RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONDUCT, SUPERVISION AND COORDINATION OF COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A001000010003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 79
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 17, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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TOP SECRET
?NSC REVIEW
111COMPLETED,
7/2/03.
National Security Decision Memorandum 40
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS
February 17, 1970
TO:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Responsibility for the Conduct, Supervision and
Coordination of Covert Action Operations
I have determined that it is essential to the defense and security
of the United States and its efforts for world peace that the
overt foreign activities of the U.S. Government continue to be
supplemented by covert action operations.
By covert action operations I mean those activities which, although
designed to further official U.S. programs and policies abroad, are
so planned and executed that the hand of the U.S. Government- is not
apparent to unauthorized persons.
The covert actions of the U.S. Government abroad shall be subject
.to coordination and control by the Director of Central Intelligence.
All such covert action operations, unless otherwise specifically
assigned by the President, shall be carried out by the Central
Intelligence Agency. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be
responsible for assuring that covert action operations are planned
and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military
policies, and for consulting with and obtaining appropriate coordi-
nation-from any other interested agencies or officers on a need-to-
know basis. The Director of Central Intelligence shall obtain
policy approval for all major and/or politically sensitive covert
action programs through The 40 Committee.
The 40 Committee as presently constituted consists of the Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs as Chairman, the
Attorney General, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central
Intelligence.
The Director of Central Intelligence will be responsible for insuring
an .annual.rcview by The 40 Committee of all covert action programs
previously approved.
TOP S EC 1', 1ff
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Also subject to The 40 Committee's policy review and specific
operational mission approval are the following programs origina-
ting in the Department of Defense: the monthly Joint Reconnais-
sance Center Schedule, missions of the National Reconnaissance
Organization
Furthermore, any proposals for covert activities or opeiaLious
from agencies not represented on The 40 Committee shall be
subject to that committee's approval unless otherwise directed
by the President.
Covert action operations shall include any type of activity
necessary to carry out approved purposes except that they will
not include armed conflict by regular military forces, or cover
and deception for active military operations by the armed forces
of the United States.
This directive supersedes and rescinds NSC.5412/2.
CC:
25X1
NSC
The Attorney General
The Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
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TOP SECRET
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filled in form is detached from controlled document.
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DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
11
REGISTRY
Source
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CIA Control No.
TS# 198291
Doc. No.
11
Date Document Received
Doc. Date 17 Feb 1970
20 Feb 1970
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The NSCIC
The NSCIC has met only once since its inception in 1971.
This is due largely to the major preoccupations of its Chairman,
Dr. Kissinger, since that time. In recognition of Dr. Kissinger's
workload, the President recently appointed a Vice Chairman. I
will fill that role, and I intend to commence a regular meeting
schedule.
Since November 1971 the NSCIC has had a functioning
Working Group. Its members have been the ASD (I) , an Assistant
Attorney General (occasionally) , the J-3 of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, [_tnt13 a representative from the State Department's Policy
Planning Staff, and the Chief of the Net Assessment Group of
the NSC Staff. The producers of intelligence serve on the
Working Group as observer members (D/INR, D/DIA, DDI of
CIA, DDS&T of CIA).
The Working Group has embarked upon three kinds of
work:
1. Three crisis studies with recommendations
for the DCI from the NSCIC on how intelligence could
have served better. (The India-Pakistan War, the Arab-
Israeli Ceasefire Crisis of 1970, and the Jordan-Fedayeen
Civil War.)
2. An evaluation of how well the Community has
functioned on a specific problem over a period of time.
(Yugoslavia was the case study, given the potential for
sudden change there and the obvious Soviet interest.)
3. Background studies to inform the NSCIC members:
a. A study of current intelligence reporting.
b. A study of the intelligence contribution
to the anti-narcotics effort.
c. A study of economic reporting.
d. A study of resources devoted to production.
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NOTE FOR MR. COLBY
All of the above studies were sent to the NSCIC for action or
information. Little or no response. A copy of memo to you on this
problem follows.
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a
5 November 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: NSCIC Record on Action Requests
1. The National Security Council Intelligence Committee (NSCIC)
was established by the President in his memorandum of 5 November 1971
on "Organization and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence
Community." The NSCIC held its first and only meeting on 3 December
1971 at which the members agreed to the establishment of an NSCIC
Working Group under the chairmanship of a representative of the DCI.
2. A total of six actions have been submitted to the Chairman,
NSCIC, all of which called for some response. To date no formal
reply has been received to any of the six action requests.
3. Briefly, the actions requested were as follows. A more
complete account of these activities will be found at Tab A.
a. Working Group request of 9 February 1972 for NSCIC
approval of two proposed product evaluation projects, one on the
India/Pakistan crisis and one of an evaluation of intelligence
inputs to NSSMs.
b. A request by the DCI to Dr. Kissinger on 24 February
1972 for comment on DCID 1/2 and its Supplement.
c. A request from the DCI to Chairman, NSCIC, on
28 September 1972 for policy guidance on the present scope and
character of current intelligence coverage.
d. Submission of the NSCIC Working Group report on the
India/Pakistan crisis study to the NSCIC on 5 October 1972
in order to initiate a discussion of major issues and problem
areas highlighted by the study.
e. Submission on 16 May 1973 of the NSCIC Working Group
summary report of the three crisis studies with recommended
actions for issuance by the NSCIC as guidance to the DCI.
f. A recommendation by the DCI to the Chairman, NSCIC, on
3 August 1973 for reorganization of the NSCIC and the NSCIC
Working Group.
xecu ive ecre ary
NSCIC Working Group
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TAB A
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1. Request for approval of two NSCIC Working Group product evaluation
projects:
Projects on the India/Pakistan crisis and an evaluation of
intelligence inputs to NSSMs described to Chairman, NSCIC, in a
memorandum of 9 February 1972, Subj: Progress Report on NSCIC
Working Group, and NSCIC approval requested. Memo also requested
any guidance the NSCIC might provide as to specific areas of interest
on which it considered the Working Group could most profitably
focus attention.
Action: On 16 February, the Chairman, NSCIC, advised the
NSCIC members by memorandum of the Working Group request and recommended
approval of the projects identified. The memorandum also urged
the Working Group "to continue its efforts to design a work program
that will assist us in all of our tasks." In the absence of
other direct communication, the Working Group proceded with the
two projects.
2. Request for comments on DCID 1/2: As agreed by the Working Group,
a letter was prepared and signed by the DCI to Dr. Kissinger on
24 February, forwarding a copy of DCID 1/2 and its Supplement and
asking for his comments as to "how well you consider the listed
objectives reflect White House and NSC requirements and how appropriate
you consider the assigned priorities to be." The letter also asked
for any proposals Dr. Kissinger might have as to addition or
deletion of objectives, changes in priorities or other changes to
improve the utility of the document.
Action: No formal reply received, although informal comments
were obtained from Andrew Marshall of the NSC staff.
3. Request for policy guidance on current intelligence reporting:
By memorandum of 28 September 1972 to Chairman, NSCIC, the
DCI reported on the results of a survey of current intelligence
reporting by all elementsof the intelligence community, done for
the NSCIC Working Group, and asked for policy guidance to confirm
whether the President and his advisors considered the present
scope and character of current intelligence coverage was in keeping
with today's U.S. security and policy interests.
Action: none.
4. India/Pakistan crisis study:
The NSCIC Working Group sent this study to the Chairman, NSCIC
on 5 October 1972 for the purpose of initiating a "discussion of
major issues and problem areas highlighted by the study."
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Action: On 11 October, the NSC Staff Secretary sent a memo
to the NSCIC members asking for their written comments on the study
by 15 November in preparation for a meeting of the NSCIC.
The DCI replied saying that since the questions raised
in the study were addressed to consumers of intelligence, he considered
it inappropriate for him to reply. He advised that he would defer
comment until the views of the other members had been obtained, and
asked that copies of these replies be sent to him, at which time he
would prepare a response from the viewpoint of the intelligence
community. None of the replies were formally sent to the DCI,
but read the comments of Mr. Rush and Admiral
Moorer in Mr. Marshall's office and reported on them to the DCI
in preparation for an NSCIC meeting scheduled for 27 November, which
was never held.
5. NSCIC Working Group Report on Three Crisis Studies:
A summary report of the findings and recommendations resulting
from the Working Group survey of the Arab/Israeli Ceasefire, the
Jordan/Fedayeen Civil War, and the India/Pakistan crisis was
sent to the Chairman, NSCIC on 16 May 1973 under a memorandum from
the Chairman, NSCIC Working Group, in which he noted that the
recommended actions in the report constituted what the Working
Group proposed be ?issued by the NSCIC as guidance to the DCI.
Action: On 23 May 1973, the NSC Staff Secretary forwarded
copies of the summary report to the NSCIC members and asked for
their comments on the conclusions and recommendations by 15 June,
with copies to all members. She also asked the DCI to prepare
by the same date his recommended plan for acting on the issues
raised by the Working Group. She advised that a meeting of the
NSCIC would be scheduled at a later date.
The DCI replied with brief comments on the proposed
actions and noted that he would brief the committee in more detail
at the next NSCIC meeting. The only ccmment received here was
that of Mr. Clements.
6. Reorganization of the NSCIC and the NSCIC Working Group:
On 3 August 1973 Mr. Colby sent a memorandum to the Chairman,
NSCIC, proposing four actions: name a deputy chairman, NSCIC (a consumer);
appoint Andrew Marshall chairman, NSCIC Working Group and restrict
Working Group membership to user representatives of NSCIC principals;
add an economic representative to the NSCIC and to the Working Group;
and have each NSCIC Principal?name a deputy.
Action: No reply received. Mr. Colby's MOR on the PFIAB
meetings of 4 and 5 October 1973 note that Admiral Anderson recommended
to the President that the DCI be named Vice Chairman of the NSCIC and
th4006,4eilrlea Fkblgaieinocinkiio21141,61k-RIADERMIDEPIJutoblioto64003-4done "
Mr. Marshall has transferred to t yfense Department.
mei
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The Director
You asked about getting Treasury named to
NSCIC. The autached provides a tally on matters
you have raised with NSCIC and on which no
actions have been taken. Note (3.f. ): On 3 Aug
1973 your letter to Chairman recommended an
economic representative, e.g., Treasury, be
added to NSCIC.
At USIB you invited Treasury to attend the
NSCIC in your role as Vice Chairman. We could
formalize this with a letter to George Schultz
over Henry Kissinger's signature or your own.
/ No SIGNEDI
Yes
Daniel O. 'Graham
Henry's Mine / 6 November 1973
No Fr-4 by DI
Wit')
DCl/IC:JMC:ibm
Distribution:
0 - Addressee w/att
1 - DDCI w/att
1 - ER w/att
1 - D/DCl/IG w/att
1 - IC Registry w/att
1 - JMC w/att (chrono)
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INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION GUIDANCE
The ultimate customer of our national intelligence product
is, of course, the President, with the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs serving as a conduit. Cabinet-
level officers, primarily the Secretaries of State, Defense and
Treasury, are also key consumers.
The principal tasking mechanism for intelligence inputs
into policy deliberations is the National Security Council and
its subordinate organizatjons: Washington Special Action Group,
Senior Review Group, Under Secretaries Committee, Defense Pro-
grams Review Committee, 40 Committee, Intelligence Committee,
Vietnam Special Studies Group, Verification Panel on Strategic
Arms Limitation, and Verification Panel on Mutual and Balanced
Force Reductions. The Director of Central Intelligence, who
holds membership on each of these organizations, serves as the
intelligence advisor to the National Security Council. In this
connection, his primary role is to provide the NSC, its members
.? and its supporting organizations with the information and judg-
ments about foreign developments which they need to formulate
and implement national security policy.
ism Requirements for intelligence support are levied in various
ways. Tasking may take the form of a written memorandum to the
DCI from the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, or from an NSC Staff officer to a counterpart in a
production office. In some instances a telephone call suffices.
Or requirements may be laid on orally at a meeting of one of
the NSC groups such as the WSAG.
During crisis situations requirements for intelligence
inputs tend to be narrowly focused and are usually levied orally
at a WSAG meeting or even telephonically. At times the air
seems filled with requirements, often levied on more than one
element of the Intelligence Community simultaneously. Time
permitting, responses to such requirements are coordinated with-
in the Community in order to produce one piece of paper. Some
intelligence inputs are prepared on the initiative of the Director
of Central Intelligence in anticipation of a perceived need on
the basis of developments in the crisis situation.
During non-crisis situations the pace is not as hectic.
