COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A000900150018-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 280
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: June 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Appendicies to the Commission's Report, the
contents of which are listed in Annex E, are currently
in press. The expectation is that the seven volumes
of appendices will be available for public sale, as a
set or individually, from the Superintendent of Documents
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commission
on the
ORGANIZATION
of the
government
FOR
the conduct
of
FOREIGN
POLICY
June,1975
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C., 20402- Price $2.70
Stock Number 022-000-00108-6
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COMMISSIONONTHEORGANIZATIONOFTHEGOVERNMENT
FORTHECONDUCTOFFOREIGNPOLKX
2025 M STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
June 27, 1975
TO: The President
The President pro tempore of the Senate
The Speaker of the House of Representatives
On behalf of my colleagues and myself I submit herewith
the Report of the Commission on the Organization of the
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy.
The Commission was established by Public Law 92-352
to submit findings and recommendations in order to provide
a more effective system for the formulation and implementation
of the nation's foreign policy. A copy of the law is annexed
to the Report.
The findings and recommendations of the Commission are
presented in a single volume with a Summary at the beginning.
These findings and recommendations are those of the members of
the Commission. Supplementary views of individual Commissioners
are attached to the Report. The detailed research and analysis
of scholars and experienced practitioners which were developed
in the course of tie Commission's work are set forth in seven
volumes of appeLdices. These studies should provide a solid
base for further study.
We believe that the report will be of value in considering
future changes in the organization of the government for the
conduct of foreign policy.
We acknowledge gratefully the genuine cooperation the
Commission has received from the many agencies of government,
and individuals, from whom it has sought information and counsel.
The members of the Commission deem it an honor and a
pleasure to have had the opportunity to serve in this
challenging and important task.
Respectfully,
Robert D. Murphy
Chairman
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MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION
ROBERT D. MURPHY, Chairman
Honorary Chairman, Corning
Glass International
DAVID M. ABSHIRE
Chairman, Center of Strategic
and International Studies,
Georgetown University
ANNE ARMSTRONG**
Counsel to the President, The
White H01186
WILLIAM J CASEY
President and Chairman, Ex-
port-Import Bank of U.S.
MRS. CHARLES E ENGELHARD, JR.
The Engelhard Company
AREND D. LUBBERS
President, Grand Valley State
College, Allendale, Michi-
gan
WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD
U.S. House of Representatives
JAMES B. PEARSON, Vice
Chairman
United States Senate
WILLIAM S. MAILLIARD*
U.S. House of Representatives
FRANK C. P. MCGLINN
Executive Vice President, Fi-
delity Bank, Philadelphia,
Pa.
MIKE MANSFIELD
United States Senate
STANLEY P. WAGNER
President, East Central Uni-
versity, Ada, Oklahoma
CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI
U.S. House of Representatives
PETER H. B. FRELINGHETSEN***
U.S. House of Representatives
NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER
The Vice President
*Resigned December 1973; succeeded by Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen, January
1974.
**Resigned November 1974; succeeded by Nelson A. Rockefeller, December
1974.
***Resigned January 1975; succeeded by William S. Broomfield, March 1975.
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COMMISSION STAFF
FRANCIS 0. WILCOX, Executive Director
FISHER HOWE, Deputy Executive Director
WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR., General Counsel
PETER L. SZANTON, Research Director
STAFF
WILLIAM I. BACCHUS
Associate Research Director
STEPHEN D. COHEN
Economics
ROGER MAJAK*
Congress
PHILIP N. MARCUS
Congress
WILLIAM B. CARTER, III
ANN C. O'CONNOR
JAMES SCHWARTZ
ASSOCIATES
THOMAS J. RECKFORD
Intelligence
D. ALAN RUDLIN
Associate General Cottinsel
PAUL R. SCHRATZ
Defense
STAFF ASSISTANTS
JOHN E. TREAT*
MARGARET E. G. VANDERHYE*
ADMINISTRATIVE AND SECRETARIAL
GLORIA ADAMS
GWEN HALL
ROBERT HOLLISTER
JEANNE HOLMBERG
MARY
SENIOR
JAMES CLARK
ROBERT COX
KENT CRANE
FREDERICK D. ELFERS
* Resigned.
LOUISE
JOANN LASHLEY
FIVE FN SCHAEFER
ARLENE SULLIVAN
ANN TURNER
VASERHELYI
STAFF CONSULTANTS
WILLIAM R. HARRIS
RICHARD HOLBROOKE
PAUL A. VOLCKER
VI
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE
IX
SUMMARY
1
THE PURPOSES OF ORGANIZATION
19
CHAPTER 1?The Importance of Organization
21
CHAPTER 2?Policy Issues of the Future
25
THE PRESIDENT AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT
29
CHAPTER 3?Exec4utive Office of the President
31
CHAPTER 4?The State Department
39
THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY
53
CHAPTER 5?International Economy Policy
55
CHAPTER 6?Defense Policy
75
CHAPTER 7?Intelligence
91
CHAPTER 8?Public Opinion and Humanitarian
Considerations
107
CHAPTER 9?The Practice of Diplomacy
117
CHAPTER 1 o?Planning for Foreign Policy
143
CHAPTER 11?Budgeting and Foreign Affairs
151
CHAPTER 1 2?Personnel for Foreign Affairs
161
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS AND THE
ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS
193
CHAPTER 13?Congressional-Executive Relations
195
CHAPTER 14?Congressional Organization and Procedures_
205
ANNEXES
217
ANNEX A?Comments and Supplementary Views.
221
ANNEX B?Authorizing Legislation
258
ANNEX C?List Of Witnesses
261
ANNEX D?List of Consultants and Researchers
271
ANNEX E?Appendices: Table of Contents
275
VII
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PREFACE
PURPOSE OF THE COMMISSION
The objective set for the Commission by its authorizing legislation
is straightforward: to "submit findings and recommendations to pro-
vide a more effective system for the formulation and implementation
of the Nation's foreign policy." The statute specifies the kinds of rec-
ommendations sought: it directs that they address the reorganization
of the departments, agencies, independent establishments, and instru-
mentalities of the executive branch participating in foreign policy
matters; improved procedures among those departments and agencies;
the abolition of unnecessary activities and functions; and such other
measures as may serve "to promote peace, economy, efficiency and im-
proved administration of foreign policy." In addition to these concerns
respecting the executive branch, the Commission was directed to recom-
mend "more effective arrangements between the executive branch and
Congress, which will better enable each to carry out its constitutional
responsibilities."
The mandate of the Commission, in short, was to propose improve-
ments not in the substance of our foreign policy, but in the means
by which, in both the executive and legislative branches, that policy
is made and implemented.
We undertook this assignment believing it to be of urgent impor-
tance. The world is increasingly pluralistic. The pace of technological
change is rapidly increasing. The interdependencies of nations have
become more numerous and more sensitive. Many of the most im-
portant problems are no longer clearly "domestic" or "foreign." The
result of these complications is that the tasks of foreign policy have
grown more numerous, more difficult, and more direct in their im-
pact on our daily lives. It follows that if the United States is to
attain its ends in the future, it must formulate its policies with greater
foresight and clarity, and implement them with high effectiveness.
We ?believe, therefore, that it is timely and important to consider
afresh the organization of the government for the conduct of foreign
policy.
It should be clear that by "organization" we mean?as our mandate
intended?not only the lines of formal ?authority connecting indi-
viduals and agencies but also the processes by which decisions are
taken, and the resources?of people, information and analysis?uti-
lized in the making of those decisions. Throughout this report our
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concern is with organization in this quite broad sense, in both the
executive branch and the Congress.
We wish to emphasize, too, that our concern is with the future.
-While our mandate is to propose change, large revisions in the orga-
nization of the government cannot and should not be made with great
frequency. The changes we propose therefore look to the enduring and
longer-term needs of the government, not to issues of merely momen-
tary concern. We seek no immediate action, therefore. We have at-
tempted only to establish an agenda for orderly and timely change.
MODE OF OPERATION
In pursuing its complex and difficult task the Commission engaged
in a wide variety of activities.
?It reviewed with care the findings and recommendations of the
many relevant studies and reports which have preceded it.
?It heard the views and held discussions with a large number of
public and private persons with experience in the analysis or
conduct of foreign policy.
?It held public hearings in Philadelphia, Atlanta, Chicago and
San Francisco to enable interested citizens and representatives of
various groups to comment on matters of concern to them.
?It invited the comments of some 50 departments and agencies of
our government interested in foreign policy problems as well as
those of 225 of our overseas posts and missions. It also solicited
reactions from World Affairs Councils in many cities and from
numerous national organizations concerned with foreign affairs.
?It engaged in an intensive research program to develop hard
? evidence about the actual effects of various organizational ar-
rangements. (A number of the major studies undertaken are
reproduced in the appendices to this Report.)
?It conducted, from November, 1973 to July 1974, a detailed survey
of the attitudes of Members of Congress with respect to the
appropriate role for Congress in the making of foreign policy
and the means necessary to the effective performance of that
role. (The report of this Survey appears as Appendix M).
?Finally, the Commission and its staff engaged in prolonged dis-
cussions of the significance of what had been learned, the findings
it justified and the recommendations most likely to offer genuine
prospect for improvement.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The Commission is grateful to the many individuals and repre-
sentatives of organizations who appeared before it. It is pleased with
the work of its many consultants. It is grateful to Senator Mansfield
for making available his own offices as a site for many Commission
meetings and to Congressman Zablocki for providing sites for other
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deliberations. The Commission is also pleased to commend the open
and cooperative attitude of the many agencies of government from
whom it sought information?especially the Department of State, on
which the heaviest burden fell. The response of these agencies was
cooperative and prompt. The Members of Congress and their staffs
were also helpful.
STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT
This report is divided into five principal sections.
Section I presents in brief form a Summary of our major recom-
mendations and of the basis for them.
Section II, The Purposes of Organization, outlines the importance
of sound organizations and decision processes, and discusses the func-
tions that effective organization can and cannot perform. It then
suggests the general characteristics of the foreign policy problems
of the near future with which any organizational arrangements will
have to contend.
Section III, The President and the State Department, spells out the
Commission's main recommendations concerning the organization of
the Executive Office of the President, and the Department of State.
Section IV, The Conduct of Foreign Policy, discusses changes in
organization which might improve the formulation and conduct of
various specific aspects of foreign policy, and contains additional rec-
ommendations concerning the White House and State Department
as well as the Departments of the Treasury, Defense, and the Intelli-
gence Community. Aspects of congressional organization are also
discussed.
Section V. Executive-Congressional Relations and the Organization
of the Congress, relates a number of the recommendations made con-
cerning the executive branch to proposed congressional changes, and
reviews the means by which executive and legislative branches of
government can work together more effectively to carry out their
mutual responsibilities for foreign policy.
Despite this division into separate sections, the report attempts to
present an integrated and comprehensive view of the requirements for
more effective foreign policy making; its parts can therefore be fully
understood only in relation to each other.
In view of the number and quality of the many studies prepared
for the Commission, and in the knowledge that the complex problems
of government organization should profit from continuing reflection
and discussion among the interested public, we are publishing many
of these studies in a series of seven separate volumes, as Appendices.
The views expressed in those Appendices are those of the individual
authors. The views of Commissioners, and the Report of the Commis-
sion, are contained entirely in this volume.
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Supplementary comments by the Vice President, Senator Mansfield,
Congressman Broomfield, and Mrs. Engelhard appear in Annex A,
p. 219. In adition to making more general observations, those com-
ments address the following subjects (chapters of the Report to which
they apply are indicated in parentheses) :
Congressman BROOMFIELD. Public Diplomacy (chapter 9), the Pro-
posed Joint Committee on National Security (chapter 14), and De-
fense Intelligence (chapter 7).
Mrs. ENGELHARD. State Department Personnel Management (chap-
ter 12), the Role of the Departments in International Economic Policy
(chapter 5), Policy Planning (chapter 10), Intelligence (chapter 7) ,
the Role of the Public in Foreign Policy (chapter 8) , Congressional-
Executive Relations (chapter 13), and Multilateral Diplomacy (chap-
ter 9).
Senator MANSFIELD. Congressional-Executive Relations (chapter
13), Congressional Organization and Procedures (chapter 14), and
Intelligence (chapter 7).
Vice President ROCKEFELLER. Congressional-Executive Relations
(chapter 13), Executive Branch Organization (chapter 3), Intelli-
gence (chapter 7), Public Diplomacy (chapter 9), the Defense Budget
(chapter 6), Embassy Communications (chapter 9), and Energy Pol-
icy (chapter 5).
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Foreign policy is the whole of national policy looked at
from the point of view of exigencies created by "the vast ex-
ternal realm" beyond our borders. It is not a "jurisdiction".
It is an orientation, a point of view, a measurement of
values?today, perhaps, the most important one for national
survival.
DEAN AcirEsoN, 1960.
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SUMMARY
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SUMMARY
THE IMPORTANCE OF ORGANIZATION
CHAPTER 1
Good organization does not insure successful policy, nor does poor
organization preclude it. But steadily and powerfully, organizational
patterns influence the effectiveness of government.
Where organizational structure is logical and clear, the twin
dangers of deadlock and of neglect are both minimized Where proc-
esses of decision are orderly, decisions profit from the participation of
the knowledgeable, and from the resulting confidence?even among
those who sought a different result?that all relevant views were con-
sidered. Organization affects more than the efficiency of government;
it affects the outcome of decisions. Organizational patterns determine
whether an issue will be handled at one level rather than another, and
in one agency instead of another. Since perspectives differ from level
to level in government, and from agency to agency, the resulting deci-
sions will differ also.
The objectives served in designing organizational arrangements are
partially conflicting. They must make possible early and effective
Presidential involvement, but also give weight to the knowledge of
specialized officials. They should insure that decisions are well con-
sidered, but also made expeditiously. Officials must be able to respond
flexibly to particular situations, but must also be guided by longer-
range goals. Like policymaking itself, the design of organizations
must balance conflicting objectives. It must therefore leave flexibility
in the hands of senior officials.
Any organizational pattern must fit the personal styles of key
decision-makers. Some are comfortable formulating policy in the pres-
ence of other officials, and some are not. Some want extensive written
documentation; others prefer oral discussion. Some value the clarity
of rigorous lines of command; others prefer the competition of over-
lapping responsibilities. These are personal predilections which any
organizational arrangement must accommodate, at least in part.
The appropriateness of organizational arrangements also depends
on the nature of the policy problems with which they must deal. For
that reason, we outline the world environment in which we believe
American foreign policy will operate over the near future.
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" POLICY ISSUES OF THE FUTURE CHAPTER 2
The appropriateness of organizational arrangements also depends
on the nature of the policy problems with which they must deal.
Assertions about the future are risky, but for organizational purposes
predictions of only the most general kind are necessary, and these can
be made with some confidence.
The most pervasive characteristic of international affairs in the next
decades will be the growing interaction and tightening interdepend-
ence among the nations of the world. Almost certainly, economic issues
will loom larger on the foreign policy agendas of the future. Invest-
ment policy, international monetary issues, economic development, and
terms of trade will continue to be principal concerns. Technological
and environmental issues will continue to grow in importance.
The frequency and intimacy of contact between societies will also
increase. Virtually all governmental agencies will have direct and
growing contact with officials of foreign governments. Interparliamen-
tary groups will provide growing contacts among legislatures. Private
organizations will increasingly operate across national boundaries.
The U.S. must continue to maintain military forces clearly sufficient
to deter or respond to any threat. But military power alone cannot
provide security. A growing number of conflicts of national interest
will take economic form. Meanwhile, the global dispersion of wealth
and productivity will continue, making it harder to resolve major inter-
national economic issues without widespread concurrence. Important
questions will more often be debated or resolved in multilateral as well
as bilateral forums.
Foreign policy and domestic policy merge. Foreign economics is
inseparable from domestic economics, and domestic economics is do-
mestic politics, in the U.S. and everywhere. The organizational impli-
cations of this mingling are numerous and important. They include
changes in the number of executive departments involved in foreign
policy; the necessity for clearer Presidential oversight and direction;
a substantial expansion in the role of Congress in foreign policy; the
need for better coordination between the executive and congressional
branches; and a new role for public opinion.
To meet these challenges successfully, U.S. policymaking will have
to embody features not easy to combine: extensive public and congres-
sional participation, a clear sense of purpose, and continuity over time.
THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
CHAPTER 3
The ultimate decisions in foreign policy in the executive branch are
taken by the President. He bears great responsibilities which cannot be
delegated:
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?to provide a conception of national purposes concerning the ex-
ternal world;
?to take personal command of issues which present major threats
or opportunities to the national interests;
?to insure that the Congress is fully informed of proposed foreign
policy initiatives;
?to resolve conflicts of policy concerning issues on which the execu-
tive departments cannot reconcile their views, or may do so in a
manner which does not reflect the President's views of the na-
tional interests;
?to insure that the independent actions of various departments
are coordinated; and
?to establish organizational and procedural arrangements which
facilitate the performance of each of those tasks.
To meet their responsibilities, Presidents depend on help of three kinds.
The first is staff?able assistants, Presidential in perspective. The
second is structure?mechanisms and procedures in the Executive Of-
fice designed to facilitate the effective discharge of Presidential re-
sponsibilities. The third is strong performance from the Cabinet
departments.
Presidential Staff. In addition to providing assistance to the Presi-
dent in performance of the foregoing tasks, Presidential staff must:
identify issues likely to require Presidential attention; structure those
issues for Presidential understanding and decision; insure that each
interested department has an opportunity to state its case, and is
clearly informed of decisions once taken; monitor implementation of
policies agreed upon; and assess results. The defining characteristic of
these tasks is that they embody staff responsibilities rather than line
authority. They provide assistance to the President, not direction to de-
partmental officials, other than to convey Presidential instructions.
There should be only one official with line responsibility in the White
House, and that is the President himself.
The Assistant for National Security Affairs. It is eloquent testi-
mony to the extraordinary abilities of the present Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs that he has met the require-
ments of that post while simultaneously serving as an active and effec-
tive Secretary of State. His holding of both positions has arisen from
quite special circumstances, it is well established, and no recommenda-
tion concerning it is made. Over the long term, however, the respon-
sibilities of the Assistant for National Security Affairs, involving es-
sential personal assistance to the President, management of issues for
Presidential decision, and the direction of the National Security Coun-
cil staff, should normally in the future be performed by an individual
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with no other official responsibilities. The actual choice would of course
rest with the President.
The responsibilities of that Assistant are heavy and important
enough to require the undivided attention of even the ablest public
servant. An Assistant to the President, moreover, must be a conduit to
the President, and a force for balance and evenhandedness in the pre-
sentation and consideration of issues. These are staff functions, not
easily made compatible with the responsibilities of a line official, the
chief of a great department.
The Nature of Presidential Machinery. Since 1947, the basic White
House machinery for the resolution of major foreign affairs issues has
remained remarkably stable. The National Security Council (NSC)
has afforded its members a useful mechanism for the airing of dif-
ferences, the discussion of alternatives, the stating of recommenda-
tions, and the making of Presidential decisions. Perhaps even more im-
portant has been the development of a small but able NSC staff, headed
by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
The nature of foreign policy problems has changed since 1947. So
has the nature of international power. Increasingly, economic forces
define the strength or weakness of nations, and economic issues dom-
inate the agenda of international negotiation. National security policy
is no longer simply a mix of diplomatic and military affairs; properly
understood, national security embraces economic policy too. Accord-
ingly, the membership of the National Security Council should be ex-
panded to include the Secretary of the Treasury, and its jurisdiction
expanded to include major issues of international economic policy-
making.
With the broadening of the NSC to include international economic
considerations, the degree to which domestic considerations must be
blended into foreign policymaking also expands. On an ad hoc basis,
the President should invite to NSC meetings concerning issues with
important domestic implications either Cabinet or staff officials con-
cerned with domestic policymaking.
The NSC should be used more extensively as a deliberative body?
the highest forum in the executive branch where the major issues of
foreign policy are aired and debated, prior to Presidential decision.
The exact manner in which the NSC is used must be left to Presi-
dential choice. But when the NSC's potential for informed and bal-
anced consideration of issues is not used, important opportunities
may be missed.
The Role of the Departments. The Departments of government
must be drawn deeply into the formulation of policy at the Presi-
dential level: to help avoid the bottlenecks created when unnecessarily
large numbers of decisions are reserved for the President; to share
decision-making responsibility among those having the relevant pro-
fessional experience and technical understanding of the issues, and to
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put resporgibiliiig .4f)r decisions in 'the hands of those who will man-
age implementation.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CHAPTER 4
The State Department will continue to be the central point in the
U.S. government for the conduct of foreign affairs. It should concen-
trate upon three major functions, and adapt its personnel, organiza-
tion and procedures to fulfill them. The Department should be the
primary point in the government for assessing the overseas impact
of proposed U.S. decisions and injecting international considerations
into the national policy process. It should play a major part in the
formulation of all U.S. policy having significant foreign implications,
a responsibility which will require it to monitor, oversee, coordinate,
and influence the foreign activities of other U.S. agencies. And it
should continue to fill its responsibilities for the actual conduct of
relations with other governments and international organizations.
Recommendations affecting the Department of State appear
throughout the report, reflecting the Department's concern with vir-
tually all aspects of foreign policy. The principal organizational
changes proposed include the following:
?The position of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
should be retitled Under Secretary for Political and Security
Affairs, and become the focal point for strong State Department
participation in Defense issues. The position of Under Secretary
of State for Security Assistance should be abolished. (See Chap-
ter 6.)
?The responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
should be broadened and his title changed to Under Secretary for
Economic and Scientific Affairs.
?Functional responsibilities currently divided between the Bureau
of Economic and Business Affairs and the Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, should be
divided among four bureaus all reporting directly to the Under
Secretary for Economic Scientific Affairs.
?Economic and Business Affairs
?Food, Population and Development Affairs
?Oceans, Environment and Scientific Affairs
?Transportation, Communication and Energy Affairs. (See
Chapter 5)
?A new Senior Officer for Policy Information should direct the
press, public affairs and policy information functions currently
assigned to the Department, and those to be transferred to State
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from the U.S. Information Agency. The Bureau of Cultural and
Educational Affairs should be transferred to the proposed In-
formation and Cultural Affairs Agency (ICA). (See Chapter 9)
?The current Deputy Under Secretary for Management would be
upgraded to full Under Secretary status.
These proposals leave unchanged the number of positions at the
Under Secretary level in the State Department. They transfer one
bureau of another agency, carve two additional bureaus out of exist-
ing bureaus, and add one bureau of relatively small size. In addition,
one office?that of Inspector General for Foreign Assistance?would
be abolished.
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
CHAPTER 5
The organization of the government must reflect the reality that
foreign and political considerations cannot be segregated from
economic and domestic interests. A framework to make international
economic policy responsive to domestic and foreign policy considera-
tions should
?encourage broad sharing of responsibility for the formulation
of policy.
?encourage greater foresight in analyzing and attacking problems
at an early stage.
?assure that policies, once formulated, are implemented in the spirit
and manner intended.
The President ultimately is responsible for integratinng interna-
tional economic policy with foreign and domestic objectives. To assist
him, four measures are recommended:
?Appointment of a senior Assistant to the President for Economic
Policy. The Assistant should have direct access to the President,
and should participate or be represented in the National Security
Council and domestic policymaking bodies. He would also serve
as the Executive Secretary of the proposed joint Subcouncil on
International Economic Policy.
?Establishment of an International Economic Policy Advisory
Board composed of private citizens. The Board would be pro-
vided a small secretariat, and should have direct access to the
President.
?Creation of an independent study group on international economic
issues under the auspices of the Council of Economic Advisers, to
examine long-term international economic trends and developing
issues.
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?Establfshriient, as a joint Subcouncil of the NSC, the Domestic
Council and the Economic Policy Board, of a Subcouncil on Inter-
national Economic Policy, composed of the Under Secretary of
State for Economic and Scientific Affairs, the Under Secretary of
Treasury for Monetary Affairs, the Under Secretaries of Com-
merce and Agriculture and the Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers. Other subcabinet officers would attend as
appropriate. Staff of the Subcouncil would be drawn in part from
the staffs of its parent bodies but would function under the As-
sistant to the President.
CIEP should be abolished and its staff used to strengthen the economic
capability of the NSC and the Domestic Council.
The choice of Subcouncil Chairman should be left to the President.
The Under Secretary of State, as the most senior U.S. Government
official concerned solely with foreign economic policy, should normally
fill this role.
The Department of State must significantly improve its capability
to deal with the foreign policy aspects of economic, business, scientific,
energy, transportation, food, population, development, and related
issues.
To this end:
?More Ambassadors and Deputy Chiefs of Mission with economic
expertise should be appointed.
?Personnel interchange among departments and agencies and be-
tween government and business should be expanded.
?Multiagency participation in policy negotiation and implementa-
tion abroad under State Department coordination should be
increased.
?The Agency for International Development (AID) should remain
the operating arm of the State Department for bilateral foreign
assistance, with the Treasury Department having primary re-
sponsibility for supervision of U.S. commitments to international
development institutions.
?The Federal Energy Administration (FEA) should provide lead-
ership in carrying out the national energy policy, with the State
Department responsible for continuing to bring foreign policy
considerations to bear in the formulation of policy in that area.
?The Office of Export Administration in the Commerce Depart-
ment should be the central point for licensing and surveillance of
trade and investment with Communist countries, under policy
guidance providing a better balance between military and eco-
nomic considerations.
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?The Office of the President's Special Trade Representative should
be transferred, following current trade negotiations, to the De-
partment of State.
DEFENSE POLICY
CHAPTER 6
The U.S. will continue to require military capabilities unquestion-
ably sufficient in size, equipment, and readiness to assure the security
of the U.S. and its allies against aggression. The Defense establish-
ment must be designed and utilized as an instrument of U.S. foreign
policy.
To better achieve these objectives some restructuring of the NSC
and its committees is recommended, notably, the creation of a National
Security Review Committee, including membership from major
agencies with national security interests, whose function would be to
insure the larger integration of defense policy, programs, and budgets
with the objectives of U.S. foreign policy. The committee would con-
duct a major review at the beginning of each administration (with
annual reviews and updating subsequently) under the direction of the
President and his National Security Assistant. To bring more fully to
bear on defense policymaking the perspectives of the informed Ameri-
can public, an Advisory Board on National Defense, composed of
knowledgeable private citizens, should also be established.
The State Department is inadequately equipped to deal with polit-
ical-military issues; a number of structural and personnel system
changes are needed. These include, as indicated above, making the
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (retitled the Under
Secretary for Political and Security Affairs) directly responsible for
State's expanded role in the Defense community. The Bureau of
Politico-Military Affairs would report directly to him.
Several changes in the role of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA) are also appropriate.
?The Director of ACDA should be established as principal ad-
viser to the NSC on arms control and disarmament matters.
?The Director should become a member of the proposed National
Security Review Committee; the agency should also be repre-
sented on the proposed NSC Arms Transfer and Security Assist-
ance Committee.
?ACDA should provide more public information on arms control
and disarmament matters.
?External research should be expanded, focusing on longer-term
problems.
A substantial increase in ACDA's small budget over the next few
years Seems appropriate.
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The President's capability to deal with the major policy issues in
the defense area depend in large part on the management of the
budget. Accordingly,
?a new analysis capability should be established in the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) to address broad defense pol-
icy and program issues;
?more determined efforts should be made to inject Presidentially-
approved fiscal guidance earlier into the defense programming
cycle.
In support of all these efforts, closer contact should be maintained
among the staffs of the NSC, State Department, and OMB in defin-
ing issues, conducting special studies, and seeing that the results of
such studies are reflected in the defense budget process.
The Department of Defense (DoD) is, of course, the main operat-
ing agency in the field of military affairs, and the principal instru-
ment for assuring that the activities of DoD serve the President's
overall policy objectives in the civilian leadership he appoints. Within
DoD the Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security
Affairs (ISA) should play a greater role in shaping the defense pro-
gram and budget.
Measures are proposed to strengthen the ability of the Secretary of
Defense to exercise his responsibilities for direction and control of
crisis operations through provisions to insure the responsiveness of
the National Military Command Center to the operational needs of
the Secretary, increased autonomy for the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff vis-?is the services in operational matters, and selec-
tion procedures for officers in key Joint Staff positions.
INTELLIGENCE CHAPTER 7
National security and the effective conduct of U.S. foreign policy
require maintenance of intelligence capabilities of the highest compe-
tence. Intelligence in a democracy must meet three tests: to provide
accurate information and competent analysis concerning the issues
of greatest concern to policymakers; to avoid unnecessary costs and
duplication; and to function in a manner which commands public
confidence.
Firmer oversight of the intelligence community is required. This
is difficult to achieve for a variety of reasons.
The community consists of many agencies, with differing objectives
and lines of command. The great bulk of its budget and manpower
falls within the Department of Defense, yet the Secretary of Defense
clearly should not also serve as the nation's chief intelligence officer.
Prior efforts to deal with this situation have taken several forms, but
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have hinged on the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). In addi-
tion to his responsibilities for CIA, the DCI has been charged with the
oversight and leadership of the entire intelligence community.
This arrangement has worked only partially. Having line authority
over their own agency but only'limited influence over other intel-
ligence units, DCIs have tended to devote themselves largely to CIA
affairs.
Several changes are necessary. To supervise effectively the intel-
ligence community, the DCI must be a close assistant to the one official
who does ultimately command each element of the community: the
President. In order to meet his community-wide responsibilities, as
well as to be the President's principal intelligence adviser, the DCI
should have an office in close proximity to the White House and be
accorded regular and direct contact with the President. He should
delegate much of his authority for the day-to-day direction of CIA
to his deputy. In addition, some extensions of the DCI's current re-
sponsibilities for community-wide planning and budgeting are
recommended.
To make clear exclusively foreign responsibilities of the Central
Intelligence Agency and of its Director, the CIA should be retitled
the Foreign Intelligency (FIA), and its Director, the Director of
Foreign Intelligence (DFI).
The Director of Foreign Intelligence should have a broad under-
standing of foreign and national security affairs, managerial skill,
sensitivity to the constraints within which an American intelligence
service must operate, independence and high integrity. The DFI
should normally be a person of stature from outside the intelligence
career service, although promotion from within should not be barred.
In view of the special importance and sensitivity of intelligence,
the President should have sources of advice independent of the DFI.
The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)
should become the principal such source. Each incoming President
should review and make such changes in PFIAB's membership as may
be required to give him high personal confidence in that body's values
and judgment. PFIAB's staff should be enlarged and drawn in part
from sources outside the intelligence community.
The quality and relevance of intelligence need continuing upgrad-
ing, with a more active NSC Intelligence Committee (NSCIC) as the
priheipal forum for resolution of differing perspectives of consumers
and producers. Analytic improvements are also needed, notably in
the areas of Foreign Service reporting, economic intelligence, and the
process by which National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are pro-
duced. A better balance between technical and human means of in-
telligence collection is required.
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. ?
(-WTI t ,
To supplemen steps aken recen years to improve resource man-
agement, a multi-year plan for allocation of intelligence responsibili-
ties across the community should, be prepared, and on the basis of this
plan, an annual consolidated foreign intelligence budget should be
developed.
Covert Action. Many dangers are associated with covert action. But
we must live in the world we find, not the world we might wish. Our
adversaries deny themselves no forms of action which might advance
their interests or undercut ours. In many parts of the world a prohibi-
tion on our use of covert action would put the U.S. and those who
rely on it at a dangerous disadvantage. Covert action should not be
abandoned, but should be employed only where such action is clearly
essential to vital U.S. purposes and then only after careful high level
review.
Present practices for review and approval of covert action are in-
adequate and should be strengthened. Covert actions should be au-
thorized only after collective considerations of their benefits and risks
by all available 40 Committee members. In addition, covert action
should be reported to the proposed Joint Committee of the Congress
on National Security or to some other appropriate congressional
committee.
PUBLIC OPINION CHAPTER 8
As foreign policy issues develop domestic ramifications, and radio
and television bring world events into every home, public opinion will
be an increasingly important determinant of foreign policy. The
government will need to communicate more fully to the public, and in
return develop a more accurate sense of public attitudes on policy
matters. Procedures cannot substitute for receptiveness to what is
being communicated, but improvements are possible. Important con-
gressional foreign policy debates should be opened to television, more
comprehensive public affairs programs should be developed, and pro-
grams for education in international affairs should be more fully
funded. Policymakers can develop better information on the trends
of public opinion through .greater attention to polling, provision of
more channels for interchange of views with members of the public,
and inclusion in policymaking of officials familiar with public
opinion.
