Home Service, Nov. 10, 1958, 1620 GMT--L
(Morozov Talk)
(Text) The conference of experts convened for the purpose of examining
practical questions pertaining to the problem of averting surprise attacks
opened today in Geneva. Representatives of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Rumania, Albania, the United States, Britain, France, and Italy (Canada
not mentioned--Ed.) are participating.
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1441 R000100010016-6
 0 Approved For ReI se 000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01441 R0 j 010016-6
BB 3 - USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Nov. 12, 1955
They are confronted with the task of elaborating recommendations on
measures for preventing the possibility of surprise attacks. The experts
must devote considerable attention to such technical questions as the means
and objectives of control, and ale6 to" the results which these measures
might insure. Of course, the experts have only to accomplish preparatory
work. As to the decisions on the setting up on a mutual basis of a s-,,step,
of preventing the possibility of a surprise attack, these will have to
adopted by the relevant governments. The United Nations will be inf or:
of progress in the Geneva negotiations through its Secretary General.
The importance of the issues to be considered in Geneva is extremeh'
great, Tension in contemporary international relations caused by t .~
cold war policy and armament race conducted by the U .S . Government,
particularly of the nuclear )armament race, demands the adoption of me
decisive measures for removing the threat of war. This is demanded by t{.
vital interests of all mankind, for war under present conditions is
pregnant with unprecedented miseries for all nations.
The problem of preventing a surprise attack has, as is known, acquired
particular urgency lately in connection with the fact that the
United States had introduced the dangerous practice of flights by U.S.
warplanes carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs over territories of a number
of West European states and in Arctic areas, in the direction of USSR
frontiers. It is not difficult to imagine what consequences might arise
from the irresponsible action of some American airman piloting such
a plane, or simply from some technical fault in the equipment. After all,
facts are already known of an atom bomb which fell from an American military
aircraft on the territory of the United States itself, but by mere chance
did not blow up.
The Soviet Government's position on the question of preventing a surprise
attack by one state against another is clear. It is reflected in a number
of official documents, among others in the Soviet Government's proposal of
May 5, 1958, in the message by the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministe:os,
N .S . Khrushchev, to U.S. President Eisenhower of July 2, 1958, and ald.o
in a number of Soviet Government notes to the Government of the
United States. The Soviet Government has declared that it considers it
essential--alongside preliminary measures for limiting the armament race,
such things, for instance, as general discontinuance of nuclear weapon testy--
to come to t.rms on preventing the possibility of one state attacking;
another.
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1441 R000100010016-6
 Approved For Rp a 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1441 Rfl 00010016-6
- BB '4 USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Nov. 12, 1958
In the way of concrete measures, the Soviet Union proposed that agreement
be reached on the establishment of control `Posts at railway. junctions,
in large ports, and on important highways' in conjunction with definite steps
toward disarmament, and also oncarryig out aerial photography in areas
of outstanding significance from the point of view of averting the danger of
surprise attack. The Soviet Government, by the way, expressed its agreement
on coming to terms on the earring out,of joint aerial photography in the zone
where the main armed forces of the two alignments of European states-'
NATO and the Warsaw treaty--are conceited, to a depth of 800 kilometers
to the East and the West of the line delimiting these forces. In addition
to this, the Soviet Government has proposed that, alongside this zone in
Europe, a zone of aerial inspection. including a part of Soviet territory
in the Far East and of a corresponding part of territory of the United States,
be established.
The significance of these Soviet proposals lies primarily in the fact that
they are based on an equal estimation of the security of both sides and
take into account the earlier proposals of the Western powers, in particular
of the U.S. Goverment. The Soviet proposals are based on a realistic
foundation. This can be seen, in particular, in the matter of aerial
photography.
At the present time the possibility of aerial 'photography of vast areas, or
even the whole of the USSR or U.S. territories, as proposed in the West, cannot
be considered separately from measures for easing international tension and
strengthening confidence among states and,. in the first place, among the
great powers. Under the present international situation, when the cold war
conducted by the U.S. ruling circles has created an atmosphere of mistrust
and suspicion, the proposal on a joint flight over all the territories of
both is unrealistic. In the opinion of the Soviet Government this measure
can be carried out at the final stage of the disarmament problem, that is when
the questions of the complete banning of atomic and hydrogen weapons and
their elimination from the armament of states, of a considerable reduction
in armed forces and equipment, of removing military bases on foreign
territories, will be solved. In other words, when relations of real trust
between the states are. created.
The Soviet proposals have been a suitable basis for reaching agreement.
However, Washington's replies to the relevant USSR Government notes and
U.S . press readti-ons have, unfortunately, shown the unwillinbness of the
Western powers to agree to the Soviet Union's wise proposals. During the past
few days the American press has devoted much attention to the position of the
U.S. delegates at the Geneva conference on preventing surprise attacks.