Most requests for intelligence inputs to policy papers are levied
by means of the formal issuance of a Study Memorandu. The three
principal types of Study Memoranda are the NSSM (National Security
Study Memorandum -- issued over the signature of the Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs), the NSC Under
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Secretaries Committee Study Memorandum (issued by the Chairman,
Under Secretaries Committee), and the CIEPSM (issued by the
Director, Council on International Economic Policy). CIA
represents the Intelligence Community in the Study Memorandum
process -- a systematized procedure by which the President
(or his key advisors) directs the attention of the bureaucracy
to national security issues. The issuance of a Study Memorandum
requires the preparation of a Response, usually by an ad hoc
committee or working group. Requirements levied in the Study
Memorandum may be refined informally at thw working group level
through the direct participation of and discussion by the
representatives of the various agencies on the working group.
Intelligence Community support to negotiations on Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks and on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
includes assessments of the military posture for each side,
evaluations of our ability to monitor compliance with proposed
agreements, and the provision of on-site intelligence teams to
Provide prompt support to the U.S. negotiators in Geneva and
Vienna.
The Community also supports various Department heads in
their participation in other international conferences. For
example, we provide support to the Secretary of Defense in NATO
meetings, and to the Secretary of the Treasury at World Bank
meetings and other economic negotiations. And of course con-
siderable support is provided in connection ?with the foreign
travels of the President, the Secretary of State, the Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs, and other
Cabinet-level officials.
The frequent contacts between the policymaker and the
Intelligence Community at various levels (policymaker and DCI
or Department head, senior staffer and senior operating official,
working group analysts, etc.) provide constant opportunities
for levying and refining intelligence requirements.
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Intelligence Collection Guidance
Intelligence collection guidance helps collectors of intelligence
use their resources to acquire and report that information
which is most relevant to the intelligence production process.
Intelligence production, in turn, responds to the information
requirements of policy level consumers in the United States
Government.
Intelligence collection guidance is directed toward all
collection systems, human and technical. It must provide
answers to two basic questions of collection system managers:
(1) What substantive information does the intelligence production
process need which is feasible for collection by my resources?
(2) How important and useful to the intelligence production
process has been the information collected by my resources to
date?
There are two approaches to intelligence guidance: (1)
Program guidance, which is intended to assist collection man-
agers in the planning of resource allocation to meet longer
term inforrqation needs, and (2) Exploitation guidance,
which relates to the day-to-day tasking or use of existing
collection assets. Both of these approaches respond to the
question of need.
Program guidance includes, in the first instance, basic
intelligence objectives and priorities as defined in DCID 1/2
(Tata), Key Intelligence Questions (Ta_ j_.3/.4) , or other broad
statements of information needs. This guidance also emanates
from the relevant USIB Committees such as the Committee on
Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) and the
SIGINT Committee. The Interagency Clandestine Collection
Priority Committee (IPC) provides a list of basic or long range
information needs which can be satisfied by CIA clandestine
collection, and the Intelligence Guidance for COMINT Pro-
gramming (IGCP) list advises NSA of the information needs
which might be satisfied by COMINT . Other guidance documents
are selectively prepared on specific intelligence problems
(e.g., Laser Technology, Soviet Command and Control) , and
detail what we know about a given problem, the information
gaps, and source leads.
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Guidance for exploitation is used in the short term, when
a collector has an opportunity to exploit an unexpected source
and requires substantive guidance on specific information needs.
The standard ad hoc requirement system which is used effectively
against known sources is effective here. In addition, the
Current Intelligence Reporting List (CIRL) (Tab/S) offers good
exploitation guidance and is produced on a tri-annual basis for
each major area of the world. The Economic Alert List (EAL)
(Tab/) covers short term economic requirements. Such
reporting guidance cites the specific information needs of the
analysts on a current basis within the context of their views and
understanding of a given intelligence problem.
In answering the vital question of the usefulness of the
collector's product, intelligence guidance takes the form of
assessments. Detailed reviews by producers and consumers
of the "take" from collection activity provide feedback to the
collectors in terms of the precision of their reporting and its
relevance to the real information needs of those in Washington.
Assessments also provide the intelligence managers with an
appreciation of what they are getting for their money. They
can have a significant impact on collection planning by taking
into account the importance of the reporting to US interests,
how the illformation was used, the impact of not having it,
and alternative means of collection. Such assessments may be
made of a single facility or source, of an entire collection
sytem, or they may be related to a particular intelligence
problem.
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I? National
Security
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President
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Executive Control
? Membership on USlB
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Legal/Administrative frrimarewf?rk . ? ?
NATIONAL
SECURITY
ACT OF 1947
NATIONAL
SECURITY
COUNCIL
INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTIVES
DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTIVES
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET
NSC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
NSC SPECIAL COMMITTEES
NSC INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUPS
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
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SECRET
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National Intelligence. . .
POLICY
PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.
PRES. FOREIGN INTEL. ADVISORY BOARD
INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR (DCI)
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE PRESIDENT
THE VICE PRESIDENT
SEC. OF STATE
SEC OF DEFENSE
DIR. OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
NSC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
ASST. TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
ATTORNEY GENERAL
UNDER SEC. OF STATE
DEPUTY SEC. OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
NSC COMMITTEES
CONGRESSIONAL ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEES
PRODUCTION
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
(CHAIRMAN)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE (INR)
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
ARMY, NAVY, AIRFORCE (OBSERVERS
USIB COMMITTEES
RESOURCES
INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
(CHAIRMAN)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS
COMMITTEES
25X1A
IMPLEMENTATION
SECRET
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SECRET The United States Intelli?ence Board
CHAIRMAN: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
MEMBERS:
CIA
STATE
DIA
NSA
TREAS
AEC
FBI
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SEC. OF TREASURY
DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS, ATOMIC ENERGY COM.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION
SERVICE INTELLIGENCE OBSERVERS
? Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department
of the Army
? Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
? Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
United States Air Force
COMMITTEES
? Critical Collection Problems
? Economic Intelligence
? Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence
? Imagery Requirements and Exploitation
? Intelligence Information Handling
? Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities
? Interagency Defector
? Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence
? National Intelligence Survey
? Scientific Intelligence
? Security
? SIGINT
? Technical Surveillance Countermeasures
? Watch
? SALT Steering Group
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the relationships of the DCI to the President
and the Foreign intelligence Community
Policy Objectives
1 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NSC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE M
--4
? SECRETAR f ?viCE ?PRESIDENT ? DIRECTOR, ? SECRETARY
OF PRESIDENT OF THE OFFICE OF OF ? OCI ? U/SEC ?ASST TO ?0 SE ? AI ' ? .i!?1
ry Chrii STATE THE PRES. DEF.
STATE OF THE U S EMERGENCY DEFENSE
FOR NAIL
U S PREPAREDNESS
1 i SEC AFFAIRS
i (Chfri)
DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
Requirements
Resources
?OIR ?ODC' ?OC' ?D'R ? MR ?TREAS ?AEC'..\ r?C!A ?STATE ? DC! ? DEFENSE .OMB
REP (NP IV Cnrni iChmi DIA NSA REP REP 'Dm)
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES
ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Implementation
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
? DEFENSI.
?
? STAT[
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'zi-T111
THE COMMUNITY ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
This chart displays the component elements of the National Intelligence Community and their
subordination to the DCI under the President's 5 November 1971 directive in all matters related
to national intelligence planning and resource allocations. The dotted lines represent
management responsibility.
?
DCI
SEC/STATE
EXCOM
?????? Oft .ra. mort.
SEC/DEF
25X1
INR
CIA
DIA
ARMY
INTEL.
NAVY
INTEL.
AF
INTEL.
gpolibigiimipson????????????
25X1A
NSA
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Mr. Colby -
The attached monograph was sent to the Murphy Com-
missioners along with Kirkpatrick's book. No need to
read it all: Underlinings appear on pages 5, 8, 9, 14
to 18.
Note that on page 16, wherein Ransom proposed future
research topics for serious students of intelligence, we
find a series of questions "remarkably like" those the
Commission asked you.
On page 17 is a comment about the role of Congress
vis-a-vis intelligence which you may want to address from
your experience. At the bottom of page 17 is a key question
about whether in the final analysis intelligence makes a
difference in the formulation of foreign policy.
Page 9 raises a question about resources and require-
ments not so different from Welles' article in the Monitor
on "weakened intelligence." Page 8 correlates the growth
of intelligence with the difficulty of setting requirements.
It suggests lack of discipline on the requirements side
when reqources are not scarce -- probably true.
Page 16, question 2, asks to what extent the "Com-
munity" exists in fact, as well as on paper.
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? 1973 General Learning
Corporation
All rights reserved. No part of
this publication may be
reproduced or transmitted in
any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical,
including photocopy, xerog-
raphy, recording, or any
information storage and
retrieval system, without
permission in writing from
the publisher.
Manufactured in the
United States of America.
Published simultaneously
in Canada.
3030V00
WO
GEL GENERAL LEARNING PRESS
61. 250 JAMES STREET
MORRISTOWN, N.J. 07960
Strategic Intelligence
HARRY HOWE RANSOM
Vanderbilt University
Introduction
The most common meaning of the term "strategic intelligence" is
evaluated and processed information about the power and intentions
of foreign nations or other external phenomena of significance in
decision-making councils. Most generally the term refers to the infor-
mational needs of national government officials, particularly foreign
and defense policy makers. But private sector industries and organiza-
tions, such as political parties, may require strategic intelligence about
their competitors, and so industrial and political intelligence collection
including espionage is widespread within national boundaries. In this
module, however, strategic intelligence will be analyzed primarily as
an element of international politics.
The purpose here will be to describe and analyze strategic intelli-
gence in the context of national security (foreign and military) policy
making, to describe the nature and process of the intelligence function
and the varieties of intelligence product, to describe the organizational
setting of intelligence systems, and to analyze strategic intelligence
systems as a frontier for social science research.
Some Definitions
Few subjects in the social sciences must be dealt with on the basis
of such limited access to hard evidence as is the case in dealing with
strategic intelligence. Any scholar pursuing this subject will encounter
substantial barriers to the facts needed to authenticate his judgments
or to illustrate descriptively and analytically the structure and func-
tions of strategic intelligence systems.
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Harry Howe Ransom
An unavoidable fact is that most of the archives or
official records of the intelligence agencies are closed
for an indefinite period. Officials working within the
system are sworn to secrecy so that systematic inter-
viewing of active intelligence professionals or
"participant-observation" is not usually a realistic
research alternative. Then, too, the constant flow of
"intelligence" data to analysts and decision makers is
so voluminous that, even were access to them possible,
formidable problems of analysis would confront the
scholar.
And yet there is a growing bibliography on the sub-
ject that ranges from unauthorized disclosures, such
as those made by political "defectors" or "leaks"
motivated by a dissenting ideological posture?as in
the "Pentagon Papers"?to the inevitable disclosures
resulting from a political system with separated powers
and a free press. This inevitable "leak" explains in part
why the greatest amount of information about intelli-
gence systems pertains to the United States. Also, the
general subject has attracted a vast array of popular
writing because of the mystery and romance associated
with the work of the spy or secret agent, even though
he plays a relatively minor role in strategic intelligence.
A large amount of internal writing on the subject exists
within the intelligence system but is closed to outside
scholarly scrutiny.
The pivotal importance of intelligence, whatever its
form, in a rational system of decision making probably
cannot be exaggerated. Complete and accurate infor-
mation?almost never available?cannot assure the
optimum decision. But false or misleading information
demonstrably can subvert the attainment of policy
objectives. In the principal institutions for foreign and
defense policy making, intelligence functions and intel-
ligence products have become routine elements of the
decisional setting. Strategic intelligence has an enor-
mous potential influence in shaping decisions, but the
visible record makes clear that this influence has an
uneven impact.
Great confusion has come to be associated with the
term "intelligence." The term has in effect lost precise
meaning in common usage since it is used to denote
a wide variety of national security functions. In com-
mon usage, three main categories of activity come
under the rubric of "intelligence." First is information
gathering, by a variety of means including espionage,
and the analysis and reporting of this information. This
is the primary meaning and the principal function of
an intelligence agency. A second usage denotes what
more accurately should be termed counter-
intelligence. This is a police or security function relat-
ing primarily to the protection of information or the
security of an intelligence service and its personnel.
2
It is primarily a negative function?whereas strategic
intelligence is a positive function?but there is often
much doctrinal, organizational and semantic confusion
in the use of the terms "intelligence" and "counter-
intelligence." Mc third role commonly subsumed
under a label of "intelligence" is covert political action,
subversion, or a variety of secret operations including
para-military adventures. A variety of foreign political
interventions are undertaken by intelligence agencies,
even though labeling them as "intelligence" is a dis-
torted use of the term. Secrecy is the common bond,
but intelligence and covert political action are separate,
even disparate, functions. The semantic confusion has
been compounded by organizational arrangements that
assign such dispar Ite functions to a unified administra-
tive headquarters, such as the American Central Intel-
ligence Agency.