HUMANITARIAN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
CHAPTER 8
Issues of humanitarian and human rights activities and sensitivity
to ethical considerations in policymaking deserve greater attention.
The new Office of Humanitarian Affairs in the Department of State
should be upgraded, an Advisory Committee to the Secretary of State
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on Human Rights should be created, and a broader mandate given the
U.S. Representative to the United Nations Human Rights
Commission.
PRACTICE OF DIPLOMACY
CHAPTER 9
Bilateral Relationships. Three tasks should become the principal
focus of posts and missions abroad: providing perceptive assess-
ment of important foreign developments; supporting and overseeing
the whole range of U.S. activities in each country; and furthering
multilateral diplomacy through bilateral relationships.
The Ambassador must be the central representative abroad of the
United States and of the President; he must have greater control of
communications and personnel in his mission. Foreign Service report-
ing requires substantial improvement. Officials at home and in the
field should remain in closer touch to maintain a shared perspective
toward their joint responsibilities. Modifications in the process of in-
spection of posts abroad would help provide more effective manage-
ment.
Multilateral Relations. Multilateral channels of diplomacy will be
increasingly important as more issues of global interdependence find
their way into multilateral forums. Policymakers must decide when
our national interests are best served by their use, and when other
forms of diplomatic relations are more appropriate. Periodic review
of our approach to these organizations should be undertaken.
No single unit or department of our government can take exclusive
responsibility for U.S. participation in multilateral agencies. Lead
responsibility should be assigned to the appropriate functional bu-
reaus in the State Department. Delegations to multilateral organiza-
tions and conferences should be multiagency in composition; the Sec-
retary of State should select heads of delegations from the best quali-
fied individuals in or out of the government. Members of Congress
can and should play a valuable part as members of delegations even
if they are usually not voting members.
Public Diplomacy. Our information and cultural activities abroad
have three separate aspects. First, the function of policy advocacy
should be placed in the Department of State alongside the responsi-
bility for policy itself. Second, the longer range functions of cultural
communication and general information should be combined in a sepa-
rate agency. Third, the Voice of America should be independent, under
a separate board made up of public and private members, taking
guidance from the Department of State on all policy commentary.
Personnel for public diplomacy should continue to be separate from
the Foreign Service.
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PLANNING CHAPTER 10
To be effective, foreign policy must achieve coherence over time. It
must serve consciously developed, long-term goals and priorities. The
planning function must insure that current policy takes account of
future trends and long-term purposes and priorities, that current ac-
tions are reevaluated from time to time, and that new initiatives are
generated.
The products of planning must be adapted to many needs, but two
documents in particular would be important additions. The reintro-
duction of a State of the World statement on a periodic basis would
offer a comprehensive conceptual basis for policy and programs. The
establishment of a process which regularly produced and revised a
Global Systems Critical List would create an authoritative inventory
of possible long-run problems or opportunities associated with such
issues as food, population, weather modification, the environment,,
and natural resources. Such a list should be used by both Congress and
the executive to insure that the nation's response to such issues is
timely and adequate.
Additionally, a Council of International Planning should be estab-
lished at the Presidential level, to give a government-wide perspective
to planning and to take account of the interaction of domestic and
foreign issues. In the Department of State a strong Policy Planning
Staff is also necessary. External expertise is vital to policy planning;
to this end a planning Advisory Committee should be instituted,
among other purposes to assist government planners to become more
sensitive to newer methodologies and analytic techniques for forecast-
ing and planning.
BUDGETING CHAPTER 11
The effective treatment of resources in foreign policy analysis and
coordination has been a continuing problem for the foreign policy
community. Budgeting is particularly complex in foreign affairs, since
budgetary impact may be small relative to the importance of policy
actions, and foreign policy decisions depend heavily on external de-
velopments over which the government has no control.
Development of a unified foreign affairs budget is not feasible, but
special analyses and displays on a cross-agency basis could prove
helpful. Country and regional programming efforts should continue,
but on a selective and better focused basis.
In the Congressional budgeting process, the two foreign affairs com-
mittees should review the views and estimates of the appropriation
committees for their foreign policy implications. These two committees
should also be represented on the two new budget committees. Con-
gress should simplify the authorization process; it may wish to con-
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sider combining the appropriations and authorization processes
through "program committees," once the new Congressional budget
process has become established.
PERSONNEL CHAPTER 12
People may be the single most important element in successful for-
eign policy. The foreign affairs agencies of the government must pro-
vide a more systematic way of placing the right people in the right
jobs, and particularly assuring that qualified people are placed in
executive positions. Sustained attention to executive development and
other major issues has been missing.
State Department's personnel capabilities must be improved by:
?raising the performance in functional specialties;
?emphasizing the specialty of diplomatic functions and particu-
larly building Foreign Service assessment capabilities;
?improving management capabilities of the departmental and For-
eign Service personnel;
?revising arrangements for employee-management relations, and
?instituting a strong Executive Development Program for both
the State Department and the international activities of other
government agencies.
In particular, the State Department's personnel management should
be given a more professional basis by a single Director of Personnel,
responsible for all personnel systems in the Department, and report-
ing directly to the proposed Under Secretary for Management. Job
requirements should be matched more effectively with individual tal-
ents through comprehensive manpower planning. A Foreign Affairs
Executive Service should be instituted under the leadership of the
Department, utilizing the government-wide personnel systems, in
order to provide for the development of broad-gauged executives for
senior positions in all foreign affairs agencies, and in foreign posts and
missions.
EXECUTIVE-CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS
CHAPTER 13
A new era of cooperation between the executive and congressional
branches in foreign relations is vital to the security of our Nation
and to the peace of the world.
Major foreign policy problems of the future will increasingly arise
from the tightening economic and physical interdependence of nations,
and problems of interdependence will sharply affect the domestic econ-
omy and therefore merge with domestic political issues. Foreign policy
will therefore touch the American public more directly, and will in-
volve the Congress to a greater degree. Moreover, the Constitution
gives the Congress the sole power to regulate commerce with foreign
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nations; as that commerce becomes more central to our foreign rela-
tions, the Congressional role must inevitably grow. The Congress, then,
must be prepared to play, effectively and responsibly, a broader role
than before in those issues with both foreign and domestic dimensions.
Balance and effectiveness in the future conduct of our international
relations is necessary, not a radical shift in power between the branches.
The executive must conduct relations with other countries. The Presi-
dent must have the flexibility to negotiate effectively and provide
responsible leadership in meeting international demands of increasing
complexity. But measures are needed to provide for a fuller sharing
of responsibilities in that broad region where both branches must act
together.
Executive Agreements. ,A source of confrontation and dispute in
recent years between Congress and the executive branch has been the
use of "sole executive agreements" with foreign governments. These
are international agreements not concluded as treaties or as executive
agreements to which Congress has concurred, but by executive action
alone. The advantages to the executive of freedom to enter into such
arrangements must be balanced against the necessity for an oppor-
tunity, through the Congress, for review and recourse as to their
terms. The Department of State has revised its regulations concerning
these agreements. They now provide that there should be consultation
with Congress whenever there is a question whether an international
agreement should be concluded as a treaty or by executive agreement.
In 1972 Congress enacted a law requiring that the text of all execu-
tive agreements be submitted to Congress within 60 days after they
are concluded. These executive and legislative actions would be
strengthened, and shared responsibility for international agreements
further assured, if Congress made clearer its view as to when the
nation is committed to assist another nation by use of armed force, or
material or financial resources.
The Congress should adopt, by concurrent resolution, a statement
that a national commitment?meaning an agreement to assist a for-
eign country, government or people by the use of the armed forces
or financial resources of the United States, either immediately or upon
the happening of certain events?results only from affirmative action
taken by the legislative and executive branches of the United States
Government by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of
both Houses of Congress specifically providing for such a commitment.
Emergency Powers. Four Presidential proclamations of national
emergency are currently in effect. Pursuant to them, over 470 pro-
visions of federal law have come into effect, delegating extraordinary
authority to the executive. The actual emergencies have now ended,
but the formal states of emergency endure. These national emergencies
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should be terminated. Any future cfeelanttfons of national emergency
should specify the statutory powers required to meet such an emer-
gency; all national emergencies should be terminable at any time by
concurrent resolution or Presidential proclamation; and provision
should be made for their termination in the absence of their extension
by Congress.
Executive Privilege. A claim of executive privilege should be as-
serted only by the President personally, and when so asserted, any
such claim should be considered carefully and respectfully both by the
Congress and, if the matter should come to litigation, by the judiciary.
There are kinds of information which present a substantial basis for
claims of executive privilege. Yet Congress has a right to the fullest
access to information necessary for the fulfillment of its own con-
stitutional responsibilities.
Congress should therefore establish procedures to limit the occasions
for dispute between the two branches, and to provide for the swiftest
resolution of conflicts should they arise. These procedures should
regularize the process whereby either House or a committee of either
House may seek information. They should also establish the steps
whereby, if that information is denied, the matter can be referred to
the federal courts for expeditious resolution.
A Classification System Based on Statute. Too much information
in the field of foreign policy is classified too highly, and too long. A
number of corrective actions have recently been taken, but the classi-
fication system still operates without any statutory basis. Procedures
so important and potentially so dangerous as those which restrict the
ability of a free people to review the operations of its own executive
departments should be defined and circumscribed by law.
The Congress should consider legislation establishing a comprehen-
sive classification system based on the following guidelines:
?Mandatory classification of specified types of information relating
principally to national defense and the sources and methods of
intelligence.
?Mandatory exemption from classification of certain other
information.
?Classification or exemption from classification of all other in-
formation on the basis of specified criteria balancing the need
for secrecy against the potential value of disclosure.
Increased Use of Report-Back and Time-Limit Procedures. Greater
use should be made of report-back requirements for testimony and
written reports from executive officials to the Congress, and of statu-
tory time limits in proposed legislation.
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CONGRESSIONAL ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES CHAPTER 14
To improve the coherence and consistency of Congressional actions
affecting other nations, the House Committee on International Rela-
tions should be accorded "special oversight functions" over reciprocal
tariff agreements, in addition to its other responsibilities for trade
policy issues. It should also exercise concurrent legislative oversight
over international financial organizations, together with the House
Committee on Banking and Currency. A review by the Senate of its
own committee system also now seems appropriate. Subcommittees in
both Houses should be more fully utilized to strengthen the basis of
committee action, and to provide greater interchange with working-
level executive officials as should joint subcommittees hearings.
A New Joint Committee. Since political, military and economic
aspects of foreign policy have become interlocked, Congress should
contain some forum in which those interrelations can be directly
weighed. At the same time Congress is requiring greatly increased
consultation with senior foreign policy officials of the executive
branch. The result is a potentially unsustainable demand on senior
executive officials for multiple appearances before Congress. To help
resolve both problems, and to provide more effective oversight over
the intelligence community, a Joint Committee on National Security
should be established. It should perform for the Congress the kinds of
policy review and coordination now performed in the executive branch
by the National Security Council, and provide a central point of link-
age to the President and to the officials of that Council.
In addition, it should take responsibility for Congressional over-
sight of the Intelligence Community. The Joint Committee should
include the leaders of the key foreign, military, and international
economic policy committees from each House, and several Members-at-
Large appointed by the party leaders. It should be vested with author-
ity to:
?Receive, analyze and refer reports from the President under the
War Powers Act.
?Receive and review analytic products of the intelligence com-
munity.
?Oversee the system of information classification discussed above.
?Establish a code of conduct to govern the handling by Commit-
tee members of classified or sensitive information.
In two specific areas the Joint Committee might usefully have author-
ity to report legislation to the floor of each House. These are to consider
the creation of a statutory system of information classification; and
(if intelligence oversight is assigned to it), annual authorization of
funds for the intelligence community.
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In the event that this Committee is not established a Joint Commit-
tee on Intelligence should be created to assume the important task of
Congressional oversight of the intelligence community.
Capacities for Evaluation and Review. Through various proposed
actions, the Congress might be able to meet more systematically than
before its responsibilities for the evaluation and review both of major
programs and of the policies on which they are based.
Increasing Attentiveness to Foreign Affairs. International con-
tacts have a beneficial effect in familiarizing Members of Congress
with overseas conditions and foreign perspectives. To this end, more
extended travel abroad by Members, the preparation of reports based
on staff travel, and increased travel by teams of Members are desirable.
Similarly, greater participation by Members of Congress is inter-
national negotiations, is an important means of increasing the first-
hand information available to Members on foreign policy and its
conduct.
As to public understanding of foreign policy issues, Congress,
through carefully organized hearings, can provide needed critical re-
view of U.S. purposes and policies. Such review is necessary to test the
soundness and coherence of policy and to generate the public under-
standing and support without which, in the end, it cannot succeed.
Recent trends toward opening the deliberations of Congress on
major foreign policy issues should be encouraged. Committee hearings
should routinely be open for television. At the discretion of the House
and Senate, consideration should also be given to making floor debates
on major foreign policy issues available.
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THE PURPOSES OF ORGANIZATION
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CHAPTER 1
THE IMPORTANCE OF ORGANIZATION
Organization cannot make a genius out of an incompetent; even
less can it of itself make the decisions which are required to trigger
necessary action. On the other hand, disorganization can scarcely
fail to result in inefficiency and can easily lead to disaster.
?DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1963
Good organization does not insure successful policy. Nor does poor
organization preclude successful policy. But steadily and powerfully,
organizational patterns influence the effectiveness of government.
Policymaking on any subject of importance requires adequate in-
formation, careful analysis of the implications of that information,
consultation with the various parties legitimately concerned, and
balanced assessment of the alternative courses of action. Once a deci-
sion is made, it must be clearly communicated to those responsible or
affected by it, carefully monitored in its implementation, and evalu-
ated for its actual effects. These are not functions which occur
automatically.
In a necessarily large and complex government, effective operation
requires a general understanding of who is responsible for what, and
how those responsibilities interact with the tasks and authorities of
others. Where organizational structure is logical and clear, the twin
dangers of deadlock and of neglect are both minimized. Where the
processes of decision are orderly, or as orderly as the press of events
permits, decisions profit from the participation of those knowledge-
able or affected, and from the resulting confidence?even among those
who sought a different result?that their views were considered.
But organization affects more than the efficiency of government; it
can affect the outcome of decisions. Organizational patterns deter-
mine the probabilities that a decision will be taken at one level rather
than another, or in one agency instead of another. And since perspec-
tives differ from level to level in government, and from agency to
agency, the resulting decisions will differ also. To illustrate:
During the 1960s, the U.S. maintained substantial Chemical and
Biological Warfare capabilities (CBW) and reserved the right to
use them, contrary to the Geneva protocol of 1925 which most ma-
jor nations had signed but the T7.S. had not. The Joint Chiefs of
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Staff supported this policy and were understandably disturbed
by occasional statements of other officials that U.S. policy might
or should be changed. Consequently, in 1967, the Chiefs asked Sec-
retary of Defense McNamara to seek formal reaffirmation of the
policy and a direction to the State Department and Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency to cease statements to the contrary.
Under the procedures of the Johnson Administration, an issue of
this sort could reach the President only if a senior official were
prepared to urge the President to adopt a particular recommenda-
tion, even over the opposition of other officials. In the light of his
other concerns at the time, McNamara decided to take no position.
He referred the JCS request to Secretary of State Rusk, who for-
warded it to the Bureau of Politico Military Affairs in State.
That bureau was divided on the issue. When other bureaus were
consulted, differences only deepened. During the last year and a
half of the Johnson Administration, State proved unable to pro-
duce an agreed position and the CBW issue was never brought
to the White House.
The Nixon Administration instituted a different procedure, and it
produced a different outcome. In 1969, the Chiefs again asked the
Secretary of Defense to seek a national policy on CBW. The
Secretary now had a new alternative. He proposed that, consist-
ent with the new procedures for the study of major issues, a Na-
tional Security Study Memorandum be issued requiring an inter-
agency study to identify all options concerning CBW policy, and
stating the pros and cons of each. The study was completed, and
the issue went to a National Security Council meeting. There the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs personally represented to the Presi-
dent the Chiefs' position. But the President-had before him the
counter-arguments.
After all views had been aired, the President reversed the previ-
ous policy. He renounced the right to produce and use biological
weapons and pledged to sign the 1925 Geneva Protocol.*
It obviously does not follow that the best process is one which brings
all decisions to the President. The objectives to be served in designing
organizational arrangements are partially conflicting. They must
make possible early and effective Presidential involvement, but must
also give weight to the perspectives and knowledge of more specialized
officials. Similarly, though decisions should be well considered and
carefully thought through, they also should be made expeditiously. We
must be free to respond flexibly to particular situations, but must also
be guided by longer-range goals. We want policy decisions understood
and supported as widely as possible, but on some occasions they must
be taken quickly and without broad consultation.
The design of organizations, like policymaking itself, must seek to
balance conflicting objectives. It must therefore leave considerable flex-
ibility in the hands of senior officials.
* The details of this incident are set out in appendix K.
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Organization, Personality, and Policy. The basic tasks which any
organizational arrangement must perform?the provision of informa-
tion, analysis of alternatives, monitoring of implementation and so
forth?do not change. But there are many ways of performing them.
The question of which way?which organizational structure?is best
at a given moment in history will depend on at least two factors.
Any organizational pattern must fit the personal styles of key de-
cision-makers. Some Presidents and some Secretaries are comfortable
formulating policy in the presence of other officials and some are not.
Some want extensive written documentation; some prefer the give and
take of oral discussion. Some value the clarity of rigorous lines of
command and clear-cut jurisdictions; some prefer the competition pro-
duced by overlapping responsibilities. These are personal predilections
which any organization arrangement must accommodate, at least in
part. ?
The appropriateness of particular organizational arrangements also
depends on the nature of the policy problems with which they must
deal. In a period characterized by the wide recognition of external
threat and by a high degree of national unity, a President may appro-
priately rely on a small group of advisers. In a period of debate over
national objectives, and of sharp interaction between foreign policy
and domestic politics, he may require a larger group. Organizations
must evolve to meet changing needs. For that reason, it is important to
outline the world environment in which we believe American foreign
policy will be required to operate over the near future. We turn to that
subject in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
POLICY ISSUES OF THE FUTURE
Progress in dealing with our traditional agenda is no longer enough.
A new and unprecedented kind of issue has emerged. The problems
of energy, resources, environment, population, the uses of space and
the seas, now rank with the questions of military security, ideology,
and territorial rivalry which have traditionally made up the diplo-
matic agenda.
?HENRY KISSINGER, Janucvry 1975
Assertions about the future are risky, but for our purposes, predic-
tions of only the most general kind are necessary, and these can
be made with some confidence. We believe that a number of tenden-
cies already obvious?tendencies concerning the nature of foreign
policy issues, the degree of interaction and interdependence among
societies, the changing forms of international relations, and the shift-
ing sources of power?are deep seated and likely to continue. And we
believe they have important implications for the way in which the
U.S. must organize to conduct its foreign policy.
Almost certainly, economic issues will loom larger on the foreign
policy agenda of the future. Investment policy, international mone-
tary issues, balance of payments problems, economic development,
and the terms of trade will continue to be principal concerns of major
governments. It seems clear as well that technological issues will con-
tinue to grow in importance. Environmental concerns will necessarily
cross national boundaries. International agreements will affect the use
of the oceans as sources of food, mineral and energy needs. The use
of satellites for the identification of earth's resources and the moni-
toring of the earth and atmosphere will continue to grow in impor-
tance. The spread of nuclear technology will offer simultaneously the
promise of relief from dependence on fossil fuels and the difficulties
inherent in the dispersion of nuclear technology.
At the same time, we believe the frequency and intimacy of contact
between societies will continue to grow. Virtually all governmental
agencies?not merely State, Defense and Treasury?have interests
abroad, and are in increasing contact with officials of foreign govern-
ments. Interparliamentary groups will provide growing contacts
among legislatures. Private organizations will increasingly operate
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across national boundaries. The employees of U.S. private and busi-
ness organizations overseas, already far outnumbering civilian U.S.
Government employees outside the U.S., will continue to grow. Schol-
ars and scientists, cultural groups and business organizations will
increasingly perform activities across national boundaries.
While we recognize that an interdependent world will intensify rela-
tions between states and peoples and place a premium on international
cooperation, it does not diminish the need to retain that independ-
ence necessary to provide leadership, to secure cooperation on satis-
factory terms and to make the contribution to world needs which
national skills, resources and experience permit.
The U.S. must maintain a healthy economy both for its own sake
and as the necessary base for its military strength. Yet as global pro-
ductivity increases, the U.S. share of the world's wealth inevitably
diminishes. In 1947, some 50% of the world's gross national product
was accounted for by the United States; in 1960 it was 34%; in 1975,
roughly 27%. The dispersion of wealth and productivity will continue,
making it difficult to resolve major international economic issues by the
assertion of a U.S. position and the concurrence of three or four other
powers.
Moreover, as we have seen a diffusion of power among societies, so we
are witnessing a diffusion of authority within societies. Once-accepted
goals and values are increasingly questioned, the authority of estab-
lished institutions is challenged, often with outside support, with the
result of frequent changes in regimes throughout the world. We be-
lieve these trends are likely to continue at least for the near-term
future.
It has followed inevitably from the global reach of economic and
technical issues, from the growing dispersions of power, the develop-
ment of international communications, and the tripling of the num-
ber of independent states since World War II, that important ques-
tions are being more frequently debated in multilateral as well as in
bilateral forums. Policies affecting energy, nuclear proliferation, in-
vestment, raw materials, population control, food, weather, the oceans,
will evolve as a result of understandings reached and actions taken in
international political and technical agencies?the UN, the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, regional security alliances,
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and
other economic entities.
We believe that the interdependence of foreign and domestic policy
will grow. When U.S. consumer interests in the price of bread or soy-
beans conflict with the goals of our relations with the Soviet Union or
Japan; when the support of Israel produces hour-long waits at gas
pumps; when the price of tuna on the West Coast varies with the ac-
tions taken by Peru and Equador, then the relations between foreign
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and domestic concerns are direct and difficult. This fact is closely re-
lated, of course, to the growing international importance of eco-
nomic problems. International economic forces impact on domestic
economics, and domestic economics is domestic politics, in the U.S. and
everywhere. We believe that the organizational implications of this
fact are numerous and important. They include changes in the number
of executive departments involved in foreign policy; the necessity for
clearer Presidential oversight and direction; a substantial expansion
in the role of Congress in foreign policy; the need for better coordina-
tion between the branches, and an expanded role for public opinion.
The combined effect of these shifts in the nature of international
relations seems to us to be the following:
?The most pervasive characteristic of international affairs in the
next decades will be the growing interaction and tightening inter-
dependence among the nations of the world. As the linkages
between them multiply in number and in importance, even the
largest nations will not be able to satisfy their basic requirements
for material well being through independent action. By the same
token they will be unable to insulate their societies from the
effects of external forces.
?Domestic responsibilities of governments will require those gov-
ernments to work collaboratively with other states. This is the
practical meaning of interdependence: on economic and technical
issues, unable by independent action to meet national needs, gov-
ernments will require accommodation with other societies to gain
their own ends.
?The requisite cooperation of societies will involve a large number
of nations. Economic and monetary cooperation have involved
especially the developed nations of Western Europe, Japan and
North America, but the growing interrelationships among trade,
exchange rates, investment and development will increasingly
affect all nations. Problems generated by uses of the oceans and
atmosphere will involve both the developed and the less-devel-
oped countries. The regulation of armaments will concern prin-
cipally the great military powers but all states will have an im-
portant stake and consequent responsibility. Resource issues will
involve both producers and consumers.
?The essential collaboration will take many forms and operate
through many forums, but will heavily involve multilateral group-
ings and international agencies.
?The maintenance of steady, cooperative relations with a wide va-
riety of states of differing philosophies and conflicting objectives
will require greater sensitivity and understanding. It will be diffi-
? cult because many of the matters involved will directly affect the
daily lives of citizens through their effect on prices, wage rates,
and employment levels. These are the cutting issues of domestic
politics. Thus, the ,necessity to coordinate internal policymaking
closely and continuously with our actions respecting other nations
and international bodies will involve special effort and severe
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strain. It can be accomplished only if the American people under-
stand the issues.
?It seems fair to infer that in order to undertake these tasks suc-
cessfully, U.S. policymaking will have to embody essential fea-
tures which are not easy to combine: extensive public and congres-
sional participation, a clear sense of purpose and direction, and
continuity over time. The requirement for participation is obvious:
as foreign issues increasingly affect domestic conditions, they will
necessarily draw the attention of many agencies in the executive
branch, of the Congress, and of the public generally. The need for
a clear sense of national purpose may be less obvious but it is
equally important. A cooperative international order can only be
created by the cumulative effect of consistent actions over an ex-
tended period. Such consistency requires a guiding sense of pur-
pose, which is essential also if the claims of specific groups which
may run counter to long-term national interests are to be resisted.
Such resistance is difficult unless it is buttressed by long-range na-
tional purposes which enjoy public support.
The world which U.S. foreign policy must address, and which the
organization of the government must be designed to help it address,
will be one of increasing complexity, interaction, difficulty and danger,
but also one of crucial opportunities. We will return to these themes
in the pages which follow.
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THE PRESIDENT AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT
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CHAPTER 3
EXECUTIVE -OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
"The buck stops here."?HARRY S. TRUMAN.
"The real organization of the government at the higher
echelons is not what you find in the textbooks or organi-
zation charts. It is how confidence flows down from the
President."?DEAN RUSK.
THE NATURE OF PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
The day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs is the business of the great
departments and agencies of the executive branch. State, Defense,
Treasury, and increasingly others: Agriculture, Commerce, Labor,
the Energy Agency?possess the resources and bear the responsibility
for helping to determine policy and for carrying it out. Under the
Constitution the ultimate responsibility for foreign policy in the ex-
ecutive branch lies with the President. No matter how able and dedi-
cated his Cabinet subordinates, the President bears great and untrans-
ferable responsibilities:
?To provide a conception of national purpose concerning the ex-
ternal world, a conception sufficiently responsive to American
interests to enlist the support of the Congress and the people,
and sufficiently coherent and farsighted to guide the various de-
partments of the government toward effective and consistent
policies.
?To take personal command of decision-making concerning is-
sues which present threats or opportunities to the national
interest.
?To insure that the Congress is fully informed of proposed for-
eign policy initiatives and their basis and that to the extent pos-
sible, Congress participates in their formulation.
?To resolve conflicts of policy concerning issues on which the
executive departments, with their necessarily differing per-
spectives, cannot reconcile their views.
?To intervene in the making of decisions where the executive de-
? partments' may be capable of resolving their differences but
may do, so in a manner -which does not reflect the President's
view of the national interest.
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?To insure that the independent actions of the various depart-
ments which require coordination are in fact coordinated.
?To establish and maintain organizational and procedural ar-
rangements which facilitate the performance of each of those
tasks.
These responsibilities are heavy. The establishment of a farsighted
and coherent view of U.S. interests in the world is particularly dif-
ficult, and particularly important, as the broad postwar consensus on
the U.S. role in the world had come into question. The resolution of
departmental differences has become more difficult as the number of
agencies involved in foreign policy issues has grown. No important
foreign policy problem now falls within the jurisdiction of a single
department; energy, for example, concerns more than twenty. Mon-
itoring the flow of action and decision at the departmental level is
similarly more difficult, though it is essential both to ensure the appro-
priateness of decisions and the coordination of actions.
In meeting these responsibilities, Presidents depend on help of three
kinds. The first is staff?able assistants, Presidential in perspective.
The second is structure?a set of mechanisms and procedures in the
Executive Office of the President designed to facilitate the swift and
effective discharge of Presidential responsibilities. The third is strong
performance ;from the Cabinet departments. We discuss them in order.
PRESIDENTIAL STAFF
The functions of Presidential staff are many. All are important. In
addition to providing assistance to the President in the performance
of each of the tasks just referred to, Presidential staff must:
?identify issues likely to require Presidential attention.
?structure those issues for efficient Presidential understanding and
decision?insuring that the relevant facts are available, a full
set of alternatives are presented, agency positions are placed in
perspective.
?assure due process, permitting each interested department an
opportunity to state its case.
?insure that affected parties are clearly informed of decisions once
taken, and that their own responsibilities respecting those deci-
sions are specified.
?monitor the implementation of Presidential decisions.
?assess the results of decisions taken, drawing from those assess-
ments implications for future action.
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Various other tasks may appropriately be undertaken by presi-
dential staff. But the essential tasks, we believe, are those described.
The defining characteristic of these tasks is that they embody staff
responsibilities rather than line authority. They provide assistance
to the President, not direction to departmental officials other than
to convey Presidential instructions. There should be only one official
with line responsibility in the White House, and that is the Presi-
dent himself.
The Assistant for National Security Affairs. It is eloquent testimony
to the extraordinary abilities of the present Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs that he has met the requirements of that
post while simultaneously serving as an active and effective Secre-
tary of State. His holding of both positions has arisen from quite
special circumstances, it is well established, and we make no recom-
mendation concerning it. As we have stressed earlier, we seek not to
address matters of topical interest, but the enduring and longer-term
problems of government organization.
Having reviewed the responsibilities the Assistant for National
Security Affairs must meet over the long term, we conclude that
these responsibilities, involving essential personal assistance to the
President, management of issues for Presidential decision, and the
direction of the National Security Council staff, should normally
in future be performed by an individual with no other official re-
sponsibilities. The actual choice would of course rest with the
President.
The reasons for this are two. The first is simply that the responsi-
bilities of that Assistant are heavy and important enough to require
the undivided attention of even the ablest public servant. The second
is that an Assistant to the President must be a facilitator of decision,
a conduit to the President, a force for balance and even-handedness
in the presentation and consideration of issues. These are staff func-
tions. They are not easily made compatible with the responsibilities
of a Cabinet officer, a line official who must necessarily act as the chief
of a great department.
THE NATURE OF PRESIDENTIAL MACHINERY
Since 1947, the basic White House machinery for the resolution of
major foreign affairs issues has remained remarkably Stable. Though
Presidents have used it quite differently, the structure of the National
Security Council (NSC) has remained basically the same. It has
afforded its statutory members?currently the President, Vice Presi-
dent, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense?and the others nor-
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mally present, especially the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Director of the CIA, a familiar if unevenly used mechanism for
the airing of differences, the discussion of alternatives, the stating of
recommendations, and the making of Presidential decisions. Perhaps
even more useful has been the basis the NSC has provided for the devel-
opment of a small staff, headed by the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs.
The primary NSC mechanism for dealing with the majority of sig-
nificant foreign policy issues is the NSC Senior Review Group/Inter-
departmental Group structure. Under current procedures the Presi-
dent directs that an interdepartmental group undertake a review of a
specified problem and formulate policy options. The papers of this
group are reviewed by a more senior group, chaired by the President's
National Security Advisor. Following this review, papers are either
forwarded directly to the President for decision or become the basis for
a NSC meeting, after which the President makes his decision. Presi-
dential decisions are then expressed in decision memoranda distributed
to all concerned departments. The systematic development of inter-
agency positions for Presidential decision under this system has
proven an effective procedure for dealing with significant and com-
plex policy questions at the Presidential level.
In the Commission's view, the NSC structure should now be broad-
ened in scope, membership, and use. As we suggest in Chapter 2, the
'nature of foreign policy problems facing this country has changed
dramatically since 1947. So has the nature of international power.
Increasingly, economic forces define the strength or weakness of na-
tions, and economic issues dominate the agenda of international nego-
tiation. National security, policy is no longer a mix of simply of diplo-
matic and military affairs; properly understood, national security
embraces economic policy too. Accordingly, we recomment that:
The membership of the National Security Council be expanded to
include the Secretary of the Treasury, and its jurisdiction be en-
larged to include major issues of international economic policy-
making.
As indicated in Chapter 2, we also are aware that the distinction
between foreign and domestic policy is increasingly tenuous, especially
with respect to foreign economic-policy. With the broadening of the
NSC to include foreign economic considerations, the degree to which
domestic considerations must be blended into foreign policy making
also expands, and the need arises for an institutional link or bridge
between the mechanisms through which domestic and foreign policy
are made. In Chapter 5 we recommend the creation of a Joint Sub-
council of the NSC and the appropriate domestic economic policy-
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making body to establish that bridge for formulating foreign economic
policy. We believe it also appropriate that:
On an ad hoc bath, the President should invite to NSC meetings
at which issues with important domestic implications are being
discussed either Cabinet or staff officials concerned with domestic
policymaking.
