ALTERNATIVE STUDY PLANS: INTELLIGENCE, ORGANIZATION, AND FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A001000060009-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: June 18, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE: 18 June 1974
TO: Fisher Howe, Deputy Executive Director, Commission on the
Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign P?1iCY4E0.10 NO.:
FROM: m:William R. Harris
SUEILIECT: ALTERNATIVE STUDY PLANS: INTELLIGENCE, ORGANIZATION, AND FOREIGN POLICY
COPIES TO: Thomas Reckford, Peter L. Szanton, Francis 0. Wilcox
. ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS FOR RESEARCH ON INTELLIGENCE ISSUES
On the basis of a preliminary Meeting (Harris-Howe-Reckford), and in
view of prior intelligence panel experience, I assume that intelligence
issues relevant to the organization and respective powers and functions
Gcf organizations will be reviewed by two distinct panels, one addressing
issueA_of intelligence (as information) and the other addressing issues
of intelligence organizations as repositories of clandestine services.
This separation of review permits the following: access to the critical
views of thoughtful analysts who have acquired insights respecting the
capacities, of clandestine services (e.g. Sy Hirsch, Paul *Blackstock,
Tony Lake, ACLU civil liberties project, etc.) via an Intelligence panel,
which need not involve substantial exposure to the details of clandestine
service behavior. At the same time, this separation of review functions
provides an element of balance for any review of the clandestine services,
experts on which are almost by definition part of the system, or at least
exposed primarily to the views of those syMathetic to an active CS capabil-
ity.'
NSC
Referral Not
Required
1
Dept of State
review(s)
completed.
Alternatives for the organization of research, and development of iSsue
.papers could involve:
A. Direct management by the Commission staff (which has its own
personnel with intelligence backgrounds or academic familiarity),
with assignment of particular issue papers to particular scholars.
B. Management by each of two panel rapporteurs,, one for intelligence,
one for review of clandestine services.
C. Management by one Intelligence panel rapporteur, with the panel
organized into two working groups (intelligence; review of clandes-
tine services).
If you were to choose alternative B, I would recommend that you obtain the
services of Harry Howe Ransom as rapporteur of the intelligence panel, and
of myself (with some reluctance, as it is more popular to look at the
intelligence side of the house) as the rapporteur of the clandestine service
review panel. . If you were to choose alternative C, I could only be 'the
rapporteur on the understanding that I 'Would work closely with someone on the
full-time Commission staff., and would have, available to the panel, the
research monies necessary to sponsor needed issue papers, written (with perhaps
one or two exceptions) by other consultants.
I mention. Ransom as the best alternative rapporteur because I feel that he is
receptive to the views of others, whatever his personal biases (toward strong
direct Congressional management, splitting off the CS, reduction of CS activities
Further, he is familiar with the open literature -- which is enormous in volume,
whatever it lacks in expertise -- and would not be particularly impeded by any
lackef cola-rat-1.
ve t- or -rigag4 Obv3/64/21611PC6C-1415P80104391133AdelieteM0008142Lnk that alterna-
tive etTout be t e best, beating in mind substantial limitations on availability
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II. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COMMISSION STAFF IN FORMULATING
THE INTELLIGENCE STUDY/SCOPE OF RESEARCH
Intelligence Panel
(1) Functions of intelligence.
Review of the growing theory on decision-making, which
suggests a .closer integration of intelligence production
and policy decision. The theory conflicts with autarchy
tendencies in intelligence agencies, and raises questions
about the appropriate alternatives for management of
these conflicting tendencies. Is the Schlesingerjleport_
solution (an IC staff mediator) optimal?
(2) The _estimatiyg_pr,ocess.
Role for competitive advocacy, alternative expressions of
uncertainties, admissible score forecasting, systematic
biases and corrective mechanisms (if any), inpotation in
estimation respecting new subjects (resource scarcity, ?
international systems behavior, etc.) or old subjects
respecting which estimators have been generally unsuccess-
ful (e.g. warning intelligence).
(3)
Resource management.
Tendencies toward overinvestment in collection (if true) and
organizational implications. The intelligence requirements
cycle, and modifications. Early post mortems on the
Schlesinger reorganization.
(4) The authority of intelligence agencies, and organizational
implications.
Implications of Presidential choice of the Schlesinger task
force constraint upon reorganization involving amendatory
legislation.,
Present authority for the conduct of clandestine services
and possible alternatives thereto.
Authority of the DCI, and capacity of the DCI to delegate
authority to the IC staff.
Authority for large DoD covert operations.
Authority to protect sources and methods, and adequacy thereof.
Authority for undertaking national security intelligence collec-
tion within the U.S., and alternative resolutions of 4th Amendment
Rights and informational needs.
Implications for the legitimacy and public support of intelligence
services, and effects upon foreign relations of the U.S.
(5)
Intelligence and International Organizations
Access of international organizations to intelligence; role of
U.S. in providing U.N. intelligence support, OAS, NATO, etc.
International system forecasts (energy, natural resources,
environmental hazards, ocean resource management, etc.)