While on the subject of definitions, the adjective
"strategic" needs brief attention. Strategy, in its basic
meaning, implies the economic allocation of resources
toward the attainment of objectives. The importance
of this definition is that it incorporates evaluated infor-
mation, i.e. "intelligence," as an essential and unavoid-
able element in any conception of a decision-making
system. The common meaning of strategic intelligence
is the evaluated information needed at high-level
policy-making levels for the economic allocation of
resources not only toward national objectives but also
toward the formulation of such objectives. It is common
to make a distinction between strategic and tactical
intelligence. Tactical intelligence is more accurately
called operational intelligence, or that information
required by commanders in the field, whether mili-
tary, diplomatic, or other "commanders" needing such
evaluated information for carrying out specific foreign
missions. Probably the distinction between strategic
and tactical intelligence is vanishing under the impact
of fast communications and accelerating technology.
Information that once was considered to be only of
importance to operational commanders may now be
of great importance also to those in the high-policy
commands. A major field commander, once concerned
only with combat or operational level information,
today may require much the same kind of information
needed at the level of the President or the Secretary
of State, and vice versa.
Categories of intelligence
In truth, intelligence categories are endless. For
analytic purposes, however, it is useful to stipulate
arbitrarily certain categories. In an age of information
explosion, intelligence must be pursued in functional
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Strategic Intelligence
categories, and the labor of thousands of intelligence
professionals must be divided accordingly. The
Defense Department requires military intelligence;
the Atomic Energy Commission needs a specialized
information; the State Department needs particular
kinds of political and economic information; and the
Presidency needs an amalgam of these and many more
varieties of information. Intelligence activity has con-
sequently become a vast world-wide industry, with
total U.S. government expenditures on intelligence
estimated at around $6 billion (1972), directly employ-
ing more than 200,000 persons in the United States
and many thousands more overseas.
When describing kinds of intelligence, ultimately
one must refer to both users and sources of particular
types of information, for these end-points sometimes
determine the categories. It is important to be
reminded of the fact that in some information
categories the data can be expected to be "hard"
(measurable data), while in others they will be "soft"
(predictions of future human or national behavior).
A sharp boundary line cannot be drawn around the
sources or the potential users of intelligence. They are
boundless, and intelligence agencies and activities tend
to expand apace as they are commanded to gather "all
the facts," sometimes merely in anticipation of their
possible future use. One may, however, arbitrarily list
the major categories as follows: political, military,
economic, scientific, biographic, and geographic. In
recent years, technology has afforded new machines and
skills that have been used to develop the analytic capa-
bility in each of these categories, particularly as comput-
er technology, versatile photographic and interpreta-
tion techniques, and all forms of communications have
rapidly advanced.
Political intelligence is perhaps the most sought after
and least reliable, or in one sense the most "un-
knowable," ofi he various types of intelligence. This field
is heavily dependent upon advances in the social sci-
ences, where professional scholars aspire to construct
theories of political behavior. In estimations of political
situations, intelligence analysts must deal with human
dynamics. Consequently they focus on political pat-
terns and trends. Hard data in this category include
such elements as census data, voting records, party
organization and leadership, and content analysis of
politically significant documents.
Diplomats have long been prime collectors of politi-
cal intelligence, and, in the absence of an inherent
competition from bureaucratic rivals, their labor is
shared with intelligence analysts. Diplomats normally
seek data overtly from non-secret sources; intelligence
agents secretly ferret underground sources and roam
the back streets and seek political information by illegal
3
or devious means. Diplomats are not expected to soil
their hands in espionage. Yet they have come to share,
sometimes reluctantly, their classical role of political
reporting with secret agents, whom they sometimes
refer to?not always lovingly?as -spooks.- The raw
product from both diplomats and spies is supplied to
analysts whose mission is to interpret political trends,
to discover the true locus of governmental power, and
to discover and measure the various political factors
that affect the foreign policies of nations.
Military intelligence is another prime category. The
historical derivation of the intelligence function and
much intelligence doctrine is military. Intelligence
agencies have a close kinship with the institutions of
military security. For more than a century and a half
it has been customary for nations to exchange military
attaches, even between adversary nations. During all
the years of Cold War, for example, the United States
and the Soviet Union have exchanged military
attaches, whose prime function is intelligence?albeit
overt intelltgence?and who, in Alfred Vagts' words,
were "nearly always more warlike in their outlook than
the ambassadors" and tended to make reports with
their own service's budgetary welfare in mind [1967,
p. xi]. Ironically, military information is often more
difficult to obtain in peacetime than during war. Dur-
ing war information considered to be of greatest value
pertains to military organization and equipment,
procedures and formations, and the number of units
and total personnel?what the military call "order of
batti" information. Of prime concern are essentially
those elements of information thought to provide
forewarning of an attack or signs of weakness that offer
opportunities for attack or counter-attack.
Economic determinism aside, one can concede the
often dominating importance of economic factors as
influences on domestic and foreign policies. Thus these
kinds of factors constitute major arenas for intelligence
analyses. Economic resources are patently an impor-
tant element in calculating a nation's military power,
will condition to an important if not entirely predict-
able degree its political development, and generally
will impinge significantly upon the conduct of foreign
policy. Unemployment in Brazil, a food shortage in
Japan, the level of rice production in Southeast Asia,
a balance of payments crisis in the United States or
Germany?all will affect the particular nation's foreign
policy. Intelligence analysts must be concerned con-
stantly with economic factors and with collecting data
on such factors as trade, finance, and gross national
product.
Specialists involved in the function of selecting -war
plan" targets for bombers or missiles as ultimate policy
instruments must concern themselves with the sensi-
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Harry Howe Ransom
tive elements of a nation's economic systep: Target
selection is one grim job of the intelligence analyst
specializing in economics.
Intelligence centering on scientific development has
become increasingly important with each passing year.
During a period when technology creates a nip and
tuck race between offensive military capabilities and
defensive measures and between new intelligence col-
lection methods and new techniques of protecting se-
cret information (counter-intelligence), intelligence sys-
teins have to be on guard against scientific or
technological breakthroughs that may give one side a
decisive advantage against the other. So analysts in the
field of scientific intelligence center attention on data
about foreign advances in nuclear energy, electronic,
chemical, and biological sciences and science's bound-
less frontiers.
Biographic data, dealing with questions of "who's
who" in international politics, are also of prime impor-
tance to decision makers. If the intelligence system
is expected to produce estimates of a foreign nation's
future behavior, it obviously is necessary to have
detailed information about the personal background
and characteristics of its decision makers.
As the number and activity of international organiza-
tions increase apace, biographic information becomes
a constant need. Furthermore, as nations are constant-
ly represented by negotiators at international confer-
ences, biographic background data is a constant need
fbr envoys. It is standard operating procedure that
negotiators are "briefed" with biographic information
about their foreign counterparts in international
negotiations.
Geographic intelligence, largely self-defining, is an
obvious intelligence category. Since geography clearly
has some bearing on a nation's resources, cumulative
power, and its culture and politics, geographic data
constitute a major category in intelligence work. Thus
whether it be for purposes of targeting for contingent
strategic attack or for predicting next year's gross
national product, intelligence agencies are constantly
at work compiling new data on foreign population,
topographies, climates, and an increasingly wide range
of ecological factors. A decision maker's inquiry to an
intelligence analyst may range from "What is the length
of the rainy season in Rangoon?" to "What will be the
configuration of Chinese nuclear power in 1980?"
Importance to Decision Making
In today's real world of revolutionary ferment, the
real-life intelligence officer?as contrasted with the
James Bond stereotype?is a person almost always
4
anonymous to the public but who often occupies the
center in policy stol ins over foreign and defense policy.
At the heart of these great debates, frequently, are
the differing judgments and assumptions about the pre-
sent and particularly the future. Often at issue are
questions of power, probability and time. This is to
say that the function of intelligence almost always must
be involved with measurements of power interlaced
with estimates of probable behavior, and both in the
context of a time framework. An ideal strategic intelli-
gence system would provide a nation's leader and his
principal deputies with precise knowledge of the power
of a foreign adversary, the probability of his action
or reactions in given contingencies, and a time
schedule for the unfolding of events.
This ideal would suggest a reasonable premise that
knowledge is power. The use of the term power here
is in the sense of Ineans for accomplishing the objec-
tives of policy and strategy. If knowledge is power in
relation to objectiNs-s, then lack of information (or mis-
information) can bc subversive to the accomplishment
of objectives. Although we must be on guard against
simplistic interpretations, compelling evidence exists
that great wars in the twentieth century have been
the result of misinformation?of poor intelligence
estimates if you will. At the same time it can be noted
that near disasters have occurred to the United
States?at Pearl Harbor in 1941 and in the Cuban mis-
sile crisis in 1962? and to other nations because of the
misinterpretation or misuse of what we recognize from
hindsight to have been good information.
This point serves to remind us that collection of infor-
mation is one thing; its proper interpretation is
another; its communication to where it is needed is
still another; and ultimately its use is another, and
sometimes the most crucial, step in a complex process.
While each of these is a separate element or "steps
in a process," each is also closely interrelated.
It may be useful to think about strategic intelligence
with the aid of a simple graphic conception of decision
making for foreign and defense policy. As a macro-view
of such decisions, one might view the process on the
pattern of a triangle.
Ends
Intelligence
Means
The "Ends" represent the aspirations, objectives or
goals of policy. While these may be set in the abstract
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and perhaps sometimes are, the realistic policy maker
must fix specific goals in terms of an estimate of both
the means available and an estimate of the situation
(intelligence). The "Means" represent the power avail-
able, usually in instrumental categories, such as
economic, military, or persuasive (propaganda
resources) power. But such means can only be under-
stood in the context of the situation as estimated by
an intelligence analyst. Meanwhile the structure,
scope, and activities of the "Intelligence" instrument
are determined by the goals sought and the power to
be exercised. It can be argued, however, that "Intel-
ligence" is ultimately the key point of the triangle.
Nature of Intelligence
In essence, the task of intelligence is to provide the
decision maker with all the information he needs prior
to a decision [Platt 1957]. Some things in essence are
"unknowable.," so this is an impossible task in the
abstract. Intelligence therefore comes to be concep-
tualized in functional categories, derived from a set
of explicit or implicit requirements. This is to say that
decision makers require strategic intelligence that will
range from the spot news report (evaluated) to the
encyclopedic datum. In between will be a range of
summaries, "briefings," digests and "National Intelli-
gence Estimates."
In order that labor be divided in a vast intelligence
bureaucracy and so that purposeful collection plans
can be drawn and missions assigned, certain functional
intelligence categories have come into existence. Three
such major categories have come into common usage,
influenced by Sherman Kent's trail-blazing book,
Strategic Intelligence, first published in 1949. These
are (1) basic descriptive or generalized information usu-
ally pertaining to "hard" or "knowable" data, such as
population or economic facts; (2) current reportorial
or current estimate information, such as the political
party alignment in a foreign nation at a given instant;
and (3) speculative-evaluative, or the forecasting or
warning kind of information, such as a prediction that
a particular government will fail a vote of confidence
in its parliament next week. Categories such as these
are likely to be interrelated, and the same data base
can serve each.
The basic descriptive function is performed essen-
tially by government publication of a series of intelli-
gence encyclopedias, which are constantly updated and
expanded. They differ from the ordinary encyclopedia
in that they are organized by countries or other special
categories, rather than alphabetically. One element of
the strategic intelligence function, therefore, employs
5
thousands of individuals whose task is to keep up to
date a series of reference volumes that can provide
the answers to a wide variety of questions about almost
any part of the world. If a Presidential assistant should
ask whether a particular hotel in Afganistan has alter-
nating or direct electric current, the expectation is that
the intelligence system can provide this datum.
Specifically, the basic descriptive element is
embodied in what, in the United States intelligence
system, are called National Intelligence Surveys (NIS).
These are the composite product of the various ele-
ments making up the national intelligence system.
Army intelligence, for example, is responsible for sup-
plying data on foreign topographical features; the Air
Force supplies information on landing fields and air-
craft facilities in a variety of foreign settings; and the
Navy supplies data on ports, harbors and shoreline fea-
tures. Bits and pieces that go into the final composite
called the National Intelligence Survey may be pub-
lished separately to serve particular functional needs
and to avoid delays that would occur in waiting for
the amalgamation of the entire survey. The NIS of the
American government has grown in scope and size to
the point where it could be described authoritatively
some years ago as more than ten times the size of the
Encyclopedia Britannica. Inevitably, comprehensive
digests of various NIS sections have been published
for internal intelligence use, so that manageable sec-
tions are available by subject or by particular section
of the world. These kinds of strategic intelligence may
be used by diplomats preparing for foreign assignment,
by military planners, by propaganda officials and
foreign aid officers, or by policy makers at the highest
National Security Council level.