Finally, if the expansion of scope and membership of the NSC is to
be meaningful, the NSC should be used more extensively as a delibera-
tive body?the highest forum in the executive branch where the major
issues of foreign policy are aired and debated, prior to presidential
decision. The exact manner in which the NSC is used must be left to
Presidential choice. But we believe that when the NSC's potential
for informed and balanced consideration of issues is not used, impor-
tant opportunities may be missed. If the NSC staff is to remain staff,
then those having line operating responsibilities?the cabinet officers
who are members of the Council itself?must be extensively involved in
White House policymaking through the NSC mechanim.
Alternatives. The structure we recommend, which places foreign
economic policy in a subcouncil designed to form an institutional
bridge between the mechanisms through which domestic and foreign
policy are made, is not the only system for which a strong case can
be made. We have considered two main alternatives. The first is repre-
sented by the current situation, in which foreign economic decision-
making is handled through a separate coordinating mechanism (the
Council on International Economic Policy, or the Economic Policy
Board), with the Domestic Council a third separate mechanism. The
second alternative was the creation of a single overall policy council,
either encompassing the full Cabinet or some sub-set of Cabinet officials
responsible for both foreign and domestic policy.
We conclude that the first alternative is practicable, especially if the
Secretary of the Treasury becomes a member of the National Security
Council and close coordination is developed between the Presidential
economic staff and the staff of the NSC. While the system is workable,
however, it does not seem to us nearly so desirable as the one we pro-
pose. Economic policy is now so central both to foreign and to domes-
tic policy that we believe it should not be considered separately. The
desires of Cabinet departments may indeed be to treat it separately, so
that the special perspectives of diplomacy or of military affairs on the
one hand, and of international trade and monetary issues on the other
are assured sympathetic forums of their own. But it is exactly the
problem of the Presidency to achieve coherence of policy through the
integration of these perspectives. The severity of that problem is
greatly eased if both kinds of policy issues are dealt with through
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linked mechanisms and with the help of an integrated Presidential
staff.
The second alternative, that of a Cabinet or an overall policy coun-
cil, is in theory more attractive. In practice, however, we believe it
would prove cumbersome and inefficient. There do remain issues?
of base rights in Spain, for example, or the utility of housing allow-
ances as an alternative to low income housing construction?which
may need resolution at the White House level but which are so dis-
tinctively "foreign" or "domestic" as to put an unnecessary burden on
those many members of the Cabinet, or even of an executive council
of the Cabinet, who would take no interest in them, and whose presence
might inhibit free discussion among those more directly involved.
Using the Machinery. The scope of jurisdiction accorded to the
foreign policy machinery at the Presidential level is one consideration;
the formality and regularity with which it is used are others. Recom-
mendations concerning these latter factors cannot be made with con-
fidence. The manner in which a President uses the machinery of the
White House must conform to his own preferences and style of deci-
sion. We do not seek to control Presidential style, but we offer some
observations about the alternatives.
Some Presidents may impart great regularity to the operation of the
White House foreign policy machinery, establishing formal commit-
tees of fixed membership with regular meetings and established agen-
das. Others may prefer less fixed ad hoc arrangements and dig deep
into the departments or the White House staff for substantive advice.
Both tendencies have advantages, and both have drawbacks.
The disadvantages of formality may be significant as foreign policy
problems increasingly cut across departmental lines and intersect with
domestic and political considerations. Formal mechanisms originally
well balanced and well conceived may become too narrow or rigid.
Informality presents the opposite disadvantages: extensive attention
may be accorded to some questions, while the consideration given
others may be inadequate or late. Ad hoc decision processes, moreover,
are likely to be less accessible than more formal ones; even when they
produce successful results they may fail to meet the needs of Cabinet
officials for regular channels of communication, clear opportunities
to state their positions, and timely and explicit guidance once decisions
are made.
There is obviously no perfect way to use the White House foreign
policy machinery. Whatever approach a President chooses should be
taken with attention to its weaknesses as well as its strengths, and
hedges against potential vulnerabilities should be established. Fixed
procedures must allow for some flexibility; ad hoc arrangements must
be placed in an overall framework which insures full coverage of all
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important issues, and allows the representation of all relevant
perspectives.
Another set of Presidential choices with important implications are
those concerning who should chair the various permanent and ad hoc
committees of the NSC. White House staff members bring a Presi-
dential perspective to the task, but in such roles may too easily acquire
line authority. Departmental officials as chairmen may feel obliged to
protect departmental positions and consequently have difficulty getting
agreement on decisions from other departments; their committees may
succumb to patchwork consensus of bad decisions which all members
can live with. But wherever departmental officials are of sufficient
breadth, their use as chairmen can signal the perspectives to which
the President wishes to give primacy, and it can also link decision-
making more closely to implementation. A President must weigh what
he hopes to accomplish with a given committee, and choose its head
and membership accordingly.
We have spoken of "machinery," but the mechanical reference should
not give a false impression. Policymaking is-not a branch of mechanics;
however wisely designed or carefully utilized, no machinery is ade-
quate to assure its results. The selective use of various mechanisms and
forums in ways which fit the particular issues, positions, and person-
alities involved is as much a part of the President's responsibility as
is the necessity, finally, to decide the substantive issues.
The Role of the Departments. Whether or not Departmental officials
are used to chair White House committees, they and their departments
must be drawn deeply into the formulation of policy at the Presidential
level, for many reasons. One is to avoid the bottleneck created when
unnecessarily large numbers of decisions are reserved for the President.
A second is to place a share of responsibility for the making of deci-
sions in the hands of those having the most relevant professional ex-
perience and the deepest technical understanding of the issues. A third,
as we have indicated above, is to put decisionmaking responsibilities,
as far as possible, in the hands of those who must take responsibility
for implementation.
Having made clear how important we believe strong departmental
performance in the conduct of foreign policy to be, we turn in the
following chapters to more detailed discussions of the special roles of
particular departments, and of the changes we believe are needed to
equip them to undertake those roles. In the course of these discussions,
numerous additional elements of White House organization are spelled
out. These include:
?the role of the Council of Economic Advisers, which we believe
needs more economic intelligence and planning capability, with
one member having explicit responsibility for international eco-
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nomic policy; and other interagency economics coordinating
machinery (Chapter 5) ;
?creation of a Council of International Planning to engage in
longer-term government-wide planning (Chapter 10) ;
?the role of a Science Advisory mechanism in managing interde-
partmental studies of questions of global resource and environ-
mental interdependence (Chapter 10) ;
?a revised role for the Office of Management and Budget in the
defense and foreign affairs budget processes (Chapters 6 and 11).
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CHAPTER 4
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
The President makes foreign policy. In the conduct of foreign af-
fairs, however, the central department of government is, and must
continue to be, the State Department. Only it has responsibilities across
the full range of official U.S. external relations.
In recent years some have asserted that the State Department, to
fulfill this central role, should direct and manage all foreign policy.
Organizational steps have been proposed to put such a proposition into
effect. For reasons discussed in Chapter 2 involving the wide range
and sensitivity of world problems, we do not believe any agency can
assume such authority for the resolution of foreign policy issues. The
State Department cannot be expected to direct the Defense Depart-
ment, or Treasury, or Agriculture, Commerce and the Energy Agency
on many of the issues on which it is engaged with them, simply because
foreign policy considerations are involved. But if the deepening and
necessary involvement of many other agencies in foreign policy makes
such central management by any one department impossible, it also
makes central coordination and leadership imperative. Below the
President only the State Department can perform these functions.
Foreign offices the world over fulfill three fundamental responsibili-
ties. First, they serve as the central locus of information about coun-
tries and conditions and events abroad; although assisted by intelli-
gence agencies and indeed by many other agencies, it is in the end the
foreign offices which marshall the information and form the judg-
ments on which the policies and actions toward other countries are
founded. Secondly, foreign offices have the principal role in formulat-
ing policies and recommending to heads of government courses of
action to govern the country's external relations; in so doing they work
with other parts of the government which have international interests
and responsibilities. And, thirdly, through embassies, posts and mis-
sions, and by dealing with foreign diplomats and international or-
ganizations, foreign offices maintain communication with other
countries.
In reviewing the organization of the government for the conduct of
foreign policy, the Commission has devoted particular attention to
the Department of State, and has sought to evaluate its performance
in the fulfillment of these basic functions. Many of our findings and
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recommendations are discussed in chapters of this report relating to
the various specialized aspects of foreign affairs?international eco-
nomic, national security, intelligence, etc.?where the State Depart-
ment has only a part, albeit an important part, of the action. In this
Chapter we abstract some of the recommendations from the more de-
tailed presentations which bear quite directly on the operation of the
Deparinent, and present others not elsewhere developed, in order
to provide an integrated view of what we believe to be the changes
necessary in the State Department to make it better able to meet the
changing conditions in the world around us. In so doing we propose
to discuss, first, the basic role we envisage from the Department and
the organizational changes which would seem to emerge from that
role; the Office of Congressional Relations and the role of the Deputy
Secretary; and, third, the adjustments .we believe necessary in the
overall management of the Department to achieve fuller effectiveness.
A final section of this Chapter summarizes the changes recommended
in the organization of the State Department with an organization
chart.
MAJOR ROLES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
The Information and Assessment Role. Research undertaken for the
Commission highlights many instances in the past where policymakers
have failed to understand why foreign governments were taking
certain actions, or to anticipate the impact of a U.S. action, and thus
have designed actions aimed at one objective which in fact triggered
contrary reactions by foreign governments. Limiting such mistakes
by having available the most reliable information and the most pro-
found understanding of foreign events, personalities and conditions
is a first order of importance. In earlier periods foreign policymakers
could rely on the relative strength of the U.S. to provide a comfortable
margin for error. Today, with the increasing interdependence of U.S.
security and economic interests with the interests of other countries,
policy choices must take more precise account of the impact of U.S.
actions on foreign governments.
In the future environments we have postulated for American foreign
policy, this core of information, understanding and judgment?this
foreign assessment?will be critical to policy choices. Major foreign
policy issues will involve domestic agencies, with their own sources of
information, and their own interests. But the State Department will
be in the best position to assess the impact of decisions and actions
abroad.
It will frequently be necessary for the State Department to argue
against a policy which may be attractive domestically (e.g. the sale
of agricultural products under certain conditions) because of the
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negative effects on national foreign policy and goals. This position
will not be easy or comfortable; it will be impossible to maintain unless
the Department is both correct in its assessments and aggressive in
arguing them.
We believe, therefore, as we discuss in Chapter 9, that far more than
ever before the State Department and the Foreign Service must be
equipped to fulfill this role of foreign assessment; that is, an under-
standing of why foreign governments take, or do not take, certain
actions; the anticipation of the actions foreign governments are likely
to take; and, in light of that understanding and anticipation, the
prediction of the impact actions will have and designing initiatives
or reactions accordingly. Foreign Service reporting is one component
of this core understanding, assessment and judgment.
The Commission believes that the assessment role will increasingly
become the major "comparative advantage" of the Department of
State. Other departments will have superior competence in specialized
tasks; other departments will be able to participate in direct negotia-
tions; other departments will have close and continuing contact with
their counterparts in other governments and international organiza-
tions. But no other department can provide the government with
detailed understanding and judgment of the dynamics of foreign
societies and governments and multilateral groupings and agencies.
The Secretary and his supporting staff must assure that the depart-
mental and foreign services fulfill this role and capitalize upon it in
maintaining a leadership position in the conduct of foreign policy.
The Policy Development Role. For all but the simplest issues, de-
veloping policy is a complex process. A wide mixture of individuals,
agencies, perspectives and goals are involved. Divergence is inevitable.
Conscious and persistent efforts at reconciliation are the norm, not the
exception. The Commission thus has devoted much effort to those
issues which involve many parts of the government, especially foreign
economic policy, global environmental and resource problems, defense
and arms control.
In each of these the State Department has an important role but
shares responsibility with other agencies and departments. The Depart-
ment's central place in the foreign affairs community requires it to
monitor, oversee, and influence foreign activities of other agencies if
consistent policy in all these areas is to be developed. Elsewhere in
this report the nature of these problems and specific recommendations
are set forth. Here, in looking at the organization of the Department
of State, we summarize those findings which relate to the role the
Department should play in the critical prcieeis of policy development.
On the matter of intenuttional economic policy, Chapter 5 explains
the complexities, and the interplay between the "foreign" and the
"economic" considerations. It highlights the complications which arise
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from the fact that responsibility for domestic economic policy is dis-
tributed among a great many departments and agencies. In that chap.
ter and in Chapter 12, the Commission makes recommendations for
developing the necessary expertise within the Department to permit
it to fulfill its mission, and it suggests what that mission should be;
notably, one of sharing the responsibilities with other agencies, and
a close participation and monitoring by the State Department in all
aspects relating to foreign relations.
The State Department has taken some steps to strengthen its eco-
nomic capability, but much more needs to be done. Traditionally the
Department and Foreign Service have tended to downgrade economic
matters in favor of political affairs and, compared to the domestic
agencies, there is a thinness of economic expertise. This imbalance has
been exacerbated by the normal political preoccupation of most Sec-
retaries of State. Geographic bureaus dominate the working level
activity of the Department and assignments in these bureaus are
widely seen as having higher career awards than employment in the
functional bureaus; for example, those dealing with economics or
with oceans, environment and scientific affairs. Thus recruitment suf-
fers and with it the ability to command the respect of other units of
the Department or other agencies.
This situation may be most critical for what we have called glObal
issues?those questions of global environmental and resource interde-
pendence such as, for example, weather modification or atmospheric
pollution, which are rapidly becoming of much greater importance.
The need to equip the Department of State better to deal with these
issues and to play a balancing role in foreign economic policy is pre-
sented extensively in other chapters. In particular the discussion and
recommendations on personnel highlights the need for improving the
quality of personnel in the economic? and scientific fields. But it is also
necessary to assure that interdependence and economic issues are more
completely integrated with each other and with the whole body of
foreign policy. For that reason we have recommended that the Under
Secretary for Economic Affairs should be broadened in scope to be
Under Secretary for Economic and Scientific Affairs. We are recom-
mending that the Under Secretary therefore be responsible for four
closely related bureaus:
(a) For International Economic and Business Affairs;
(b) For Energy, Transportation, and Communication Affairs;
( c) For Oceans, Environmental, and Scientific Affairs; and
(d) For Food, Population and Development Affairs.
The effect of this recommendation we hope will be to create a coher-
ent economic-scientific-technological complex within the Department
of State.
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In the area of national security, defense and arms control, some-
what parallel problems arise in interagency relations, in the organi-
zation of the Department and in the personnel competence to perform
the role effectively. The Department is more closely engaged in defense
and arms control issues, and has a more direct impact on the develop-
ment of policy in these areas.
Accordingly, the Commission is recommending in Chapter 6 that
the position of Under Secretary of State for Political and Security
Affairs be established as a successor to the existing positions of Under
Secretary for Political Affairs and Under Secretary for Security
Assistance so that a strong, institutionalized voice for these issues is
placed in the top command of the Department. This change would
provide a single, top level official with responsibility for political-
military affairs, would bring security assistance into its proper relation-
ship with the larger range of security issues, and would provide a
focal point for policy integration of political and defense matters.
The Commission also believes other steps are necessary in the defense
and arms control area. As in the case of economic and global interde-
pendence issues, personnel competences must be upgraded and recom-
mendations to this effect are set forth in the Personnel Chapter.
Similarly, the regional bureaus of the Department, charged with the
direct conduct of most bilateral relations, should improve their
political-military capabilities. Above all the Department of State must
provide its contribution and participate effectively in national security
policy as one aspect of its central responsibility for monitoring the
total U.S. foreign concerns; to do so such questions must receive con-
tinuous and competent attention.
Finally, on the question of public diplomacy?foreign cultural and
information programs?the Commission has concluded (Chapter 9)
that the function of advocacy of foreign policy, currently a part of
the responsibilities of the U.S. Information Agency as well as of the
State Department, can most effectively be carried out entirely in the
Department of State. It recommends that all programs which 'articu-
late and explain foreign policy should be combined in a new State
Department Office of Policy Information. The other major change
recommended in 'Chapter 9 affecting the Department of State in this
field calls for the transfer of functions currently carried out by the
Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs to a new Information and
Cultural Affairs Agency (ICA) along with the bulk of USIA.
To summarize, then, in order to serve the policy development role of
the Department of State, the Commission has found the need to estab-
lish two major functional arms at the top level of Under Secretary?
one for Political and Security Affairs and the other for Economic and
Scientific Affairs. In addition, a high level office should be established
to deal with the public diplomacy responsibilities of the Department.
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The Conduct of Relations. However satisfactory policy decisions
may be, and however good the assessments upon which they are based,
desired outcomes are dependent upon turning decisions into actions.
Thus the third primary role of the Department of State?historically
a central responsibility?is the actual conduct of relations with other
governments and the representation of the United States in interna-
tional organizations. These tasks?the essence of diplomacy?will con-
tinue to be the primary responsibility of the Department's geographic
and functional bureaus in Washington, which must assure that rela-
tions are expertly conducted through embassies, missions and posts
abroad. Recommendations relating to this matter are presented in
Chapter 9.
The geographic bureaus of the Department are designed to be focal
points in Washington for all U.S. official activity relating to individual
foreign countries and regions. These bureaus cannot formulate policy
in isolation, since they must take into account both the perspectives
of the functional portions of the Department of State and of other
agencies and departments. But just as the Department as a whole must
have substantive expertise even in those areas where more specialized
agencies are the major actors, the geographic bureaus cannot be totally
dependent upon the functional bureaus. Economic issues, for example,
look different from the perspective of economic officers in a regional
bureau than from the viewpoint of economic officers in the Bureau of
Economic and Business Affairs. The same is true for other specialties.
The geographic bureaus, therefore, must have the ability to link re-
gional and substantive concerns, to translate broad policy in func-
tional areas to regional applications. For this reason, we believe that
as a general rule, Deputy Assistant Secretaries in the regional bureaus,
rather than heading up one division of the geographic area of the
bureau, should have functional responsibilities for the entire bureau.
The former pattern has the effect of under-emphasizing functional
considerations at a time when the geographic bureaus must take a
broader perspective if they are to be effective. Such functional respon-
sibilities of Deputy Assistant Secretaries in regional Bureaus, more-
over, can coincide with responsibilities of the functional Under
Secretaries.
CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS AND THE ROLE OF THE DEPUTY
SECRETARY
The foregoing discussion outlines the changing role of the Depart-
ment of State and emphasizes the adjustments needed to meet the
specific responsibilities centered in the Department?the information
and assessment role, the policy development role, and the conduct of
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relations. The fulfillment of these responsibilities depends also on a
number of other aspects of organization within the Department. Thus
we have made extensive recommendations on the personnel structure
for foreign affairs in Chapter 12, fully aware that the capability and
performance of people is at the heart of effective operation. The budget
and its place in coordination among departments is taken up in Chapter
11, especially the need for improved processes in marshalling resources
to foreign policy objectives. In Chapter 9 on the Practice of Diplom-
acy, we heave discussed the important part played by the country
directors.
Before turning to the key question of managing the Department of
State, we want to make brief comments on two offices and functions:
the Office of Congressional Relations and the Deputy Secretary.
An especially important staff function is the support of the Secretary
and Department in relationships with the Congress. The Commission
is aware that many advocate that the Office for Congressional Rela-
tions (H) be expanded and upgraded to insure more responsiveness
to, and improved consultation with, the Congress. We have no quarrel
with this idea, but we believe effective Congressional relations must be
the responsibility not only of the Secretary and of this office of Con-
gressional Relations, but of all the principal officials of the Depart-
ment, down through at least the deputy assistant secretary levels. Thus
the Office of Congressional Relations should not act as a buffer between
officials of the Department and Members of Congress or Congressional
committees; rather, it should facilitate an increasing range and depth
of such contacts.
The importance of the position of the Deputy Secretary cannot be
overemphasized. The Commission, as other commissions before it, has
been impressed with the difficult, multiple role which the Secretary
must fill. He is the personal adviser to the President on foreign policy.
He is the official voice of the United States in dealing with other
nations?to an extent that his personal presence or absence at a meet-
ing or a social function becomes itself a factor in foreign policy. He
must represent the executive branch to the Congress in all aspects of
foreign affairs where responsibility is shared. In many of these activi-
ties he cannot be substituted. But then, in addition and not least, he
must manage one of the most complex organizations of government:
The Department of State.
Clearly the Secretary needs a Deputy in whom he can put the great-
est reliance. However, this relationship?Deputy and principal?diffi-
cult in any organization, is especially sensitive with the Secretary of
State for the very reason that he can pass to his Deputy only a limited
number of his responsibilities. The Deputy cannot be an alter ego in the
usual pattern. It makes it all the more important, therefore, that the
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Secretary delegate as much as possible of the management of the
Department. At a minimum the Deputy should be able to integrate
the multiple geographic, functional and staff offices of which the
Department is comprised. He should also be able to assist the Secretary
in marshalling the personnel and administrative support elements?
the resources of the Department?to the basic policy purposes.
OVERALL MANAGEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Traditionally the State Department, and particularly the Foreign
Service, has accorded little attention to management. Indeed there is
a general antipathy towards the very idea of management. We believe
that in large measure this arises from a significant misunderstanding
of what management really is.
Management is not housekeeping. Management is not even adminis-
tration, although both administration and housekeeping are impor-
tant aids to management. Management is direction and control. It
follows that, only the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary can manage
the Department in the sense of pulling together all the substantive
policy effort and the personnel and administrative support into a single
effective whole. Only they are in a position to do so. The Under
Secretaries and the Deputy Under Secretary "for Management" man-
age their own areas of responsibility, just as each Assistant Secretary
manages his Bureau, and each Ambassador manages his Embassy. For
the Department as a whole, the Under Secretaries have responsibility
for the policies and activities falling within their functional areas, and
they assist the Secretary and Deputy Secretary by directing such poli-
cies and activities in all bureaus.
This concept of the nature of management has two important impli-
cations for the Department. In the first place, the Secretary and the
Deputy cannot delegate the management of the Department as a whole.
They can delegate authority to supervise functions and activities, but
the control and direction of the entire Department remains with them.
If personnel and budgets and communications are to be marshalled
in support of policy in a single strong effort, only the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary can bring it about. Their personal involvement in
these maters makes the difference between a strong and a weak
Department.
In the second place, this concept of management underlies recom-
mendations we have made in the Personnel section of the report;
notably those concerning the training and experience Foreign Service
Officers and other government officials must receive in the practice of
management?direction and control?if they are to fulfill their respon-
sibilities when they are called upon to run an Embassy or a Bureau
in the Department. In the Personnel Chapter we have recommended
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quite specific steps that must be taken to improve the management of
Departmental divisions, and posts and missions abroad.
To assist the Secretary in the management of the Department we
have made a number of specific suggestions relating to the several func-
tions discussed in this report. Here we would only make a few recom-
mendations which relate first, to the so-called management side of the
Department and second, to the responsibilities of some of its senior
officials.
With respect to the Deputy Under Secretary for Management we
believe, that it is important, once having removed the notion rather
widely held that he manages the Department, to recognize that he does
play a critical role in marshalling the supporting services for the Secre-
tary in the Secretary's management of the Department. We recom-
mend that:
The position of Deputy Under Secretary for Management be ele-
vated to Under Secretary.
In this new post the Under Secretary for Management should insure
that organization, internal processes, and resources are well matched
with the requirements of policy and operating activities.
One important reason for raising the level of this position to Under
Secretary arises from the heavy responsibilities we would assign to him
for directing the proposed Foreign Affairs Executive Service as de-
tailed in Chapter12. The Commission attaches great importance to this
new personnel concept for selecting and assigning the foreign affairs
leadership of the future across departmental lines.
To assist the Secretary and the Under Secretary for Management in
assessing both the Department's performance as an organization, and
the effectiveness of field posts and missions in conducting our foreign
relations, the Commission is recommending in Chapter 9 that the
Office of the Inspector General of the Foreign Service, with representa-
tives of other agencies, be given a mandate to inspect the overseas
activities of the other agencies associated with embassies and consulates
in addition to those of the Department of State.
On a related matter, we believe that the expanded responsibilities
of the Inspector General for Foreign Affairs, the proposed creation of
an Assistant Secretary of State for Food, Population and Develop-
ment Affairs, the work of the new Congressional Budget Office, and
the expanded capabilities of the General Accounting Office, together
provide adequate inspection capability for foreign assistance pro-
grams. The Commission thus recommends that:
The Office of the Inspector General of Foreign Assistance be abol-
ished, and its analytic functions be transferred to the proposed
Assistant Secretary for Food, Population and Development Affairs.
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The Inspector General for Foreign Affairs should include close
field scrutiny of foreign assistance programs in the course of "conduct
of relations" inspections.
A major and continuing problem of the Department of State has
been the ambiguous relationships and jurisdictions among its senior
officials. Currently the Department has eight individuals below the
Secretary and Deputy Secretary and above the Assistant Secretary
level: three Under Secretaries, a Deputy Under Secretary, a Counselor
and three Ambassadors-at-Large. The roles of none of these
officials can be considered clear-cut. The Commission therefore would
press for the establishment of the following general principle:
Under Secretary positions should be reserved for supervisory
officers halving responsibility for specific portions of the Depart-
ment's work; for example, Political and Security Affairs, Economic
and Scientific Affairs, and Management. Under SecretteriPs are
senior officers by virtue of their direct management responsibilities
for subordinate bureaus and their responsibility for regional bureau
activities in their assigned functional areas. These positions should
not normally be used for "ad hoc trouble shooters" or "roving
ambassadors."
Clearly the Secretary will wish to assign to a single individual
responsibility for special new and important problems, for conduct of
important negotiations, or for overseeing develping situations. Flexi-
bility of structure is essential to meet these very real and difficult
needs. Normally, however, we do not believe that the positions and
titles of Under Secretary should be used for these purposes. Instead,
the Commission recommends that:
The positions of Counselor of the Department and Ambassadors-
at-Large should be used for the special assignments requiring senior
attention, under the direction of the Secretary. The Counselor
should remain, a permanent position, while Ambassadors-at-Large
should be appointed for shorter periods of time and specific projects.
SUMMARY OF CHANGES PROPOSED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
The major organizational changes proposed throughout this report
which pertain to the Department of State can be seen by comparing
Table 1, Current Departmental Structure, with Table 2, Proposed
Structure. These changes are as follows:
(1) The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs would be-
come the Under Secretary of State for Political and Security Affairs;
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the position of Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance would
be abolished.
(2) The responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Economic Af-
fairs would be broadened to make this official the Under Secretary
for Economic and Scientific Affairs.
(3) Responsibilities at the functional bureau level, currently di-
vided between the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs and the
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs, would be expanded to form four bureaus:
?Economic and Business Affairs.
?Food, Population and Development Affairs.
?Oceans, Environment and Scientific Affairs.
?Transportation, Communication and Energy Affairs.
(4) A new Senior Officer for Policy Information would direct the
press, public affairs and policy information functions currently in
the Department and those which would be added to the Department
from the U.S. Information Agency.
(5) The Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs would ?be
transferred to the proposed Information and Cultural Affairs Agency
(ICA).
(6) The current Deputy Under Secretary for Management would
be upgraded to full Under Secretary status.
(7) The Bureau of International Organization Affairs would be
reconstituted as a Bureau of United Nations Affairs, with its current
functional activities transferred to new bureaus outlined under item 3
above (see Chapter 9).
(8) A Special Assistant to the Secretary. for Humanitarian and
Human Rights Affairs would be created (see Chapter 8).
(9) The Office of the Inspector General for Foreign Assistance
would be abolished.
(10) The Foreign Service Institute, to reflect its new responsibilities
(Chapter 12) would be renamed the Foreign Affairs Institute.
In terms of numbers, these proposals leave the top command of
the State Department at the same level as previously: one Under
Secretary position would be abolished, one deputy Under Secretary
would be raised to Under Secretary. At the bureau level, one bureau
would be transferred to another agency and two additional bureaus
would be divided out of existing bureaus. There would be a net increase
of one bureau and one senior officer, but of relatively little additional
staff. In addition, one office?that of Inspector General for Foreign
Assistance?would be abolished.
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Executive
Secretariat
IS/U)
Educational
and
Cultural Affairs
(CU)
Arms Control
and
Disarmament Agency
(ACDA)
TABLE 1.?Department of State as currently organized
DEPARTMENT OF STATE AS CURRENTLY ORGANIZED
Secretary of State
(S)
Deputy Secretary of State
(D)
Agency For
International
Development
(AID)
Under Secretary
For
Political Affairs
(P)
Press
Relations
(S/PRS)
Economic
and
Business Affairs
(EB)
Under Secretary
For
Security Assistance
(T)
Policy Planning
Staff
(S/P)
Oceans and
International
Environmental and
Scientific Affairs
(UES)
Counselor
(C)
Protocol
(S/CPR)
Under Secretary
For
Economic Affairs
(E)
Legal Adviser
(L)
Congressional
Relations
(M)
Deputy
Under Secretary
For Management
(M)
Inspector General
Foreign Assistance
Inspector General
Foreign Service
(S/1G)
Direct? General
Foreign Service
Intelligence
and
Research
(1NR)
Politico Military
Affairs
(PM)
Public
Affairs
(PA)
Security
and
Consular Affairs
(SCA)
African
Affairs
(AF)
European
Affairs
(EU B)
East Asian
And
Pacific Affairs
(EA)
InteriAmerican I
Affairs
(ARA)
Near Eastern
And
South Asian Affairs
(NEA)
DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND DELEGATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
sepaiate agency with the director reporting ditectly to the Secretaty and serving as printirial adv et
to the Secretary and the President on Arms Control and Disarmament.
Ad m in istration
Foreign Service
Institute
International
Organization
Affairs
(10)
TABLE 2.?Department of State as proposed
DEPARTMENT OF STATE AS PROPOSED
SECRETARY OF STATE
COUNSELOR
AMBASSADORS
AT LARGE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
HRRA
S/S
? ? ?
? ?
UNDER SEC
POLITICAL
AND
SECURITY
ACDA
POLICY
INFO
ICA
POLITICO
MILITARY
AFFAIRS
UN
AFFAIRS
VOA
S/IG
PLANNING
S/P
UNDER SEC
MANAGEMENT
ADM PERSONNEL
SCA
FAI
INTELLIGENCE
INR
UNDER SEC
ECONOM ICS
AND
SCIENCE
CONGRESSIONAL
LEGAL
PROTOCOL
AID
ECONOMICS
AND
BUSINESS
AFRICAN
AFFAIRS
EUROPEAN
AFFAIRS
EAST ASIAN
AND
PACIFIC
AFFAIRS
INTER-AM.
AFFAIRS
NEAR EASTERN
AND
SO. ASIAN AFF.
DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND DELEGATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
INTERNATIONAL
ENERGY,
TRANSPORTATION
AND
COMMUNICATION
OES
FOOD,
POPULATION
AND
DEVELOPMENT
ACDA
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
OES
Oceans, Environment & Science
INR
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
ADM
Bureau of Administration
SCA
Bureau of Security and Consular
S/IG
Inspector General for Foreign Affairs
AID
Agency for International Development
Affairs
S/P
Policy Planning Staff
FAI
Foreign Affairs Institute
HRRA
Special Assistant for Humanitarian and
S/S
Executive Secretariat
ICA
Information and Cultural Affairs Agency
Human Rights Affairs
VOA
Voice of America
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THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY
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CHAPTER 5
ORGANIZATION FOR INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC POLICY
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
International Economic Policy is concerned with the wide variety of
interactions between the economy of the United States and the econo-
mies of other nations?trade and investment, resource requirements,
monetary exchanges and financial flows, travel and transport, foreign
assistance programs and the workings of international businesses, to
name the more important ones. The issues arising from our interna-
tional economic life are becoming more complicated as well as more
interdependent. They will require a fresh and greater emphasis in both
our domestic and foreign policymaking processes.
This is partly a matter of sheer quantity. The volume of interna-
tional economic transactions has grown at unprecedented rates over
the past decade and more, substantially faster than the growth of
domestic economies. And this integration of the world economy is
likely to continue, for it is fostered by such fundamental forces as
the growing ease of communication, the speed of transportation, the
urge for higher living standards, and the vast accumulation and
spread of knowledge.
