MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD FROM L. K. WHITE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01284A001800090111-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2005
• Sequence Number: 111
• Publication Date: March 24, 1969
• Content Type: MFR

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24 March 1969
Morning Meeting of 24 March 1969
Godfrey noted that it was relatively quiet over the weekend. He
reported the loss of an outpost just west of the Plaine des Jarres.
D/ONE noted that he has some extra copies of the memorandum
on the Sirio/Soviet dispute.
Carver noted that the weekend was quiet but that all hands were
hard at work reacting to a MACV request for a review of our base areas.
He commented that OER developed a response which was cabled to
Saigon on Sunday.
Maury reported that this afternoon ill be briefing
the Subcommittee on Bomber Defense of the Senate Armed Services
Committee.
mThe Director called the DD/S&T's attention to John Finney's
article on the ABM debate in the Sunday New York Times and to Finney's
article on the SS-9 in today's New York Times. The Director asked
the DD/S&T for his views on both articles.
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The Director expressed his opinion that we might wish to review
our judgment that a new Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarine has
been identified, as reported in today's CIB on page 4. DD/S&T noted
that this identification was the result of considerable analysis.
mThe Director asked D/ONE to review the Djilas article in the
Sunday New York Times Magazine and to report on any- variance with
our Estimates.
The Director called attention to 'Notes and Comment, " contained
in the 22 March issue of The New Yorker and reporting on a speech by
George .Wald, professor of biology at Harvard. A discussion of the
article ensued,.
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I'ro and Con on the `Modified' A~1Vl
PRO ,
Will the ABM sys#?m slow down the arms race?
President Nixon's announcement of his decision to go
ahead with a modified antiballistic missile program has
set off, as predicted, an intense debate over the wisdom
of deploying the Sentinel-or, as the Pentagon has re-
named it-the Safeguard system. Last week the debate
was centered in two televised Senate hearings on the
merits of th? program: before th? Armed Services Com-
mittee, where Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird faced
friendly questioning, and before the Foreign Relations
Committee, where he faced hostile questioning. It was
shaping up as a new great debate covering not only
military strategy but foreign policy as well, with a e-ose
vote forecast when Congress finally has to pass on the
Administration's proposal. What follows are some of the
arguments, pro and con, on the ABM issues as they be-
gan emerging last week.
CON
Since the proposed system is defensive in nature and
designed to protect the nation's retaliatory strike capa-
bility, ~ it is not "provocative." Secretary Laird said it
"will require no reaction at all from the Soviet Union"
Deployment of an ABM system will accelerate the
atomic arms race, prompting the Soviet Union to expand
its offensive forces, thus setting off another spiral iri the
action-reaction cycle of the arms race.
,W;II deployment encourage arms talks?
A U.S. initiative to deploy an ABM system will com-
plicate and perhaps obstruct long-discussed' plans for
the United States and the Soviet Union to discuss a limi-
tation on their offensive and strategic weapons and, as
Senator Albert Gore put it, "ultimately could degrade our
deterrent "
Will the ABM system enhance national security?
By deploying its own ABM system, the United States
will strengthen its bargaining hand in any negotiations.
The Soviet Union is already deploying an ABM system
and there is no indication that it will become disinter-
ested in arms talks now .that the United States is
deploying one. In fact, Mr. Laird said, the modified de-
ployment gives the Russians "an added incentive no
negotiate a meaningful agreement on limitation both of
offensive and defensive weapons."
With its recent buildup in offensive force, the Soviet
Union could require a "first-strike" capability by the
mid-1970's: "If the Soviet threat turns out to be, as the
evidence now indicates, an attempt ho erode our de-
terrent capability," Mr. Laird said, "we must be in a
position to convince them that a first strike would always
involve unacceptable risks."
. Will it forestall counter measures?
Admittedly offensive counter measures can ~ be taken.
But an ABM system complicates the problem of an
attacker and forces him to allocate more of his resources
to offensive weapons. Some warheads may get through,
but in defending missile sites-in contrast to population
centers-an air-tight defense is not needed.
With its Minuteman, Polaris and bomber forces, the
United. States has more than .enough deterrent power to
absorb an attack and still retaliate devastatingly against
the Soviet Union. As the Polaris missiles are replaced
by Poseidons, Senator Stuart Symington asked, "Is there
any reason to believe that our Poseidon force will be
vulnerable to pre-emptive attack during the early nine-
teen-seventies?"
