Soviet Attitude on Discussion of Various Instruments of Surprise Attack

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01441R000100010009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: October 22, 1958
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
22 October 1958
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Soviet Attitude on Discussion of Various Instruments of
Surprise Attack
1. This memorandum deals with two questions: (a) What US means
of possible surprise attack are of greatest concern to the Soviet
leaderstj and (b) ghat Soviet means of possible surprise attack would
the Soviet delegation be most reluctant to discuss? These questions
are closely related to issues discussed in the 0/NE staff paper of
9 September "Probable Soviet Positions at a Technical Conference on
Measures to Avert Surprise ,ittack" and the latter should be read in
connection with the present memorandum.
2. The Soviets' willingness to discuss in detail various weapons
systems will probably depend on how they weigh the following five
considerations:
(a) genuine concern over the threat from any US system;
(b) extent to which a discussion of particular weapons systems u~d r e
r Soviet disclosure of secret information or of
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weaknesses;
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(c) whether discussion of various weapons systems might give
the USSR clues as to US thinking on future weapons systems;
(d) potentiality for propaganda exploitation of the US position
at the conference and subse quentlyp and avoidance of matters
which the US could exploit in propaganda;
(e) relation to preferred Soviet surprise attack inspection
systems i.e.$ an effort to stack the deck toward the kind
of agreement they really want to achieve.
On the basis of these considerations, we make the following estimate of
the Soviet attitude toward discussion of various instruments of possible
surprise attack.
3. Long-Range Ground-Launched Missiles. The Soviet leaders probably
believe that they have an advantage in long-range missile development and
strength, and they will therefore be cautious about giving the US any
opportunity to single out neutralization or limitation on missiles. They
may,, however,, take a longer term view of the probable future US capability
in intermediate and intercontinental missiles. In any cases they will
probably agree to the discussion of control over missiles only if this
subject is tied to long-range bombers and bases. They.will probably
expect us to raise the subject, and will seek to leave the initiative for
introduction of technical specifications to us, so as not to disclose
details of their own program which might assist us.
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14, Long-Range Avia ton# The Soviets will emphasize controls and
restrictions on long-range aviation in view of the heavy US reliance on
this arm, and their relative lesser reliance upon it. They will probably
stress the dangers of unintentional triggering of war by a beserk pilots
by accidental dropping of a bomb on foreign territory, by misjudging as
an enemy act the accidental dropping of a bomb on one's own territory,
to a penetration of his airspace or mass flights "towLxdtt an enemy's
territory? thus "compelling" that power to take countermeasures, etc.
These arguments will be used to focus attention on limitations governing
foreign basing and overflight of other countries, flight near or toward
another power, and the like. They will also probably have an interest
in exploring purely technical inspection-control measures to assist them
in reaching a conclusion on what these would involve; the history of
their own past disarmament proposals has reflected an evident wavering
on this point, probably in part because they are uncertain just what it
would involve in terms of inspection activities.
5. Tactical aviation. The Soviets will probably tie controls over
tactical aviation to zonal areas of inspection and limitation of forces.
In general, as in most other cases, they will probably argue that it is
not the tactical aviation or other system, but the nuclear munitions, which
make controls so necessary. Hence, they will probably stress nuclear-free
zones, especially in Central Europe, with control over tactical air (as
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well as ground) forces within such zones.
6. Ground Forces. The Soviet disarmament proposals of the last
three years, insofar as they have dealt with measures to avert surprise
attack, have stressed inspection of facilities for large-scale movement
of ground forces: railway junctions, large ports, and motor highways.
Ms insistence will probably be maintained, oven though it is a vulnerable
propaganda position to emphasize these to the exclusion of airfields
and missile sites. One reason is that it accords with the Soviet view
that large armies would be involved even in a general nuclear war. Also,
it is consistent with the Soviet political line on disarmament thus far,
that invasion across frontiers with large bodies of troops is a form
of surprise attack requiring controls and weapons limitations. This
stand supports their campaign for a nucle r-free, limited-forces, and
inspected area in Central Europe -- which we believe to be one of the
chief objectives of the Soviets in the forthcoming conference. The
Soviets will probably be sensitive to any revelation of their ground
force strength anti deployment, and they will therefore seek to avoid other
than technical inspection discussions.
7. Missile-launching Submarinese It is difficult to estimate the
Soviet position on this topic. They are believed to be developing a
capability in weapons of this typos While this subject may not be
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introduced by them, they will presumably agree to discussions but try
to limit them to controls at naval bases, and perhaps to agreements on
non-navigation in certain areas near the other sidets territory.
8. Other Naval Forces, It would be logical for the Soviets to sock
controls over aircraft carriers, since they have none and we do. Again,
suggested controls would probably take the form of limitations on deploy-
ment, and non-carrying of nuclear weapons to prevent such accidents as those
discussed in connection with long-range aviation. They might advance
the idea of similar limitations for other conventional, or missile-launching
surface vessels,
9. Earth Satellite Vehicles. It is possible that the Soviets will
advance a new proposal for control over space vehicles overflying other
countries in aformulation which would not limit missile test or other
firings over home territory. There is no certainty of the Soviet estimate
of the value to them of reconnaissance satellites, but there is evidence
of their concern over US planned and possible use of such vehicles for
reconnaissance and for bombardment. Aside from the fact that such a proposal
would be good propaganda, if implemented it would deny the US future
improvement in intelligence. On the other hand, while the Soviets would
presumably gain much loss from a reconnaissance vehicle, they would probably
wish to avoid ;riving the US an opportunity to raise the possibility of a
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UN or internationally-run disarmament inspection satellite, Moreover,,
at present they are probably willing to contemplate only limited zones
of inspection in Central Europe and possibly in the Far East. While
some forms of inspection, such as aerial overflight, can be either
universal or limited to special danger (or 'ipilottl) zones, and might
there fore be acceptable to the Soviets for discussion, an inspection
system using satellite vehicles covering very broad areas might be
considered to place pressure on them toward more comprehensive controls
than they presently intend,
10, Other Means of Surprise Attack. As we have noted, the Soviets
are likely to attempt to place particular stress on nuclear munitions
and warheads of all kind as the principal danger in surprise attack.
This will not, however, provide a basis for rohl oorifo anco discussion
as the Soviets are aware*
U. While it is not likely that the Soviets will raise the question
of intelligence and warning systems -- surely a key matter in detecting
ourprise -- it cannot be excluded that they may do so, Should they
raise questions of electronic and other specialized collection techniques,
they probably have materials which would support a new popular campaign
against forms of activity previously little known to world publics* Also,
in recent internal propaganda, the Soviets have raised the issues of
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alleged US interest in clandestine entry of small nuclear weapons$
US use of balloons for reconnaissance., and foreign attache contacts with
the civilian population for espionage purposes. One or more of these
subjects might be raised, the last indicated perhaps in terms of defining
severe limits on the role and movement of inspectors for any disarmament
agreement. 25X1A9a
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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