As international economic relationships increase, so do interdepend-
encies. Mutual 'benefits will normally flow from these interdependen-
cies, as trade provides cheaper sources of goods and broader markets
for national products, and as financial flows supply needed capital for
some and investment outlets for others. But interdependence also can
become uncomfortable. Sources of critical materials may prove vul-
nerable to economic or political forces. Business and labor interests
may have difficulty adjusting to changes in the flow of international
trade. As governments have accepted responsibility for meeting pub-
lic expectations for higher standards of living, and for more satis-
factory distributions of income, these dependencies become crucial. In
an age of interdependence, no government can fulfill its commitments
to its own people except through cooperative arrangements for foreign
governments and overseas economies. At the same time, the U.S. gov-
ernment should seek to encourage an international climate conducive to
the play of market philosophy which prevails at home.
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One further aspect of foreign economic policy needs emphasis. This
country can no longer play the dominant role it did in establishing
and maintaining the framework of the economic system of the Western
World after World War II. Economic power?and with it economic
responsibility?is now far more widely diffused. Nonetheless, the
United States is still the leading national economy; the size and power
of our economic system make it essential that, in conducting our for-
eign policies, we understand the implications of particular actions?
the degree to which what we do will affect the whole of the interna-
tional monetary, trading, and investment systems. That understand-
ing is critical because the condition of the international economic
system will in turn affect the economic health and stability of our
political and security relationships with others, as well as our own
economic health. Consequently, coherent policy for the United States?
even more than for other countries will continue to require a long
view of our interests in international economic order, a clear under-
standing of the order we would like to see evolve, and an understand-
ing of the relation between our economic, political and security
objectives.
The implications of these facts are plain. Foreign economic policy
looms large in the concerns of both foreign policy and domestic. In
specific instances, a particular economic interest may need to be subor-
dinated to?or blended with?strategic, security, or diplomatic con-
siderations. In other instances, it may properly dominate, perhaps
reflecting crucial domestic priorities. But the fact that these con-
siderations are linked?that political or foreign considerations cannot
exist in watertight compartments separated from economic or domes-
tic interests?is now clear. Such recent developments as the effect of
U.S. balance of payments drains and the depreciating dollar on our
security and political relations, or the impact of Middle East politics
on our en? rgy supply make the point plainly.
The sit ition is further complicated by the fact that although a
number of iterests, constituencies, agencies, and Congressional corn-
inittees part ;pate in the making of foreign economic policy, foreign
economic 2clicy has et been the central concern of an important con-
stituency, line agency or Congressional committee; each is focused
mainly on either foreign political and security concerns on the one
hand, or domestic economic concerns on the other.
Conflicts and competition among a variety of groups in setting pol-
icy are healthy and necessary in a democracy. We do not want to iso-
late foreign economic policy from the mainstreams of foreign or do-
mestic policy. Yet, we do want it to have coherence and design. It is
against this background that we approach the organizational question.
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THE ROLE AND OBJECTIVES OF ORGANIZATION
The processes of policy analysis, formulation, and implementation
take on various colorations depending upon whether the problem is
first perceived and policy options first considered, and on which other
interests are then brought to bear on those options. It is easy to imagine,
for instance, that a decision originating in the Department of Agricul-
ture affecting world food supplies and costs might differ sharply from
decisions on the same issues originating in the Department of State.
The point is not that one decision is likely to be better than the other,
but that both will be inadequate unless they reflect the full range of
relevant concerns?those of the American farmer, consumer, taxpayer,
and of U.S. foreign policy priorities.
The problem is not confined to executive departments, for many
decisions affecting foreign economic policy?often important in them-
selves but of peripheral concern in the context of a larger piece of
domestic legislation?may take on the coloration of a particular Con-
gressional committee.
A simple call for coordination is not enough to deal with this prob-
lem. Content must be poured into that word, particularly to ensure
that foreign economic policy gets the increased awareness and attention
it requires. In formulating its recommendations, the Commission pro-
poses a mixture of more or less fixed organizational structure and
flexible processes designed to:
(1) Encourage a consistent general framework in foreign economic
policy responsive to and integrated with vital considerations of domes-
tic and foreign policy. Foreign economic policy, in short, must bridge
foreign and domestic policy. No organizational structure or simple set
of general principles can by itself assure consistency in the treatment
of a multitude of policy issues. But they can help make sure that the
relevant questions are asked, a variety of perspectives are brought to
bear, longer-term considerations are not submerged in the urgency of
the day, and that policies are more clearly articulated, to our citizens
and to foreign governments.
(2) Permit and even encourage a broad sharing of authority and
responsibility for the formulation of policy, while providing protec-
tion against narrow and isolated views becoming dominant. In our
complex society, many parishes have a right to be heard. They need
clear access to and participation in the decision-making process. But
decision-making should not be merely a tug-of-war among competing
interests. A variety of organizational means?encompassing personnel
policies, Departmental structure, the choice of Cabinet officers, flexible
use of committees, and Presidential articulation of a set of guiding
principles?must be introduced to check excessive parochialism and
encourage a broader perspective in approaching foreign economic
policy.
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(3) Encourage greater foresight in perceiving, analyzing and
attacking problems at an early stage. The human capacity to foresee
the future is uncertain and limited. But for problems to be neglected
because they fall through the cracks of established jurisdictions, or
because no analytic capacity has been brought to bear, is inexcusable.
For this reason the Commission has given particular attention to
strengthening the ongoing mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating,
and for bringing to policymaking levels the significant developments
affecting our foreign economic policy in a fast-moving world.
(4) Provide adequate assurance that, once decisions are made, they
are followed up and implemented in the spirit intended. Again, the
Commission has put special emphasis on the need for strengthening
our capacity to follow through on decisions taken, and to evaluate their
results over time.
Fashioning organizational structures and processes to meet these
objectives is not easy, even in theory. We recognize that the relative
advantages and disadvantages of specific proposals can be subject to
endless debate, that others might reach different conclusions on some
of the specifics, and that any President or agency head will want to
retain flexibility to match organization to men and circumstances. For
all these reasons, we have tried to balance organizational blueprints
with flexible processes. We recognize that our objectives in recom-
mending both may be met by alternative means, which under certain
circumstances may be even more appropriate.
Finally, we have eschewed change for the sake of change. The pres-
ent basic structure, while not ideal, has much to commend it.
ORGANIZATION AT THE "TOP"
Assisting and Advising the President. Only the President is in a
position to integrate international economic policy with foreign and
domestic policies, and to provide the required focus and stimulus for
decision and action. He must direct the formulation of international
economic policy?just as he does domestic economic or foreign pol-
icy?and its increasing importance will demand his increasing
awareness.
He will need help in dealing with international economic problems
to assure that necessary issues come to him for decision and unneces-
sary ones do not; that issues for decision have been fully staffed and
relevant viewpoints presented; that newer and emerging problems are
given appropriate attention; and that issues are dealt with in timely
fashion.
In light of these and other needs, we propose three organizational
measures:
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(1) A senior Assistant to the President should be charged with
the central -White House staff function in economic policy, both
domestic and foreign. Having direct personal access to the President
and strong qualifications drawn from economic and/or business
experience, this Assistant should participate or be represented in all
relevant meetings of the National Security Council and of domestic
policymaking bodies (such as the Domestic Council, the Troika or
Economic Policy Board). He would be the Executive Secretary and
Director of staff of the proposed joint Subcouncil on International
Economic Policy.
He should have no operational or representational responsibilities
that would undermine his ability to work closely with?and not com-
pete with?cabinet officials. His function is a delicate one: to facilitate,
on occasion to prod, to think innovatively, to translate technical debate
into lay language, to observe the way Presidential decisions are acted
upon and to bring deficiencies to his attention, thus helping to monitor
the implementation of policy. In the perspective of the President, he
will need to make sure that in domestic councils, foreign policy con-
cerns have been brought to bear, and in foreign policy decisions domes-
tic economic implications are not forgotten. But we do not contemplate
he will assume a public posture?become a Presidential "spokesman"
and an independent bureaucratic force, usurping the duties of the
responsible line officials. In line with this conception, occupants of the
position should not be subject to confirmation by the Senate. His im-
mediate staff should be small.
(2) The President should appoint, and have mailable to him for
advice, a senior and representative group of people drawn from the
private sector who are well equipped by training and experience to
assist in formulating foreign economic policy in the national in-
terest?an International Economic Policy Advisory Board. The
Board would be provided a small secretariat to help prepare meet-
ings, disseminate information and focus discussion on relevant issues.
It would meet at least quarterly to review issues raised at its own
initiative or by the government. The Board should have direct access
to the President, and the President should himself take the initiative
to meet with it from time to time. The Board should have wide lati-
tude to set up ad hoc groups, commission studies and otherwise equip
it to carry out its functions. It should replace most, if not all existing
advisory groups dealing with aspects of international economic
policy.
There are several precedents for this kind of advisory board?for
instance, in the areas of intelligence and disarmament. Such boards
can prove particularly useful when responsibility for policy is shared
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by several agencies, and where the policy itself poses difficult or sensi-
tive problems. We believe that a board to advise the President on for-
eign economic policy is particularly appropriate since the matters it
involves cut across much of the fabric of our private economic life.
The President should therefore have direct exposure to thinking out-
side of official channels, and conversely the ability to generate broader
public understanding and support of policy positions.
In addition, the Commission believes that the nation's ability to deal
with its foreign economic problems would be substantially enhanced
if the President and his advisers had available an independent study
group dedicated to identifying and analyzing longer-term develop-
ments in this area and investigating their significance for policymak-
ing. We are impressed by the difficulty any operating agency experi-
ences in undertaking such research, given the pull of its immediate
responsibilities.
(3) In order to provide a focus for objective study of longer term
international economic problems and a more effective early 'warning
system for identifying the major related policy issues on the horizon,
we believe an independent study group on international economic
issues should be created tender the auspices of the Council of
Economic Advisors.
The proposed study group, comprised of a limited number of senior
specialists, should have the broadest possible mandate as to areas of
study, drawing upon the expertise of relevant agencies to augment its
own resources. It should work closely with the various departments
to improve methodologies, cross-check its data, and assure that research
findings are broadly shared. Its particular focus, however, should be
on issues of longer-range importance to the White House, for example,
the problem of this country's having to deal with the increasing num-
ber of economies that are centrally controlled or planned. The group
should not be involved in current policy decisions or operations; neither
should it have coordinating responsibilities for the research activities
of the departments.
Interfacing of the Departments. Under the President the major re-
sponsibility for initiating, formulating and implementing policy
should lie with the major departments. We are convinced that delega-
tion of large authority to a White House staff?with its implied
corollary of a sizable staff?will erode the competence, authority and
thus inevitably the quality of the Departmental executives and their
staffs. Yet if his policy is to be successful, the President needs effective
Cabinet officers, and highly competent Departmental bureaucracies.
The President also will need to work closely with the Congress--and
substantive interplay with the Congress on the mass of policy issues
must perforce fall to Cabinet officers and their principal assistants
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under Presidential policy guidance. The competence and initiative of
departmental officers can be maintained only by their full participa-
tion in policy formation.
The Commission is persuaded that in this area, the simplicity
of a single centralized structure must be avoided. If foreign
economic policy were simply an arm of foreign or of domestic eco-
nomic policy, its management could be entrusted to a single depart-
ment. However, since we believe that foreign economic policy cannot
be considered the exclusive concern of any single executive depart-
ment or Congressional committee, but must reflect the interplay
between foreign and economic policy considerations, neither pattern
is suitable. That conclusion is reinforced by the consideration that
responsibility for domestic economic policy is not centralized in the
U.S., but is dispersed among a number of departments and agencies.
Thus, the answer must be sought in effective relationships among
State, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, the Energy Agency and the
other Departments having domestic economic responsibilities, with
each bringing its own strengths to the process of policy formation.
The State Department's principal task is obviously the formulation
and conduct of foreign policy, encompassing the full range of our
relations with other nations. In this context it must follow closely
and influence trends abroad?making sure that the President and
his advisors are aware of the probable consequences of our decisions
before they are made rather than afterwards. State, through the For-
eign Service, also must bear the brunt of official activities and rep-
resentation abroad. These central responsibilities are large ones; they
encompass economic as well as political and security matters, but
the orientation is inevitably outward and generalist.
Observers have commented again and again on the systematically
lower professional regard accorded economists in the Department,
the relative thinness of their economic expertise in various special-
ties; the built-in incentives for generalists; and the political preoccu-
pation of the Secretaries. We know that State has taken some steps to
strengthen its economic capability?the greatly improved economic
instruction offered by the Foreign Service Institute, for example?but
much more needs to be done. We make recommendations below. But
these are not designed to place the Department in a dominant posi-
tion with respect to foreign economic policy formation. To discharge
that role would require the Department to become so entwined with
the warp and woof of domestic economic policy as to jeopardize its
primary mission, and would cloud the interaction which characterizes
foreign economic policy.
Looking at the domestic side, there is, as we have said, no single
agency responsible for economic policy. Treasury has recently as-
sumed a more general role than other operating departments, but this
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has resulted in part from combinations of personalities, circumstances
and resource availabilities which may not continue naturally. None-
theless, because of its traditional concerns with international monetary
affairs, taxation, and some specialized aspects of trade, Treasury is
intimately concerned with the interface of domestic and interna-
tional economics. Commerce also has broad concerns affecting for-
eign economic policy?trade, investment and tourism, for example?
although it has been less successful than Treasury in expanding its
influence. Agriculture has a more limited involvement, but an impor-
tant one.
It is these departments?Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture?
in close contact with domestic economic interests and the principal
government decision-makers which must share with each other and
with State responsibility for foreign economic policy. When they fail
to reconcile positions, it will be by definition an issue worthy of Presi-
dential decision.
Of course, these four are not the only voices to be heard?almost
no important department or agency fails to touch upon issues of
foreign economic policy. Their top men should have access to the
President as well, when they deem critical points are at stake. Organi-
zational mechanisms need to recognize that reality too.
There is need for a mechanism to address foreign economic policy
in a sustained way and to facilitate the processes necessary to bring
together the domestic economic and foreign policy considerations that
must make up the analysis, debate, formulation and implementation of
foreign economic policy. For this purpose, we recommend that:
The President should establish a joint subcouncil of the NSC
and the Domestic Council and the Economic Policy Board (or what-
ever White House organizations should come to perform their
functions). Members of this body, the Sub council on International
Economic Policy, would be the Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs, the Under Secretary of Treasury for Monetary
Affairs, the Under Secretaries of Commerce and Agriculture and
the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. Other sub-
cabinet officers and agency heads would attend Sub council meetings
as full members with respect to questions impinging signiftantly
on their responsibilities.
Designation of a Chairman should be left to the President. How-
ever, we anticipate that normally the Sub council would be chaired
by the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. The Assist-
ant to the President for Economic Policy would serve as Executive
Secretary of the Subcouncil and Director of its staff. The staff would
be drawn in part from the staffs of its parent bodies but would func-
tion as the Assistant to the President's own staff.
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The Subcouncil could create such committees or task forces as the
President may deem necessary to assure adequate interagency atten-
tion to continuing issues of international econornic policy and to
special problems. The regular members of the Subcowncil normally
would be represented on each such group, as would the staff of the
Assistant to the President.
The CIEP should be abolished by Congress, and its staff should
be used to strengthen the economic capability of the NSC and
White House Domestic Council. Other interagency international
economic policy bodies would be brought under the Subcouncil
framework.
In recommending this arrangement, the Commission considered
carefully the merits of building this link between foreign and domestic
economic policy at the full Cabinet level, especially since we recog-
nize that Cabinet members must give more attention to matters of
foreign economic policy. However, because the broad responsibilities
of Cabinet members will not always permit them to devote sustained
attention to foreign economic policy, and because our research indi-
cated that the bulk of foreign economic policy issues fall at the sub-
Cabinet level, the organizational pattern recommended seems most
appropriate and consistent with these major needs.
In expressing our preference for Subcouncil Chairman, we recognize
that good arguments also exist for other choices, and have, therefore,
left that decision to the President. Our preference for the Under
Secretary of State as the most likely choice reflects a number of con-
siderations. First, he is the most senior U.S. Government official
concerned solely with foreign economic policy. Second, while State
may not always be the lead agency in c ,-ery foreign economic policy
issue, it will be so in many, and it will be one of the principal actors
in all foreign economic policy issues. Third, State?alone among
Departments?has in the Foreign Service and its posts and missions,
the capability to provide the bulk of the foreign inputs that feed the
decision-making process and to carry out decisions reached, all on a
sustained basis. Fourth, in the formulation, negotiation and imple-
mentation of policy, only State has the capacity to relate a particular
policy or issue to all other aspects of our relationship with a foreign
country.
The Commission considered the possible channels through which
recommendations ( or disagreements) of the Subcouncil might go to the
President and concluded that even though it may seem untidy, the
most practicable arrangement was to leave open various channels.
Accordingly, issues might proceed up to the President through either
parent council. Other issues could be taken directly by the Assistant to
the President. But formal requests for a Presidential decision should
proceed to the President through one of the parent bodies.
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In order to facilitate the development of policy with a Presidential
perspective in which the diverse strands are brought into a consistent
and intelligible framework and rationale, and a more orderly and
coherent examination of the issues by the Congress and the public, we
recommend:
Maintaining the practice of submitting to Congress an annual
Report of the President on International Economic Policy. This
report should be prepared in conjunction with the State of the
World Report recommended in Chapter 10 and should be sub-
mitted as part of that Report.
The President's Assistant for Economic Policy might assume coordi-
nating responsibility for preparing this report.
STRENGTHENING THE DEPARTMENTS
In recent years most executive departments (especially Treasury and
State) have strengthened their capacities in the area of foreign eco-
nomic policy. We believe that this effort should be continued but with
some important shifts of emphasis.
With respect to Treasury we do not favor, as has been suggested,
efforts to split responsibilities of the most senior Treasury officials?
at the Deputy and Under Secretary level?between domestic and inter-
national concerns. Certain of those officials?particularly the Under
Secretary for Monetary Affairs?may increasingly find the balance
of their work weighted toward the international side. But relieving
them of their domestic responsibilities, or removing other officials of
similar rank from responsibility for foreign problems, would be dam-
aging to that understanding of intimate interactions between the two
which we seek to reinforce.
In the case of the State Department, a number of needs exist. To
better equip State to play a balancing role in foreign economic policy,
and to assure its closer integration with the whole body of foreign
policy, changes should be made to assure on a continuing basis a strong
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, experienced in dealing
with business and economic problems and able to command adequate
resources to support his activities.
In emphasizing the crucial nature of the Under Secretary's position,
we do not intend to diminish the importance of having the Secretary
himself play a greater role in foreign economic or scientific policy.
In fact, we believe that events will leave him no alternative. On the
other hand, we know that the Secretary will often find it impossible to
devote large amounts of his time to these matters. Effective delegation
to the proposed Under Secretary for Economic and Scientific Affairs
will thus require an incumbent with enough stature in the Department
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and in the eyes of the President and other Cabinet officers, to permit
him to act as the alter ego of the Secretary in this area.
The traditional preoccupation of the State Department with politi-
cal matters has impeded the Department's effective participation not
only in such main line foreign economic matters as trade, aid and
investment, but also in the more novel but increasingly important
questions of global environmental and resource interdependence.
Concerning such issues as world population, weather modification,
ozone depletion, governance of ocean uses and resources, it is essential,
we believe, to improve the Department's capacity to conform in partic-
ular U.S. positions to the larger purposes of American foreign
policy. The reorganization of 1975, instituting a Bureau of Oceans
and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES), rep-
resented a step in the right direction. A remaining weakness in the
current organization of the State Department, however, derives from
the lack of integration between units dealing with global resource and
environmental issues and those focusing on economic questions.
Both the relatively low status of those bureaus and their separation
from the Economic Bureau should be corrected.
We believe this can best be done by broadening the scope of the
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. We, therefore, recommend
that:
The Under Secretary for Economic Affairs be retitled the Under
Secretary for Economic and Scientific Affairs and that the Bureau
of Economic and BU8b1688 Affairs, and the Bureau of Oceans and
International Environment and Scientific Affairs, together with
the functional units of the Bureau of International Organization,
Affairs, be reordered as four new, closely related bureaus, each
headed b yan Assistant Secretary responsible to the Under Secre-
tary, as follows:
(1) International Economic and Business Affairs (pririeixdby
trade, monetary, and investment policy);
(2) Energy, Transportation, and Communication Affairs;
(3) Oceans, Environmental, and Scientific Affairs;
(4) Food, Population, and Development Affairs.
As the senior officer of the Department responsible for all of these
matters below the Secretary, the new Under Secretary would have
greater status, as well as closer links with experts and officials working
in these areas. As discussed in Chapter 9, the Under Secretary also
would play a major role in multilateral diplomacy, since many of the
issues of concern to him will arise in multilateral contexts.
The effect of these recommendations would be to create a coherent
economic-scientific-technological complex within the Department of
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State. The Under Secretary and the bureaus concerned should be able
not only to provide more assistance to the geographic Assistant
Secretaries on economic, scientific, and interdependence matters, but to
monitor much more effectively the activities of other parts of govern-
ment whose concerns parallel their own.
In addition, we believe that certain changes in personnel policy
will be required in the Department. Existing career incentives and
organizational arrangements in State have discouraged promotion to
the prestigious positions of officers with a background in economics,
contributing to an insulation of foreign political and economic policy.
This problem has been recognized before, and some changes
instituted, but more must ? be done if State is to meet the challenge
of a more effective international economic policy. We therefore recom-
mend that:
Larger numbers of career Ambassadors and Deputy Chiefs of
Mission, should be appointed from among officers with, economics
training and background: senior officers at economically important
consular posts should ordinarily be expected to have had economic
and commercial exposure either in State or through assignment
to another agency; the recruitment of professionally trained
economdsts should be accelerated without requiring that they become
part of the Foreign Service; and training programs in
economics for Foreign Service Officers should be accelerated.
The Commission ?has not examined in depth the organizational
problems concerning economic policy within other Departments, but
wishes to express its conviction that, if those departments are to play a
proper role in shaping and implementing international economic pol-
icy, they too will need increased emphasis on such policy in personnel
selection and organization. Some recommendations follow for strength-
ening the capability of all government agencies to deal with foreign
economic policy problems. It is the Commission's view that all domestic
agencies concerned, as well as our national interests, would benefit
from such strengthening.
PERSONNEL FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
Central to our strategy for a more effective foreign economic policy
is the open competition of divergent interests and perspectives. But
that competition must take place within a context of genuine under-
standing of opposite perspectives and a commitment to serve the na-
tional interest. To help create the context to facilitate communication
among Departments, and to encourage greater depth and professional-
ism among civil servants, we recommend that:
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Systematic personnel interchange at the middle-grade levels
anuyng the Departments and agencies with principal responsibilities
for foreign economic policy be expanded.
To assure the success of such a program, arrangements should be
instituted by the Civil Service Commission and the Foreign Service,
to designate a number of responsible positions in the key agencies
involved in foreign economic policy as interchange positions. Such
positions would then be filled by officials from other agencies on at
least a two-year term. For such a program to succeed, meaningful
incentives and sanctions would have to be imposed: for example, in
the case of domestic agency employees, that career officials would not
ordinarily be eligible for positions of senior responsibility in foreign
economic policy unless they had served with the State Department
or in an overseas post. In the case of State Department officials, a
corresponding tour with a domestic economic agency would be re-
quired before eligibility for senior economic positions was permitted.
The Commission rejected a more extreme option of creating a sep-
arate "International Economics Service," administered by the Civil
Service Commission or the Foreign Service, to provide a common pool
of trained and experienced manpower to all executive departments
and agencies involved in international economic policy. Such an ar-
rangement would provide the strongest incentive to minimize narrow
bureaucratic loyalties and to broaden the horizons of key officials.
Despite those attractive aspects, the Commission felt that the proposal
would too sharply insulate a specialized corps from the very concerns
of domestic and foreign policy that we wish to integrate. Further, the
top policymakers in each department might be deprived of the loyalty
and continuity they will properly demand of their key subordinates.
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND OVERSEAS REPRESENTATION
Unlike foreign political policy, where States has virtually exclusive
responsibility, the execution of foreign economic policy has been shared
to a degree among the Departments of State, Treasury, Agriculture,
Commerce, and others, depending upon the substance. We believe this
is appropriate, both because of the degree of knowledge required in
specialized areas and because of the value of direct exposure to for-
eign concerns for domestically oriented agencies. Moreover, as inter-
national economic problems have grown in importance and multi-
lateral diplomacy has increasingly supplanted bilateral negotiations
as the main channel of international decision-making, Washington-
based officials have assumed a larger role in economic negotiations
relative to Embassy personnel. These trends have suggested to some
that the time has come when we might appropriately transfer from
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State and the Foreign Service the bulk of its responsibilities for eco-
nomic negotiations and reporting. As is implied by our earlier recom-
mendations, we reject this line of reasoning. But, equally, an attempt
to centralize all responsibility for these matters, removing them from
economic departments to State, appears impractical and counter-
productive in terms of our basic objectives.
As a consequence, the Commission supports flexibility in the use
of multiagency participation in policy negotiations and implementa-
tion abroad. The State Department must retain overall coordinating
responsibility; no international negotiations should proceed without
its knowledge and approval. It should normally participate in the
manning of international delegations, but need not automatically
chair these, depending upon the substantive area. Overseas repre-
sentation of domestic economic departments should continue in se-
lected areas (e.g., agriculture and finance) so long as their repre-
sentatives are under the control of the Ambassador.
The proper balance between Treasury and State Department repre-
sentatives overseas presents some problems; their functions overlap,
yet their loyalties and conceptions will necessarily be somewhat dif-
ferent. Still, if the desired balance is to be achieved as we propose,
we feel that direct and senior representation by Treasury staff overseas,
under the overall guidance and control of the Ambassador, will remain
important despite the organizational untidiness. Ultimate control by
the Ambassador is essential. It is as important that we speak with
one voice in our relations with other governments as it is in the execu-
tive branch's relations with the Congress and the public at home.
RESEARCH, ANALYSIS AND INTELLIGENCE
The need for effective research, analysis, and intelligence in the
foreign economic field can hardly be overemphasized. The impression
of the Commission is that this function, which presently involves
modest costs, can usefully be intensified in virtually all concerned
Departments.
We are aware that research and analysis tend to take on the pre-
occupation and orientation of originating agencies, and there will be
no certain and unambiguous answers to economic questions. But sup-
porting research capacities in the relevant agencies is a necessary corol-
lary of the basic theme of competition in policy formulation. Neither
the President nor other policymakers should be confined to one source
of research. Moreover, the President will be able to draw upon the CEA
directed research group recommended earlier.
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Considerable effort has developed in recent years to facilitate com-
munication between the intelligence community and the makers of in-
ternational economic policy, paralleled by some reorientation of the
intelligence community toward economic matters. We welcome these
efforts and feel that the CIA, among others, should continue to im-
prove its capacity for international economic research and analysis.
RELATIONS WITH BUSINESS, AND THE COMMERCIAL
FUNCTION ABROAD
We have noted that successful foreign economic policy will be de-
pendent in part on more active communication between the govern-
ment and the private sector. In considering how to accomplish this, we
recognize that the links between the public and private sectors will
need to conform to established traditions, attitudes and laws estab-
lishing the broader context of government-business relations in Amer-
ican society. Intimacy in policymaking is discouraged by these
traditions in contrast to the practices of some foreign countries. Those
traditions are fully consistent, however, with better communication.
As one approach toward improving communications with the inter-
ested public, we have recommended establishment of an International
Economic Policy Advisory Board. We also recommend that:
The present personnel interchange program between goverrument
and business should be expanded substantially. The Commission be-
lieves this proram should be concentrated at the middle and junior,
rather than at senior levels.
The Commission considered transferring from the State Depart-
ment to Commerce responsibility for overseas commercial assistance
to business, but we rejected this proposal, in part because we believe
it would further compartmentalize functions, in part because we were
impressed by recent efforts of both State and Commerce to accent this
function and to strengthen their cooperation.
SPECIAL PROBLEM AREAS
Foreign Assistance Programs. The Commission considered the pos-
sible advantages of separating the major assistance programs admin-
istered by the Agency for International Development (AID)?secu-
rity or supporting assistance, development assistance and disaster
relief?afid housing them in new organizational units. In doing so,
we recognized that AID has come under increasing criticism from
public and professional groups, and that the reception it has received.
from the Congress has been increasingly hostile.
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We concluded that foreign assistance programs, while they differ
in specific orientation, are inevitably overlapping instruments of
foreign policy. The programs share the use of taxpayer's money in
support of diverse foreign policy objectives, and almost certainly
will continue to do so. We do not think that their management or
operation will be made less difficult by breaking apart the agency.
On the contrary, there are advantages in treating these programs in
a common administrative framework.
That AID has survived for 15 years in essentially its original form
despite constant criticism is a fact of some significance. The Agency
has served as a relatively flexible, multi-purpose resource for the
support of foreign policy, subordinate to the State Department with
respect to general policy direction but charged with operating respon-
sibilities that the State Department itself is not equipped to provide. It
can accommodate frequent changes in program emphasis, an important
advantage. The evolution of new kinds of assistance programs, or
greatly expanded programs might suggest other organizational ar-
rangements, but in the absence of such initiatives the present organiza-
tion has much to be said for it.
The Uominieeion, therefore, recommends that the Agency for In-
ternational Development (AID) remain the State Department's
operating arm for the implementation of bilateral foreign assistance.
The Commission did not concern itself with the proper roles and
relative funding of bilateral and multilateral programs. We assume
both will continue. We did consider whether coordination between
these two forms of assistance would be more assuredly achieved if
State/AID assumed the lead role in supervising U.S. participation
in the multilateral development banks ( as is already the case with
respect to the United Nations Development Program) , rather than
leaving that responsibility with the Treasury Department.
We resist this change. The flows of capital through the development
banks are a logical concern of the Treasury Department both as they
impinge upon U.S. capital markets and as they affect the climate of
international financial affairs. We are conscious that the Congressional
interest in these institutions has emphasized the need for a banking
or financial orientation in their management, and for a distinction
between these programs and bilateral assistance. Finally, there is much
to be said for separating the long-term U.S. interest in the develop-
ment missions of these banks from the shorter-term and more specific
political and security interests which our bilateral assistance program
must perforce reflect.
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Accordingly, we endorse the continuation of primary Treasury
Department responsibility for supervision of U.S. commitments to
the international development institutions. Treasury should coordi-
nate with the State Department concerning directives given U.S.
representatives on the executive boards when political issues arise
in connection with the policies and operations of these institutions.
The Flow of International Investment. Issues of international in-
vestment have received greater prominence as a result of the growth
of international corporations, many of which are based in the United
States. More recently, the actual and potential flows of larger amounts
of foreign investment into the United States, particularly from oil-
rich nations, have raised new opportunities as well as new questions.
These issues have led some nations to set up organizations to deal spe-
cifically with direct investment or with that form of enterprise popu-
larly known as the multinational corporation.
We recognize that a wide range of substantive issues is raised by
international investment and by international corporations, including
tax, monetary, anti-trust and expropriation questions. We welcome
the recent establishment of the Interagency Committee on Foreign
Investment to screen investment funds coming into the U.S., us well
as the increased efforts being given by the Commerce Department to
collecting and analyzing information about foreign direct investment
in the United States.
This is only part, and probably the smaller part, of of the national
concern with the flow of investment funds. We need huge amounts of
capital to meet energy, environmental and economic growth needs.
With so much of the world's capital formation taking place in the oil
rich nations and the Eurodollar market, a good part of the capital
needed in the U.S. should come from abroad. Also, our need for raw
materials, our interest in the development of the poor countries and
the world's food needs make the application of our technology and
a flow of capital from the U.S. to other countries essential to a satisfac-
tory international economic order. To achieve a satisfactory inward
and outward investment flow, it will be necessary to make investment
attractive and secure both here and abroad. This is primarily a matter
of tax and 'financial policy here and in other countries and of inter-
national understandings on expropriation and other barriers to
investment.
We do not, however, believe it is necessary or desirable to establish
within the United States Government a new agency, or Special Rep-
resentative, to control either international corporations or the flow of
capital to or from this country.