The Soviet Union, as well as the United States, can
easily overwhelm any ABM system by allocating more
warheads to a target or sending in decoys and penetra-
tion aids.
Is it a feasible system?
From all,the tests of components thus far, the system A system so complex and unable to be tested under
should work as planned. And again perfection is not I combat conditions cannot be expected to work the first
needed when protecting missiles. time it is put to a test.
Is the modified ABM an improvement for defending cities
A system to protect populations against large scale By its reorientation of the ABM system, the Pentagon
attack is unfeasible, although it is practical to build a is now proposing to defend holes in the ground not
defense against a small scale attack such as Communist people-and see if you can sell that to the voters back
China~might launch. The protection oP the strategic forces home. Senator Charles Percy said he is not convinced
is the best defense of populations since it will help deter the ABM "adds one iota to our national security."
an attack. ,
Is the system essential to meet the Chinese threat?
Admittedly the Chinese missile program has slipped.
But still it appears that by the mid 1970's China will have
a force of about two dozen missiles and, Mr. Laird said,
"pose a threat to our people and our property." With
such a small force, China might be so irrational as to
be tempted to s~~~~~gf~r~a~~c~a~~~>~il~t~3~4
was wiped out b e m ed tat s.
China has yet to test-fire an ICBM and fo.r the fore-
seeable future it will not acquire .enough missile force
to threaten the U.S. And Russia has been deterred by
the U.S. retaliatory capability. Senator J. W. Fulbright
accused Mr. Laird of invoking the "technique of fear"
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SS-9 Helps Administration Score Points in Missile Debate
By JOAN W. FINNEY
Spedal to The xew York Tfmt~e
WASHINGTON, March 23-
By stripping away some of the
secrecy about SS-9, the large
Soviet intercontinental ballistic
missile, the ?Administration has
apparently won the opening
round in the Senate debate over
a missile defense system.
Privately some Senate op-
ponents of an anti-ballistic mis-
rile (ABM) system concede that
the Administration, in the first
week of Congressional tests-
, mony in defense of its safe-
guard system, has made a pre-
sumptive case that additional
steps must be taken to defend
the nation's nuclear deterrent
against the SS-9.
What the Administration has
yet to establish, however, in
t'he opinion of these opponents,
is that the Safeguard system
is the most effective or cheap-
' _ est way to defend the deterrent
.- force of Minuteman intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles:
Alternatives Drafted
To recapture the initiative in
the debate, therefore, the op-
ponents are drafting deterrent-
. protection alternatives to an
ABM system, such as placing
some of the Minuteman mss-
' siles on the bottom . of the
Great Lakes, where they would
be immune from detection and
protected by a layer of water
' against the warheads of the
SS-9.
That some of the opponents
should be drafting alternatives
rather than taking issue with
the Administration's basic pre-
mise that the nation's nuclear
deterrent is threatened reflects
a significant shift in the debate
in favor of the Administration.
What probably caused the shift,
more than any other factor,
-was SS-9.
55-9 is not a new factor in
the secret war games played 'by
the .Pentagon to work out the
..nation's nuclear strategy. The
Soviet Union started deploying
"the SS-9 in underground silos in
1966, a fact quickly detected by
United States reconnaissance
.:satellites.
In terms of the ABM debate,
however, what was new was
the way Defense Secretary
Melvin R. Laird publicly in-
troduced the SS-9 to the Sena-
tors and the American public in
his initial appearances last' week
before the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee and before the
Disarmament Subcommittee of
the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
First Open Discussion
Never before had the Pentagon
openly discussed the SS-9, and
the fact that Mr. Laird chose to
declassify intelligence informa-
tion about the missile prompted
.: Senator J. W. Fulbright, chair-
man of the Foreign Relations
Committee, to complain that
fear" to sell his Safeguard pro-
gram.
Mr. Laird staked his case far
the Safeguard program largely
on the SS-9. His argument
basically went like this:
91t is apparent that the
Soviet Union by deploying the
SS-9, is intent an acquiring a
"first' strike" capability-or an
ability to launch such a devas-
tating attack on American mis-
sile and bomber forces that the
United States could not retali-
ate.