The largest New York papers frankly wrote that at this conference the
United States will pursue two aims :
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1441 R000100010016-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/30 CII P A-5 DP80RO1441 R t'QA1 ~~ .L A,F AIRS
Nov. 72, 1953
Firstly--they pointed out--the American delegation will strive to obtain
the maximum information possible on the USSR's war po1x ntial and,
mainly, on new types of arms. Of pax'Aphlar i n.terest--and. this the
American press As not corldsal-=:areSoviet achievements in the field
of rocket technology which are considerably in advance of those of the
Americans.
Seeoudly--the American papers stated.--in Geneva thee, U..S. delegation
will try to thwart any possibility of reaching a practical agreement
in the discussion of the most complex system of control and inspection
or effectively preventing a surprise attack. The U.S.. delegation--the
press noted--will try at these negotiations as well to insist on the
establishment of such a system of control and inspection which, in
practice, is practically impossible and represents, as described by the
Baltimore SUN, something in the nature of a "global puzzle" which can
include anything you wish, from interplanetary spheres and sputniks to
groups of land observers'.
These Pessimistic American press statements cannot, however, shake the
firm determination of all those who are sincerely interested in consolidating
peace and who want to achieve progress in the matter of preventing a
surprise attack. And the possibilities to do so are obvious. They will
be implemented, as N.S. Ithrushchev indicated, only if all sides proceed
from the need to take into account the interests'of security of every
participant in the agreement, and refrain from actions leading to a
deterioration in the atmosphere and to increasing the danger of a war.
Today one can but wish success to the Geneva conference on the
prevention of surprise attacks, which can make an important contribution
to the cause of easing international tension and consolidating peace in
the world.
Conference Agreement Possible
Moscow, Soviet Near Eastern Service in Turkish, Nov. 11, 1958,
15 30 GMT--L
(Uruzhinin talk: "Geneva Conference on Surprise Attack Must End in Success")
(Text) The conference of experts dealing with the problem of.measures
for preventing surprise attack began in Geneva yesterday. The Warsaw
pact countries arc represented in this conference by the delegates of
the Soviet Union, Poland, C7ee.hosl.ovakia, Rumania, and Albania.
From the countries of the North Atlantic organi7nti.on, delegates of
United S%atcs, BY t al a, TfrmnPQ , , (:anKd n,,, nr(l l tn,ly are . pL-,'aozlt.
Approved For Release 2000/08/30: CIA-RDP80RO1441 R000100010016-6
 Approved For ReL 2000/08/30: CIA-RDP80R01441 R001 010016-6
DR 6 - USSR 111FETRATI41VAL AH:tU _ :,?S ,.
Nov. 12, 1958
The Soviet Government attaches great importance to the problem of
preventing sudden attack. This is shown quite clearly by tine fact
that it is basically the Soviet Union which is tY initiator in
calling the present Geneva conference of experts. The Soviet
G3Vernmcnt has stated many times that in the present international
situation, this problem must be solved by definite steps side by
side
with the disarmament problem. The Soviet Union expects the conference
of experts to show practical steps in this field.
In the opinion of the Soviet Governr,lent, if the sides concerned take
into consideration the reciprocal interests and refrain from actions
leading to the exacerbation of the international situation and to
increasing the threat of a new war, then agreement can very well be
possible on measures for preventing sudden ,?htack. Thus, as everyone
will easily understand, it is because of this that the Soviet Union
approaches the Geneva conference of experts in the opinion that it is
both possible and necessary that those taking part in this conference
reach agreement.
However, if comments in the U.S. and British press are taken as an
indication, the views in certain Western circles are totally different.
Long before the delegates to the conference held their first meeting in
Geneva, the U.S. press was predicting that the conference would
certainly fail. The papers kept referring to the deep contrasts dividing
the Soviet Union and the Western powers, to the precipice between the
two sides. For example the ASSOCIR-PED PRESS correspondent Hightower said;
The conference is beginning (two words indistinct) conditions. The New
York IURALD TRIBUNE added the following to the above story: Right from
the beginning the conference cannot attain any sort of agreement. The UPI
reported: In Washjngton, they are very, doubtful whether the conference
of experts can give definite results.
As the U.S. papers write openly, the United States intends to make use of
the conference of experts to obtain as much information as possible,
particularly on the Soviet Union's military potential. The measures
which the United States basically wants to discuss are not at all
measures for the prevention of attack. As to the problem of what sort
of w'eapons are to be controlled, the..Washington STAR asserts that in the
opinion of the United States the talks should cover not only existing
weapons of attack but also weapons that are in the preparatory stage.
As it will be easily understood, under present day conditions when the
United States is lagging noticeably behind the Soviet Union in the sphere
of rocket technology, such tactics have only the foll..owig aim: to
examine the Soviet Lin. i.Uri' s faos i +, j.z, in, the..spherc>. of most modern Weapons.
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1441 R000100010016-6