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In resisting such proposals, we are influenced by two considerations:
(1) In concept, the activities of multinational corporations neces-
sarily cut across a number of aspects of international economic policy,
but those policy issues will need to be considered on their merits as
they apply to all businesses with some international exposure?not
just to some indefinable group labeled multinational. The designation
of a special organizational entity to deal with multinational companies
on the one hand, or to screen foreign investment in the United States
on the other, would imply a decision to treat these matters in a new
and special manner?a decision that is not justified at present.
(2) In practice, dealings with other nations on the problems of
international corporations and international investment do not reveal
a clear need for new and separate organizational arrangements. What
are needed are the sustained attention and cooperative efforts of exist-
ing bureaus and agencies, especially in State, Commerce, Treasury and
the Export-Import Bank in this area. Both for general policy prob-
lems and for more specific concerns, these flexible arrangements are
effective and adequate. This issue should be a major item on the agenda
of the Subcouncil on International Economic Policy.
There are, however, two exceptions to our conclusion that no broad
organizational changes are necessary.
The energy industry is one special case. Rapid changes are underway
in the nature of the international energy business, with ownership
of production passing rapidly into the hands of foreign govern-
ments. Petroleum has enormous importance to the economy and secu-
rity of the United States, and we have become substantially more
dependent on foreign sources. Sensible energy policy necessarily in-
volves simultaneous consideration of domestic and international con-
siderations. In fact, energy policy is, perhaps, the outstanding example
of how domestic and foreign policies intertwine. Oil embargos and the
cartelization of oil prices generate concern for our national security,
deterioration in our trade balance and the value of the dollar, and
differences among allies, as well as lines at gas stations, unemployment
and higher prices at home. To meet these multiple threats will take
a combination of domestic policies which will conserve fuel and bring
in new oil and gas and develop alternative sources of energy, and for-
eign policies which will result in the application of our superior oil-
finding and nuclear technology around the world in order to increase
the supply of oil and reduce demand for it. It also will be necessary
to develop understandings among nations which will assure access to
supplies, mitigate distortions in financial flows, and provide for joint
efforts at conservation, oil reserves, the pooling of supplies to blunt the
impact of any embargo, and so on. Some progress has been made, but
not nearly enough. This is primarily a matter of deciding on appropri-
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ate policies and implementing them. This is, above all, an area where
cooperation between Congress and the Executive Branch is critical.
An improved organizational focus also can help resolve these prob-
lems constructively. We recommend therefore that:
The Federal Energy Administration should provide the focus and
leadership for carrying out the national energy policy. The State
Department will have a crucial continuing role in bringing to bear
on all aspects of the policy process the critical considerations of
security and diplomacy, and in coordinating and implementing the
foreign policy aspects of our energy policy.
The second area in which a better organizational focus appears
necessary includes trade, investment, credits and technology transfers
with Communist countries. Economic contacts with nations having a
centrally planned economy differ qualitatively from those where
market forces predominate. Relatively close government surveillance
and regulation of the process appears inevitable and necessary.
Especially is this so where national security considerations arise
out of the export of high-technology products. But in no other area
has the Commission heard more criticism of the fragmentation of
authority within the executive branch, and apparent inability to re-
ceive necessary guidance. We believe improvement here is important.
The Cam/mission proposes that the Office of Export Administra-
tion in the Commerce Department be designated a central point
of contact between the private sector and the government for the
licensing and surveillance of trade and investment with Communist
countries. Policy guidance for that office should be centralized in the
Board of East-West Foreign Trade authorized by the Trade Act
of 1974, and consisting of Cabinet-level officials from each of the
departments involved in export regulation. The Board should be
backed up by a working group of officials from the same agencies.
This Board, now being organized, shall reevaluate existing policies
and devise a new, more efficient, and more consistent system of export
control management. It shall review proposed transactions with Com-
munist countries in light of economic criteria as well as their potential
effects on national security. We believe the broad range of agencies
represented on the Board, and its directive to "coordinate the policies
and operations of all agencies of the United States which regulate or
participate in trade with nonmarket economy countries" will help it
supersede the relatively narrow approach traditionally taken toward
export control. Strong State Department participation shall also seek
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By itself, however, such a board will not be enough. Also necessary
is a working-level staff with wide expertise on all relevant considera-
tions, including a balance between business development interests and
those of national security. This staff should be drawn in part from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA's
Office of Strategic Research, and the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency?organizations knowledgable about the crucial link between
technological capabilities and the enhancement of important military
capabilities. In addition, trade specialists and other experts on Soviet
political and economic affairs should be drawn from the Departments
of State, Commerce, and Treasury, as well as from other government
agencies, in order to integrate more fully these considerations with
military ones.
Representatives of the academic and business communities should
be formed into technical advisory committees to assist the Board in
gauging existing foreign availability of proposed .U.S. exports,
monitoring new technological developments and establishing pro-
cedures for evaluating the success or failure to export control process
itself.
Close Congressional contact with the proposed Board of East-West
Trade should be maintained to insure the reflection of Congressional
views, and help insure Congressional approval of those arrangements
which may require legislative action or approval.
Trade and the Special Trade Representative. The Office of the Spe-
cial Trade Representative grew out of particular legislative concerns
prior to the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations in the 1960's. It has
successfully provided a focus for consideration and negotiation of
questions of trade policy cutting across the jurisdiction of a number of
agencies, particularly at times of complex multilateral negotiations.
We see no reason to disturb a reasonably successful modus vivendi, par-
ticularly in the midst of ongoing negotiations. However, this Office
will presumably be less active following the termination of the present
multilateral trade negotiations some years hence.
We propose that, after the current negotiations are concluded, the
ongoing tasks of administration, negotiation and coordination be
accomplished by a transfer of the Office, under a Special Ambas-
sador, to the Department of State.
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CHAPTER 6
DEFENSE POLICY
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Elsewhere in this report we have noted the changing contents of the
foreign policy agenda, the growing importance of economic issues and
of problems of global interdependence. Those trends are deep-seated
and continuing, but they do not diminish the importance of a powerful
defense establishment. For as many years ahead as we can foresee, the
U.S. will require military capabilities unquestionably sufficient?in
size, equipment, and readiness?to assure the security of the U.S. and
its allies against military aggression.
That being so, the U.S. will continue to face the difficult problems
associated with the maintenance of varied and powerful military forces
and the large defense establishment on which they depend. Three re-
quirements in particular concern us.
Most importantly, as the defense establishment halts its primary
requirement to safeguard national security, it should be an effective
instrument of U.S. foreign policy. The needs of the armed services
themselves, and the difficulty of the missions assigned them, will to
some extent affect foreign policy?especially through base rights and
overseas deployment requirements. Yet the services must be the ser-
vants of governmental policy.
Second, the services must be effective. They must be ready and able
to successfully execute the extraordinarily various and difficult tasks
which at any moment may be assigned them.
Third, the needed capabilities must be acquired and maintained as
economically as possible. Defense is inevitably expensive, but the De-
partment of Defense, the President, and the Congress have an obli-
gation to hold those expenses to the minimum required.
To more effectively pursue these objectives, we offer a number of
recommendations. They concern first the interagency policy considera-
tion at the White House level, and then the organization and the rela-
tions among the various executive departments concerned with
national security.
THE NSC AND ITS COMMITTEES
The Commission believes that some restructuring of the NSC Com-
mittes concerned with defense issues would be helpful.
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The Verification Panel, charged with the analysis of arms control
issues, requires least change; it and its subgroups have worked rela-
tively well. We believe that effective arms control can be a crucial con-
tribution to the security of the U.S. and of all nations, and we there-
fore expect the Panel to continue to play a major role. The Panel
should continue to be chaired by the President's Assistant for National
Security Affairs, with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA) ,the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) , the Departments of
State and Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) represented
at the appropriate level. The formal inputs of each agency should be
sought vigorously and on a regular basis. Findings of the Verifica-
tion Panel should regularly be presented to the principals of the Na-
tional Security Council. This sequence has not always been followed,
but it has great merit and ensures that the President will oversee this
process, one of the most profoundly important that he must address.
Arms Transfers and Security Assistance Committee. The Commission
recommends:
Broadening the current Security Assistance Program Review
Committee (SAPRC) into a standing committee of the NSC to serve
as the primary forum for interagency review of all issues involv-
ing arms transfers and security assistance.
This review process would be headed by the proposed Under Secre-
tary of State for Political and Security Affairs and include repre-
sentatives of the Office of Management and Budget (01VIB), ACDA,
State, Defense, JCS, Treasury and the NSC staff. State should be
vested with the primary responsibility for determining the role of
security assistance and arms transfers in our bilateral relations.
This is a broadening of the original SAPRC concept, and would
bring into better focus and better management several areas of critical
importance. One of these, security assistance, is declining in size, but
arms transfers are growing rapidly and have important policy impli-
cations. It is essential that U.S. transfers of military equipment to
other nations are carefully assessed, prior to the making of commit-
ments, in the light of their many political implications. We believe the
Department of State must take the lead responsibility for such assess-
ment, and that the proposed committee structure, effectively utilized,
would prove a useful step toward that end.
The Washington Special Action Group. WSAG's purpose is to deal
with rapidly breaking crises. It has been used effectively. We endorse
the continued location of this group in the White House, chaired by
the President's National Security Adviser. We believe that, between
crises, a brief but systematic review of U.S. actions and crisis manage-
ment procedures would frequently be valuable. We propose, therefore,
that:
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After a WSAG?level crisis, a crisis review group should assess
the government's performance and, where appropriate, review and
reconsider contingency plans.
This activity need not engage WSAG members, but should be under-
taken under WSAG supervision.
A Notional Security Review Committee. Each of the interagency
groups and committees discussed above, together with the Senior Re-
view Group discussed in Chapter 3, can contribute to the better linking
of some aspects of U.S. military and political activity. None of them,
however, can assure the larger integration of defense policy, programs
and budgets with the objectives and requirements of U.S. foreign
policy. That task was intended to be the special responsibility of the
NSC's Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC). Charged with
an extraordinarily difficult assignment made even harder by the
resistance of the DoD to the exercise of that responsibility at any level
short of the President, the DPRC has fallen into disuse. The result
has been that the recent record of our government in reviewing the
totality of its defense activity in the light of the nation's overseas
policy and security requirements has been?in the words of Secretary
Kissinger's testimony before this Commission?"not distinguished."
The Commission believes that record can and must be improved. The
personal commitment of the President to this task is essential; it can-
not be carried out without his active support. But we believe that a
mechanism and a process suitable to the task must also be established.
We therefore recommend:
Establishment of a National Security Review Committee (NSRC)
to conduct abroad review, under the direction of the National Secu-
rity Council principals, of the U.S. worldwide national security
posture at the beginning of every new Administration. The review
should involve the newly appointed senior officials and draw upon
the views of the relevant departments. It should be directed by the
President and his National Security Assistant.
Participants should include State, CIA, Defense, Treasury, OMB,
JCS, ACDA, the President's Science Adviser, the Chairman of the
National Defense Advisory Board proposed below, and others as ap-
propriate. The review should identify the major contingencies U.S.
forces should be prepared to meet, lay down broad fiscal and structural
guidelines for the development of U.S. national security policy, and
identify major issues for future analysis.
The concepts that emerge from such a review will be fundamental
to the values, objectives, and methods of the United States. They will
become statements of the U.S. Government's understanding of its na-
tional security interests. As such, they should be broadly understood
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and broadly articulated. While a few of the conclusions of this review
may necessarily remain classified, most of them should be broadly
shared within the entire executive branch, with the Congress, and
with the American people. They should therefore be fully reflected
in the President's "State of the World Report" which in Chapter 10
we propose be reinstituted.
Following initial Presidential decisions on force levels, and issuance
of Presidentially approved fiscal guidelines, the NSRC should conduct
two forms of annual review and updating. The first should be a policy
review, designed to revise and update, as necessary, policy decisions
made in the initial study. It should be chaired by the President's Na-
tional Security Adviser. The second should be a review of progress in
implementing the initial Presidential decisions. It should take place
under the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and include
representatives of the other agencies.
An Advisory Board on National Defense. Our final recommendation
at the Presidential level seeks to open better channels of communica-
tion and advice between national security authorities and the public.
National security has taken on new dimensions. Access to essential ma-
terials, alertness to technological potentials, and public understanding
of the need to maintain readiness against distant but lethal threats are
today critical to national security. Much of the perspective and experi-
ence relevant to these more intangible aspects of national security is
found primarily in the private sector. To facilitate their input into
governmental decision-making, and to better communicate defense
needs to the public and channel back the convictions and reactions of
the American people, we recommend that:
The President establish an Advisory Board on National Defense,
composed of private citizens who are well equipped by training and
experience to bring to bear on defense questions the views of Ameri-
can society, and to facilitate the communication of defense needs to
the public. The Board should be provided with, a small independent
staff.
Similar advisory boards have been useful in other areas (e.g., in-
telligence) and we recommend their establishment in two other chap-
ters of this report. The Commission believes that our defense establish-
ment also would benefit from this direct exposure to thinking outside
Official channels as well as from the ability to generate broader public
understanding and support of policy positions.
Taken together, these alterations in the structure and processes of
national security decision-making at the White House level can sub-
stantially improve our government's ability to make its huge and
essential investments in defense better meet the three difficult tests of
responsiveness to policy, effectiveness, and economy.
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THE STATE-DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP
, \
The position of the President and the effectiveness of the NSC,
structure are crucial to the better integration of the policies and pro- '
grams of the Department of Defense into the amalgam of military,
political and economic purposes which should determine the nation's
foreign policy. But while White House actions are essential, they are
not sufficient. Both the effective making of high policy and the success-
ful linkage of military to other foreign policy purposes in the daily
flow of governmental actions require the strong participation of the
central cabinet department in foreign affairs, the Department of
State.
We believe that the President must require such participation from
the Department, and that the Secretary of State must direct it. But
we also believe that when those conditions are met, the Department
will be found inadequately organized and staffed to meet its political-
military responsibilities. Part of the problem stems from the training
and orientation of the Foreign Service, few members of which are
professionally qualified to deal confidently with political-military
issues. Attitudes toward management, quantitative analysis, budget
processes and toward military expertise all contribute to the problem.
State's organizational arrangements are also inadequate, however. We
discuss these first.
The Office of Politico-Military Affairs. The State Department's move-
ment into the arena of national security policy has been slow and
uneven. Only in 1961 did State first establish an office dealing spe-
cifically with political-military affairs (now called PM), and not
until 1970 was the head of that office given a rank equivalent to that
of an Assistant Secretary of State. The job is not Senate-confirmed,
however, and the rank equivalence is only by executive fiat.
Even today some in State argue that PM ought not to exist, or at
most should serve only as a small personal staff to the Under Secretary
of State, as it did originally. This argument proceeds from the belief
that principal responsibility ought to reside in the regional bureaus
in State, a position with which we are in full agreement. To extend
this argument to make political-military affairs the responsibility only
of officials within the regional bureaus would badly weaken the
Department in its dealings with the Pentagon. The overriding re-
quirement, we believe, is that State be able to assist the White House
and face the Pentagon from a much stronger position.
PM stands at the proper position for such upgrading; its growth
is healthy for both State and Defense. It has begun to acquire some
outstanding personnel, including highly capable officers from outside
the Foreign Service. But in our view much more needs to be done.
The political-military point of view needs a strong and steadily
focused position at the top of the State Department. In theory, it
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already has one, with the Department containing both an Under
Secretary for Political Affairs and an Under Secretary for Security
Assistance. But in practice, matters are otherwise. The former position
has at some times been strongly oriented towards political-military
issues. At other times, as at present, it has not. The problem is that
the Political Affairs job does not carry an explicitly-stated political-
military responsibility. Each incumbent is free to define the job as he
and his Secretary wish. At the same time, the Under Secretary for
Security Assistance, ranking fifth in the Department, is responsible for
only one portion of the work of one Bureau located far below him.
This results from the understandable desire of Congress for some
official whom it could hold responsible for the billion dollar security
assistance program, but the end result makes little sense and should
be reconsidered.
The problems then, are essentially two:
There is no high level focal point below the Secretary to coordi-
nate State's role in the national security area and its relations with
other agencies in the community. Currently, the Secretary performs
this role personally on the handful of issues in which he can take a
continuing interest. The prospect for departmental and interagency
leadership on national security issues from the Director of PM, even
if he were formally elevated to Assistant Secretary, must be considered
remote.
Current recruitment and training patterns in the Foreign Service
do not routinely produce competent analysts of national security
policy issues. Moreover, restrictions on lateral entry inhibit their
recruitment from outside. The current Foreign Service "career cones"
concept is, if anything, more limiting in this respect than previous
personnel policies. For example, training in budget and planning skills
is concentrated in the administrative cone, and economic analytic
techniques are taught in the economic cone; both types of skills are
useful for national security analysts. Consequently many of the
Department's analysts on national security issues must come initially
from outside the Foreign Service, but many barriers inhibit such
recruiting.
To deal with these problems, the Commission makes four recom-
mendations.
A single senior State official should be clearly identified as respon-
sible, under the Secretary, for political-military and national se-
curity affairs. To accomplish this the position of Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs should be retitled Under Secretary for
Political and Security Affairs, and made directly responsible for the
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. The position of Under Secre-
tary of State for Security Assistance should be abolished.
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The Under Secretary for Political and Security Affairs would be-
come State's principal representative in the defense community, man-
aging the Department's activities and positions concerning security
assistance, arms control, overseas deployments and bases, nuclear issues,
certain intelligence oversight functions, and all other political-military
affairs. He would have line authority over the PM bureau, and PM's
director would act as his principal deputy.
The selection and training of Foreign Service officers should recog-
nize the need for competent and national security analysts in both
Washington and abroad.
This requires greater emphasis on quantitative aptitude, develop-
ment of analytical skills and experience in political-military matters.
It could be accomplished either by designating a new career cone sub-
speciality (political-military affairs) or by training a percentage of
FSO's on an individual basis.
Barriers and administrative inhibitions to the hiring of political-
military specialists or to their lateral entry into Foreign Service
ranks should be sharply reduced.
This is an essential requirement at least until the Foreign Service
can develop its own political-military competence. Even then, however,
temporary employment of outside specialists on term contracts should
be encouraged.
The political-military capability of the regional bureaus in State
should be upgraded.
The proposed upgrading of State's role in the national security com-
munity is not intended to result in the ascendence of PM over the
regional bureaus. The regional bureaus must themselves take a stronger
role in political-military planning. Indeed, our proposed interagency
structure would require their active participation in the review of
bilateral and regional security issues. We suggest either the establish-
ment of strong regional political-military teams (as now exist in the
European Bureau), or the assignment of officers with political-military
experience to desks of individual countries where the U.S. national
security establishment has particularly substantial interests.
THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Arms control will continue to be an important element in -U.S.
national security policy in the years ahead. Not only will the strategic
arms limitation talks (SALT) continue to be a major element in our
relations with the Soviet Union, but a growing range of related issues
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will require expanded activity and expertise. These include nucleat
proliferation, mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe,
a threshold nuclear test ban, peaceful nuclear explosions, chemical
weapons, the use of environment modification techniques in warfare,
and better control of the world arms trade.
Effective arms control can improve national security. To insure that
it does so will take action in several arenas, all under the guidance of
the President. One important resource for such action is the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency.
ACDA's creation in 1961 marked a conscious decision to emphasize
and institutionalize arms control as a component of U.S. national
security policy. Though administratively related to the State Depart-
ment, ACDA is an independent agency and its Director is charged with
serving the President and Secretary of State as their principal advisor
on arms control matters. ACDA's role was defined in its enabling legis-
lation to include: the conduct, support and coordination of research
for arms control policy formulation; the preparation, operation and
direction of control systems which become part of U.S. arms control
and disarmament activities.
ACDA has played a useful role. We believe, however, that the agency
should be further strengthened and upgraded in a number of respects.
These include:
Innovation in Research in Arms Control. ACDA's research structure
should emphasize both servicing on-going negotiations and long-term
planning. The recent establishment under the Agency's Counselor of
a Policy and Planning staff to undertake long-term planning studies
was a desirable development. We believe both types of research are
fundamental and can be further strengthened. Accordingly, we recom-
mend that:
ACDA's external research program should be expanded, focusing
on longer term problems and possibilities for arms control.
This work should address such issues as conventional arms control;
regional limits on arms purchases and force levels; and the impact of
future technologies on existing agreements.
Assessment of U.S. Developments. The basic responsibility for U.S.
weapons development and acquisition policy lies with the Department
of Defense and the new Energy Research and Development Adminis-
tration. But it is important that ACDA have a systematic opportunity
to review defense plans for their arms control implications. We have
therefore earlier proposed that:
The Director of ACDA should become a member of the proposed
National Security Review Committee (N SRC).
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Through the NSRC, the Director of ACDA should advise the Secre-
taries of State and Defense and the President of any arms control
implications in the planned defense program.
Assessing the Impact of Military Assistance and Arms Transfers. The
agency has not in the past played a fully satisfactory role in the review
of U.S. arms sales and assistance. Yet, arms control considerations and
the impact of security assistance on local and regional balances should
be central considerations in U.S. security assistance policy. ACDA
should therefore contribute importantly to the making of that policy.
Accordingly, we propose that:
The Director of ACDA should become a member of the proposed
NSC Arms Transfer and Security Assistance Committee, and should
enlarge ACDA78 capability to assess the arms control implications
of U.S. security assistance policy and arms sales.
Public Education on Arms Control. Public understanding of arms
control issues is extremely limited, partly as a result of ACDA's re-
straint in providing information and stimulating debate. ACDA must
not become a sponsor of propaganda, but within that constraint should
be enabled to contribute fully to public education on arms control
issues. We propose that:
ACDA should provide public information on arms control and
disarmament matters, much as State is charged with, explaining
U.S. foreign policy.
ACDA should enlarge its program of publications, and develop a
more active program of liaison with universities and research centers,
stimulating studies and course developments relevant to arms control.
If statutory change is required to permit such activities, it should be
sought.
In order to facilitate these strengthened roles of ACDA, we pro-
pose that the Director of AC DA be established as principal adviser
to the NSG on arms control and disarmament matters.
We believe such changes can strengthen ACDA's ability to carry out
its responsibilities. Implementation may require an increase in per-
sonnel and budget, but we note that ACDA's budget has never sig-
nificantly exceeded the $10 million originally appropriated in fiscal
1964. A substantial increase in ACDA's small budget over the next
few yeals would be a small price to pay for its potential returns to
the national security.
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ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
The President's budget is a comprehensive statement of his program
in dollar terms. It reflects his priorities and policy emphasis across all
Federal programs. At the same time, the budgetary process provides
a decision-forcing mechanism and a framework for budget allocations
within overall fiscal policy.
The level and composition of the defense budget results from a
complicated interaction of many pressures and participants. It reflects
changing estimates of external threats; of foreign policy objectives; of
assessments of risk, technological developments, fiscal policy, congres-
sional and public attitudes. Thus an effective budget process must pro-
vide for a careful balancing of many interests.
Several background points about the budget process should be made
before we address the role of OMB:
1. The President has direct constitutional responsibilities as Com-
mander in Chief of the Armed Forces and the Chief official respon-
sible for the conduct of foreign relations. He must therefore be di-
rectly involved in decisions on the defense budget.
2. The Secretary of Defense is second in the chain of military au-
thority. The President must rely heavily and personally on the Secre-
tary in making the balancing judgments and exercising civil control.
3. The Congress takes a special interest in defense matters, reflect-
ing its constitutional responsibilities for raising armed forces and de-
claring war, the importance it attaches to the Nation's security, and
the political significance of the $100 billion defense budget. The rele-
vant Committees of the two Houses have great knowledge of military
matters.
OMB's budget review is focused on determining the defense outlay
total. This is, of course, a significant percentage of the Federal total,
though it has been falling steadily, from 56% in 1956 to 41% in 1966,
to 27% in fiscal 1976. To arrive at this total, OMB reviews all de-
fense programs, focusing most heavily on those it considers to be of
marginal effectiveness. The OMB effort builds upon and is integrated
with a defense planning, programming, and budgeting process devel-
oped over the last 15 years. Although still evolving, the defense Plan-
ning, Programming and Budgeting system has done a great deal to
tie long-range military planning to 5-year program costing, and to
annual budgeting of Total Obligational Authority (TOA) and
outlays.
What changes in OMB organization or procedure might strengthen
the President's capability to deal with the major policy issues of the
defense budget and to make effective trade-offs among defense and
non-defense programs? We believe several would be helpful.
OMB analysts are currently organized solely along program and
budget category lines, an arrangement effective for some purposes
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but inhibiting the broad policy perspective OMB might most usefully
apply. We therefore propose that:
A new analysis capability should be created to support the Asso-
ciate Director for National Security and International Programs,
and to provide sustained attention to broad defense policy and pro-
gram issues in OMB and in the proposed Nsiec.
There should also be available to the President the results of con-
tinuing analyses of large-scale resource allocation questions, including
defense versus civil program trade-offs. Since OMB is the only agency
capable of marginal program analysis across the Government, im-
provement efforts should probably best be focused here. The Commis-
sion recommends that:
The OMB should take the lead in organizing a continuing inter-
agency program of overall resource-allocation analyses, specifically
including the trade-offs of defense against civil programs.
The staffs of the NSC, the Domestic Council and a few of the large
domestic agencies like HEW should be involved in these efforts. They
should be completed early in the year so that the results can be taken
into account during the discussions between the OMB Director and the
President in late June. The analysis should then be updated prior
to the President's final decisions on the budget in December.
Such an effort would undoubtedly require some restructuring of
OMB's staff resources to support top officials. Moreover, new tech-
niques of arraying data and performing trade-off analysis would have
to be developed. But the Commission believes that the improvement
in the executive's ability to manage basic budget allocation issues can
be significant.
At present, the main fiscal constraint reflected in the defense pro-
gramming cycle is that provided by the Secretary to his own depart-
ment in March. Fiscal guidance from the Budget Director often
arrives much later, thus losing an important early opportunity to rec-
oncile defense programs and fiscal policy. We believe that stronger par-
ticipation by OMB in the early stages of the defense programming
process, and involvement by the President in mid-year are required.
We suggest that:
A more detenruined effort should be made by OMB and the White
H01286 to inject Presidentially-approved fiscal guidance into the de-
fense programming cycle at budget preview time (mid-June to mid-
July), and to come to grips with the major defense program issues
relating to this guidance at that time. OMB participation with. 0 SD
in the Joint Budget Review should be extended to the Program,
Review in May-August.
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It is in the May-June program review that the Secretary of Defense
makes the critical program decisions which affect the total and mix
of defense activities. Thus, this extension of the joint review process
would make more effective the reconciliation of Defense totals with
overall fiscal policy and with the trade-off analyses discussed above.
The President's fiscal policy guidance to DOD should be provided
in both TOA and outlay terms.
Up to now, OMB has focused almost exclusively on the budget year
outlay implications of the defense program, and has tended to accept
defense views on TOA levels. But TOA levels have profound impact
on future-year outlays, so that in effect future Presidential fiscal con-
trol and options are steadily being mortgaged. The process would be
more effective from both defense and Presidential viewpoints if fiscal
guidelines each year were provided in both TOA and outlay terms.
There should be continuing contact and support throughout the
year between staff of the NSC, the State Department and OMB in
defining issues, conducting special studies, and seeing that the results
of such studies are reflected in the defense budget process.
One such study might address the appropriateness of continuing to
include the costs of the military retirement system in the Defense
budget. The Commission believes that such inclusion distorts the size
of the Defense budget in comparison with those of other agencies.
The Budget Director and his staff should participate in the relevant
NSC processes, and NSC staff should take part correspondingly in
key points of the budget process, including the OMB Director's
Review.
THE ROLE -OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The Department of Defense is, of course, the main operating agency
of the government in the field of national security. It is the Defense
Department that buys the weapons, trains the troops and maintains
the bases from which U.S. military capability flows. In this capacity,
DoD now spends close to $100 billion per year and employs four mil-
lion military, civilian and paid reserve personnel. It maintains an ex-
tensive network of forward bases and deploys 25% of its active duty
military personnel and nearly half of U.S. nuclear weapons in over-
seas locations. Even apart from their military capability, the mainte-
nance of such large U.S. forces abroad is a significant factor in U.S.
foreign policy.
The main instrument for assuring that the activities of DoD serve
the President's overall policy objectives is the civilian leadership he
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appoints. In particular, it is the Secretary's responsibility to direct
and control the Defense Department in identifying and planning for
the contingencies in which U.S. military forces may be employed; siz-
ing and shaping military forces accordingly, and overseeing overseas
basing and deployments, and security assistance programs. In time of
war the Secretary serves as the President's second in command in giv-
ing direction to the U.S. armed forces.
The Role of OSD. The principal instruments and advisors to the
Secretary are the staff elements that make up the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense. These staffs support the Secretary and help shape
departmental policies on everything from contracting and procure-
ment guidelines to the environmental impact of defense programs and
military health care.
Of particular interest is the role of the Office of International Se-
curity Affairs (ISA), charged with advising the Secretary on how
defense activities affect broader U.S. foreign policy objectives. The
office was established shortly after the Department itself was created
in 1947, and over the years has been an important member of the for-
eign policy community. The ISA office is, in a sense, the opposite num-
ber of State's office of Political-Military Affairs (PM).
That ISA has often been called "the little State Department" is tes-
timony to both the office's strength and its weakness. In one sense ISA
is an informed and knowledgeable representative of the diplomatic
community within the Pentagon. Indeed, a substantial fraction of
ISA's staff officers over the years have been drawn from the Foreign
Service. At the same time, ISA shares with State the traditional diplo-
mats' weakness in quantitative and technical analysis. In recent years,
analytic techniques have been one of the Defense Secretary's main tools
in evaluating and shaping the defense program and budget, and the
role is ISA has been weakest in this area.
The principal sources of_the Secretary's advice on budgetary and
force level issues have been the military services and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff as a body, along with the Office of the Comptroller and the
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (formerly Systems Anal-
ysis). These offices are somewhat remote from the perspectives in-
volved in fitting military forces into our overall foreign policy. But
it is essential for effectiveness and economy that defense improve its
ability to relate military force requirements to foreign policy objec-
tives. This, in turn, implies an influential role for ISA in shaping the
broad outlines of our military forces. Accordingly, we recommend
that:
The Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs should
play an increased role in, shaping the defense progra?n, and budget
to fit our foreign policy. This requires that ISA develop greater
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technical and analytical capability, and that it take the lead in
research and analyses to better relate force levels to foreign policy
implications of major resource decision.
None of these activities requires major changes in ISA's charter or
personnel levels, though some increases in personnel and possibly
use of outside support should be expected. It does require an increased
emphasis on the part of the Secretary and of ISA leadership on the
importance of relating our military forces to our policy objectives.
The Secretary and the Role of the JCS. The second major aspect of
the Secretary's responsibility that influence foreign policy is his role
in the national military chain of command. The 1958 Amendments to
the National Security Act removed the military services from the chain
of operational command. But a 1958 directive from the Secretary of
Defense to a degree brought the services back into the chain by pro-
viding that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would act as the Secretary's
staff for operations. In practice the service chiefs (acting in their
joint capacities) were injected back into the chain of command. More-
over, each chief has maintained his own service-based operational staff
in addition to the large operational directorate (J-3) of the Joint
Staff.
This situation has significant implications for U.S. foreign policy
in that it raises the possibility, highlighted in some of the Commis-
sion's research, of particular service interests and viewpoints seriously
detracting from the integrity of the Unified Command structure and
the effectiveness of military operations in a crisis.
The Chairman and service chiefs tend to act as a separate element
in the command structure, rather than as "staff" to the Secretary in
his statutory role. While JCS procedures give the Chairman some
freedom to act individually in operational matters if there is not time
to consult the other chiefs, the consensual nature of the JCS decision-
making process imposes strong constraints on the Chairman and
inhibits his role as staff and advisor to the Secretary.
The Commission believes the basic wisdom of the National Security
Act and its amendments in affirming the principle of civilian control
and unified planning and command structure is unchallenged by events
of recent years. The 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (Fitzhugh Re-
port) and other reviews of defense organization have also confirmed
this belief.
The Secretary's ability to exercise his statutory responsibilities
in direction and control of crisis operations should be improved.
