STUDY PLAN - COVERT ACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A001000060014-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 14
• Content Type: MEMO

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DRAFT/TR/ga/ 6/ 14
MEMORANDUM "' 1, : (--: f-)P"
SUBJECT: Study Plan - Covert Action
1. The Problem.
Should the U. S. Government have a capability for
covert action overseas, i.e., clandestine political
intervention in foreign countries? If so, under what
circumstances, safeguards, and organizational respon-
sibilty should it be handled?
The subject of covert action is going to be extremely
difficult to handle. Over the last 25 years, it has been
an important tool of U. S. foreign policy, but one that
is not officially acknowledged. It is a subject that
Stimulates pa66iou but 8f,1doi(i obJJeccivi ~-y; -ts repercussions
have been great but difficult to measure. With a few exceptions
(Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs, Laos), its efforts remain highly
classified. The problem of covert action (CA) generally
breaks down in the following way:
a. The Pros and Cons of Covert Action.
The case for and Egainst CA should be stated as
persuasively as possible, e.g.,
(1) Advantages: historical effectiveness (?);
protection against covert action of hostile
countries; real-politik; a way to protect
U.S. national interests when 4overt action
would be inappropriate; maintaining a capability
for some unforeseen eventuality; difficulty of
dismantling the ongoing apparatus.
Dept of State review(s) completed.
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NSC Referral Not Required
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(2) Disadvantages: Immorality (?); historical
ineffectiveness (?); dangers of backlash
through revelation; questionable justification
in post Cold War era; self-fulfilling nature
of the operations.
b. The Criteria Governing Covert Action.
If CA is to remain a tool of US foreign policy, what
criteria ought to govern its use? Only in a situation
whose outcome is important for the world power balance?
Only in support of political forces that are self--
sustaining? Only in a defensive situation (to protect
against hostile CIS? What is the need for spreading
prop.:.ganda clannestinely or countering disinformation?
For using paramilitary/countersubversion forces' Should
CA branch out from its traditional, areas (political
action, propaganda, and paramilitary activities) to
new fields (e.g., suppression of narcotics or terrorism)?
What limits in scope should be imposed, if any? What
should.be the US policy for admitting or declassifying
CA programs?
This section can also be handled as a set of options,
i
using different criteria.
C Safeguards.
If covert action is maintained, what safeguards are
necessary to insure careful study of each proposal at
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the highest levels of the Government?
Current procedures: Do the procedures of the 40
Committee permit the members adequate time and staff
support for reflection on the programs? Once a-ff-ordde',
what are the mechanisms for reviewing on-going programs?
What kinds of programs are discussed with the Armed
Services Subcommittees of Congress? With Ambassadors
overseas?
Alternatives: What are the various options for overseeing
covert activities (e.g., more involvement of Congressional
committees, creation of a new approval group in the
Executive Branch, etc.).
J. Oigani at ior.-ii Responsibility
If CA is retained,
What are the alternatives (e.g., a directing and planning
staff in the NSC or the State Department)? Should the
CIA keep the responsibility for conducting CA operations
abroad?
In any examination of the foregoing issues, security
problems will undoubtedly be troublesome. We will
probably have to avoid discussing all real-life examples
of covert action, except those programs already in the
public record (Bay of Pigs, National Student Association,
etc.) In addition, we will need a measure of cooperation
from the DCI and perhaps Secretary Kissinger as well
(in his capacity as chairman of the 40 committee).
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Gec. ?etary,\clearances for all personnel and study group
members will be required. Some documents will have to
be stored or studied in specially secured quarters.
The papers which are developed, if unclassified in any
part, will probably require a classified annex. In
short, the Commission will have to go to considerable
lengths in order to accommodate the security
problem.
2. The Study Mode
A study group composed of several Commission members and
a number of experts knowledgeable about covert action --
drawn from several different quarters.-- can prepare findings
and recommendations for the Commission's review. The study
group can base its work initially on preparatory material
developed by a research consultant (or consultants) retained
to analy e and sot forth the key problems and the fundamental
choices available. The -tidy plan, therefore, falls into
two stages:
Stage I - Preparation of a paper by a research
consultant (or consultants), for the review
of the Intelligence Study Group, covering each
of the foregoing issues. The paper, drawn from
research and interviews, will comprehensively
review
(a) The basic issues involved and the
key problem areas,
(b) The relative advantages and dis-
advantages of alternative organization
and,--procedures.
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Stage II - Intelligence Study Group to review the
paper and to make recommendations on
appropriate organization and procedures.
Study Group may require five two-day meetings
at two week intervals.
3. Participation.
Study Group membership would include:
Commission Members
Others (e.g., Langhiin Campbell, Hugh Cunningham, Bob
Kiley, Frank Lindsay, William
Harris, Bill
Trueheart, Roger Hilsman, Ray Cline)
4. Staff .
Temporary full time consu tart (with assistants?) to be
retained for the summer months to produce the papers
in Stage I and to participate in Stage II matters. Core
staff (FH and TR) to monitor and oversee.
5. Budget.
6. Follow-up. Meshing of Covert Action Study Group report with
other Commission work.
7. Timing.
Stage I - July, August, September
Stage II L September, October, November
8. Next Step.
Get Commission approval.
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