MEMORANDUM FOR:(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01362A000200070003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 15, 1977
• Content Type: FORM

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f
Attached is the memorandum on Concorde
landing rights in New York that you re-
quested for passage to Mr. Frank A. Weil
Assistant Secretary Designate for Domestic
and International Business Affairs, US
STAT
FO,
5.75 101 EUS, DITIONS PREVIOUS
n er or Policy Support
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 CONFIDENTIALI 25X1
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Concorde Landing Rights: French Adamancy and Possible
Reactions
The French emotional committment to Concorde cuts
across the political, economic, and social boundaries
that usually divide the country. We believe it virtually.
certain that a refusal of New York landi-ng rights to
Concorde will result in retaliation, probably initially
in the civil aviation sphere. The French unions will
refuse to service US airliners and the French government
may also take some action against US civil aviation
interests after pursuing the landing rights issue in the
US courts.
Reasons for French Adamancy
The product of the 15-year, $3 billion Anglo-French
Concorde program is an unquestioned technological success
and an equally unquestioned financial failure. As the
French people see it, the US pulled out of the three-
way competition to produce a supersonic transport. The
Soviet Union built an inferior aircraft which crashed at
the Paris airshow and is still deemed unsafe, even by
Russian standards, for passenger service. In contrast
France and the UK persevered and finally completed an
aircraft which meets the requirements that were specified
for it in 1965. The Concorde cuts transatlantic flight
time by half and is claimed to be as quiet as many of the
aircraft currently in use. Moreover international travel-
lers seem anxious to use it despite the cost--a fact
attested to by the high load factors being achieved on
the current transatlantic routes.*
'E ScheduZed transatlantic flight times for the Concorde are
4 hours, and 5 minutes, Paris to Washington, 3 hours and 50
minutes, London to Washington, and 7 hours, Paris to Rio. 25X1
.Comparable times for subsonic aircraft are 8 hours and 55
minutes, 8 hours and 20 minutes, and T2 hours and 10 minutes
respectiyelu.
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The proud hopes that hundreds of Concordes would
be flying in the 1980's are now forgotten. Probably
the best that can be expected is to find buyers and
steady utilization for the sixteen aircraft currently
completed and under construction. This would also help
to keep alive whatever hopes remain for a new production
run or a follow-on aircraft.
Given the curious mixture of fact and fantasy that
comprise the French'conventional wisdom on the Concorde
issue, a denial of landing rights in New York is seen
as an American sourgrapes attempt to deny even the limited
recognition and reward still possible for the Gallic
equivalent of the Apollo space program. Living in a
country where authority is highly centralized, the French
have difficulty comprehending the'power that state and
local governments exercise in the US. They would at-
tribute a refusal to intensive lobbying by US airlines
and aircraft manufacturers who don't want to face
competition from Concorde. Noise'and other environmental
arguments are seen as little more than a smokescreen.
The French Gove'rnment's Position
Officials of the Giscard government have a-much less
naive view of affairs on this side of-the Atlantic. How
ever, even they probably are convinced that a US-built
SST would not have encountered the obstacles that
Concorde faces.
In any event, staking out and-maintaining a strong
position on landing rights is a political imperative for
the current French leadership. Successive governments
under de Gaulle, Pompidou, and Giscard have reaffirmed
their faith in the project and Giscard is already under
fire from both Gaullists and the left for his willingness
.to cooperate with the US.
Giscard is vulnerable to such pressures. His govern-
ing coalition is suffering major losses to the left in
the municipal elections on March 13 and 20. The Socialist-
Communist alliance's strength is growing and opinion polls
show it is likely to win control of the National Assembly
in 1978. Giscard's own center-right coalition is weakened
by the ambition of Gaullist chief Jacques Chirac, who is
challenging the President's leadership, and by Giscard's
'failure to exert consistent strong leadership.
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Retaliation
An adverse decision on Concorde landing rights
would elicit immediate non-official retaliation. The
unions have already announced plans to refuse service to
US airliners in France. They also would take the lead
in organizing demonstrations against the US decision
and probably would attempt to organize a boycott against
US-made products. Aside from the possible disruption
of US air carrier service the actual economic effects
would probably not be great.
On the official side the immediate reaction would
be limited to strong condemnations. Paris believes that it
has a strong legal case on Concorde and thus can still
win the landing rights battle. in court. The French.
will base their case partially on their contention that
the shorter New York-Paris run allows for reduced take-
off weight. They will maintain that lower weight and
adjusted takeoff procedures will result in a noise re-
duction sufficient to meet the New York requirements.
The French goverrment is unlikely to escalate the con-
troversy with retaliatory measures until and unless
the legal battle is also lost.
If Concorde loses the final court battle as well,
Paris will act and probably in several different areas.
Some direct retaliation in the civil aviation sphere
seems likely. The French may, for example, pull back
from the closer ties between their aircraft industry
and US manufacturers that have been developing lately.
McDonnell Douglas recently reached a tentative agree-
ment with Aerospatiale and Dessault to develop an
advanced short-to-medium range aircraft, the Mercure 200.
Beyond some action in the aerospace area the French
government will likely to be a good deal less cooperative
in relations generally. This could show up in the
form of French stonewalling in the Multilateral'Trade
Negotiations., in tightened French controls on American
business and in other areas of mutual interst.
Future of Concorde
No matter what the decision on the Concorde's
landing at New York, we believe that Air France and
British Airways will continue all existing Concorde
services and add selectively to their supersonic route
network. The vast sums needed to develop the aircraft
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have already been expended and it will require relatively
small subsidies to keep them flying. Although service
to New York as North America's gateway city is an
important goal--for both prestige and passenger traffic--
both France and the United Kingdom will seek other
routes.
Currently, Iran Air holds purchase options for two
Concordes.and the Peoples Republic of China, an option
for up to three aircraft. Iran has wavered in recent
months but may yet go ahead for prestige reasons. We
do not know the current status of the PRC's options
for the aircraft. No other airline has indicated any
desire to purchase the SST in the near future, but
at least four--Braniff, middle East Airlines, Singapore
Airways, and Quantas--have shown some interest in a
possible leasing arrangement.
Refusal of landing rights in New York will make
it more difficult to sell the remaining seven Concordes.
Of the 16 Concordes completed and under construction,
nine have been sold to the captive markets of Air France
and British Airways. Both the French and British want
very much to sell the remaining aircraft to other airlines.
CONFIDENTIAL
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TO:
STAT
FOR M
I FEB 55 24
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