With its large warhead and
accuracy, the S5-9 would be.
capable of knocking out a large
portion. of the 1,000-missile
Minuteman force, even those
sitting in the security of super-
hardened silos. The deterrent
force of Polaris submarines,
with some 656 missiles, is
threatened by Soviet anti-sub-
marine warfare developments.
Therefore, if it is going to
maintain its deterrent strength,
the Unfted States has no alter-
native but to protect some of
the Minuteman bases with the
Safeguard system against the
SS-9. Under phase I of the Ad-
ministration's Safeguard plan,
two Minuteman bases-one in
Montana, the other in North
Dakota-would be protected
initially, with the protection
extended to other Minuteman
bases if the Soviet threat con-
tinued to grow.
Analyses Differ
Mr. Laird's description of the
SS-9, and of the Soviet plans
for deploying and using it, at
times impressed some Senators
as confusing if not contra-
dictory. But that may reflect
the facts that there are differ-
ences within the intelligence
community over the signifi-
cance of the 55-9.
According to well-informed
Congressional sources, there
are differences on these critical
points:
SIZE OF WARHEAD - Mr.
Laird and David Packard,,
Deputy Secretary of Defense,'
credited the missile with a 20-
25-megaton warhead. The Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency report-I
edly believes the warhead is
much smaller, probably nearer
five megatons. That would make
it more comparable to the
United States Titan II intercon=
tinental missile -and at one
point, in fact, Mr. Packard de-
scribed the S5-9 as a "Titan II-
like weapon."
A magaton is the equivalent
of a million tons of TNT. The
bomb that fell on Hiroshima
was the. equivalent of 20,000
tons of TNT.
RATE OF DEPLOYMENT-
Mr. Laird estimated that more
than 200 SS-9'S were already
deployed ands j~~"
telligence inf~r~-sF~-
ceived as recently as December
tinuing deployment, contrary to
earlier intelligence estimates by
the United States. Graphs pre-
sented by Mr. Packard pro-
jected that the Soviet Union
would have nearly 500 55-9's
by 1975. But this projection
assumes that the missiles will
be deployed at the relatively
high rate of the past.
In his statement in January
on the nation's defense posture,
former defense Secretary Clark
~M. Clifford predicted that the
rate of increase in Soviet inter-
continental missiles "will be
considerably smaller over the
next two or three years. Be-
yond that point, our estimates
become less firm."
ACCURACY - Mr. Packard
credited the missile with an
accuracy of around six-tenths
of a mile. With that accuracy
and a 20-megaton warhead, he
pointed out, the missile could
destroy a Minuteman silo.
Other intelligence estimates re-
portedly do not credit the mis-
sile with such high accuracy.
PURPOSE OF WEAPON -
Some intelligence analysts be-
lieve the missile is a retaliatory
weapon aimed primarily at
cities. Late last year, for ex-
ample, Alain Enthoven, former
Assistant Defense Secretary for
Systems Analysis, told the Sen-
ate Armed Services Committee
that the SS-9 was built for "a
second strike purpose." But Mr.
Laird took the position that
"this weapon can only be aimed
at destroying our retaliatory
force" and thus was a . "first'.
strike" weapon.
Pessimistic Estimates
In his Congressional appear-
ances, Mr. Laird apparently was
using the most pessimistic in-
telligence estimates about what
the Soviet Union was up to
with the SS-9.
To that extent, the ABM de-
bate was becoming reminiscent
of the "missile gap" debate a
decade ago. Then a "gap,"
which never materialized in
,fact, was created in .political
,debate by using the most pessi-
'~mistic assumptions about So-
viet missile production capa-
bility.
As one security aide to Presi-
dent Kennedy now deeply. in-
volved in the ABM debate
commented: "Plug fn the differ-
ent words and it is just' like the
missile gap debate."
In its analysis of the Safe-
guard program, the President's
science advisory committee re-
portedly cast doubt on the va-
lidity of the intelligence esti-
mates being used to justify the
decision to deploy the system.
The committee also was said
to have questioned whether the
Safeguard system was the.
proper re
s
ponse to
th
e Sov
ie
ts
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that in the interest of national token, it is being argued within
the basis of the more pessi-
mistic estimates. "I hope the
intelligence estimates that go
out to 1975 are not true," he
observed at one point to the
Disarmament Subcommittee,
"but I cannot assume the pro-
jections are untrue."