Even the digests of sections of the National Intelli-
gence Survey inevitably become dated because of
editorial and production lead-times, making necessary
a second category of intelligence reports: current
reporting. Organizationally this function is assigned to
a separate institution within the bureaucracy, called
the Office of Current Intelligence or a similar name.
Current reports of strategic intelligence come in a
variety of forms, ranging from "raw intel-
ligence"?which is similar to journalistic reporting, and
so in a sense "hot off the wires"?to a "National Intel-
ligence Estimate" that would be the careful product
of the entire intelligence system. Let us detail here
the major categories in which current information is
produced and reported:
Raw intelligence takes the form of a "news flash"
reported through the intelligence system. For example
a Presidential Assistant or Secretary of State might be
informed in the middle of the night: "A coup d' etat
has occurred in Iraq, staged by a group of Army
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officers." Although the collector of this "raw" flash may
have evaluated its source and content, it has not been
evaluated from the broader perspective of a higher
level in the intelligence system.
The next morning, a second category would emerge
from the system in the form of a written memorandum.
This might give the background to the coup d'etat in
Iraq, update the news flash, and set the topic into such
context as could be assembled within a few hours from
government-wide sources. Therefore it would be
somewhat less "raw"; nonetheless, a policy maker
would be wise to consider it only "half-baked."
Current intelligence reporting can take a third form,
that of the oral briefing. This can be a supplement
to the written memorandum or a substitute for it when
demanded by the busy policy maker. The personality
of some policy makers leads them to prefer the oral
briefing to the written report. Some policy makers are
better listeners than readers, and their tastes become
known. Keep in mind that the intelligence professional
normally has a vested or personal human interest in
knowing that his product has impact within the system
and will go out of his way to maximize this impact.
Another form of current reports is the routine daily
publication. Within national intelligence systems of the
great powers, current intelligence appears in a variety
of forms, for a variety of clienteles. These range from
the exclusive brochure labeled, "For the President.
Intelligence Checklist. Top Secret," to the "Daily
Intelligence Digest" with a wider, although limited,
circulation in policy-making councils. Still another
form is the weekly or monthly publications summariz-
ing the foreign situation in various categories. In these
publications, estimates of the situation can be put in
greater perspective than in the daily publications.
Finally, current intelligence may appear as a "Na-
tional Intelligence Estimate," which is the product of
the entire intelligence system. The NIE can take vari-
ous forms, ranging from a "crash" estimate produced
on short notice; a Special National Intelligence
Estimate (SNIE), which may be produced within
several days dealing with a special problem; or a stan-
dard NIE, which may represent six months of work
by many hundreds of analysts.
Until very recently, it was not possible to illustrate
concretely these forms of intelligence product. But
through a series of events, particularly the "Pentagon
Papers" episode, authentic examples are available. Fol-
lowing is an example of a Special National Intelligence
Estimate. This document is marked SNIE 53-2-61, 5
October 1961, with the cover note that it was submit-
ted by the Director of Central Intelligence, who noted
that participants in producing the estimate were the
CIA, intelligence organizations of the Departments of
6
State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Joint Staff.
The estimate had the concurrence of specified rep-
resentatives of the organizations listed above, plus the
Assistant to Secretary of Defense, Special Operations,
and the Director, National Security Agency. Represen-
tatives to the Board from Atomic Energy Commission
and the FBI abstain,?d, "the subject being outside their
jurisdiction" [Unite,1 States-Vietnam Relations, 1971
Book 11, pp. 292-29
Bloc Support of the Communist Effort Against the Govern-
ment of Vietnam
The Problem
To estimate the extent and nature of Bloc support of the
Communist effort against South Vietnam.'
The Estimate
1. The Communist subversive and guerrilla apparatus
in South Vietnam, known as the Viet Cong, is an integral
part of the North Vietnamese Communist Party and it looks
to Hanoi for political and military guidance and various
forms of support. 1 lanoi is the implementing agency for
Bloc activity in South Vietnam, and the Hanoi authorities
are allowed considerable local freedom in conducting Viet
Cong guerrilla and subversive activity. The Communist
Bloc probably views the guerrilla and subversive cam-
paigns in Laos and South Vietnam as two parts of a single
broad political-military strategy, and of the two, considers
South Vietnam as the more significant prize.
2. The Viet Gong are using Maoist tactics. A large part
of the North Vietnam Army was trained in Communist
China during the Indochina war ending in 1954, and some
of these troops are leading operations in South Vietnam
now. Each Bloc country has supported the -struggle" in
the South with propaganda, notably during Pham Van
Dong's trip to other Bloc areas in June-August, 1961.
3. Since early 1960 a general Hanoi-directed political
and paramilitary Communist offensive against President
Diem and his government of Vietnam (GVN) has been
underway, and during the past year this campaign has
taken on increased tempo and scale. The Viet Cong
apparatus has undergone rapid expansion, and the scope
and area of operations of its guerrilla units have increased
significantly. More recently, the Viet Cong has begun to
operate in larger sized units (500-1,000 men) and they
have extended lar.w-scale attacks to include, for the first
time, the plateau area in the northern part of South Viet-
nam.
4. Apparently in response to this direction from Hanoi,
cadre personnel and many special items, such as communi-
cations equipment. chemicals, medical supplies, and other
items needed for guerrilla warfare not available in the
countryside, are being infiltrated into South Vietnam via
long established land and sea routes. Thousands of junks
which ply the coastal routes of the Indochina peninsula
1. For a broader treatment of the situation and prospects
in South Vietnam, see NIE 143/53-61. -Prospects for North
and South Vietnam,- dated 15 August 1961.
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provide a means of infiltration extremely difficult to con-
trol. Mountain trails in southern Laos have been used
freely by the Communists for years for movements of men
and supplies between North and South Vietnam. Other
infiltration routes pass through Cambodia. Nevertheless,
the Viet Cong effort is still largely a self-supporting opera-
tion in respect to recruitment and supplies. The Viet Cong
live upon locally produced food which they either grow
themselves or levy upon villages. They meet most of their
currency needs by taxing areas under their control, by
robbery, or by blackmail. Most of their arms and much
of their ammunition have been locally acquired or captured
from GVN Army and security forces.
5. We estimate present armed, full-time Viet Cong
strength at about 16,000, an increase, despite substantial
combat losses, of 12,000 since April of 1960 and of 4,000
in the past three months. About 10-20 per cent of total
Viet Cong strength consists of cadres infiltrated from North
Vietnam mostly via mountain trails through southern Laos.
Most of the remaining 80-90 percent of the Viet Cong
are local recruits, but they also include remnants of the
approximately 10,000 stay-behind personnel who went
underground during the 1954-1955 regroupment and
evacuation of Vietnamese Communist Army units follow-
ing the Indochina War. Approximately 90,000 Vietnamese
Communist troops were evacuated to North Vietnam dur-
ing this period, most of whom were from south and central
Vietnam. It is from this pool of experienced fighters that
most of the guerrilla cadres now operating in South Viet-
nam are drawn. These hard-core guerrillas are augmented
by several thousand supporters who, under the cover of
normal civilian pursuits, join the organized insurgent
bands to assist in intelligence, sabotage, propaganda, and
terrorist operations. In addition, local inhabitants in many
areas provide the Viet Cong with recruits, food, refuge,
and operational support, in some cases voluntarily and in
others as the result of intimidation or coercion.
6. As part of the buildup for their current campaign,
the Viet Cong have established an extensive communica-
tions network. Much of the communications equipment
in use is probably quite primitive and some of it is assem-
bled in the field. There is evidence, however, that in addi-
tion there are substantial quantities of sophisticated com-
munications equipment and well-trained technicians serv-
ing the Viet Cong. Such equipment and the necessary
maintenance and operating personnel were infiltrated into
South Vietnam.
7. There has been no positive identification of Bloc man-
ufactured military equipment in South Vietnam. Most of
the arms and equipment now in use by the Viet Cong
is of US or French origin. Although weapons have been
infiltrated from North Vietnam, most Viet Cong equip-
ment is probably from caches established at the end of
the Indochina War or is equipment captured from GVN
armed forces or security forces. During 1960, over 3,000
small arms were lost by GVN armed forces during combat.
Some items, such as grenades, land mines, booby traps,
and small arms ammunition are locally manufactured by
village level Viet Cong "arsenals," from materials procured
locally or imported from North Vietnam and Cambodia.
Moreover, in view of the physical problems of infiltrating
large amounts of arms and ammunition into South Vietnam,
many Viet Cong operations are primarily for the purpose
of capturing arms, ammunition, medical supplies, and
other equipment. A major buildup of Bloc equipment in
7
South Vietnam is likely to await the improvement of lines
of communication into and within South Vietnam.
8. Outlook. Viet Cong control of the Ca Mau peninsula
at the southern tip of South Vietnam has been virtually
complete for several years. During the dry season begin-
ning in November, the Viet Cong will probably intensify
the exploitation of GVN weaknesses in the plateau areas
of the north and central parts of the country, seeking to
establish another "liberated area" as a logistics base from
which larger scale operations could be mounted. The crea-
tion of a second "liberated area" in the plateau region adja-
cent to southern Laos would enable the Viet Cong to keep
GVN forces split and prevent the concentration of effort
against either. Moreover, a strong Viet Gong position in
the plateau area would seriously threaten the rear of
Diem's troops posted along the demilitarized zone.
9. To a considerable extent the ability of the Viet Cong
to maintain this expanded effort will depend upon
improved logistical support from the outside. It is probable
that the Bloc intends to build up the eastern part of south
Laos, improving the roads, mountain trails, and airfields,
as a major supply channel to support a stepped up Viet
Cong campaign in north and central Vietnam. There has
already been a considerable increase in Communist troop
strength in south Laos, a substantial supply buildup, par-
ticularly east of Thakhok, and an increase in the Commu-
nist airlift into the area.
It is extremely revealing, and a unique opportunity,
to have this look at an actual intelligence estimate. One
can extrapolate or infer the various elements that went
into such an estimate; one can, after more than a
decade, judge the quality of this estimate in terms of
predictive performance; and one can even put oneself
in the shoes of the policy maker who was required
to make important decisions on the basis of this kind
of information.
The above strategic intelligence estimate was labeled
as "Special" because it dealt with the specific subject
of "bloc" support of the Viet Cong.
The next sample is simply a digest of a "National
Intelligence Estimate," and it is distinguished by the
general nature of the subject it treats?"Prospects in
Vietnam." This is National Intelligence Estimate No.
53-63, submitted by the Director of Central Intelli-
gence with the concurrence of the United States Intel-
igence Board, dated 17 April 1963 [1971, United
States-Vietnam Relations Book 12, pp. 522-524].
Prospects in South Vietnam
The Problem
To assess the situation and prospects in South Vietnam,
with special emphasis upon the military and political fac-
tors most likely to affect the counterinsurgency effort.
Conclusions
A. We believe that Communist progress has been
blunted and that the situation is improving. Strengthened
South Vietnamese capabilities and effectiveness, and par-
ticularly US involvement, are causing the Viet Cong
increased difficulty, although there are as yet no persuasive
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indications that the Communists have been grievously
hurt. (Paras. 27-28)
B. We believe the Communists will continue to wage
a war of attrition, hoping for some break in the situation
which will lead to victory. They evidently hope that a com-
bination of military pressure and political deterioration will
in time create favorable circumstances either for delivering
a coup de grace or for a political settlement which will
enable them to continue the struggle on more favorable
terms. We believe it unlikely, especially in view of the
open US commitment, that the North Vietnamese regime
will either resort to overt military attack or introduce ac-
knowledged North Vietnamese military units into the south
in an effort to win a quick victory. (Pares. 29-31)
C. Assuming no great increase in external support to
the Viet Cong, changes and improvements which have
occurred during the past year now indicate that the Viet
Gong can be contained militarily and that further progress
can be made in expanding the area of government control
and in creating greater security in the countryside.
However, we do not believe that it is possible at this time
to project the future course of the war with any confidence.
Decisive campaigns have yet to be fought and no quick
and easy end to the war is in sight. Despite South Vietnam-
ese progress, the situation remains fragile. (Para. 32)
D. Developments during the last year or two also show
some promise of resolving the political weaknesses, par-
ticularly that of insecurity in the countryside, upon which
the insurgency has fed. However, the government's capac-
ity to embark upon the broader measures required to trans-
late military success into lasting political stability is ques-
tionable. (Pares. 33-35)
Keep in mind that the above estimate is the product
of a multi-billion dollar foreign intelligence system.