Specific measures to bring this about include: provisions to insure
the responsiveness of the National Military Command Center to the
operational reporting needs of the Secretary (the Chairman and
service chiefs 'would be informed simultaneously); increased auton-
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oray for the Chairman in operational matters vis-a-vis the services
(the role of service chiefs in operations should be explicitly defined
as advisory to the Chairman, and Secretary, service operational staffs
sh,ould be sharply cut back and, if necessary, the joint operations
staff, J-3, should be increased); the Chairman in consultation with
the Secretary should select officers for key Joint Staff positions in
operational matters, in, 7,?,gling the top officers in J-3 and the NMC C.
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CHAPTER 7
THE ORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The maintenance of intelligence capabilities of the highest compe-
tence is essential to the national security and to the effective conduct
of U.S. foreign policy. The world which American foreign policy
seeks to affect is diverse, complex and rapidly changing. In such a
world, policy must be based on detailed understanding of many issues,
military and economic, political and scientific, foreign and domestic.
That understanding requires the collection and analysis of enormous
quantities of information. Much of it is publicly available, appearing
in reports of government agencies and of private businesses, the
reporting of the press, or publications of scholars. But much of the
most critical information?especially though not solely, information
concerning the military activities and capacities of potential antag-
onists?is not openly available.
The responsibility for gathering, evaluating and reporting such
information, and for assessing its significance in combination with
data openly available, is the primary mission of the U.S. intelligence
community. The Commission believes that mission will remain crucial
to U.S. security, and to international stability and peace for the fore-
seeable future. It also believes, however, that, to assure the more
effective performance of that mission, a number of organizational
changes should be made in the management composition and operation
of the intelligence community.
Standards of Performance. Intelligence in a democracy must meet
three main tests. First, it must respond to the evolving needs of national
security and foreign policy decision-makers: its estimates and analyses
must address the questions of real concern, and do so at high levels of
competence and integrity. The second test is economy. Intelligence is
a necessity, and some forms of intelligence gathering are extraor-
dinarily expensive. Where unavoidable such costs must be borne;
where unnecessary they must be avoided. Thirdly, the U.S. intelligence
community must operate in such a manner as to command public
confidence.
It is against principally the first two of these standards that we
have reviewed current performance and projected future needs, leaving
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the third largely to the several Executive and Congressional bodies
now focused especially on that problem. But we believe that our
recommendations will be helpful in improving performance against
that third crucial standard as well.
We believe that, with respect to both the responsiveness of intelli-
gence to the needs of policy, and the principle of reasonable economy
of effort, current performance of the intelligence community can be
improved. The difficulties in achieving improvement are considerable,
however, because they are rooted in the very nature of the intelligence
community. The key characteristic of that community is that it is made
up of a large number of separate entities which, while all serving the
interests of national security and foreign policy, embody differing
histories, distinct missions, and separate lines of command. It is both
necessary and useful that the community be composed of many ele-
ments, but that characteristic makes central direction and oversight
difficult. Among the results, we believe, have been some excesses in
the collection of information and gaps in its analysis; the occasional
development of costly systems not because requirements demanded
them but because technology permitted them; as well as occasional
failures to observe those standards of conduct which should distinguish
the behavior of agencies of the U.S. Government.
These findings are broadly consistent with those of many prior
studies, and considerable progress in remedying the problems has been
made. We believe that more is possible, however. In particular we
believe that firmer direction and oversight of the intelligence commu-
nity are essential. That is the main thrust of our recommendations.
We detail them below, following a brief description of the intelligence
community as now constituted.
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
The various major agencies of the intelligence community are shown
on the following page.
Central Intelligence Agency. Established in 1947, the CIA was man-
dated principally to correlate and evaluate foreign intelligence relat-
ing to the national security; to recommend to the NSC methods for
the coordination of intelligence; and to perform for existing intelli-
gence agencies services of common concern which the NSC determined
could be more efficiently accomplished centrally. The agency was also
authorized "to perform such other functions and duties as the NSC
may from time to time direct," language which has been interpreted
to grant authority for covert action not limited to the acquisition of
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Ca
"40" COMMITTEE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STRUCTURE
UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE BOARD
USIB COMMITTEES
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
OFFICERS
NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY
-r
PRESIDENT
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NSC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
DIRECTOR
OF
INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES
ADVISORY COMMITTEE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
I
I
I
I
I
I
1
I
I
I
I
I
I
L
INTELLIGENCE R&D COUNCIL
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
STAFF
I
1
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
ENERGY RESEARCH &
DEVELOPMENT
ADMINISTRATION
-r
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
ARMY
?r
STATE
DEPARTMENT
TREASURY
DEPARTMENT
NAVY
AIR FORCE
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
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information. The agency was specifically denied any "police, subpoena,
law enforcement powers, or internal security functions."
To accommodate the secrecy of its work, CIA has authority to ex-
pend funds solely on the certification of its Director, to negotiate
purchases without publicly soliciting bids, and to transfer funds and
people between government agencies. It is also exempt from the laws
requiring disclosure of its organization, functions, and budgets, and
the identity of its employees.
CIA is headed by a Director and Deputy Director, both appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Senate. One or the other has
always been drawn from military life. The Director of Central Intelli-
gence (DCI) has two quite separate functions. He is responsible for all
activities of the CIA, but is also the principal intelligence adviser to
the President and NSC, and thereby responsible for coordinating the
activities of the entire intelligence community. As suggesil ed below,
the latter responsibility has never been fully carried out.
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). This bureau of the State
Department is devoted to the assessment rather than the collection of
intelligence. Much the smallest of the major intelligence agencies, it
serves principally the needs of policymakers in the State Department,
but also contributes to common analytic products of the intelligence
community and specifies State's intelligence requirements. INR man-
ages the State Department's programs for external research and pro-
vides departmental policy guidance for intelligence operations con-
ducted by other agencies.
Defense Intelligence Agency. DIA provides intelligence support to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. It prepares
its own intelligence assessments and coordinates Department of De-
fense (DOD) input to the production of national intelligence. It also
manages the Defense Attache system and various other special intelli-
gence programs. Though responsible for inducing economy and effi-
ciency in the management of all DOD intelligence resources and for
issuing defense intelligence requirements, the Director of DIA cannot
control those resources, which remain under the authority of the Secre-
tary of Defense and the direction of the individual armed services.
National Security Agency. NSA, largest of the intelligence agencies
in personnel despite considerable contraction in recent years, is a semi-
autonomous cryptologic agency of the Defense Department responsible
principally for monitoring foreign communications and other signals
for analysis by other agencies. NSA is also responsible for protecting
the security of U.S. communications.
Each of the armed services maintains its own cryptologic agency,
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however, which both manages facilities on behalf of NSA and meets
the special requirements of its own service.
Program for Overhead Reconnaissance. A semi-autonomous office
within the Defense Department, with the largest budget of any intel-
ligence agency, operates overhead reconnaissance programs for the
entire intelligence community. The program is given general direction
by the DCI and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence,
and responds to specific requirements determined by a committee of
the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB).
Army, Navy, and-Air Force Intelligence. Each of the armed services
maintains sizable intelligence organizations. All participate in the
production of national intelligence and have responsibilities to meet
the tactical intelligence requirements of field commanders, to protect
the security of armed services installations and personnel, and to
gather technical intelligence on the weaponry of their counterpart
services in other countries.
? Other Agencies. The intelligence units of the FBI, Treasury Depart-
? ment, and Energy Research and Development Administration are
also formally part of the intelligence community, contributing spe-
cialized foreign intelligence on matters within their jurisdictions.
.Direction of the Community. Two committees of the NSC contribute
to the overall direction of the community:
?the Intelligence Committee (NSCIC) intended to provide a
forum in- which policymakers?consumers of intelligence?can
inform collectors and analysts of their interests and requirements.*
? The NSCIC has two ? subcommittees: a Working Group, headed
by the DCI's Deputy Director for the Intelligence Community,
and the Economic Intelligence Subcommittee, chaired by the
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs.
?the 40 Committee, which must approve covert actions and other
high risk operations.**
. In addition there exists a U.S. Intelligence-Board (usrB), coin-
posed of all major U.S. agencies with intelligence responsibilities, and
the _Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC), on which
_ both the intelligence community and the Office of . Management and
*Members: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chair-
man), Director of Central Intelligence (Vice-Chairman), Deputy Secretary of
State, Deputy Secretary of Defense,' Chairman, JCS, and Under Secretary of the
Treasury for Monetary Affairs.
**Members: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chair-
man), Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Deputy Secretary of De-
fense, Chairman, JCS, and Director of Central Intelligence.
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0, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
?. President ? Vice President ?Secretary of State ? Secretary of Defense
? Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ? Director of Central Intelligence
White House
Situation Room
Asst to Pres for Nat'l
Sec Affairs
NSC Staff
UNDER SECRETARIES
COMMITTEE
? Dep Sec of State (Chmn)
? Asst to Pres for Nat'l Sec Affairs
? Dep Sec of Defense
? Chairman, JCS
? DCI
SENIOR REVIEW GROUP
? Asst to Pres for Nat'l Sec
Affairs (Chmn)
? Pep Sec of State
? Dep Sec of Defense
? Chairman, JCS
? DCI
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
? Asst to Pres for Nat'l Sec
Affairs (Chmn)
? DCI (Vice Chairman)
? Dep Sec of State
? Deo Sec of Defense
? Chairman, JCS
? Under Sec of Treasury for
Monetary Affairs
VERIFICATION PANEL
? Asst to Pres for Nat'l Sec
Affairs (Chmn)
? Dep Sec of State
? Dep Sec of Defense
? Chairman, ICS
? Dtrector, ACDA
? DCI
DEFENSE PROGRAM
REVIEW COMMITTEE
? Asst to Pres for Nat'l Sec
Affairs (Chmn)
? Dep Sec of State
? Dep Sec of Defense
? Chairman, JCS
? Chairman, Council of
Econ Advisors
? Director, OMB
? DCI
WASHINGTON SPECIAL
ACTIONS GROUP
? Asst to Pres for Nat'l Sec
Affairs (Chmn)
? Dep Sec of State
? Dep Sec of Defense
? Chairman, JCS
? DCI
"40" COMMITTEE
? Asst to Pres for Nat'l Sec
Affairs (Chmn)
? Under Sec State for Pol All
? Dep Sec of Defense
? Chairman, JCS
? DCI
INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUPS (Regional)
? STATE (Chmn)
A representative of:
? DEFENSE ? CIA ? NSC ? JCS
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
REVIEW GROUP
? Asst to Pres for Nat'l Sec
Affairs (Chmn)
? State ? CIEP
? Treasury ? FEA
? Defense ? CEA
? OMB ? AEC
? CIA
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Budget are represented. Both are chaired by the DCI. USIB's respon-
sibilities are principally to advise the DCI on the establishment of
intelligence requirements and priorities, the production of national
intelligence estimates, and the protection of intelligence sources and
methods; IRAC is intended to advise the DCI on the allocation of
resources throughout the community.
Finally, at the Presidential level, there exists a President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) . Members of PFIAB are pri-
vate citizens appointed by the President, served by a 2-man staff whose
head is also appointed by the President. PFIAB's principal respon-
sibilities are to "advise the President concerning the objectives, con-
duct, management and coordination of the various activities making
up the overall national intelligence effort ;" and to consider and make
recommendations concerning matters brought to its attention by the
intelligence community. It can request staff assistance and special
studies from intelligence agencies to augment its own efforts.
TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT AND LEADERSHIP
None of the three major purposes this Commission seeks to advance
can be met without effective communitywide leadership of U.S. intel-
ligence. Neither responsiveness to the needs of decision-making nor
economy of operation nor adherence to standards of conduct can be
insured unless the intelligence community as a whole is subject to
adequate supervision, and made accountable for its activities. Achiev-
ing that end has proven extraordinarily difficult. Many commissions
and many presidents have sought improvements, and steady evolution
in the right direction has resulted. But we believe that additional
steps are now necessary.
Sources of the Problem. The difficulty of the problem arises from
several causes. We have already referred to one: the community con-
sists of many agencies, with differing objectives, traditions, and lines of
command. Another is suggested by the sketch of the community offered
above: the great bulk of its budget and manpower falls within the De-
partment of Defense. Yet the Secretary of Defense clearly should
not also serve as the nation's chief intelligence officer. A third arises
out of the promise of technology. Where rapid developments in tech-
nology promise new capabilities, it is a common tendency for orga-
nizations to acquire those technologies without examining closely
whether the capabilities are really necessary. That tendency has ap-
peared in the intelligence community.
Prior efforts to deal with this situation have taken several forms.
Presidents have used advisory boards reporting to them (PFIAB
and its predecessors) to help monitor the community. Committees of
the NSC (NSCIC, 40 Committee) and of principals of the intelli-
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gence agencies (USIB and IRAC) have been charged with some
aspects of coordination. We believe both devices are appropriate, and
make recommendations for their extension below. Since the creation of
CIA in 1947, however, the central figure in the direction of the intelli-
gence community has been the Director of Central Intelligence. In
addition to his responsibilities for CIA, the DCI has been charged
with the oversight and leadership of the entire intelligence community.
From the beginning this arrangement has worked only partially.
Having line authority over their own agency, but only limited influ-
ence over other intelligence units, DCIs have tended, especially in
the early years, to devote themselves almost entirely to CIA affairs.
On the authority of directives issued in 1971, Deis have given con-
siderably more attention to their community-wide responsibilities, and
created an Intelligence Community. (IC) Staff to assist them in that
effort. But the Commission believes that an additional step is now
necessary.
The Crucial Role of the President. It is neither possible nor desirable
to give the DCI line authority over that very large fraction of the
intelligence community which lies outside the CIA. If he is to effec-
tively supervise the whole community, however, there is only one sub-
stitute for such authority, and that is a close relationship with the
one official who does ultimately command each of the separate strands
of that community: the President. We think it essential, therefore,
that to meet his community-wide responsibilities as well as to function
as the President's intelligence adviser, the DCI should have direct
access to the President. We recommend, that
the DCI should have an office in close proximity to the White House
and be accorded regular and direct contact with the President.
To.function as the President's intelligence adviser, it is essential
that the DCI have immediate access to and control over the CIA
facilities necessary to assemble, evaluate and reach conclusions about
intelligence in all functional fields including political, economic, mili-
tary and scientific subjects. Today the bulk of the information comes
from open sources, overhead reconnaissance, and electronic signals
and communications, with only a small but possibly critical component
derived from clandestine sources.
Therefore, the DCI would retain responsibility for the CIA, spend-
ing whatever time at CIA headquarters may be necessary. But he
would delegate much of the authority for direction of that agency to
his deputy. In stressing his relationship to the President, we do not
mean to diminish the DOI's responsibilities to the Congress. He would
continue to be confirmed by the Senate and to be available to testify
and otherwise to confer, with the appropriate committees of the Con-
gress.
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We believe, moreover, that, to make clear the solely foreign respon-
sibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency and of its Director,
the CIA should be retitled the Foreign Intelligence Agency (FIA),
and its Director the Director of Foreign Intelligence (DFI).
We believe that certain modest extensions of the DCI's current respon-
sibilities for community-wide planning and budgeting are also appro-
priate, and make specific recommendations to these ends in the pages
below.
It is obviously useful for persons appointed to the DFI rank to
have had some prior experience in intelligence matters. But the crucial
characteristics for this position will be broad understanding of foreign
and national security affairs, managerial skill, sensitivity to the con-
straints within which an American intelligence service must operate,
independence and high integrity. The DFI should normally be a
person of stature from outside the intelligence career service, al-
though promotion from within should not be barred. And the DFI
must be someone in whose judgment the President has great confidence.
Without Presidential backing the DFI's community-wide role will
not materialize.
A Strengthened PFIAB. In view of the special importance and sen-
sitivity of intelligence, the Commission believes the President should
have sources of advice independent of the DFI. The PFIAB should
become the principal such source. In the past, PFIAB has played an
important role in the development of technical collection systems, in
conducting useful analyses of apparent intelligence failures, and in
directing attention to new issues for intelligence concern. But we be-
lieve the Board should play a larger role?the steady, external and
independent oversight of the performance of the foreign intelligence
community as a whole. In this connection, the Commission notes
favorably the recommendations of the Rockefeller Commission on
strengthening the role of PFIAB. Both the objectives and the methods
of U.S. intelligence in a rapidly changing world require such review
from outside the community, and a strengthened and well-utilized
PFIAB would be best situated to perform it. We recommend, there.
fore, that
?each incoming President should review and make such changes
in PF AB's membership as may be required to give him high, per-
sonal confidence in that body's values and judgment; that
?he make himself directly available to the Chairman of PFIAB
upon the latter's request; and that
?the PFIAB staff should be increased in size, and drawn in part
from sources outside the intelligence community.
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Covert Action: A Special Problem. To this point we have addressed
only the intelligence activities of the intelligence community. But, in
addition to those endeavors, the community?specifically CIA?has
also been responsible for another activity which poses special problems
of oversight and control. This is covert action, activity abroad
intended not to gather information but to influence events, an activity
midway between diplomacy and war. It has taken many forms, from
the financial support of friendly publications to the mounting of sig-
nificant paramilitary efforts.
The Commission has considered whether covert action should any
longer be authorized at all. It recognizes that there are many risks and
dangers associated with covert action. Partly for these reasons the
use of covert action in recent years has markedly declined.
But we must live in the world we find, not the world we might wish.
Our adversaries deny themselves no forms of action which might
advance their interests or undercut ours, as quite recent as well as past
events demonstrate. In many parts of the world a prohibition on our
use of covert action would put the -U.S. and those who rely on it at a
dangerous disadvantage. We conclude, therefore, that
covert action cannot be abandoned, but that it should be employed
only where clearly essential to vital U.S. purposes and then only
after a careful process of high level review.
The current process for approval of covert action involves the sub-
mission of proposals to the 40 Committee. The Committee approves
or disapproves, and its chairman, the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, issues appropriate instructions. In recent
years, however, as authorizations have decreased in number, the pro-
cedures of the Committee have become quite informal, and it has met
infrequently.
We believe present practices are inadequate. The sensitivity and
risks of covert action require appropriate review and consultation.
The Committee therefore proposes that:
?Covert action should only be authorized after collective con-
sideration of its benefits and risks by all available 40 Committee
members, and that,
?Besides granting initial approvals, the 40 Committee sh,ould reg-
ularly review the continuing appropriateness of activities still
being pursued.
In addition to requiring careful review within the executive branch,
the Commission believes that covert action should be reported to the
Joint Committee of the Congress on National Security proposed in
Chapter 14. We also believe that the current requirement of law that
the President personally certify to the Congress the necessity for all
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covert actions (the Hughes Amendment to the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1974, P.L. 93-559) is harmful in associating the head of State
so formally with such activities. We propose, therefore, that:
PL 93-559 be amended to require reporting of covert actions to the
proposed Joint Committee on National Security, and to omit any
requirement for the personal certification of the President as to
their necessity.
TOWARD RESPONSIVENESS: IMPROVING THE RELEVANCE AND
QUALITY OF INTELLIGENCE
Relevance. Intelligence is not an end in itself; to be useful it must
assist decision-makers to meet their responsibilities for national secu-
rity and foreign policy. To do that, intelligence must provide answers
to the questions central to the formulation of policy. The intelligence
community cannot identify those questions without the assistance
of policymakers.
The solution in theory is easy. Policymakers at all significant levels
must regularly inform appropriate elements in the intelligence com-
munity of trends in the evolution of policy which may set new intel-
ligence requirements. They must make clear what questions they need
answered?and with what timing and in what degree of detail. And
they must provide pointed evaluations of current intelligence prod-
ucts. But practice is harder. Policymakers are few and overburdened.
Even when dissatisfied with intelligence, they are rarely willing or
able to devote substantial time to determining the causes of inade-
quacy, and correcting them. The result is that the work of the intel-
ligence community becomes largely responsive to its own perceptions
of what is important, and irrelevant information is collected, some-
times drowning out the important.
As a result of attention to this problem in recent years, the National
Security Council Intelligence Committee (NSCIC) was established
to provide guidance on consumer needs and intelligence requirements,
USIB was broadened by inclusion of a representative of the Treasury
Department, the DCI was assigned a stronger mandate to establish
requirements and to develop comprehensive community-wide plans,
and the Intelligence Community Staff was established to assist the
DCI especially in assessing community performance and in monitor-
ing consumer interests.
Building on these reforms, the DCI then inaugurated several addi-
tional innovations. His IC staff began developing five-year commu-
nity-wide plans, and formulating "Key Intelligence Questions" to
reflect the concerns of principal intelligence consumers. The DCI also
replaced the old Board of National Estimates with individual Na-
tional Intelligence Officers (NI0s) responsible for responding to con-
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sumer requests and for personally supervising the production of
National Intelligence Estimates.
Most of these new steps are proving useful, but the major institution
on which they all largely depend, the NSCIC, has not functioned ade-
quately. We believe it is important to correct this situation. There was
considerable difference of opinion within the Commission about how
to increase the effectiveness of the NSCIC. Some favored making the
DFI Chairman because, as the President's principal intelligence ad-
visor, he would have both the authority and the incentive to bring
together the key policymakers on a regular basis, as well as an intimate
knowledge of the capabilities of the intelligence community. Others
preferred leaving the President's National Security Adviser as Chair-
man because he is the principal representative of the President on
national security matters. He is also an important intelligence user,
and is well placed to judge the adequacy and timeliness of the intelli-
gence product in terms of policy needs.
It was agreed that:
The NSCIC should be actively used as the principal form for
the resolution, short of the President, of the differing perspectives
of intelligence consumers and producers, and should ?meet frequently
for that purpose.
Improving the Quality of Analysis. To meet the needs of decision-
makers, intelligence must not only address the key questions; it must
do so at the highest levels of analytic competence and integrity. To
help maintain those standards the Commission makes recommenda-
tions of four kinds.
The first and most important involves the more effective utilization
of the State Department's routine Foreign Service reporting. A series
of recommendations for sharpening the focus and improving the qual-
ity of that under-utilized resource appear in Chapter 9.
The second proposal involves economic intelligence. As the economic
content of foreign policy increases, it is crucial that accurate and far-
sighted analyses of global demand and supply problems, emerging
international trade and investment opportunities, and international
monetary matters be available to foreign policy decision-makers.
Unlike military intelligence, which frequently requires enormous
investments in data gathering, most economic issues do not depend
upon secret information. The key to their understanding lies in highly
competent analysis of readily procurable data. Commendably, CIA
has greatly strengthened its capability for economic analysis in recent
years. But?with some exceptions?this is not a field in which CIA, or
the intelligence community generally, has a strong comparative advan-
tage. Moreover, though duplication in large-scale data-gathering is
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expensive and wasteful, competition in analysis is relatively cheap
and highly desirable. We recommend, therefore, that
while the intelligence agencies should retain and exercise their
improved competence in the analysis of international economic
issues, the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Agri-
culture, and the Council of Economic Advisors must maintain simi-
lar capabilities focused on the analysis of issues involving their
own Weresponsibilities. believe that, in all four of the Departments,
those capabilities should be significantly strengthened.
Thirdly, we propose a modification to the NIO system. Prior to 1973,
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), the formal expressions of
the intelligence community's best judgment on major issues, were pro-
duced by a Board of National Estimates. But that collegial process
tended to produce better estimates of what the community could agree
upon than what policymakers needed to know. The Board has been
replaced ?by some eleven individual National Intelligence Officers
(NI0s) , each charged with insuring the responsiveness of NIEs to
policy needs in particular substantive areas. NIEs are now drafted by
individual experts selected by the NIO from various intelligence
agencies. Predictably, the gains in responsiveness of estimates have
been somewhat offset by problems of reliability, and the practice of
requiring officers already bearing other responsibilities to undertake
the production of NIEs has created unnecessary burdens. Most impor-
tant, NIEs appear to have little impact on policymakers today, in
large part because key consumers prefer to base their own estimates
of future developments on competing sources of information and analy-
sis. NIEs have lately begun to reflect more clearly differences in view
within the intelligence community, but we believe that this process
should be intensified. For these reasons we propose that
a small staff of the highest quality, drawn from within and without
the intelligence community and responsible for the drafting and
review of NIEs, should be established. This staff, reporting directly
to the DF I, should be charged with reporting clearly any important
differences in the views of concerned agencies, and the reasons for
such differences.
Finally, we note that, while investing very large sums in sophisti-
cated technical means of intelligence collection, the community has
tended to slight the contribution that only human sources can make.
On many subjects, the completeness and accuracy of intelligence esti-
mates depend on factors of intention and motivation that only human
sources can provide. We believe that efforts to maintain and utilize
such sources should be enlarged and strengthened. These efforts should
include improved Foreign Service reporting (elsewhere discussed),
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reenforced clandestine collection, and changes in the military attache
system designed to make the attache service an important part of
career progression for capable officers.
MAKING MORE EFFICIENT USE OF INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES
Resource management, like other major problems of the intelligence
community, has received considerable attention in recent years. Two
recent institutional innovations?the IC Staff and IRAC?have proven
useful, and the combination of organizational change and the personal
concern of recent DCIs and Secretaries of Defense have produced a
very substantial cutback in intelligence personnel and a leveling of
the intelligence budget over the past several years.
The Consolidated National Foreign Intelligence Budget developed
by the DCI in each of the past several years has presented a compre-
hensive overview of the intelligence effort useful to the budgetary re-
view of 01VIB, the President, and the Congress. And the DCI has
developed an annual analysis of the political, economic, and security
environment anticipated in the next five years, called "Perspectives
for Intelligence," which should make possible more comprehensive
community-wide planning of activities and consequent allocations of
budget.
We believe two evolutionary steps would now be useful.
Under the direction of the DFI, the IC staff should expand "Per-
spectives for Intelligence" into an annually revised multi-year plan
for the allocation of responsibilities across the intelligence cora-
nvunity. The plan should be reviewed in USIB and approved by
the NSCIC.
?
On the basis of the multiyear plain, the IC staff should prepare an
annual Consolidated Foreign Intelligence Budget. After review by
IRAC and OMB, this document should guide the budget submis-
sion of each of the agencies and departments of the intelligence
community to OMB. It should also provide a basis for the consid-
eration, by the proposed Joint Committee of the Congress on Na-
tional Security, of the funds to be annually authorized the intelli-
gence community.
Resource Management in DOD. However influential the DFI may
become, the preponderance of the intelligence budget, appropriated
by Congress to the Department of Defense, will continue to fall under
the authority of the Secretary of Defense. The Commission makes
no recommendation concerning the organization of intelligence func-
tions or responsibilities within the Department of Defense. But it
asserts that, if the resources applied to intelligence are to be allocated
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in accordance with the overall priorities established by the NSCIC and
the DFI and utilized more efficiently, the Secretary of Defense must
serve as an agent of these priorities. In order to do so, we believe, he
will have to equip himself with the analytic and managerial capacity
necessary to oversee the large and partly duplicatory intelligence oper-
ations of the armed services.
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CHAPTER 8
PUBLIC OPINION AND HUMANITARIAN
CONSIDERATIONS
We group together here two important, pervasive, subjects because,
though different, they bear quite similar relationships to the problem
of formulating and carrying out foreign policy, and because they
also have in common a relation to the fundamental values of our
nation. These are the roles of public opinion and of humanitarian
considerations in the making of U.S. foreign policy.
Many have told us that any effort to deepen the involvement of
the American people in the making of foreign policy is impossible or
dangerous. They argue that the role that the general citizenry can?
or should?play in the conduct of foreign policy must of necessity
be very limited.
Similarly, some have taken the position that ethical and moral
components of foreign policymaking, together with the associated
problems of human rights, are too elusive to be given organizational
weight, and that either policy will be made by those sensitive to moral
and ethical constraints, or it will not.
We do not believe that all problems of the foreign policy process
can be solved by organizational means, but we do believe that organi-
zational changes can be helpful.
PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY
Public opinion only intermittently makes itself felt on foreign
policy issues. It focuses mainly on dramatic national security ques-
tions, especially those involving the actual or possible use of American
forces abroad. The best predictor of public interest is whether a
substantial portion of the public sees itself directly affected by an
issue. If, as we believe, our future foreign policy will be dominated
as much by economic problems having direct domestic impacts as by
political-military issues, public concern with foreign policy will be
substantially heightened. There will be a greater incentive to learn
about foreign policy, and an increased desire to communicate views
about it to government officials.
New political realities thus reinforce traditional political theory.
Both suggest that the public must possess accurate information about
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what the government is doing or proposes to do, and why. Similarly,
better channels of access to policymakers for expressions of public
attitudes about current or possible actions will be useful.
We believe that future policies will involve hard choices and trade-
offs, with domestic sacrifice, sometimes necessary as the price of for-
eign policy gains. In such instances both the Executive and Congress
can expect to receive strong public expressions of attention and con-
cern. Effective policymaking will be further complicated because,
while the effect of foreign actions on the U.S. are quite obvious, the
impact abroad of U.S. actions are often less clear to the American
people. A coherent policy requires balanced attention to both foreign
and domestic implications of world interdependence.
We believe these developments will add to two already difficult
problems. Public opinion is volatile. Radical swings in public opinion
present constraints on responsible foreign policymaking. Secondly,
the issues we believe will come to the fore in the next years are likely
to be featured by long time frames, requiring maintenance of policies
whose costs may be immediate, but whose benefits are distant. In both
cases, the positions taken by national leaders?executive and congres-
sional alike?will be critical. The public will need to be adequately
informed if it is consistently to support constructive policies in the
national interest.
The public involved in future foreign policy issues will be much
broader than the small groups which have traditionally participated in
foreign affairs, or the representatives of specific interests directly
affected by legislation or decision. Public involvement will include not
only many individuals who in earlier days would have shown no con-
tinuing interest in foreign policy, but also organizations interested in
the quality and openness of government, and intent upon active par-
ticipation in the development of public policy. Much of this attention
will be devoted to the Congress. By virtue of the increasing interrela-
tionship between domestic and foreign considerations and with the
increased awareness through TV of events throughout the world, Con-
gressional constituencies will more heavily and continually than here-
tofore be engaged in matters of foreign affairs. This involvement may
be to the discomfort of some of the Members of Congress who at times
have taken refuge in aloofness from responsitility for foreign policy.
To a far greater degree than previously, foreign policy issues will con-
cern all Members of Congress and not simply the foreign affairs com-
mittees and the leadership.
In this changing climate, the challenges facing political leadership,
congressional and executive, in resolving conflicts and in making
intelligent policy choices will be less difficult if the public is well
informed. The government will need to convey more information to the
public, and in return to receive a more accurate sense of public toler-
ance and support for current and proposed policies.
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Against this background, the Commission believes that there are a
number of ways of improving the two-way flow of information be-
tween public and government. We are fully aware that devices and
procedures to improve commuications cannot substitute for receptive-
ness to what is being communicated. We are also aware that there
are no simple solutions to the problems of public opinion and public
education on foreign policy issues.
We divide our recommendations into two categories: those directed
to improving the amount and quality of information about foreign
policy which is available to the public; and those designed to improve
the transmittal of public opinion about foreign policy issues to both
Congress and the executive branch.
Informing the Public. The Commission believes that the quality,
relevance, and in some cases, the quantity of information the public
receives about foreign policy must be improved. Multiple sources are
required, since government officials will understandably strive to
present current policies in the most favorable light. Official statements
arguing the merits of specific policies will remain the starting point,
but the executive branch should be receptive to the expression of alter-
native views. Obstacles to obtaining and presenting factual informa-
tion, whether by the Congress, the news media, or private organiza-
tions, should be reduced.
The Commission therefore is recommending (Chapter 14) that
recent trends toward opening to the public the deliberations of Con-
gress on major foreign policy issues be encouraged and that Commit-
tee hearings and under certain circumstances floor debates be open for
television.
Executive branch officials should provide information with speci-
ficity and completeness, whether through press conferences, speeches,
informal presentations, and publications. Periodic, scheduled oppor-
tunities to explain policy should be accompanied by arrangements
to encourage public dialogue. To this end we recommend that:
The executive branch foreign affairs agencies should seek ade-
quate funding for the specific purpose of developing more compre-
h,ensive public affairs programs.
This effort may require a change in congressional attitudes about au-
thorizing and appropriating funds for domestic information pur-
poses, but we believe the nature of emerging issues makes such pro-
grams necessary. Similarly, some relaxation on the distribution of
USIA materials domestically may be appropriate.