Even accepting Mr. Laird's
estimates, however, there was
a question in the minds of some
Senators as to how the SS-9
force that he was .projecting
for. 1975 would have a "first
strike" capability against the
'Minuteman force.
Since the Minutemen silos are
so widely dispersed-as much
as 10 miles apart-one SS-9
warhead would be able to de-
stroy only the minutemen. With
500 SS-9 missiles in 1975, there-
fore, the Soviet Union would be
able to destroy only about half
the Minuteman force, presum-
ing each SS-9 worked perfectly.
To destroy 80 per cent of the
Minuteman force-which was
the -ratio that Mr. Packard
suggested would eliminate Min-
uteman as a retaliatory force-
the Soviet Union theoretically
would need 800 SS-9's carrying
the 20-megaton warhead.
Multiple Warheads
But if it were to be audacious
as to launch a first strike, the
Soviet Union could not assume
that all the SS-9's would work
perfectly. Therefore using a 50
per cent reliability rate-about
the present reliability rate of
the Minuteman missiles -the
Soviet Union would need 1,600
SS-9's carrying a single war-
head.
While never specifically
stated by Mr. Laird, it was ap-
parent from his statistics that
the 55-9 could become a
"first strike" weapon only when
equipped with multiple war-
heads, known as MIRV's (for
multiple independently target-
able re-entry vehicles).
At one paint , Mr. Laird sug-
gested that the SS-9 might be
able to carry four MIRV war-
heads. That would mean that a
.500-missile SS-9 force would be
capable of launching 2,000 war-
heads, or presumably enough
to eliminate the Minutemen as
a retaliatory force.
But the MIRV warheads
would be smaller and therefore
would have to come closer to
their target to knock out a
Minuteman silo. Mr. Packard
suggested at one point that a
five-megaton warhead woti~d'
have to land within three-
tenths of a mile to destroy a
Minuteman. Within the intelli-
gence community there are
doubt that the Soviet Union
can develop that large and that;
accurate a multiple warhead
by 1975.
committee, the Soviet Union
can be fearful that the United
States is attempting to acquire
a "first strike" capability by
developing multiple warheads
far its Minuteman and Poseidon
missiles.
In the relatively near future,
the Defense Department will
start placing three MIRV war-
heads on each of the 1,000
Minuteman missiles and 10 on
each of the 656 Poseidons, the'
new missile developed for the
Polaris atomic submarines. The
Defense Department has em-
phasized ~ that these multiple
warheads will have pinpoint ac-
curacy, thus presumably con-
tributing to Soviet fears that
they are aimed at missile sites
rather than cities.
As seen by some prominent
scientists advising Senate op-,
pPnents of an anti-ballistic mis-
s~le system, the Soviet decision
to deploy the SS-9 in large num-
bers came about in this way:
The Soviet Union some five
years ago began deploying its
Galosh ABM system around
Moscow. As a counter to over-
come this defense system, the
United States began developing
MIRV warheads. The Soviet
Union then became fearful the
United States was acquiring a
"first strike" capability. So as
a counter, the Soviet Union
began to develop and deploy
SS-9's with multiple warheads.
It is this action-reaction cycle
mittee, such as Senators John
Sherman Cooper, Republican of~
Kentucky, Albert Gore, Demo-
crat of Tennessee, and Clifford
P.' Case, Republican of New
Jersey more than the specific
technical issues of the Safe-1
guard system.
They fear that the two super-
powers are nearing "the point
of no return" in their escalat-
ing arms race. Their argument
is that once both sides deploy
multiple warheads, it will no
longer be possible to police an
arms control agreement with
reconnaissance satellites, since
neither side will know how
many warheads are sitting in
the nose cone 'of a missile that
shows up in a satellite photo-
graph. The only alternative
would be on-site inspection,
and that presumably, would be
unacceptable to either side as
part of an arms control agree-
ment.
Their proposal, therefore, is
that before deploying an ABM
system, and thus perhaps set-
ting off acounter-reaction on
the Soviet side, the United
States make one more effort,
.perhaps the last, to reach an
'agreement limiting the number
of offensive and defensive stra-
tegic weapons.
Mr. Laird and President Nixon
have both said they do not ex-
pect deployment of the safe-
guard system to provoke a
counteraction from the Soviet
Union because the Safeguard is
being deployed solely as a de-
fensive measure.
in the arms race that is begin-
ning to bother some members
of the Disarmament Subcom-