Note also that it is presented as the best information
available from the government's entire intelligence
system, including spies, electronic devices, broken
enemy secret codes, computers, social science analysis,
and the best interpretative, analytical, and writing
skills?supposedly?available to the government. When
all of this is said, note also how the President and his
principal advisers are left with the clear opportunity
to make their own final estimate. For it will be
observed that, in back-to-back sentences, for our side
"the situation is improving" and U.S. involvement is
causing the enemy "increased difficulty" and yet "the
situation remains fragile" and "lasting political stability
is questionable."
It must be understood that most strategic intelli-
genceestimates a.re likely. to be of this sort, leaving the
decision maker in effect to make his own decision about
what the situation acnaily_i_La_nd how it can be affected
'by actions within the control of the decision maker.
Having sketched the categories and nature of intel-
ligence, let us turn now to the question of how the
intelligence product, in its various forms, is produced.
What are the principal steps in the intelligence pro-
cess? What is the process that leads up to such
"products" as have just been illustrated?
8
The Intelligence Process
The intelligence process may be described in the
most general terms as involving three basic steps: first,
collection of information; second, its evaluation,
analysis, interpretation, and synthesis; and third, its
communication to consumers. This level of generaliza-
tion, however, does not convey much of the true nature
of the intelligence process or the real-life complexities
involved. Strategic intelligence by definition is high-
level, "national" intelligence that is the product of a
vast system involving many disparate elements and
institutional levels. At the lowest level, the intelligence
process is relativel) simple when, to use a military
illustration, a patrol sets out to gather information and
reports this directl) to the company commander. The
commander must of course evaluate the reliability and
credibility of the pat rol leader and members and judge
the quality of the data supplied. But he can do this
on a face-to-face basis. The President of the United
States, on the other hand, receives at the highest level
intelligence reports and estimates that, in most cases,
have been filtered through dozens of layers, and
originated from perhaps hundreds of sources. It is
much more difficult for him to evaluate the product.
The company commander is both the intelligence ana-
lyst and the decision maker, but at the Presidential
level, the information has been subjected to a variety
of layers among collectors, analysts, producers, writ-
ers, and in the case of verbal briefings "actors"?each
of whom can shape the information either deliberately
or unconsciously in d variety of ways.
The process ma) be better understood if a more
detailed delineation of various steps is made. It is use-
ful to consider these analytically separable steps in the
strategic intelligence process: the setting of
requirements; collection; processing of information;
analysis; dissemination or communication; and final-
ly?and most crucial as well as elusive?the use of the
information.
Requirements
One principal reason that the United States intelli-
gm_icuiltfatias ac-iwn enormously in the past 20 years
is the difficulty of setting requirements. That is to say,
much greater econony of effort mi&ht have been possi-
ble with a more zecise definition of requirements.
In the absence of such precision, the whole world
comes under surveillance, and the "requirements"
tend to become indiscriminate amassing of data. With-
out careful attention to requirements, the strategic
intelligence system can come to resemble a huge vac-
uum cleaner, sweeping up indiscriminately everything
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in its path. Hoping to avoid this, bureaucrats have tried
to see that collection labor be elaborately divided,
specialized institutions developed, and intelligence
missions assigned with particular care for bureaucratic
jurisdictions.
/Ultimately the setting of intelligence requirements
may actually be decided on the basis of resources avail-
able. Since unlimited resources are almost never avail-
able, certain essential elements of information must be
identified. These are the raw material basic to the set-
ting of requirements. In intelligence doctrine, the dis-
tinction is sometimes made between basic require-
ments and essential elements of information. At a low
level of operations, basic requirements would be infor-
mation on weather and terrain for a military operation;
at a high level requirements might be data on gross
national product, balance of international payments,
or the strength of a political coalition. Essential ele-
ments of information, in these illustrations, would be,
at a low level, a determination of whether the enemy
will attack and specifically information on Highway 5;
at the highest level the essential elements might be
how a particular element in a government would
respond to a given diplomatic move.
Sometimes the political leader or the military com-
mander may set specific requirements or even specify
essential elements of information. More often than not,
the strategic intelligence system works at anticipating
intelligence needs, once requirements have been set
primarily by statutory and administrative arrange-
ments. It may not be too much to say that the setting
of requirements and the definition of essential ele-
ments of information may be the most important long-
term feature of an intelligence system. Supplying the
decision maker with what he needs to know prior to
a decision is the ultimate, ideal objective of an intelli-
gence system, but, as earlier noted, rarely obtained.
A national intelligence system will be guided by a
broad and secret statement of intelligence objectives
and requirements, periodically revised. These provide
the guidance for the next crucial step in the intelligence
process, collection.
Collection
Perhaps the most important characteristic of this
step is specialization. In the strategic intelligence sys-
tem of a major power, a myriad of collection efforts
are constantly in action, ranging from the monitoring
of foreign radio broadcasts to the interception of the
secret coded messages of a foreign government or the
most daring attempt to steal data by espionage. Most
commonly the collection process is categorized in
9
terms of types of sources. An important point to note
is that contrary to popular notions about the nature
of an intelligence service, open sources?available to
anyone?usually provide the greatest part of the infor-
mation used by intelligence analysts. A collection plan
for strategic intelligence, however, will be designed
in the hopes of exploiting the widest possible range
of intelligence sources, open as well as secret. As
earlier indicated, sources are unlimited, but it is possi-
ble to stipulate the principal source categories. These
are listed and described here in the general order of
their importance?in terms of the amount of informa-
tion supplied to the strategic intelligence process.
First of all are the commercial news services. It was
once facetiously stated that were the New York Times
and Washington Post to cease operations because of
a labor dispute, hundreds of analysts in the national
intelligence system would be without work. More seri-
ously, it should be understood that all national intelli-
gence services constantly monitor the press news
"tickers" as well as domestic newspapers and periodi-
cals. They are a major source of current information,
and intelligence analysts sometimes find themselves in
competition with journalists to get the "scoop" or news
"beat" on current events. And, as intelligence profes-
sional Jack Zlotnick wrote in 1964, "many an analyst
has to leave his warm bed in the early morning hours
to prepare his quick assessment of a news scoop ticking
over the press wires" [p. 17].
A second important source for the collection of raw
intelligence data is foreign specialty publications, such
as economic and other technical journals, which
include, for example, publications on agriculture,
engineering, manufacturing and the like. Such sources
are of more use for generalized surveys and background
research studies than for current intelligence, because
of the normal publication time lag.
A third important resource is the monitoring of radio
broadcasts. These may be of greater importance in
time of war than in peace, and in each case there is
often a heavy overlay of propaganda from government-
controlled radio broadcasts. The importance and use
of radio broadcasts varies with the degree of freedom
such broadcasts enjoy from government or political
party censorship and control. Use of radio broadcasts
for strategic intelligence purposes requires sophis-
ticated techniques of content analysis.
A fourth source of intelligence is data obtained from
non-government domestic institutions, such as univer-
sities or commercial or other enterprises with overseas
operations. Therefore foreign intelligence organiza-
lions like the Central Intelligence Agency maintain
domestic offices in various cities within the United
States. The CIA has no domestic intelligence functions
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as such, but some of the information needed may
require a domestic collection plan.
The diplomatic establishment is a fifth major cate-
gory of intelligence sources. The basic function of the
diplomat is to supply information to his government.
But the protocols of diplomacy, developed over the
years, rule out espionage activity by diplomats. The
intelligence function of diplomats, while a major part
of their work, must remain within the boundaries of
information set by the foreign governments to which
they are accredited. In the years of cold war, rules
of diplomacy have sometimes been violated by most
foreign governments, when they use the diplomatic
establishment as a cover for espionage or intervention-
ist political intrigue.
A sixth institutionalized source of intelligence in the
process is the military attacUs. Their function is in
some ways very similar to that of the diplomat. But
the attache confines himself to military intelligence.
Ake the diplomat, he generally collects only that infor-
mation which the host foreign government wishes him
to have. In fact, the attache will receive formal invita-
tions to attend various foreign military maneuvers or
reviews. He will tour military installations as the guest
of his foreign host. He is in fact accredited by the gov-
ernment of the foreign nation to which he is assigned.
The reason governments have adopted the attache sys-
tem, even in the very competitive world of power poli-
tics, is the perceived mutual strategic intelligence
advantage in the exchange of this kind of information.
In recent years the American government has
expanded the concept of attache, so that there are now
labor attaches, cultural attaches and the like. Civilian
attaches, like the military, are expected to confine their
activities to the collection of non-secret foreign infor-
mation.
Still another, and seventh, category of information
is photography and other -sensing" methods that, in
the age of missiles and artificial satellites, have come
to be one of the most important and expensive sources
of intelligence data. Photographs constitute the kind
of hard, concrete data rarely matched by other forms
of intelligence. Hundreds of millions of dollars are now
expended annually on such sources. These have
expanded beyond photography to a wide range of elec-
tronic eavesdropping and sensing devices, use of infra-
red sensors, and a whole new world of surveillance
apparatus provided by modern technology.
Finally, the most glamorized source of intelligence
information?the category that supplies the stereotype
in the public mind that tends to identify intelligence
with spying?is secret or covert collection methods. It
is important here to note the distinction between secret
and covert. The secret?sometimes called clandes-
10
tine?method is that attempted collection of informa-
tion occurring corapletely outside the view of the
counter-intelligence agencies of the target system.
Covert collection is that activity that goes on under
the cover of some other function. For example,
a foreign aid official will in fact be an intelligence agent,
using the foreign aid organization as the cover for his
true mission. As earlier indicated, even diplomatic
offices are sometimes used as cover, although this vio-
lates the protocols of diplomacy. But in part because
diplomats resist being used in this way, it is much more
common for military organizations, foreign aid, prop-
aganda or private business enterprises to be used for
cover in the covert collection of information.
Evaluation of the quality and reliability of informa-
tion gained through espionage is more of a serious
problem than with information gained from other more
open sources or "hard" information such as photo-
graphs. For judgm, .nts must be made not only as to
content but as to the reliability of the information
source.
After evaluation, the next step is the processing and
analysis of the raw data. If one can imagine the massive
scope of a national intelligence system and the moun-
tains of data that pour into the system constantly, one
will readily see that a wide variety of specialists will
be assigned to various categories of data. Part of the
processing problem r therefore is similar to that of
operating a large library or, in effect, a huge reference
system that will be of use only if it represents carefully
conceived procedures for analysis, storage, and
retrieval. Strategic intelligence systems from earliest
days have floundered on the problem of getting the
evaluated and anal) red information to those who need
to have it for decisions in a timely fashion. So a crucial
step in the intelligence process is the classification,
indexing, and storage of the data so that it will be on
call by methods which users can utilize effectively.
An efficient reference system, utilizing in some cases
the latest techniques of automation for retrieval, is
therefore a prerequisite for analysis. Analysis is the
important step in which raw data are utilized in the
production" of intelligence?or what is sometimes
referred to as "finished intelligence." In a basic way,
the analysis stage in intelligence production is similar
to basic research in an academic environment. It differs
primarily in that the decision-making consumer often
has great impact 01 1 the product. This is so in several
ways. For one thing, the consumer initially has played
a role in setting intelligence requirements, either
through asking a specific question or in specifying cer-
tain categories of information needed. Another way
that intelligence analysis differs from pure academic
research is that the consumer is less interested in
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theories or generalizations than in short-run, practical
questions of immediate policy relevance. He is less
interested in discovering new knowledge than he is
in knowing about the current situation. Finally, there
are subtle ways in which the intelligence consumer
influences the intelligence process in ways not usually
felt in academic research. This is in the tendency for
the analysis to be influenced by what the consumer
wants to hear. This effect can be seen somewhat in
the examples of estimates given above.
The next step in the process is intelligence produc-
tion. This has been dealt with above by the description
of the various categories in which intelligence reports
may be produced, ranging from the spot reports of
current intelligence to the lengthy, long-term ency-
clopedic intelligence surveys. Needless to say the form
in which intelligence is produced can have a major
influence on bow it is disseminated and utilized in mak-
ing and applying policies and strategies.
The next to last step is commonly called "dis-
semination." Essentially it is a communications pro-
cess. A central feature to be understood here is that
there are various circles of privilege within which intel-
ligence is disseminated in its various "finished"
categories. There is a small "inner circle," outer circles,
and a number of intermediate circles, all conceived
on the somewhat arbitrary basis of "need to know."
Security concerns pervade intelligence organiza-
tions. Security consciousness is considered a prime
requisite for an intelligence professional. This fact has
profound impact upon the dissemination of intelli-
gence. It affects how the finished product is com-
municated, i.e. by courier, wire, or radio, in code or
in the clear. These considerations of course can affect
the speed of transmission. Not only the means of com-
munication are affected by security. Equally as impor-
tant, the question of who the recipients will be is deter-
mined by security considerations. An elaborate secur-
ity classification policy has evolved to cope with this
enormous problem. As indicated, the guiding principle
has security as well as political and efficiency aspects.