In a similar vein, we have recommended in connection with planning
for foreign policy that the practice of issuing authoritative annual
reports on foreign policy such as "The State of the World" report
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should be reintroduced, and that Congress should conduct hearings
to review and illuminate controversial aspects of these reports.*
This annual report should be prepared in an attractive and readable
format, to encourage wide attention. Together with Congressional
debate and public discussion, such a report should help develop and
articulate a new conception of national purpose toward other nations.
Private organizations interested in foreign relations, such as the World
Affairs Councils in many cities, might be encouraged to review and
critique the annual report. The report would clearly serve a wider
purpose than simply public information; indeed it would become the
clearest and most comprehensive enunciation of the conceptual base of
U.S. foreign policy. Nevertheless, for public information purposes
alone, it can have untold value and warrants the assignment of high
level staff to insure its most effective presentation.
These steps would improve the quality of information provided
to the public by government. But, by themselves, they are obviously
insufficient to insure that the level of public knowledge is adequate.
Alone, they run the risk of providing one-sided views, and therefore
need to be supplemented by non-official sources. The press will always
provide much of the short-term information, and educational institu-
tions the frames of reference for current events. Timely and accurate
information should be available to the public in a forthcoming fashion.
The Commission considered the advisability of creating a "National
Endowment for Foreign Policy Information" or other official or
quasi-official mechanism, whose purpose would be to further the ex-
change of information by private citizens, organizations, and the
government itself, and perhaps to provide grant support for private
programs dealing with foreign affairs. We have concluded that such
a clearing house for information would seem to us to be highly desira-
ble, but we believe it should be a private sector activity.
However, on a broader level, efforts to improve national educational
programs are essential in developing a sophisticated public under-
standing of complex issues. To that end, the Commission recommends
that:
The International Education Act of 1966, or an equivalent act to
develop and support programs of advanced and undergraduate in-
ternatioval studies, should be funded. Its objectives might be
broadened to include programs designed to provide (a) extensive
research in foreign policy fields and (b) better substantive training
for journalists.
Informing the Government. In the American constitutional system
responsibility for foreign policy rests with the executive branch and
Congress. Both must be responsive to the public, but responsible polit-
* See Chapter 10 for the recommendation proposing such a report and
Chapter 14 for the recommendation proposing such hearings.
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ical leadership requires that elected and appointed officials be willing
to take the lead in actiOns which they believe to be right but which
may be currently unpopular. At best, the member of Congress or execu-
tive policymaker may be aware only of the views of specific interests
likely to be affected by a proposed action, with little sense of how
accurately this reflects broader public opinion. This problem can
never be completely solved; the general public forms opinions on
many issues only when confronted with the results of actions already
taken. In any event, "government by referendum" is neither desirable
nor practical, even in relation to the broad and continuing direction
of overall policy and national goals.
The Commission believes that improvement is possible in what the
government does know about public opinion; the nation is best served
by government officials knowledgeable about views of their fellow
citizens.
Polling is one such useful way of determining the trends of public
opinion on issues of major importance. Results of such polls, par-
ticularly on embryonic issues, cannot be considered definitive, but
they can serve a number of important purposes if they are closely
heeded to by policymakers. In some cases they may provide early
warning of swings in public opinion which might need to be taken
account of in order to carry out responsible policies. They can also
give indications of instances in which the reasons for policy may be
perceived very differently by the public than by government officials.
Implicit in these reasons is that polling provides a means for views
of the general public to be conveyed to policymakers, unfiltered by
expressions of special interest.
Because of the potential utility of public opinion polling, the Coin-
misison considered carefully whether to recommend that the govern-
ment resume polling, possibly under the joint auspices of the executive
and legislative branches, with the results made public. We have con-
cluded that such polling is properly a private sector activity, and
that reputable private polling organizations are best equipped to
carry it out. We 'do encourage policymakers, however, to employ the
results of polls as one element in their consideration of complex policy
issues.
We recommend in addition that:
Forums for interchange of views and opinion between govern-
ment, particularly the State Department, and the public be
expanded.
For example, the small current program for periodic meetings between
representatives of state and local governments and the State Depart-
ment on issues that affect governments and constituencies at that level
should be expanded, and broadened to include other departments as
well. Similarily, widespread communication channels should be
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strengthened between key Department of State officials and the gen-
eral public as well as the major voluntary organizations with foreign
affairs concerns. While the proposal made by some of a centralized
"Citizens Foreign Affairs Council" with national representation seems
impractical because of difficulties in determining membership, regional
bodies or conferences based on voluntary participation and premised
on serious discussions of specific agendas seem to us to be a promising
means of facilitating communication. We also believe that exchange
programs for Foreign Service Officers to universities, to state and local
governments and to Congressional staffs should be further encouraged.
The Commission is more concerned that a wide range of consultative
mechanisms be encouraged than with advocacy of any of those sug-
gested here. What is important is that there be channels of access to
policymakers by citizens groups, and that they be used to improve the
information available both to the public and to the government.
More generally, we believe that official spokesmen responsible for
explaining policy to the press and public should be given a more ac-
tive role in the policy process. This would not only reduce the "second-
hand" nature of information given out, but make it more probable that
policymakers would be better informed about the real concerns of the
public and the press while actually making policy. Spokesmen who
are also policy participants and who must confront questions about
what is being done on a routine basis are likely to have a much better
sense of public opinion than those who are more insulated. If many
policy choices are likely to be as difficult as suggested earlier because
of the conflict between domestic and foreign policy goals, as much
knowledge as possible about what is acceptable should be welcomed.
Similarly, results of major public opinion polls should be systemati-
cally brought to the attention of policymakers.
In conclusion, the Commission hopes that the recommendations and
suggestions presented could lead to an improved dialogue between
citizen and government. We believe that they do not cross the narrow
line between informing and educating the public on the one hand,
and influencing public opinion for political or policy advantage on the
Other. This line is not always clear, and safeguards and periodic re-
assessments are vital. But we believe it is even more dangerous in a
democratic society for the public, because of the unavailability of
accurate and timely information or of a means of expressing opinions,
to be denied the opportunity to state their preferences on policies
which affect them directly; and equally dangerous for policymakers
to act without benefit of such expressions of the public will.
HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMANITARIAN AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY
Virtually all major foreign policy issues contain some ethical com-
ponent. Ethical aspects of policy may be obvious, as in such issues as
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the emigration rights of Soviet Jews, apartheid in southern Africa,
or drought relief for the Sahel. They may be less evident in such
issues as trade relations with developing countries, access to raw ma-
terials, political relations with authoritarian regimes, strategic doc-
trine and weapons design, and environmental and oceans policies. They
arise in novel problems (e.g., weather modification) in familiar prob-
lems involving new sensitivities (e.g., covert political action), and in
unresolved issues with which societies have wrestled since the begin-
ning of recorded history (e.g., rules of war).
The Commission believes that one of the enduring goals of U.S.
foreign policy is a world order in which all nations respond to the
urgent needs of those who have been victims of disaster, or denied
basic rights. It believes therefore that the U.S. must take special care
to insure that in both word and deed our own foreign policy reflects
devotion to high ethical standards.
To that end, we propose a number of organizational and procedural
measures. We offer these proposals as we do our others, knowing that
organizational forms do not assure policy results, but conscious also
that they may increase sensitivities and thus help insure that due con-
sideration is given to ethical arguments in the setting and carrying
out of policy.
It is useful to distinguish among three kinds of ethical considera-
tions in foreign policy. One category can be termed "Humanitarian."
Issues of this character involve people affected or threatened by nat-
ural or man-made disasters, who can appeal to the humanity or char-
ity of their fellow humans, but possess no claim of right against any
external power. Humanitarian issues are generally the least contro-
versial of those involving ethical considerations in foreign policy. In
practice their resolution usually involves the allocation of resources,
in money or in kind, in aid of those in need. Such aid may be given
to victims of droughts, epidemics and earthquakes, refugees and vic-
tims of war. The needs of such victims are generally obvious and
frequently poignant; U.S. response to them has generally been good.
Organizational responsibility for these humanitarian programs is
focused in the Offices of Refugees and Migration Affairs, Private and
Voluntary Cooperation, Foreign Disaster Relief Coordination, in the
State Department and in A.I.D.
The central problem is that these offices are not organized to work
together effectively. A recent report by the Inspector General of the
Foreign Service observed that the various offices function too inde-
pendently of one another. Improved coordination of effort should be
the primary objective of any change. A more unified structure, more-
over, would give greater weight to the humanitarian perspective in
the U.S. decisionmaking process generally.
A second category of issues, "Human Rights," involve deprivations
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attributable to a government's policies or negligence?the protection
of inherent and universal rights of persons to life, liberty, the security
of person, freedom from slavery, torture, or arbitrary arrest; freedom
of religion, and equal protection of the law. Questions of the weight
to be accorded these rights arise in connection with issues as diverse
as those of political asylum, the treatment of prisoners of war, U.S.
relations with authoritarian regimes of right and left, and the use of
some forms of covert action.
Organizational responsibilities for the representation of human
rights in our government have undergone recent change. The State
Department in 1974 and 1975 has supplemented the small Human
Rights Office in what is now the Bureau of International Organiza-
tions Affairs, in existence since the 1950s, with an Assistant Legal
Adviser for Human Rights, Human Rights Officers in each regional
bureau, and a Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in the Office of
the Deputy Secretary. Although it is too early to make a firm evalua-
tion of these innovations, some problems are already apparent. The
Foreign Service Officers assigned the new regional Human Rights
positions continue to carry their previous full-time responsibilities;
their human rights function is therefore of secondary priority. More-
over, nothing insures that these officers are included in crisis discus-
sions of issues with human rights or humanitarian implications,
especially if the implications are not immediately obvious. The Co-
ordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, who has recently been named
as a special assistant to the Deputy Secretary, may not have the
capability for an effective follow-through on the many diverse issues
involved. Moreover, these various organizational entities, like the
humanitarian officers, have had no focal point and have lacked co-
ordination. While the recent changes are laudable, they are likely to
prove insufficient.
The foregoing problems are relatively easily identifiable. They
involve moral dimensions that humanity has recognized for centuries.
The third category, that of general ethical responsibilities, is less clear-
cut. The ethical responsibilities that man has to man and nation to
nation, where neither recognized rights nor dramatic misfortunes are
involved, are more subtle and less certain. But ethical issues lie close
to the heart of many current international differences: problems of
arms control and disarmament, including weapons design and strategic
doctrine; problems of the redistribution of wealth, including terms of
trade, and transfers of capital and of technology; and food and popula-
tion policies. The resolution of these issues will require attempts to
apply basic ethical norms as well as other criteria in the formulation
of policy.
, A few commentators have gone so far as to suggest the appointment
of a number of "counsellors in ethics" who would sit with top policy
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r
i
PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OF STATE DEPARTMENT
HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMANITARIAN AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS
Bureau of UN
Affairs
U.S. Rep.
to UN HR
Commission
I
r
11111
Regional
Bureaus
HR
Officers
I I ,
I 1
Field
HR
Officers
Secretary
of State
Deputy
-r
I
I
S/HA
Advisory
Cornmittee
I
I
AID Liaison
I I
I
i
Office of the
Legal Advisor
L
Sp. Asst
Refugee
S/R
Sp. Asst
POW & MIA
D/PW
Office for
Food for
Peace
Bureau for
Population and
Humanitarian
Assistance
FFP
AA/PHA
Assistant
Legal Advisor
on
Human Rights
Office of Foreign Disaster
Relief Coord. PHA/FDRC
Office of Private and
Voluntary Coop. PHA/PVC
Office of Population
PHA/POP
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officers and advise them on the ethical aspects of policy matters.
Though the Commission believes that special offices of this kind are
probably inappropriate, it is reasonable to design the organizational
arrangements in such a way as to increase governmental sensitivity
to more general ethical concerns.
In this spirit, the Commission wholeheartedly supports the recent
creation of the Office of Humanitarian Affairs (D/HA). The pro-
posed structure for this office will include a Coordinator for Humani-
tarian Affairs and a Deputy Coordinator for Human Rights. The
various functions of this office will include coordination of humani-
tarian programs and human rights matters for which the various
offices and bureaus of the Department are responsible. However, we
recommend that:
Because of the importance of the ft/actions of the Office of Hu-
manitarian Affairs (D/ HA), its director should have the title of
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.
As such, he can facilitate coordination with the Bureau for Population
and Humanitarian Assistance (AA/PHA) at AID and serve as a
high level focal point for ethical concerns in U.S. foreign policy-
making. Unavoidably, this officer will tend to be drawn into opera-
tional functions. The Commission cautions that the primary functions
of the office should be staff counsel and policy guidance. An early ap-
pointment of the proposed Deputy Coordinator might assist in main.
taming continuity at all times.
The Commission also recommends the following:
The Department of State should create an Advisory Committee
on Human Rights to advise the Department on U.S. policy with
respect to international hipman rights issues. This committee should
include selected representatives of nongovernmental organizations,
scholars, Members of Congress, churchmen, and others active in the
Human Rights field.
Decisions involving the use of force should be made with prior
recognition of their ethical implications and standing in law.
The Department of State should make instruction in ethical and
human rights considerations an integral part of the basic training of
Foreign Service Officers and of the various area studies programs.
The U.S. Representative to the Human Rights Commission should
be a full time official of ambassadorial rank and assigned broad re-
sponsibility for human rights considerations inherent in all U.S.
participation at the United Nations. If necessary, the Ambassador
should be provided with additional staff for this purpose.
Chiefs of missions in sensitive human rights areas should assign
personnel to monitor and report on Human Rights issues.
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CHAPTER 9
THE PRACTICE OF DIPLOMACY
The conduct of foreign relations among states through the ex-
change of representatives has been the first task of diplomacy for
centuries. The attention the Commission gives in this report to the
policymaking process in Washington does not diminish the importance
of diplomatic activity; both policymaking and diplomacy are integral
parts of any "effective system for the formulation and implementation
of the Nation's foreign policy," to quote from the Commission's
mandate.
In this chapter, the Commission's findings and recommendations
are presented with respect to three types of diplomatic activity:
bilateral diplomacy between states; multilateral diplomacy involving
many states; and "public diplomacy," the cultural and information
programs carried out by the United States in other parts of the world.
BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE ROLE OF OVERSEAS POSTS AND
MISSIONS*
Historically, the United States has looked to its diplomatic posts
and missions abroad to serve the nation in a variety of ways:
?to communicate with foreign states.
?to negotiate and administer agreements with foreign governments.
?to report on events and host government reactions to them.
?to improve mutual understanding with the officials and people of
the countries involved.
?to promote U.S. trade and assist American businessmen abroad.
?to meet the needs of American citizens and travelers.
?to provide supervision, coordination, and administrative support
for the activities of other agencies of the U.S. Government.
*This Section draws particularly on papers prepared for the Commission by
T. McAdams Deford, Godfrey Harris, William 0. Hall, Foy D. Kohler, and
J. Robert Schaetzel, most of which ^re reprinted in Appendix Q to the Com-
mission's Report.
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The world is changing rapidly, and the conduct of international
relations must evolve accordingly. The increasing importance of multi-
lateral diplomacy, the use of special envoys and presidential repre-
sentatives, the tendency to send specialists directly from Washington
to conduct major negotiations abroad, and the increased speed of
communication have radically changed the character of modern
diplomacy. But as long as the world is organized into nation-states,
relationships among those states will be of importance, and diplomatic
missions accredited to other nations will be an essential element of our
diplomacy.
The traditional functions of diplomatic posts and missions there-
fore remain important. Their nature, however, is evOlving, and their
relative importance is changing. Three important new emphases dis-
tinguish the work of the field posts.
Foreign Assessment. The most important modification needed in
embassy responsibilities is to bring a far greater emphasis on the anal-
ysis of probable host country responses to emerging issues of con-
cern to the U.S., a function we term "foreign assessment."
Foreign assessment is analytic as well as factual. It includes not
simply reporting but predictions and proposals on specific issues. It
is concerned with understanding why foreign governments are taking,
not taking, or are likely to take certain actions; predicting the impact
in that country of proposed U.S. actions; and conveying this informa-
tion in a form which suggests how U.S. initiatives can be designed or
modified to have their desired effect. Such assessment requires a sense
of priorities about which actions and issues warrant intensive analysis,
and which are below the threshold of policy importance.
The assessment role, to be effective, must be closely shared by field
missions and by country and functional experts in Washington. Em-
bassies have always been called upon to report fully and intelligently
on host country developments. What we are suggesting is, firstly, that
this responsibility has become the most important single function of
U.S. embassies abroad; and secondly, that the depth, breadth, and
quality of that assessment must be so much greater than has been tra-
ditional as to make it very substantially different.
Some such assessment is now performed in connection with political,
economic, military, and technological reporting. But there are strong
indicators that present reporting, while voluminous, too often focuses
on simple description, and too seldom upon the interpretation of events
and long-term possibilities. Specific recommendations concerning im-
proved reporting?that source material for the overall assessment ef-
fort provided from field posts?are presented in a subsequent section.
Diplomatic Support and Oversight. A second new emphasis relates
to the mounting use of special representatives from Washington for
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negotiations in the field, and the increasing number of agencies hav-
ing business with foreign governments which require the presence of
their own representatives abroad. International transactions are car-
ried out more and more through specialists. But effective bilateral re-
lationships require the Ambassador and the mission to be heavily
involved in these technical activities. In some cases, the Ambassador
will be called upon to supervise activities of other agencies; in others
he will merely coordinate and provide administrative support for
them. In all cases, he must be fully informed about and able to moni-
tor their activities in order to insure that they are compatible with
overall policy towards the country in question. When questions arise,
the Ambassador should have means of reconciling divergent views,
either through his own authority, or through his ability to gain the
attention and support of higher policymakers in Washington.
Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy. As we argue elsewhere, multi-
lateral diplomacy will be increasingly important for a wide range of
issues, particularly those related to global interdependence. Nation-to-
nation negotiation of treaties and agreements, at least relatively, is
diminishing; it has been widely superseded by negotiations in the
United Nations and the growing number of international agencies. But
multilateral diplomacy does not substitute for bilateral diplomacy.
Rather, effective multilateral diplomacy, conducted in forums where
U.S. views may be in the minority, increasingly will be dependent upon
proper support from posts and missions abroad. Embassies will need
to be much more attuned to important issues pending in conference
settings, to the positions of goveinments to which they are accredited,
and to the possibilities of obtaining support for U.S. positions in multi-
lateral discussions through bilateral persuasion. We believe that this
expanded requirement for support of multilateral negotiations, in
addition-to the continuing need for effective bilateral negotiation, is
important enough to qualify it as the third new emphasis required of
posts and missions abroad.
The American Ambassador. These new emphases in the activities
of missions abroad have important implications for the role of the
Ambassador. The ability of the post to provide superior assessment,
to guide and monitor the activities of other agencies and special repre-
sentatives, and to provide timely support of multilateral initiatives, is
dependent upon the Ambassador's fulfillment of his central role and
upon the authority he is given.
Our concept of the role of the Ambassador flows from one basic
principle: the Ambassador is, and must be, the central representative
of the United States, and of the President. All other embassy person-
nel, temporary or permanent, Foreign Service or other agency, spe-
cialist or generalist, of high or low rank, are extensions of the Ambassa-
dor. This concept has been reaffirmed by a succession of presidents, and
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more recently, made a part of law.* The Commission believes, however,
that actual practice continues to fall short of this goal, and that
remedial action is necessary.
It is imperative for the Ambassador to serve as the representative
of the President and the entire government, rather than simply as the
senior Department of State official, if he is to coordinate effectively
all U.S. activities in the country to which he is accredited. To do so, he
must have control over embassy communications and access to all
reports proposed by all personnel assigned to the embassy.
These responsibilities will require Ambassadors who are at once
broad-gauged and knowledgeable, who can as the head of mission
fulfill both managerial and analytic roles and as personal representa-
tives of the President, advise on policy matters. Success will also
require a willingness to draw upon his advice, and to keep him fully
informed of activities which affect the success of his mission.
Ambassadorial Appointments. The qualifications sought in an Am-
bassador should be derived from both the requirements of a specific
assignment and from the more general qualities needed to carry out
the foregoing functions. Nominations should not be merely rewards,
either for financial contributions or political services, nor for surviv-
ing a requisite number of years in the Foreign Service.
The Commission, therefore, believes that reserving a certain per-
centage of positions for Foreign Service Officers is an inappropriate
means of reaching the laudable goal of greater ambasadorial compe-
tence. While we would expect the majority?perhaps a large major-
ity?of ambassadors to be foreign affairs professionals, we do not
advocate that they necessarily be drawn from the Foreign Service.
Rather, the individual with the best qualifications for a given position
should be selected. It is likely that some ambassadorial positions can
best be filled from the senior career ranks in other foreign affairs
agencies such as the Information and Cultural Affairs Agency, AID,
possibly the International Security Affairs section of the Defense
Department, and from the internationally oriented elements of depart-
ments such as Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce. The Commis-
sion, therefore, recommends that:
The Executive Development Staff of the Foreign Affairs Execu-
tive Service (proposed in the Personnel Chapter of this Report)
should be given responsibility for identifying qualified individuals
throughout the government, and for recomm,endation to the presi-
dent as potential ambassadorial nominees. Similarly, when circum-
stances call for appointment of individuals outside the government,
whether from business, labor, or the academic world, they should be
*Public Law 93-475, October 26, 1974, Section 16. (State Department/USIA
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1975.)
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appointed; the guiding principle must be to match job needs with
the best qualified individual available.
Within this fundamental approach, the Commission believes it is
desirable and necessary that the Ambassadorial corps be representa-
tive of the country and its people. Qualified women and members of
minority groups must 1. ye equal access to these positions.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee can play an important
role in insuring the quality of ambassadorial appointments. Close
scrutiny of nominees should. be the norm, and their qualifications
should be examined on grounds of ability as well as to screen for
patently political rewards. This recommendation is spelled out in
Chapter 13 dealing with the Congress.
Once the best individuals available have been chosen and confirmed,
Ambassadors should have tours of duty long enough to allow them to
gain sufficient awareness of the people, leaders, and institutions of
the countries to which they are accredited to be useful. The enhanced
importance of the assessment role in the future makes this especially
important. For this purpose one or two year tours will normally not
be enough.
The Deputy Chief of Mission. While progress has been made recently
in understanding the importance of the Deputy Chief of Mission
(DCM) role and in preparing designees to fulfill it, the Commission
wishes to underscore its importance, particularly in larger missions,
and especially in assisting the Ambassador in carrying out the new
emphases suggested above. The DCM should be a true deputy, pre-
pared to serve as both alter ego to the Ambassador and his chief exec-
utive officer. His strengths and those of the Ambassador should be
complimentary; his professional country expertise can overcome an
inexperienced Ambassador's limitations, and he can serve as the
manager of the Embassy if the Ambassador is oriented toward ex-
ternal considerations. The personal nature of an effective Ambassador-
DCM relationship is highly important for effective embassy perform-
ance, and suggests that no one standard pattern is desirable.
Because of their close relationship to their Ambassador, and the
importance of their role to the success of the mission, as much care
should be given to selecting able DCMs as to finding superior Am-
bassadors. They should normally be selected from the best qualified
careerists available throughout the government. Critically impor-
tant, too, is the need to develop potential DCMs by insuring that
career officers in the foreign affairs field are provided training and
experience in directing organizations of more than just a few sub-
ordinates. Management ability must be acquired and, as this Report's
Personnel chapter discusses, the Foreign Service does very little to
develop that ability in its officers.
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Communications. As noted earlier, control of communication is an
important aspect of the Ambassadorial role we propose. Communi-
cations are the heart of "command and control"?for the Ambassador
and DCM as much as for the military.
Embassy communications to and from the State Department and
other agencies in Washington are sent by cable, by letter pouch and
by phone. If the Ambassador is to be the representative of the Presi-
dent and agency personnel in the Embassy are extensions of him, it
follows that he should have their communications available to him.
(An exception is intelligence information relating to sources and
methods.) This condition does not pertain in most Embassies. The
Commission recommends that:
It should become accepted and standard operating procedure that
communications to and from all Embassy personnel of all agencies
be available to the Ambassador, either in advance or after dispatch,
at his discretion.
Cable communications facilities for the diplomatic establishment,
by which the bulk of secure messages are sent, are now handled tech-
nically and cryptographically by another agency. The Commission
sees no way of defending this arrangement. It arose in the mid-1960s,
when improved equipment required a sizeable outlay of funds the
State Department was unable or unwilling to seek. The effect of this
transfer of responsibility, especially the cryptographic, is that the
Ambassador, except by utilization of special and inefficient devices,
does not have privacy of his communications. The Commission
strongly recommends that:
Control of diplomatic cryptographic facilities be fully in the
hands of the Department of State.
Improved Foreign Service Reporting. At the heart of the Embassy's
role in the years ahead, particularly in its part in the assessment
function, is the quality of its reporting. We agree with Secretary of
State Kissinger that:
"It is absolutely imperative not just to report what people say
but to explain what people mean, not just to describe how a situ-
ation looks but to try to lay out what the trends are, what can be
expected, and to do so not on the basis of some sentimental pro-
clivities but on the basis of a hardheaded?if necessary cold-
blooded?analysis of what the various alternatives are that the
situation requires."*
*Henry Kissinger Speech to American Foreign Service Association, Novem-
ber 11, 1974.
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A comprehensive study of Foreign Service reporting prepared for
the Commission* identifies the gap between current performance and
what is required for adequate foreign assessment. It notes as the
central problem in current reporting, the absence of overall direction
and guidance on the information needed and cites the general lack
of communication between the field and the mission on this activity.
More explicitly, this report concludes:
a. Foreign Service reporting must serve many disparate users?
State Department senior officials, policy planners, geographic
bureaus and country directors, functional officials, intelligence
analysts, and other agencies (Commerce, Defense, National Science
Foundation, etc.)
b. Foreign Service reporting is not now consciously designed
to meet the needs of any one of these users, and therefore satisfies
none of them completely and some of them not at all.
c. If Foreign Service reporting is to be more responsive to a wider
range of users, it will be necessary to identify more clearly these
different consumers and their needs and then quite directly seek
to meet them. This internal problem means establishing more clearly
different forms of reports which have differing content, format,
and analysts to meet specific needs of different users.
d. If Foreign Service reporting is to be realigned to meet this
concept, it will almost certainly need unified direction which does
not now exist.
We would add a further and quite fundamental conclusion: to ful-
fill the requirement for high quality and specialized analysis and assess-
ment, Foreign Service Officers must possess and/or be trained in
analytic disciplines to a far more expert degree than at present.
On the basis of these conclusions, in which the Commission concurs,
we believe the following steps are required.
The Under Secretary of State for Management should be assigned
direct authority for communications, including Foreign Service
reporting, and should establish a staff to carry out this responsibility.
This staff should take the lead with the collaboration of the Bureau,
of Intelligence and Research (INR), the Regional Bureaus, the
Foreign Affairs Institute (F AI)" and the Executive Secretariat?
in making the Embassy communications system and particularly
Foreign Service reporting more effective in scope, content and form.
In so doing it will need to make systematic studies of needs of the
many disparate users?starting with the President and Secretary?
of Foreign Service reporting, and communications generally, and to
devise ways for fulfilling those needs.
*This report, "Toward the Improvement of Foreign Service Reporting" is
printed in its entirety as Appendix E to the report of the Commission.
**See Chapter 12 for recommendation on converting the Foreign Service Insti-
tute to the Foreign Affairs Institute.
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INR should work actively with such a Foreign Service Reporting
Staff, to relate Foreign Service reporting effectively to the needs of
the intelligence community, and should be staffed adequately to
fulfill this role.
The Foreign Affairs Institute, in coordination with the Foreign
Service Reporting Staff, should significantly improve its course
offerings and in-service university enrollments to train officers to
fulfill the assessment role in Foreign Service reporting. (A number
of other personnel system changes which would be necessary to im-
prove the foreign assessment capability of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service are developed in Chapter 12 of this report,
on personnel.)
At many posts abroad, political and economic sections in the
Embassies should be merged. Integrated, comprehensive reporting
and assessment which considers economic and politiical issues in
their close relationship are what we believe will be most needed;
a combined section would enhance the likelihood of it being pro-
duced. It would also help to encourage F SO's serving abroad to pay
more attention to the economic aspects of our bilateral relations.
Quite apart from Foreign Service reporting, the Commission notes
that agencies in the field outside the Department of State are called
upon by their headquarters to report on political and economic mat-
ters pertaining to the host country. Moreover, these reports?sometimes
submitted on a regular, periodic basis?are very often unavailable to
the Ambassador. In many cases, such reporting and collection efforts
are redundant, and their elimination may result in reduction in the
number of agency personnel needed.
Mission Organization. The foregoing discussion of the Ambassador-
DCM relationship and the recommendation that some Political and
Economic Sections be merged begin to suggest the pattern of organi-
zation needed to equip the mission to adapt to its changing role.
More specialized needs suggest that a number of departments and
agencies will continue to have representation abroad on a permanent
or at least a temporary basis. This condition should be accepted where
this is the most practical and efficient means for carrying out essential
functions. The stipulation concerning communications noted above
is critical. Moreover:
The Ambassador should have a full opportunity to comment ON
any change in the staff complements of e,zch, agency at his post,
and his word should carry great weight even if it is not the deter-
mining factor.
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The Commission believes that the Ambasador now has too limited
an influence on the size of agency representations; if he is to be held
responsible for the performance of his mission, as he should be, he
must have a greater role in determining its size and composition.
This principle will require firm support from the Secretary of State,
OMB, and in the final analysis from the President. Assignment of
senior agency representatives should also be subject to the Ambas-
sador's review. He should retain the authority he presently has to
remove anyone on the Embassy staff if he believes this to be in the
best interest of the United States.
Particularly at a time when the size of operating programs is being
reduced in many countries, the State Department for both economy
and managerial control should incorporate in one overall structure
support activities for those remaining. Allowances, perquisites and
personnel policies should be rigorously regularized. We recommend
that:
The Department of State should provide managerial and ad-
ministrative services for the entire mission.
The organization of each embassy will of course vary depending
on the post and its specific needs, but it should always reflect both
ambassadorial primacy and his right to be informed; it should operate
as one mission in an integrated fashion, rather than as a series of
loosely associated independent offices.
The Field-Washington Linkage. It is ironic that at a time when
communications and travel are so much easier than in the past, a
chronic complaint of officers both in field missions and in Washington
is that they are often out of tune with each other's thinking. This
linkage is crucial if U.S. interests are to be effectively represented
abroad, and conversely, if the reporting done in the field is to provide
information for policymakers in a timely and usable fashion. An
effective policy is simply impossible if the policymaking functions
are not closely linked with information sources on the one hand and
implementation agents on the other.
The Commission therefore believes that it is false economy to
restrict unduly travel between the field and Washington.
Ambassadors should frequently consult in the Department of
State and elsewhere in Washington, perhaps several times a year in
addition to leave, depending on specific needs. On a somewhat less
frequent basis, DC Ms and section heads should come to Washington
for consultation, and, conversely, Country Directors, Deputy Assist-
ant Secretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of geographic bureaus
should spend a substantial portion of their time in the field. The
Department's budget requests, and Congressional response to them,
should reflect this need.
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Serving a similar purpose, but designed to enhance development of
a regional perspective in addition to a bilateral one, the Commission
recommends that:
Regional conferences of key personnel from Washington and the
various missions should be held more frequently than the current
chiefs of mission conferences.
These conferences could be held both in Washington and at various
locations in the region, and focused not only on general relations but
on specific topics of mutual interest. Particularly in situations where
countries in a region are antagonistic, and where U.S. missions are
likely to reflect very different recommendations on a purely bilateral
basis, such conferences can help to encourage close mission-to-mission
coordination in policy development. The regional affairs offices of each
geographic bureau should be given responsibility for developing and
staffing these meetings.
Country Directors in the geographic bureaus have been reasonably
effective in meeting the needs of Ambassadors. More steps should be
taken, however, to enable the Country Directors to be the Washington
focal point for country-related activity for the whole government.
The Country Director cannot command other agencies, but he should
know what their interests and proposed activities are, and working
closely with the Ambassadors, promote and guide reconciliation of
individual agency activities with overall policy toward the country.
Country Directors should also play an important role in the foreign
assessment function, by providing frequent commentary on informa-
tion most needed, and the atmosphere in Washington. It goes without
saying that to perform effectively, the Country Director must be privy
to all available information about U.S. relations with his country, and
should not be excluded from the development of policy initiatives. It
is the Country Director, for most countries, who is the only official
in Washington in a position to inject accurate foreign assessment con-
siderations into policymaking. If he is excluded or out off from infor-
mation he cannot perform this role effectively and policy will suffer.