Organizational implications; security implications.
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Clandestine Services Review Panel
(1) U.S. capacity and limitations upon (foreign) clandestine services
changing foreign policy objectiVes; transitionalleapabilities.
(2) Organizational alternatives ?
Role of DoD; large operations
Capacity to perform many functions within constraints of international
law
(3)
legislative authority; executive authority, and implications respecting
public support of governmental activities. (Overlaps with Intelligence
Panel topic 4).
teA
William R. Harris
office tel: [phone]x7856)
home tel: [phone])
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STATIN
AUG 1974
IC REGISTRY ROUTING SLIP
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6 August 1974
The Honorable Robert D. Murphy
Chairman of the Board
Corning International Corporation
717 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10022
Dear Ambassador Murphy:
Pursuant to our conversation, herewith is a rough draft of a
possible approach to your study of the role of intelligence in foreign
policy. I am sure you would want to expand this with some of the
snore specific suggestions given to you by the staff, but this might
provide an overall approach. If you have any further questions on it,
I would be delighted to respond.
Thank you again for your courtesy in consulting with me on this
important matter. I will give it every support possible.
Sincerely,
/is/ Bill
W. E. Colby
Director
Attachment
WEC:blp
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
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DRAFT
Dear Bill:
As the Commission on the Organization of the Government for
the Conduct of Foreign Policy moves from the briefing phase to
the phase of study in depth of some selected features, I would
like to outline for you our approach in the area of intelligence.
Intelligence obviously plays a major role in the formulation
and execution of foreign policy. We would like to identify
that role clearly and look at various ways intelligence could
make an even better contribution to foreign policy deliberations.
This will require us to be aware of some of the organizational
aspects of the intelligence relationship to foreign policy and
to assess the ways in which intelligence contributes to foreign
policy, from the raw report to the finished estimate. We must
also cover the degree of success our intelligence has and can
hope to have in accurately reporting events abroad and
projecting their likely future directions. Lastly, I think we
must include a review of the political costs involved in
intelligence operations where they do cause problems for
foreign policy. As a related but somewhat separable issue,
we will need to identify the role in our foreign policy of what
is called covert action and come to some judgments on its
desirability, extent and decision-making process.
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On the other hand, I do not view the Commission's function
as reviewing and making recommendations on the organization of
our intelligence services and community, its budgets, personnel
strengths, etc., or the details of its operations and
0
procedures. The Commission will not be conducting an investigation
of the organization of intelligence itself but, rather, the
role of intelligence as it affects the conduct of our foreign
policy. In order to make informed judgments on the latter, of
course, we must be aware of some of these matters as necessary
background, but I want to assure you that the thrust of our
work will be in the latter category. I share what I know is
your great concern about the necessity to protect the sensitive
operational aspects of the intelligence effort. We will
conduct our inquiry and maintain our records so as not to
expose such matters.
As I believe you are aware, Mr. Kent Crane will be directing
the intelligence aspects of our inquiries. He will commission
several studies by individuals within the intelligence community
or by acknowledged experts outside of it. I would like him to
discuss with you the specifics of these studies and the
individuals who will undertake them to be sure that the
appropriate clearances can be obtained and to discuss with you
the appropriate staff support and access arrangements to the
intelligence community which will be necessary. I would expect
Kent to work with your officers in dealing with the other elements
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of the intelligence community in addition to the CIA, under
the general charter of the Commission, of course. I have
attached a first cut at an outline of some of the matters
Kent will be studying, and I hope that you and he can discuss
this and any improvements which might be useful.
Sincerely,
Robert D. Murphy
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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STUDIES
1. Statutory and Other Authority. A review of the statutory
base for the intelligence community, to include the authority
of the CIA, the directives of the NSC, and Presidential
instructions such as the November 5, 1971, directive. .This
should also include a review of the special legislation applicable
to intelligence (such as the unique authorities of the Director
of CIA over personnel and finances), the espionage and
communications intelligence legislation, and current proposals
for modification of the legislative authority of the intelligence
community and its protection of intelligence sources and methods.
2. Organization. A study of the way in which the intelligence
community interfaces with foreign policy formulation; the
independence of the CIA, the roles of the departmental intelligence
entities such as DIA and INR; intelligence relationships at
working departmental levels, field entities, and national policy
levels (e.g., WSAG, etc.); the role of the Ambassadors.
3. Congress and the Public. To what extent does the Congress
benefit from intelligence? To what extent can intelligence be
made available to assist the Congress in decision-making? To
what extent can intelligence better inform the American public?
4. Control of Intelligence. Executive and Congressional
controls on intelligence operations? executive and Congressional
influence on intelligence appreciations; procedures for
evaluation of intelligence risks and resources.
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5. The Utility of Intelligence. The accuracy of intelligence
reports and judgments; to what extent does intelligence contribute
to policy formulation? How is its utility affected by its
palatability, presentation, participation in sensitive policy
deliberations, etc?
6. Covert Action. Review of the arguments for and against
covert action; procedures for control; alternatives to association
with intelligence.
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