This is the conception of need to know. In general there
is a prejudice that favors sharply limiting the circle
of those involved in policy making who have a need
to know. The overlay of politics and power here cannot
be ignored, in the sense that sharing information is
sometimes the equivalent of sharing power.
The dissemination problem is a fundamental one.
It is never really solved. An intelligence report marked
Top Secret cannot be read by a person whose top clear-
ance is Secret, and so on. But it may be that the Top
Secret report contains information of vital importance
to the person not entitled, by security rules, to read
it. The problem is compounded by the fact that a vigor-
11
ous "need to know" policy often prevents even those
with the proper "clearance" from seeing certain reports
because a need to know cannot be demonstrated in
the bureaucratic context or cannot be proved in
advance of the dissemination of pivotal information.
Assuming that there are always some proper
strategic secrets, the dissemination stage of the intelli-
gence process sometimes confronts security officials
with dilemma. This is illustrated by the Japanese sur-
prise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The Joint Con-
gressional Committee that investigated the attack after
the war illustrated the dilemma in these words: "The
fact that the Japanese codes had been broken was
regarded as of more importance [that is, to be kept
secret] than the information obtained from decoded
traffic. The result of this rather specious premise was
to leave large numbers of policy-making and enforce-
ment officials in Washington completely oblivious of
the most pertinent information concerning Japan"
[Zlotnick 1964, p. 26]. In retrospect it often is easy
to identify such disastrously inverted priorities, and
intelligence systems ought to be able to learn from
history. They do not often seem to do so.
Overemphasis on secrecy and security can jeopardize
national security. The operational rule seems to be
"When in doubt, classify or restrict circulation," His-
tory would seem to suggest a better rule: "When in
doubt, disseminate."
The last step in the process is the use of intelligence.
This is a subject in its own right that cannot be given
adequate attention here. But to generalize and to over-
simplify, the use of intelligence is characterized by two
tendencies: On the one hand, the decision maker has
a selective perception in the use of intelligence. His
tendency is to see in intelligence reports what he wants
to see. This problem is fundamentally aggravated by
the tendency of intelligence agencies to supply deci-
sion makers with information they judge to be pre-
ferred by the decision maker. This is a complicated issue,
and the record is usually not open to scholars to enable
confirmation. Nor is the record always consistent. Pearl
Harbor was a surprise to American leaders because
they expected the Japanese attack to come elsewhere;
Stalin was surprised by Hitler's attack on Russia
because he did not wish it to happen; Hitler was sur-
prised by the Normandy invasion in part by deception
but in some measure because his mind had become
fixed on the Calais area as the locus for invasion; in
more recent times American leaders were surprised
by the early development of Russian atomic weapons
and missiles because their minds were fixed on the
erroneous notion of American technological superiority
in these fields. And so on. This tendency is so pro-
nounced that Wilensky [1967] calls it an "information
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pathology.- Some intelligence officials over the years
come to believe that in the last analysis strategic intel-
ligence is irrelevant in the face of these tendencies
on the part of policy makers. The Vietnam War may
be said to be the prime example of this problem in
the 1960s and 1970s.
Another step in the process may be suggested,
although it is not part of intelligence doctrine. This
is periodic assessment of the intelligence product and
performance or a -post-mortem- following an intelli-
gence failure. Such a review would allow for the refine-
ment of requirements and the possible improvement
of each step in the process, assuming that the cause
of failure has been identified.
To sum up the intelligence process, it may be useful
to view it as circular, with no clearly identifiable start-
ing point in reality.
Use
Setting of
Requirements
Collection
Dissemination 141111,/ Production
The Organizational Environment
All major powers maintain sizeable intelligence sys-
tems. Newly developing nations see intelligence
agencies as a status symbol. As modern world politics
becomes more complex, intelligence agencies are
increasingly important. They have greatly expanded in
size and scope of operations, have become more profes-
sionalized, and in recent times play a more influential
role in policy making than ever before.
But as earlier noted, secrecy shrouds strategic intel-
ligence structures and functions from public view. Cir-
cumstances of the Cold War, however, and highly pub-
licized intelligence failures or disclosed disasters in
covert operations?such as the Bay of Pigs in
1961?and a number of subsequent disclosures have
shed some light on the outlines of the major intelli-
gence services. Another source of information is the
occasional ideological -defection" from one side or
another in the Cold War.
While strategic intelligence has a universal function,
12
one may discern three major types of intelligence struc-
ture: the United itates system, which has influenced
intelligence structures in those nations coming under
American control at the end of World War II, such
as Japan and West Germany; the British model, on
which most West( in European nations have patterned
their systems; and the model of the Soviet Union,
copied by most nations dominated by Communist
parties.
United States
World War II saw American intelligence organized
on a government-wide basis for the first time. During
the war the Officc of Strategic Services (OSS) came
into being, in part to gather and coordinate strategic
intelligence but also to conduct secret operations
behind enemy lines. At war's end the OSS was
demobilized. From some of its remnants, the new
Central Intelligence Agency was created by Congress
in 1947 [Kirkpatrick 1968, Ransom 1958].
Functions of the CIA were specified by statute: to
advise the National Security Council, including the
President, on foreign intelligence activities; to coor-
dinate, correlate, evaluate, and disseminate national
intelligence within the government; and to perform
intelligence and other intelligence-related functions of
common governmental concern best performed cen-
trally. Operating guidelines are specified in secret NSC
intelligence directives that spell out CIA's functions
and delineate the roles, missions and jurisdictions of
other government intelligence agencies.
Since 1947 through an evolutionary process the CIA
has come to have three major functions: foreign intel-
ligence, counter-intelligence overseas, and clandestine
political operations. including psychological warfare.
The Director of Central Intelligence heads the CIA
and is also the President's principal intelligence
adviser. As chairman of the United States Intelligence
Board he serves as a kind of chief appellate judge in
the American intelligence community. The U.S. Intel-
ligence Board comprises the CIA, the State Depart-
ment, the Defense Department and its sub-
sidiaries?the Defense Intelligence Agency and the
National Security' Agency?plus representatives from
the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Approval by this Board is the
final step in an elaborate process of producing a -Na-
tional Intelligent a- Estimate.- The principal
members" of the -intelligence community" include
the following:
The Department of State, through its Bureau of
Intelligence and lit search, headed by an Assistant Sec-
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retary of State, collects (from open sources), analyzes,
and disseminates political intelligence. This Bureau,
organized along geographic and functional lines, pro-
duces a variety of policy-oriented reports.
The Defense Intelligence Agency, created in 1961,
is a part of the Department of Defense and the newest
major member of the intelligence community. The
DIA's Director is the principal intelligence adviser to
the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The National Security Agency is the largest and most
secret of American intelligence agencies. It keeps the
world under electronic surveillance, makes and breaks
codes, and is responsible for the security of American
secret communications. From its Fort George Meade
headquarters in Maryland, NSA operates a vast system
for electronic intelligence.
The Atomic Energy Commission collects, produces,
and consumes strategic intelligence about foreign nu-
clear energy and weapons. An intelligence division
forms atomic intelligence policies, sets AEC require-
ments, and coordinates atomic intelligence operations.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has a limited
role in strategic intelligence estimates. Essentially, the
FBI is responsible for internal (domestic) security. It
has no overseas functions, although the FBI's counter-
intelligence activities may sometimes turn up informa-
tion of importance in strategic estimates.
Other agencies having some role include the Trea-
sury Department, which follows foreign finance
developments; the Commerce Department, gathering
foreign information on factors affecting U.S. exports;
the Agriculture Department, concerned with foreign
produce; the U.S. Postal Service, sometimes assigned
mail surveillance duties for intelligence purposes; and
? the Secret Service.
Great Britain
The British Secret Service was organized under the
first Elizabeth. Rather than having a central intelli-
gence agency, Great Britain maintains a confederation
of agencies coordinated by a Cabinet subcommittee.
The two principal intelligence organizations are the
Secret Intelligence Service (commonly called MI-6
because of its military origins) and the Security Service
(popularly termed MI-5), which is a counter-
intelligence and internal security arm of government.
Scotland Yard, Special Branch, is the overt arm of the
Security Service; it makes arrests and presents evi-
dence in security cases while "MI-5" agents remain
in the shadows. A third important service is the
Defense Intelligence Staff of the Ministry of Defense,
consolidating in 1965 what formerly were separate
armed service intelligence units.
13
These agencies, along with such specialized units as
the Government Communications Center (for code
making and breaking) and Foreign Office intelligence
groups, are coordinated by a Joint Intelligence Com-
mittee. A high official of the Foreign Office presides
over JIC, embodying the firm British principle of
civilian policy control.
Soviet Union and China
The intelligence system of the U.S.S.R. resembles
in many ways that of the United States, but differences
are distinct and important. Major intelligence functions
are coordinated by a central civilian organization, the
Komitet Gosudarstennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB). This
"Committee on State Security" dominates the entire
structure, enabling strict Communist Party controls.
KGB's coordination extends to a large Defense Minis-
try intelligence arm, the Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye
Upravlenie (GRU). This "Chief Intelligence Direc-
torate" conducts primarily military intelligence opera-
tions overseas. At certain periods in the evolution of
the Soviet intelligence system, GRU has seemed to
be in competition with KGB. The total Soviet intelli-
gence effort in supposedly the largest in the world.
Communist China is known also to maintain a mas-
sive intelligence apparatus. Because of its isolation, lit-
tle is known about it. The best information suggests
that the Chinese system is divided into four major
intelligence units: that of the party, the foreign office,
defense ministry, and of the State Council (govern-
ment). Each not only performs intelligence functions
but checks on the others. The Chinese Communist
Party, through its Politburo and more specifically its
"Social Affairs Department" (similar to Russia's KGB)
attempts to exercise dominant overall controls.
Overview of Strategic Intelligence
Any intelligence system is ultimately tested by how
well it describes reality in the external situation, gives
timely warning of imminent dangers, and identifies pol-
icy opportunities. In other words, it is successful if
it forewarns decision makers. Intelligence failures are
more publicized than successes. Sometimes the failure
may have been in the use rather than the quality of
information. As Wohlstetter explains [1962] the Japan-
ese attack on Pearl Harbor may be regarded as such
a failure. As noted, most intelligence systems incline
towards telling national leaders what they want to hear,
and decision makers often seem compelled to believe
what they want to believe and to perceive "facts"
according to preconceived notions. Both Hitler and
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Stalin suffered the consequences of wishful thinking
in World War II. Wishful thinking may also have been
the basis for major American failures, such as
the Korean War and Chinese intervention, unexpect-
edly early success of the Soviets with atomic weapons,
Soviet space achievements, and the strength of the
insurgency in South Viet Nam [de Rivera 1968, Whiting
1970].
American successes have mostly been in the
technological realm of intelligence, such as the U-2
aircraft flights that gave hard data on Soviet missile
progress in the late 1950's and the outstanding Ameri-
can intelligence performance in forewarning of China's
atomic and missile developments in the mid-1960's.
Rapid advances in communications and related tech-
nologies predicted for the future will bring new assign-
ments, challenges, and capabilities to all intelligence
systems, and new problems of policy, organization, and
control of intelligence systems. Man's grasp for
strategic intelligence, however, will always exceed his
reach.
Strategic Intelligence as a Research Frontier
Study of strategic intelligence offers a challenging
research frontier because information possibly is the
most important variable in institutional and individual
behavior. Signals, messages, and messengers con-
stitute the vital blood of the body politic, but informa-
tion may be the variable we know least about. Institu-
tional descriptions and doctrinal analyses aside, how
is information really gathered, analyzed, com-
municated, received and perceived? How is it used,
or ignored? The way information determines behavior
may be at once the most difficult and challenging
research frontier of the social sciences [Hermann 1971,
Jervis 1970, Pollack 19681.
A phenomenon of modern times is the spectacular
rate of growth of information technology and bureau-
cracy. This expansion of techniques for collecting,
evaluating, interpreting, and transmitting or storing of
information is manifest in many segments of modern
society, but particularly in the -mega-machines," to
use Mumford's term [1970], of the national govern-
ment's strategic intelligence bureaucracies. Informa-
tion -mega-machines" are viewed as an empirical sign
of the highest stage in economic development, but also
are normatively viewed with concern about their impli-
cations for individual freedom and privacy and par-
ticularly with alarm for their potentially destructive
impact upon the democratic idea. In simple generaliza-
tion a collective polity or an individual person
becomes potentially subservient to institutions able to
14
manipulate the sollection, evaluation, storage and flow
of information. The ideal of government by informed
consent tends to become rule b mani ulated consent.
For example, one may hypothesize that the allocation
of more than a trillion dollars in American resources
for a militarized containment foreign eolicy has since
1947 been supported, if not manipulated, by the intel-
ligence system. This is to say that foreign and defense
policies have be...f n based upon an intelligence premise
about the "enemy's" power and intentions.
Giant strategic intelligence bureaucracies created to
inform decision makers about the -realities" of the
external world are institutional manifestations of this
larger problem. A. strategic intelligence system has
become a major and often pivotal part of the govern-
ment's decision-making system. But this system func-
tions in secrecy while it informs decision makers with
secret information, secretly gathered, on what could
be life or death decisions for the nation. Additionally,
decision makers apply secret instruments towards
attaining sometimes secret foreign policy objectives.
Thus the nation is confronted with dual problems aris-
ing out of the existence of secret missions in an open
society. It is highly likely that similar problems, in dif-
ferent institutional contexts, confront all great world
powers.
The pages folk wing will survey the United States
government's strategic intelligence system with three
questions in mind. First, how much do we know about
this system; indec cl, can we confidently use the term
-system"? Second, how much more can be learned?
And, third, what are some feasible research approaches
to a subject matter for which most of the archives
are closed indefinitely and where much of the data
are protected as official government secrets?*
Even to suggest that such subjects are research fron-
tiers is at once controversial and paradoxical. Con-
troversial because leaders of the system past or present
disagree about thf necessity for and about the costs
and benefits of, secrecy. Paradoxical because logic
demands that a secret service remain secret.
American democratic government, however, has its
own logic. Government by meaningful consent
requires informed consent. So a vast secret intelligence
bureaucracy is something of an anomaly in a democ-
racy, particularly one that, unlike parliamentary gov-
ernment, -separatt s" the authority among executive,
legislative and judicial branches. Even granting some
special executive roles and privileges in foreign policy
making, there is in theory no concept comparable to
the British notion of -crown privilege" in foreign affairs
*This survey of .the research frontiers was made in
1971-1972 with the aid of a grant from Russell Sage Founda-
tion of New York.
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that is compatible with American democratic ideals.
While the President is clearly dominant, the American
Constitution assigns a substantial amount of foreign
policy-making authority to the representative legisla-
tive body (Congress). And yet secret intelligence
activities patently demand fewer popular controls than,
say, public health, education, or welfare. The annual
budgets for the intelligence services are closed to pub-
lic or even general Congressional view; the product of
the system is rarely seen directly; and many basic facts
of policy, organization, and control are held by but
a tiny few. Moreover, the people were told by Richard
Helms, the nominal professional head of the intelli-
gence system in 1971, that they must accept "on faith"
that the system is led by honorable men who would
perform only necessary and proper functions. Ameri-
can democracy, it can be argued, forbids public officials
from making such a request.
One must understand the strategic intelligence sys-
tem if one would understand the arrangement of power
in the American political system. Perhaps the underly-
ing general assumption?still untested?is that the
power of the top foreign and defense policy decision
makers today "is very largely the power of their infor-
mation monopoly" [Westin 1971, P. 248]. Parentheti-
cally it ought to be noted that an information
monopoly" would likely be the key to decision-making
power in almost any system.
In a recent book, The Intelligence Establishment
[1970], I have described the intelligence bureaucracies
that have evolved in the United States since 1947. In
this work are identified and analyzed some major prob-
lems of intelligence purpose, policy organization and
control. Many questions remain unanswered or
perhaps even unasked in my book. Certainly other
social scientists would pose some questions differently
[Blum 1972]. A great amount of scholarly work remains
to be done from a variety of disciplinary approaches
in this still relatively unexplored social science frontier.
But the scholar who would pursue this subject further
will confront substantial barriers or dead ends. These
and other obstacles to research must not be underes-
timated, and yet the subject is too important and its
ramifications too pervasive to accept total inhibition
of further research.
A Research Overview
The general subject has attracted a vast array of
popular writing because of the mystery and romance
connected with the work of the spy, the counter-spy,
and the secret agent. For a general distillation of politi-
cal science literature see Ransom [1968, pp. 415-421]
and for sociology see Wilensky [1968]. The lengthy
15
unpublished bibliography compiled by William R.
Harris (1968 and earlier segments) at Harvard Univer-
sity identifies an extensive and wide-ranging body of
literature relating to some aspect of intelligence
activities, very broadly defined. Yet this array of mil-
lions of printed words leaves most of the questions listed
below in this essay unanswered.
Several categories of writing can be identified and
illustrated by the following examples, which I do not
claim represent a thorough critique of the literature
but merely a sample.
Doctrinal issues. What should be the role of the
intelligence professional in policy making? Should he
be an "expert" removed from involvement with or con-
cern about particular values or policy preferences?
Should he be isolated from day-to-day _policy concerns
and preoccupied simply with getting the facts on the
assumption that if all the facts are in hand, the decision
is automatic? Or should he work in close contact with
the policy maker, sharing his values and concerns and
supplying the informational input; indeed telling the
policy maker what he needs to know prior to shaping
a policy?
Pettee and Kent emphasized an analytic distinction
between policy making and intelligence analysis. Pet-
tee, however, saw a danger in too great a distance
between decision makers and analysts so he advocated
the decentralizing of intelligence functions, with each
government department having its own intelligence
staff [Pettee 1946]. Kent felt that knowledge of a
foreign nation's capabilities or intentions cannot be
adequately developed by those with responsibility for
policy and policy application and saw intelligence as
essentially a staff function to be performed in some
organizational and intellectual isolation from policy
making [1949, pp. 180-206].
Knorr has ointed to the absence of a satisfactory
theory of intelligence, either descriptive or normative.
Without a theory that either describes how intelligence
work actually is performed or how it ought to perform,
he has argued, there are few criteria for judging
whether intelligence work is effectively performed and
there are inadequate guides either to questions of pro-
cess or of organization. Knorr calls for research on a
theory of intelligence, which he says must be both con-
ceptual and empirical and which,would require access
to intelligence records [1964, pp. 46-48].
Hilsman, in the early 1950's, made a survey in
Washington, D.C., of the opinions of intelligence con-
sumers and producers. He reported [1956, pp. 37-122]
a prevalence of the notion of "report the facts only"
as the dominant value among intelligence profession-
als, policy makers, and those responsible for imple-
menting policy. Hilsman saw this notion as an unwise
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disassociation of intelligence from policy. One impor-
tant consequence was the production of a large number
of intelligence reports with little relevance to real prob-
lems.
Organizational issues. Organizational issues are
closely related to doctrinal issues. Allen Dulles argued
that intelligence and policy should be sharply
separated organizationally. He was a leading proponent
of the intelligence school that carries the banner: "We
give information only, not policy advice." This is, of
course, the rationale for a central agency, independent
From the policy and operating departments [1963, p.
51].
Related issues. Like Dulles' views in 1963, much
of the literature on intelligence constitutes commen-
tary based upon experience, intuitive observation, or
general speculation. Access to intelligence records has
been denied the scholar working outside the govern-
ment service, even with regard to historical materials
of the distant past. For example, it seems unlikely,
without radically new policies, that a detailed,
scholarly history of the Office of Strategic Services,
1942-1945, could be written at this time. Smith's 1972
volume, however, shows what can be done with inter-
views.
The aforementioned commentary has ranged over
a wide ground, as the following summary of illustrative
propositions will indicate:
? That more than 80% of intelligence raw material
comes from open sources [Ransom 1970, p. 19], an
idea supported by Sherman Kent [1956, pp. vii?ix].
? The contrary view that the truly important intel-
ligence information can only be gained from espionage
directed at highly secret sources [Orlov 1963, pp.
5-12].
? That intelligence is often used or misused, for
gaining support for preferred policy positions [Ransom
1970, p. 103, 218].
? That American diplomatic styles must be altered
to incorporate covert operations into its range of policy
instruments [Cottam, 1967]. This view is contested by
Paul Blackstock [1964, p. 313], who argues that clan-
destine operations "are capable of preempting a policy-
making role."
? That Congressional as well as Presidential surveil-
lance of foreign intelligence activities has been
inadequate [Ransom 1970, pp. 159-179].
Much of the literature cited here, though serious
and informed in some degree, is based more upon
intuitive generalization and judgment than hard data.
Research Topics and Questions
In any discussion of research feasibility, attention
for the most part must focus on the following topics
16
and on the questipits of whether and how these topics
4.11114.1=ti.(21.1Litlating to them can be further studied.
These topics art
1. The statutor) and administrative authority for
existing strategic intelligence organizations and the
assignment of intelligence resources, rules, and func-
tions. What are the o_thiplpiLtimpresent United States
intelligence establishment?
2. The intelligence "community" and its current con-
figuration. To what extent is the term "intelligence
community" a hortatory statement of aspiration and
what extent a working reality?
3. The purpose methods and forms of the National
Intelligence Estimate and other estimates. Do intelli-
gence estimates make a crucial difference in decision
making? Or, is "intelligence" irrelevant?
4. The legislative, executive and judicial controls
over the intelligence system. Is the intelligence estab-
lishment effectively guided by responsible political
authority or is it a -state within a state"?
5. The interfa( e of domestic counter-intelligence
(FBI) and natioaal or strategic intelligence and
counter-intelligence. Does the external intelligence
system overlap the domestic police function, and are
military and civilian foreign intelligence agencies
under carefully delineated jurisdictional controls?
6. The impact of technology on the intelligence func-
tions. Is technology changing the nature of intelligence
operations? Has human intelligence (agent intelli-
g_e_peel a future? Is an overdependence on machine
Chardlyar_Lej jelli-ence developing?
7. Systems for data collection, categorization, stor-
age, and retrieval. What is the current state of the
art and promise of the future?
8. Methods of Intelligence analysis. Do intelligence
systems use the hest and most modern techniques of
social science analysis? Is the intelligence community
adequately in contact with academic frontiers of knowl-
edge?
9. Recruiting, training, and professional develop-
ment in the intelligence services. What is the record?
10. Criteria for efficiency and effectiveness. Can
such criteria be developed? How can effectiveness be
measured? How does anybody know whether the $5-6
billions spent each year is a waste or not? Concern
about this question prompted the President to order
an organizational overhaul of the intelligence system
in November 1971.
These, of course, are not the only topics or pertinent
questions, but they would seem to cover the main
ground. Few qu? qions, indeed, are more basic to the
social scientist than the relationship of knowledge to
action. Certainly this is a permanently challenging
issue. But when the questions addressed pertain to
the relationship ol secret knowledge, sometimes se-
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cretly gathered, to action that itself is sometimes a gov-
ernment secret, the subject matter is particularly chal-
lenging.
Let us now review briefly the first four of these ques-
tions.
Statutory and Administrative Authority for Existing
Intelligence Organizations. As earlier noted, the con-
temporary American intelligence system grew out of
the National Security Act of 1947, with subsequent
amendments and Presidential and Cabinet officer
directives. The 1947 Act serves as a basic charter and
was phrased in a deliberately flexible language. Yet
the substance of this charter was the product of con-
siderable conflict and compromise, and its constitu-
tional history has never been fully explored.
Congress has played a minor role in the establish-
ment and evolution of the U.S. intelligence system.
EN The more important set of jurisdictional definitions and
operational guidelines are found in some two dozen
National Security Council intelligence directives, pro-
mulgated by the NSC at the impetus of the Director
of Central Intelligence, who negotiated them with the
various units of the intelligence system and with Presi-
dential concurrence.
An example of the flexibility in the basic charter for
the intelligence community is the fact that covert politi-
cal operations are not recognized in that act as a func-
tion of the CIA: all of the assigned functions were to
NEW be related to intelligence.
Therefore the following proposition ought to be
e4plored, tested, and explained: Most of the actual
structure and assignment of roles and missions has
been by executive fiat rather than by legislative author-
ity, Did Congress intentionally abdicate its decision-
al' making authority, or was there deliberate executive
deception?
Strategic Intelligence "Community"?Current Con-
figuration. The concept of intelligence community
represents an ideal that may be simply stated: The vari-
ous units in an information gathering and analysis struc-
ture work in harmony to produce a single intelligence
estimate or prediction for the top decision maker that
is an amalgam of the best knowledge on a question
available to the government. The extent to which this
is a working reality, or even the question of the degree
of consensus on the ideal and its validity, are topics
of importance and, indeed, research frontiers.
As a description of a structure, and a set of organiza-
tions and relationships, an intelligence community
does exist. There are identifiable units; "boxes" on
charts and inter-unit arrangements and procedures,
was/ capped specifically with the United States Intelligence
Board, with proliferating committees. But a central
question remains: Assuming that centripetal and cen-
trifugal forces are at work, can these forces be iden-
sal
17
tified toward a fuller understanding of how the system
really works?
If various units of the. icenainunity" work at cross
purposes, this will affect the intelligence product. Or
if various units are in open conflict, knowledge of this,
:too would enli hten us as to the realit of
munity' within the system. Alleged animosity between
the CIA and FBI, sometimes leading to failures in
cooperation even though both are members of the com-
munity, is one of the legends of Washington. What
are the realities?
Military intelligence, State Department intelli-
gence, cryptography, and electronic intelligence, each
has a special set of organizational characteristics,
values, vested interests, and perhaps ways of looking
at the world. The National Security Agency may be
captivated with the hardware and science of intelli-
gence gathering and want to meet intelligence require-
ments by taking much greater risks than would be
acceptable to the Secretary of State. These are a few
suggestions of the inevitable conflicts of interest that
may function as centrifugal forces working against com-
munity.
Additionally, intelligence doctrine, which heavily
emphasizes security, fosters a compartmented activ-
ity, with each compartment or unit normally maintain-
ing a tight secrecy over its own activity. To what extent
does such a compartmentation characteristic itself work
at cross purposes with the concept of community? Are
such questions researchable in a system so closely
guarded by secrecy? The answer is that they must be
pursued largely by means of interviews of alumni of
the system. Case studies of particular events or
categories of questions can be instructive and may be
feasible. A limited amount of cooperation may be
expected in some cases by current officials who may
see some value in greater enlightenment about how
the system works.
Estimates and Decision Making. Simplistic models
of decision making show the intelligence input as a
crucial, often pivotal, factor. Doubtless the intelligence
estimate on occasion does determine the decision. But
what is the reality? I would guess that a "bureaucratic
politics" model is closer to reality than a "rational"
or "organizational hierarchy" model. Is it possible in
this regard to generalize with useful accuracy?
Contrary to some assumptions, no secret govern-
ment answer to these important questions exists. But,
after all, does the intelligence estimate make a differ-
,ence or is it true, as some frustrated former intelligei_lce_
officials have argued privately, that "In the last analysis
intelligence is irrelevant in decision making"? The
experienced policy maker will caution against generali-
zation on such an issue and will likely point out that
in most major decisions the intelligence estimate was
CC
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merely one of a number of factors. The implication
is that in the normal situation, the intelligence input
is not necessarily compelling. When faced with a single
case for decision, the decision maker may normally find
that the intelligence estimate does not point clearly
to the preferred decision. His judgment, and not the
estimate, determines the decision [Cooper 1972, Jervis
19701. Out of these considerations arise two competing
(and discouragfrig) _premises:
1. InteJligoce agencies tend to report what they
think their leaders want ,to hear or see.
2. Leaders see or hear what they want, no matter
what intelligence. is reported.
The extent of these kinds of -information pathology,"
as Harold Wilensky has termed these tendencies (he
illustrates them with cases), remains a challenging
research frontier [1967].
Hypotheses can be developed to predict when intel-
ligence estimates will or will not be accepted at their
face value. Even so, testing them will remain an
extremely difficult proposition, given government
secrecy. Perhaps if those high in government discern
value in such studies certain records will eventually
be opened to scholars. It is not likely that this will
be done without some compromises regarding free and
full disclosure of findings.
Efficacy of Policy Controls. Major concern has
been expressed outside the system over the years that
the intelligence system has not been under adequate
policy controls. Some have argued that both in the
pursuit of secret information from foreign areas (es-
pionage) and in covert political action, the CIA or
related agencies have been too much "laws unto them-
selves." [Campbell 1971, Hilsman 1967]. Those
defending the adequacy of policy controls insist that
such controls are thorough and adequate. It is com-
monly asserted by insiders?or former insiders?that
policy controls over secret political operations overseas
are much tighter than for such programs as foreign
aid, propaganda, or military operations. Existing public
knowledge about these controls relates to three major
policy control mechanisms: (1) the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (FIAB), (2) the special
high-level interdepartmental -40 Committee" and (3)
Congressional subcommittees for surveillance on intel-
ligence operations.
Beyond the description of these mechanisms?the
membership of the committees and the broadest
description of their functions?little has been pub-
lished. Further research in greater depth seems feasi-
ble with regard to each of these mechanisms.
However, in the absence of hearings, reports,
records or other archival sources, which are all clas-
I 8
sified and closed, the researcher must rely on inter-
views with past and present participants in these con-
trol mechanisms, both executive and legislative. It is
clear from the preliminary survey that such interviews
are generally possible and can be rewarding in gaining
additional details on the functioning of these mechan-
isms. Ileanwhae., one might consider. the following
ejspJprgo_u_Ltpoi _tl ieses:
1. The closer the personal relationship between the
Chairman of FIAE and the President, the greater will
be the capacity of FIAB to monitor or to effect change
in the intelligence system.
2. Units of the intelligence community can be
expected to try to manipulate the _perspectives of the
FIAB,
3. The FIAB will tend to stress post facto problems
of the intelligence system, that___ investigate_
-failures" or -flaps" at the expense of -preventive
maintenance."
4. Units within the intelligence system will tend to
use the FIAB to effect changes in their status vis-?is
other units in the system.
5. The President's attention to the work of FIAB
will vary with the public visibility of the CIA and the
other units of the political system.
6. Members of the Senate -inner club" and the
House leadership_group will regard secret intelligence
access as a badge of seniority and power and will be
_fle_gati_nly inclined to share t is wit t e ran an le
or even with the routine standing committees.
7. Congress as a whole possesses little knowledge
of the basic facts of policy, organization, and control
of the intelligence system.
8. The rank and file esteem in Congress for the CIA
is low; the greater the knowledge of the organization,
the higher the esteem.
9. An ambivalence exists among members of Con-
grels_senerally regarding the question of Eether they
should be_privy to secret facts about the secret intelli-
gence organizations of the U.S. government.
10. Security (secrecy of defense and intelligence
information) is a label easily manipulable to favor the
special interests of the intelligence system.
Other Research Topics
Topics
On the other topics relating to the interface of
domestic counter-intelligence and foreign intelligence,
the impact of technology on intelligence functions,
modern systems for information collection, storage and
retrieval, methods of intelligence analysis, and recruit-
ing, training and professional development, there is
less to be said. Each of these topics is significant and
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important to an understanding of the intelligence sys-
tem, and each presents its own peculiar research chal-
lenge, but in no case would this seem to be completely
insurmountable. A few of these topics would be impos-
sible to research adequately without some government
cooperation.
Technological advance and intelligence methods
must be classed within government as one of the most
sensitive areas of the system. And yet we are dealing
with a "state of the art- question, and an open society
offers abundant published information on technological
developments that, by the skillful use of inference and
speculation, can be rewarding in understanding the
probable state of the art within the intelligence system.
An illustration of what can be done is Robert D.
Crangle, -The New Methodology of National Intel-
ligence," an essay dealing in considerable detail with the
technological state of the art of intelligence gathering
[1969].
Another example of imaginative and rewarding work
on the research frontier is the project undertaken
by Paul W. Blackstock, of the Institute of International
Studies, University of South Carolina. Professor Black-
stock circulated a "Confidential Intelligence Question-
naire- among a group of intelligence aides experienced
in key posts "at the working level" within the intelli-
gence system. In his questionnaire, Blackstock set forth
a number of published observations by scholars relat-
ing to a broad range of topics related to the intelligence
system, requesting detailed comments on such obser-
vations from his respondents. Blackstock's project is
illustrative of a kind of research that proved feasible,
although Blackstock did not receive the quantity of
response that he had hoped for [1971].
Finally, the most important and difficult question
of all relates to criteria for judging the efficiency of
the intelligence system. As earlier suggested and as
Klaus Knorr has so astutely observed, as long as
theories of intelligence (theories as distinct from doc-
trine) are lacking, it will be difficult, if not impossible,
to fashion criteria for measuring the effectiveness of
the system. In the absence of theories, argues Knorr,
"we have no criteria (indicators!) for judging whether
intelligence work in the United States is done well
Imo or badly or for specifying ways of improving it" [1964,
p. 47].
To call for theories of intelligence may be setting
aspiration levels too high. The road to theory is long
and tortuous. Perhaps some first steps down this road
must be taken in the form of tentative hypotheses and
cautious steps of generalization. One will be told by
many "old hands" experienced in high-level policy
making as well as in producing and consuming intelli-
gence reports that "you cannot generalize." In the same
19
breath you will also likely hear the advice that because
the filing cabinets are marked Top Secret, and because
the scholar's -need to know" will be impossible to
prove, it is foolish to consider the intelligence system
a research frontier.
True frontiersmen will not be easily discouraged by
all of the impediments to meaningful research, formid-
able as they are. The importance of the challenge must
be met by an equally high fortitude and stubbornness.
Otherwise we may never learn how we are governed
and how information bureaucracies will likely govern
us increasingly in the future. At stake may be nothing
less than the adequacy of social science knowledge as
well as the survival of democratic government. The
importance of this general subject is dependant upon
two assumptions: first, that success in government will
rest upon the efficient production and management of
knowledge; and second, that the most dangerous
enemy of the United States is a misinformed group
of decision makers.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Paul W. Blackstock, "Intelligence and Covert Operations,
Changing Doctrine and Practice," Columbia, S.C.,
July 1971, mimeo.
Paul W. Blackstock, The Strategy of Subversion, Quadrangle,
1964.
Richard H. Blum, ed., Surveillance and Espionage in a Free
Society. Praeger, 1972,
John Franklin Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory.
Basic Books, 1971, Ch 6, "The Intelligence and
Propaganda Complexes," pp. 147-177.
Robert D. Crangle, "The New Methology of National Intel-
ligence," Cambridge, Mass., 1969, mimeo.
Chester L. Cooper, "The CIA and Decision Making,"
Foreign Affairs, 1972, 50:232-234.
Richard Cottam, Competitive Interference and Twentieth
Century Diplomacy. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967.
Allen W. Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence. Harper and Row,
1963.
William R. Harris, "Intelligence and National Security.
A Bibliography with Selected Annotations." Cambridge,
Mass., Center for International Affairs, 1968, mimeo.
Richard M. Helms, "Spying and a Free Society," excerpts
from an address, April 14, 1971, as reprinted in U.S. New
& World Report, April 26, 1971, pp. 84-86.
Charles F. Hermann, "The Knowledge Gap: The Exchange
of Information Between the Academic and the Foreign Pol-
icy Communities," paper for 67th Annual Meeting, APSA,
September 1971, mimeo.
Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation. Doubleday 1967.
Roger Hilsman, Strategic Intelligence and National Decision.
The Free Press, 1956.
Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations.
Princeton University Press, 1970.
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Harry Howe Ransom
Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World
Policy. Princeton University Press, 1949 (revised 1951,
1956).
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, The Real CIA. Macmillan, 1968.
Klaus Knorr, "Foreign Intelligence and the Social Sciences,"
Center of International Studies, Princeton, N.J.,
Research Monograph No. 17, Princeton University Press,
1964.
Lewis Mumford, The Myth of the Machine, The Pentagon of
Power. Harcourt Brace, 1970.
Alexander Orlov, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla
Warfare. University of Michigan Press, 1963.
George S. Pettee, The Future of American Secret Intelli-
gence. Infantry Journal Press, 1946.
Washington Platt, Strategic Intelligence Production. Praeger,
1957.
Irwin Pollack, "Information Theory," International Ency-
clopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 7, pp. 331-337.
fIarry Howe Ransom, Central Intelligence and National
Security. Harvard University Press, 1958.
Harry Howe Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment. Har-
vard University Press, 1970.
Harry Howe Ransom, "Intelligence, Political and Military,"
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 7,
Macmillan and Free Press, 1968, pp. 415-421.
20
Joseph H. de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign
Policy. Merrill, 1968.
R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First
Intelligence Agency. University of California Press, 1972.
United States-Viet-nu at Relations, /9454967 (the "Pentagon
Papers"). U.S. Gok ernment Printing Office, for the House
Committee on Ar,led Services, 1971, 12 vols.
Alfred Vagts, The Ililitary Attach?Princeton University
Press, 1967.
Allen F. Westin, ed , Information Technology in a Democ-
racy. Harvard Unlversity Press, 1971.
Allen S. Whiting, "Bureaucratic Quicksand: the U.S. in Viet-
nam," paper for 66th Annual Meeting of APSA, September
1970, mimeo.
Harold Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence. Basic Books,
1967.
Harold Wilensky, -Organizational Intelligence," Interna-
tional Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Vol. 11, Macmil-
lan and Free Pres, 1968, pp. 319-332.
Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision.
Stanford Univers itc- Press, 1962.
Jack Zlotnick, Natiopal Intelligence. Industrial College of the
Armed Forces, 1964.
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