Mission organization should reflect a balance between flexibility and
stability, and should be reviewed periodically to insure that it is in
line with current requirements. Unique patterns and practices such as
bilateral joint commissions (as suggested below) should be employed
when appropriate. At the same time, the Commission is skeptical about
the desirability of employing radical organizational arrangements in
the absence of a strong presumption that they would produce better
results. Thus we have examined and r^jected such proposals as wide-
spread accrediting of one Ambassador to several countries, preferring
instead greater differentiation in Ambassadorial ranks because we
believe the senior representative permanently based in a country should
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have Ambassadorial authority; the assignment of more than one am-
bassador to the larger countries with duties divided functionally; and
the idea of permanent ambassadorial "teams" based in Washington
and sent to the field to deal with specific issues. At times, each of these
approaches might be useful; but none of them commends itself as
normal practice. The guiding principle for mission organization in the
future should be appropriateness for the tasks at hand; neither innova-
tion for the sake of novelty nor standardization for the sake of con-
venience should be allowed to distort the overarching need to match
structure and procedure with the job to be done.
Inspection and Overseas Operations. The Commission applauds
efforts made by the Department of State in the past few years to ex.
tend the inspections of field posts to "the conduct of relations," thus
encompassing both the field posts and the country directorate in Wash-
ington, and the substance of policy as well as purely administrative
and personnel practices. U.S. overseas programs and policies in a coun-
try are difficult to coordinate from Washington, and the authority of
the Ambassador is not always sufficient to insure success in coordinat-
ing programs in the field. A positive mechanism to assist in these efforts
is needed. The Commission, therefore, recommends that:
The Office of the Inspector General of the Foreign Affairs, be
mandated to inspect the overseas activities of all U.S. agencies as-
sociated with, Embassies and Consulates, in addition to those of the
Department of State.
This change will require additional inspectors, who should be drawn
from the agencies involved, supplementing those from the Foreign
Service and the Department of State. Reports of inspections should be
made to the heads of concerned agencies as well as the Secretary of
State. In keeping with the policy monitoring role of the Department
of State, which would reflect Presidential authority, the expanded
Inspector General's office should be guided by a presidential viewpoint.
Bilateral Joint Commissions and Boards. Following a practice of
dealing through joint commissions and boards in relations with a
number of countries, including Canada, Japan and Korea, and after
? the institution of a comprehensive bilateral joint commission with the
Soviet Union in 1972, this device has been employed with a number
of other countries. The rationale for such commissions is to attempt
to construct a web of cooperation in non-political, technical fields
not normally associated with diplomatic concerns. Currently, a num-
ber of agencies and departments, including the Departments of State,
Defense, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, HEW, Interior, Labor,
and Transportation; OMB; CIA; ERDA; EPA; TVA; OPIC ; and
the National Endowment for the Humanities are participating in one
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or more of these commissions, their supporting bodies, or Washing-
ton-based planning and coordination efforts. Attempts have also been
made to involve the private sector in the United States, including the
business, science, and university communities.
The Commission believes that selective use of these joint commis-
sions can augment traditional means of conducting bilateral rela-
tions, especially in situations where an instrument which can be tai-
lored to a very specific set of needs is required. By building a network
of relationships in matters of mutual interest, they may serve to con-
tain differences and to help develop a common perspective and stake
in resolving them. But their desirability, effectiveness and prestige
probably are inversely proportionate to their number. Management of
these Commissions presents considerable difficulty, since each is unique
in its purpose, membership, scope, and its relationship to overall rela-
tions between the two countries. We therefore suggest that Bilateral
Joint Commissions should be limited to special or selective U.S. ob-
jectives and situtions in which they are likely to be more effective than
normal diplomatic channels.
MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY AND GLOBAL ISSUES*
Many of the decisions affecting the destiny of the United States
and its people are now reached in multilateral negotiations. Greater
interdepen-dence among nations and the increasing need for multi-
lateral diplomacy, both to deal with interdependence issues and as an
economizing measure in a world made up of 150 nations, will be im-
portant characteristics of future foreign policy. Among the problems
increasingly handled in multilateral forums are peacekeeping, nuclear
safeguards, and the policing of terrorism; planetary bargaining on
energy, food, population, commodities, trade, and aid; the control of
weather; the allocation of frequencies and orbital arcs in space; the
regulation of international business and monetary flows; and the
management of ocean resources.
This great increase in the range of issues dealt with through inter-
national organizations will be accompanied by the presence of an ever
* This section draws upon a study prepared for the Commission under the
direction of Joseph S. Nye and Robert Keohane on "Organizing for Global En-
vironmental and Resource Interdependence ;" and on papers on "The Manage-
ment of Multilateralism," by Harlan Cleveland, "Foreign Policymaking in a New
Era?the Challenge of Multilateral Diplomacy," by Richard N. Gardner, and
"Conduct of Multilateral Diplomacy in the United States Government," by
Charles W. Yost, all of which were prepared at the request of the Commission.
These materials may be found in Appendices B and C. An informal paper by
N. A. Pelcovits was also helpful in the Commission's work on this topic.
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larger number of such organizations. In addition to general purpose
organizations such as the United Nations, and regional groupings such
as the Organization of American States, a large number of special pur-
pose agencies are coming into existence. Some are created under the
aegis of the United Nations, such as the Conference on Trade and
Development; some are agencies associated with the United Nations,
such as the Food and Agricultural Organization and the International
Monetary Fund. Some are wholly independent of the UN, such as
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the
newly created International Energy Agency. Others are U.N. spon-
sored conferences and special negotiating groups, such as the Dis-
armament Conference in Geneva and the Law of the Sea Conference.
Finally, a wide range of less structured groupings assembled to deal
with energy and other specific problems are coming into existence.
Merely keeping abreast of developments in all of these bodies is diffi-
cult; using them effectively to further U.S. interests, and the cause of
world order, will be even more so.
It does not follow that all problems of interdependence, or all prob-
lems involving more than two states, must necessarily be resolved
through multilateral institutions. The United States must decide on
a case by case basis when it is advantageous to use multilateral chan-
nels, when bilateral relations should be stressed, and when the latter
can be used to facilitate the former.
When multilateral diplomacy is appropriate, greater attention
should be given to diminishing the possibilities of conflict and increas-
ing the likelihood that a problem-oriented consensus can emerge.
Weighted voting which reflects the real interests of the states involved
is one possibility, particularly for new organizations with special
functions. The use of working groups made up of countries having a
direct interest in certain issues, rather than the full membership of a
general purpose organization is another. Though such arrangements
may be difficult to achieve, their use could enhance the possibility of
responsible outcomes.
Another means of making multilateral organizations more useful is
to help make them more effective and efficient in operation. The U.S.
Government should do what it can to see that better qualified people
are made available to manage the programs of international organiza-
tions. A related step would be to encourage the recruitment of U.S.
citizens for the staffs of these organizations, which would have the
added virtue of helping the United States perspective on important
issues to be better understood.
In view of the evolving role of multilateral organizations and our
relationships to them, the Commission recommends (as first proposed
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by the Lodge Commission*, on the 25th Anniversary of the United
Nations) that:
Each incoming administration should create a nonpartisan com-
mission, including representatives of the Congress, charged with
reassessing on abroad front U.S. participation in multilateral agen-
cies and programs, and recommending changes in our policies and
programs as necessary.
The Conduct of Multilateral Diplomacy. Multilateral diplomacy is
one instrument of U.S. foreign policy, representing a distinctive
channel and method of operation. Because it involves the responsibili-
ties and concerns of an increasing number of U.S. departments and
agencies, multilateral diplomacy cannot be regarded as within the sole
purview of any single department or bureau. Nor can multilateral
diplomacy be treated in isolation from other ways of carrying out
policy, and it is highly desirable not to approach participation in an
international organization on important substantive issues from the
perspective of an agency committed to that organization primarily for
its own sake. Finally, foreign affairs management is now heavily
weighted toward the advancement of bilateral relations with other na-
tions, and if both kinds of diplomacy are to be used effectively, our
multilateral capabilities must be enhanced.
We believe that this reasoning suggests an organizing principle;
namely, that pursuing U.S. interests in multilateral forums must be
the responsibility of all governmental units with a stake in the issues
taken up in such forums, and not simply of one central office or depart-
ment. Some major and essentially political issues, such as peacekeeping,
will need to be handled in a bureau primarily concerned with the
United Nations. But others, including some of a political and security
nature (e.g., Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction) and especially
technical problems (e.g., oceans and energy matters) can be best pur-
sued by those who are not principally concerned with promoting mul-
tilateral institutions.
Traditionally, the Department of State has been regarded as the
agency that should coordinate foreign policy throughout the Govern-
ment, although observers have repeatedly lamented its failure to do so
effectively. As a multitude of agencies become increasingly involved in
foreign policy, with high-ranking officials taking an interest, it be-
comes even more difficult for officials at the Assistant Secretary or
Deputy Assistant Secretary level in the State Department to influence,
let alone coordinate actions of other agencies.
*The President's Commission on the Observance of the 25th Anniversary of
the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, Chairman. Report submitted to the
President on April 26, 1971 (Washington Government Printing Office, 19'71).
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The Commission believes that the White House and State Depart-
ment must therefore collaborate closely to develop policy and to coordi-
nate the activities of various operating agencies. To play its proper
role in this process, however, the State Department will need a major
internal transformation. Our approach to this problem is described in
Chapter 4.
United Nations Affairs. The Bureau of International Organization
Affairs (ICI), is currently characterized by inadequate staffing, limited
influence, largely mechanical responsibilities, and a relatively small
policy role. These current weaknesses, coupled with our belief that
it is impossible for any one organizational unit or bureau to take the
lead with respect to all multilateral issues, and the growing multilat-
eral importance of issues which are the responsibility of functional
bureaus of the department lead us to recommend that:
The Bureau of International Organization Affairs (JO) should
be reconstituted as a smaller Bureau for United Nation Affairs,
serving primarily as a Washington point of reference for U.S. mis-
sions in New York and Geneva, and responsible for international
organization budgetary contributions and international conference
support. 10's policymaking functions should be allocated to func-
tional bureaus for the relevant issue areas, and through them, to the
functional Under Secretaries. Responsibility for arranging inter-
national Conferences might go to the Under Secretary for manage-
ment.
This change should not be seen as indicating any desire on the part
of the Commission to downgrade the role of international organiza-
tions. On the contrary, we believe that international organizations
are sufficiently important for United States policy that all of the
functional bureaus of the Department of State must take them con-
tinuously into account.
The analogy of the evolution of multinational business enterprises
may be helpful here. When these firms first become involved in world
business, they usually establish international divisions. But after a
certain point is passed?after they have become heavily multinational-
ized?the international division is generally dropped in favor of an
organizational structure that gives the whole firm an international
orientation. In the same way, as dealing with multinational forums
loses its exotic character and becomes a customary way of doing diplo-
matic business, a special Bureau is no longer required, except to pro-
vide limited support functions, such as planning for the organization's
future, developing budgets (contributions as well as U.S. mission sup-
port) , evaluation of performance, and providing a repository of infor-
mation and experience about the organization's past and current
history.
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Coordination and Consistency in Multilateral Forums. Any system of
State Department organization, including the one proposed, will need
to provide procedures ensuring consistency among United States poli-
cies advanced in various international agencies. The fact that the U.S.
Government has been officially represented in more than 700 interna-
tional conferences in each recent year, underscores the magnitude of
this problem. JO is not well-situated to perform this function. Since
many of the economic, scientific, and technical issues which will con-
cern of the United States in the future will necessarily involve multi-
lateral organizations and relations, we recommend that:
The multilateral policy function for such issues of global inter-
dependence should be allocated to the Under Secretary for Economic
and Scientific Affairs. The policy function for political or military
mulilateral issues, such as peacekeeping, should be assigned to the
new Under Secretary for Political and Security Affairs.
Collectively, the Under Secretaries would be concerned with the con-
sistency of our policy and practice in different international organiza-
tions; and would work accordingly with the agencies involved. They
would also attempt to consider how issues, and U.S. policies on them,
relate to one another, and how to avoid excessive fragmentation of
policy. One important device designed to focus attention on multi-
lateral issues would be the development of the Critical List described
in the section of this report concerned with policy planning. (Chapter
10)
Another device which may be appropriate is the use of special pur-
pose advisory groups and consultants as an adjunct to government
resources when preparing for specific negotiations in multilateral
forums. Whether the issue is trade, seabed and ocean problems, or
food and population, such groups can provide broader views on the
issues involved and help generate widespread support for the policy
agreed upon.
The outcome of the proposed reorganization would be a streamlined
system, much more responsive to functionally-based issues and better
able to coordinate strategies toward international organizations. This
system would be directed not at advocacy of multilateralism in the
abstract, but at better planning and more sophisticated attention to
multilateral options, increasing the likelihood of outcomes being re-
sponsive to U.S. interests. The activities of the regional bureaus of the
Department would remain unimpaired. Indeed, they should benefit
from the early warnings and expert advice that functionally-oriented
bureaus could provide. Policy toward international organizations
would be built into the relevant functionally-defined bureaus.
The foregoing structure and organization reflect our root beliefs
that the time has passed when the State Department?whether through
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an International Organization Affairs Bureau, its geographic bureaus,
or as a whole?can manage by itself those issues likely to be conducted
through multilateral organizations. Multilateralism is not a specialty
reserved for one group or office in government, but a matter for much
broader concern.
Both in Washington and in the field, experts must be on hand to
deal with such subjects as food, population, energy and the environ-
ment; thus other agencies must be intimately involved in the diplo-
matic effort. Moreover, because of the nature of the subjects involved,
there must be close links between the State Department and the White
House. In this system, representatives of State would ensure that the
U.S. diplomatic posture is consistent with respect to these issues to be
handled in multilateral institutions, but would normally rely on others
in the Government to provide specific substantive expertise.
Transgovernmental Relations. Transgovernmental policy coordina-
tion?direct contacts among officials of technical agencies of different
governments, working together as an adjunct to or in addition to
formal international negotiations to find solutions to joint problems?
will be essential to effective management of complex issues of inter-
dependence. The State Department and particularly the office of the
Under Secretary for Economic and Scientific Affairs should encourage
constructive transgovernmental contacts of this type.
At the same time, such transgovernmental coordination bears watch-
ing, since it may shade over into the construction of coalitions among
like-minded agencies in various countries against other elements of
their own governments. If separate agencies?for example those con-
cerned with drug control, ocean use, or monetary policies?not only
coordinate policies directly with their counterparts in other countries,
but adopt their own independent foreign policies through informal
alignments, the prospect of achieving a rational synthesis for Ameri-
can policy a whole is seriously impaired. Close monitoring by the
State Department and the White House is important to avoid these
disadvantages inherent in transgovernmental contacts, while preserv-
ing their advantages for decentralized problem-solving. A bureau-
cratic context which provides this capability and which encourages
operating agencies to take a broader view than their own functional
concerns, as we have suggested above, is essential.
Delegations to Multilateral Organizations and Conferences
The Commission recommends that
In most policy areas the Department of State should select the
heads of delegations for multilateral 'negotiations, seeking the best
qualified individuals in or out of government.
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This responsibility is particularly appropriate given the overall
coordinating role of the Under Secretaries of the Department. In some
instances, Ambassadors-at-large might be assigned specific respon-
sibility for managing complex, long-term negotiations. In particularly
important or technically difficult negotiations, however, an explicit
designee of the White House or of one of the technical agencies might
usefully be appointed, with a representative from the State Depart-
ment as the Deputy.
As a general principle in deciding upon representation on multi-
lateral delegations, we recommend that the United States should look
not only to the nature of U.S. resources involved, but toward the
purposes of multilateral negotiation and participation in organizing
delegations. For example, United States representation to the World
Bank and regional development banks should reflect not only the
Treasury Department's financial perspectives, but also and more
vigorously than has sometimes been the case, those of the State De-
partment for general policy coniderations, and of the Agency for In-
ternational Development, since the purpose of these international
lending institutions is to promote development.
An additional complicating factor is that discussions in international
organizations may raise issues that U.S. officials have not considered,
or reveal new perspectives from which problems may be viewed. It
is important that the U.S. Government be so structured that agencies
dealing with a particular set of issues are sensitive to the views of
other governments. This implies that U.S. delegations to international
conferences and policymakers at home need to be both politically
and technically sophisticated, and that there be close cooperation
between technical, operating agencies of the Government on the one
hand and the Department of State on the other. It also implies that
strict quality controls should be applied to delegate selection, and that
delegates to the UN General Assembly and similar meetings should be
chosen on the basis of merit and not for political reward.
Related to delegation composition is the need to coordinate policy
and to provide administrative and budget support in a way which
will assure accountability and responsiveness to government-wide in-
terests. Currently, such services are provided by the Department of
State, and the Commission recommends that this pattern should con-
tinue in those cases where State is the lead agency in a delegation. In
other instances, it may prove more efficacious to have the major agency
involved fill this role.
Staffing Permanent Missions. In general, the Commission recom-
mends:
Staffing for permanent missions should be accomplished through
both the Foreign Service and Civil Service systems. Assignment,
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training, and promotion, practices should be devised whi4 (a)
develop a measure of expertise in multilateral diplomacy-Without
creating a separate core of specialists, and (b) permit wide flexi-
bility to utilize substantive specialists from many agencies.
Staffing permanent U.S. missions to international organizations is
likely to become increasingly difficult. Given the involvement of many
additional agencies, these missions will be increasingly called upon to
provide support for visiting experts engaged in specific negotiations in
many fields. Moreover, they will have to monitor the proceedings and
make sure that the positions of technical specialists and agency rep-
resentatives are consistent with overall U.S. policy. The Commission
regards these duties as particularly important and believes that the
Foreign Service should place a career premium on such assignments in
order to attract to them particularly able, broad gauged people. These
functions will be particularly important at the U.S. Mission to the
European Office of the U.N. and Other International Organizations.
In some cases, assignments to multilateral posts should offer special
perquisites and opportunities for advancement.
At the same time, the Commission recommends that Multilateral
organization affairs should not be the exclusive domain of a special-
ized group within the career service. Such a "cone" of officers would
lack both the breadth and the technical competence required for deal-
ing with the complex issues involved. But careers heavily weighted
toward multilateral diplomacy should not be regarded as exceptional.
The traditional political orientation of State Department country
specialists is clearly inadequate for these requirements. Broader train-
ing and a greater mix of specialized talents is essential for the conduct
of multilateral diplomacy. For example, as an increasing portion of
the work of the U.N. is focussed on economics and other specialized
matters, the skill levels and competence of the staff of the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations must reflect these new requirements. The same
is obviously true for our OECD and European Community missions.
Exchange tours between Foreign Service Officers dealing with multi-
lateral diplomacy and representatives of technical agencies increas-
ingly involved in multilateral issues would be a useful corrective to
the possible parochialism of each group.
Finally, the Commission recommends that:
The head of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. should be a prominent
personage with a close relationship to the President, and should hold
Cabinet rank.
The Role of Congress. The Commission believes that Congress must
be increasingly involved in precisely those issues of a global nature
which find their way into multilateral organizations, since these mat-
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ters of interdependence are weighted so heavily with domestic conse-
quences. Congress will have to make sure that many issues traditionally
considered the purview of domestic committees are also assessed for
their foreign policy ramifications. This may require joint staff work
between foreign affairs and domestic committees, and in some cases
joint referral and possibly joint hearings.
The executive branch should be more sensitive to the interests of
Congress in multilateral diplomacy. Congress should be seen as an
important participant with legitimate interests in the multilateral
arena. The Commission strongly recommends:
The appointment of Members of Congress to international dele-
gations whenever feasible, as a particularly useful way of keeping
Congress involved and informed about multilateral foreign policy
issues.
Even if they are not normally invited as voting delegates, Members
of Congress can strengthen the delegation by providing congressional
perspectives to supplement those of executive branch representatives.
In conclusion, the Commission believes that the choice which con-
fronts the U.S. is not whether to participate in a variety of multi-
lateral institutions, for that is unavoidable. Rather it is whether to
exercise vigorous leadership in endeavoring to strengthen them so
that they are better equipped to service U.S. interests in bearing the
burdens of international interdependence and building world order,
or to use them in a routine way with a minimum of conviction. The
current mood of the country is skeptical about many international
organizations, and may well become more so as our influence in them
weakens. Therefore, it will be especially important for policymakers
to decide when our national interests are best served by their use, and
to explain their continuing importance to our policies in a way which
will preserve necessary domestic and Congressional support. To fail
to do so would divert us from the fundamentally important goal of
building an international order and machinery capable of managing
mankind's common problems.
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
As we have noted elsewhere in this report, American foreign policy
in the future will be required to operate in a different environment
than existed in the post-war period in which most of the organizational
arrangements still in use first evolved. In the 1950s and 1960s, many
of the nations of the non-communist world depended heavily on the
economic and military power of the U.S. Our influence on those nations
was correspondingly great. The hallmark of the next decade or two?
as indeed it is a characteristic of the current day?will be the existence
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of many centers of economic and military power, loosely connected by
ties of common interest and common values.
In such an environment, with the U.S. interdependent with others,
and the others no longer grouped in tight alliance with the U.S., the
ability of this country to make its views prevail and its policies suc-
ceed will derive less from its wealth and power, and more from such
respect and support as the rest of the world accords to its values and
purposes.
Moreover, just as the bi-polar world of the post-war period has
given way to a greater dispersion of power among a large number
of nations, so power and authority have undergone dispersion within
states. International relations are increasingly affected by the way
in which events and actions of governments throughout the world
are viewed by citizens, not simply by officials. Although diplomatic
relations are undertaken with and through foreign governments,
greater popular concern with issues of foreign relations make it
important that broad segments of foreign populations understand
and support U.S. policies and purposes.
It is in that light that we turn to the problem of the organization
of the government for the conduct of cultural and information pro-
grams, known collectively as "public diplomacy." These programs have
two purposes:
?The projection, interpretation and advocacy of current U.S.
foreign policies abroad; and
?The portrayal abroad of American society as a complex, plural-
istic, tolerant and democratic community.
Distribution abroad of the text of a press conference or policy
speech by a U.S. official serves the first function. American libraries
and bi-national centers abroad, presentation of American performing
arts, English language classes, and student exchanges, academic travel
grants, lectures and seminars serve the second. Other activities of the
printed and electronic media partake sometimes of policy projection
and sometimes of culture communication. Even here, however, it is
generally possible to distinguish by purpose the magazine articles
and the radio broadcasts of longer or general character from the "fast
media" associated with the news and policy commentary.
The twin tasks of explaining U.S. foreign policy and of conducting
educational and cultural activities abroad are presently each split
between the State Department and the U.S. Information Agency
(USIA). The State Department, through its press officers in Wash-
ington and its political and economic officers in embassies and mis-
sions abroad, sets forth and explains current foreign policy. In addi-
tion, State's Cultural and Educational Exchange programs seek to
portray American society. Through its media officers and its library
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and language services, USIA also projects current American policy
and also seeks to portray the American scene. The Voice of America,
now part of the USIA, communicates directly by radio with the
peoples of the world; presenting official U.S. policies and commentary,
and projecting American thought. All three agencies, therefore, par-
ticipate separately in both foreign policy and cultural affairs. More-
over, in present practice, USIA officials in the field receive instructions
from both the State Department and USIA. The VOA receives its
policy guidance from the State Department filtered through the USIA.
The result, we believe, is that neither foreign policy advocacy nor
the building of long-range understanding between the U.S. and other
nations is now being handled with full effectiveness. The Commission
concludes, therefore, a realignment of responsibilities is needed.
Our recommendations are that the advocacy function be placed
in the State Department alongside the responsibility for policy itself,
and that the longer range functions of cultural communication and
general information?in media, in exchange of persons, in cultural
presentations?be combined in a single agency separate from but re-
sponsible to the State Department. This is how most other countries
meet the same or similar needs; we believe it will prove appropriate
and more effective here as well.
In arriving at these conclusions the Commission has had the benefit
of a comprehensive review undertaken by the Panel on International
Information, Education, and Cultural Relations under the Chairman-
ship of Dr. Frank Stanton.* The following recommendations coincide
with the Stanton Panel findings.
? The Spokesman Role
Programs which, project and explain U.S. foreign policy, now
split between the State Department and USIA, should be combined
in anew State Department Office of Policy Information.
This change makes the direct support of U.S. foreign policy through
advocacy and interpretation the clear and sole responsibility of the
Department of State, to be carried out by officers of the Department
itself and by the political and economic sections of the embassy under
direction of the Department.
The objections to this proposal which have been heard are of three
kinds. Some find unwelcome the fragmentation of information pro-
grams, believing that the articulation and advocacy of policy is in-
* The Panel was a privately funded Commission, organized by Georgetown
University's Center for Strategic ?and International Studies, and sponsored
jointly by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information and the U.S. Advisory
Commission on International Education and Cultural Affairs.
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separable from other press and media activity and, moreover, should
not be undertaken by those conducting foreign policy. Others believe
the State Department, oriented as it is in its press relations primarily to
domestic U.S. audiences, will be unable to fulfill satisfactorily this
aspect of the information role. Still others claim the application of this
realignment of functions in embassies would prove unworkable on the
grounds of an inseparability of press relations for policy and for longer
range, cultural communication. The Commission does not find these
objections convincing, and believes that the Panel's recommendations
will be fully sustained in operation.
The logic of holding the senior State Department officers in Wash-
ington responsible for those information activities and press relations
which directly concern the interpretations of foreign policy appears
particularly strong; linking the process of formulation of policy to
the responsibility for its advocacy and interpretation should improve
the quality of both.
Some doubts arose concerning the application of the principle to
embassy activities. After careful review, however, we find ourselves
in agreement that the policy interpretation aspects of press relations
could and should be handled by press officers closely integrated with
the political and economic side of the Embassy under instructions from
the Department, not from a separate information and cultural affairs
agency. The Ambassador and his Deputy Chief of Mission will be
fully capable of coordinating this activity with the related but separate
function of media relations involved in the cultural section of the
embassy. Under this arrangement, the Public Affairs Officer's posi-
tion becomes unnessary and should be abolished.
The Cultural and General Information Role
All general (non-policy) information and cultural activities
which are now carried out by the Department of State or the U.S.
Information Agency, other than those of the VOA, should be com-
binded in a new semi-autonomous (or associated) Information and
Cultural Affairs Agency (ICA). The ICA Director would report to
the Secretary of State, or alternatively, if the President wishes,
the Director could report directly to the President while receiving
day-to-day policy guidance from the Secretary of State.
The need to combine these functions in one agency is almost uni-
versally accepted. The principal differences arise over whether the
combined agency should be fully independent, fully integrated into
the State Department, or placed in some intermediate status. The
Commission, like the Stanton Panel, foresees difficulties with either
a full integration into, or a full separation from, the State Depart-
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ment. It believes that these are largely avoided if the cultural and
general informational functions are placed in an autonomous agency
under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State, having a work-
ing relationship with State comparable to that of Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). The problem of adequate fund-
ing has given us some concern. On balance, however, the Commission
believes an ICA agency having such a relationship to the State De-
partment would stand as good a chance of receiving adequate financial
support as it would in its present, fully independent, state.
The Voice of America
The Voice of America should be set up as an independent federal
agency under a Board of Governors, with a mandate to broadcast
accurate, objective, and comprehensive news as well as to represent
American society in its totality, and with the State Department
responsible for that portion of its program/ming which presents or
explains U.N. foreign policy.
? The VOA presented a harder dilemma. It necessarily serves both
the major functions of public diplomacy but it cannot be split down
the middle. It must present U.S. policy and it should reflect American
culture and society. In addition, however, it must be a source of news?
comprehensive and authoritative enough to gain attention and respect
in all parts of the world. Standing "at the intersection of journalism
and diplomacy," the Voice has to steer the perilous course between
independence on the one hand and adherence to U.S. policy on the
other. No organizational formula can fully satisfy these requirements.
The Commission finds the recommended plan to be the most accept-
able. Full integration within the Department of State would take it
too far from its important journalistic missions; it would have great
difficulty in winning a substantial listener audience. Alternatively,
giving the Voice a total independence would make it simply another
private radio station. Putting it under the proposed ICA would in-
vite the worst of both worlds, neither direct guidance nor full freedom.
An agency under a mixed Board of government and non-government
members appears to us to offer the best solution.
Even with this formula many would be concerned about the distance
of VOA from policy control where policy is importantly at stake. But
the Commission is impressed with the suggestion that the problem of
policy commentary?the function where guidance really matters?
might be resolved by the simple device of having State Department
officials placed within VOA directly responsible for broadcasting
which presented or explained U.S. foreign policy positions.
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In the personnel area, the Stanton Panel suggests that it would be
desirable to absorb USIA's FSIO service into the State Department's
FSO Corps. The Commission disagrees with this finding for reasons
which are developed in the Personnel section of the Report. (Chapter
12) Instead it recommends that the FSIO Corps maintain its sep-
arate structure, albeit closely aligned to the Foreign Service. Through-
out this report the Commission emphasizes the need to bring a new
focus to the work of the State Department and the core operations of
the Foreign Service. Accordingly, emphasis should be placed on the
role of assessment and bilateral government-to-government communi-
cation. Specialized programs, with fully as much emphasis as here-
tofore, should be placed more directly in the hands of the respon-
sible agencies and their own field representatives. Consistent with this
concept, we believe a professional corps of media specialists and those
expert in cultural communication should be maintained as a separate
entity, though linked closely to other elements of the foreign affairs
personnel system, and particularly the Foreign Service.
Separate Advisory Commissions now exist for the U.S. Information
and Cultural Activities. Over the years these Commissions have served
a useful purpose in evaluating the work of our government in the cul-
tural and information fields and making appropriate recommenda-
tions for improvements. The Stanton Panel recommends that the two
Commissions now be discontinued and in their stead Congress create
a single Advisory Commission on International Information and Cul-
tural Affairs. The Commission strongly endorses this proposal.
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CHAPTER 10
PLANNING FOR FOREIGN POLICY
In a rapidly changing, interdependent world, foreign policy to be
effective must achieve coherence over time. Shaping an international
order or managing interdependence will be possible only by actions
which reinforce each other over an extended period. While it remains
adaptable to changing conditions, policy must therefore serve con-
sciously developed long-term goals and priorities.
The processes and institutions for making and carrying out foreign
policy thus face a multiple challenge: *
?To identify future trends and developments which, in the absence
of action, would present major problems or missed opportunities;
?To define comprehensively and yet with precision the long-term
purposes and the world-wide priorities of the U.S.;
?To assure that day-to-day decisions take account of the longer term
priorities;
?To modify strategies and develop new courses in response to chang-
ing conditions and the outcomes of past actions.
The entire process of conducting foreign policy can be said to be
directed at fulfilling these requirements. Experience shows, however,
that those engaged in day-to-day operations, or those with limited jur-
isdictions, tend to neglect or resist these needs under the press of the
demands of the moment. The reason for establishing planning or "stra-
tegic thinking" as a separate function is precisely to overcome this
deficiency and to compensate for such tendencies in the system as a
whole. We believe that planning in these terms has not been exploited
to its full potential and that much greater attention to planning as a
separate function will be necessary in the future.
As we use the term, planning comprises four major functions:
1. Strategic Concepts. Consistent policies over time must be built
upon coherent definitions of long-term purposes and priorities,
developed from a broad perspective of national interest. Such
strategies need to be given the most careful articulation: they
* For fuller exposition of some of the ideas contained in this section, see the
paper prepared for the Commission by Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "Organizing for
Policy Planning," and comments by Robert R. Bowie, Chester L. Cooper, and
Henry Owen. All are published separately in Appendix F.
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form the basis for policymaking throughout the government and,
in addition, they convey publicly the sense of purpose for the
entire foreign affairs effort. The "State of the World Report,"
formerly prepared on an annual basis, was in many ways, this
kind of statement of strategy. It was discontinued because the few
officials who could conceptualize the full sweep of policy, includ-
ing the Secretary of State himself, were too occupied with press-
ing operational demands. Planners should do the job.
2. Anticipation and Initiative. The shape of the future is influenced
by the decisions of today. Short-term decisions, therefore, as well
as long-term strategies must be informed by a sense of the long
term movement of events. Planners must extrapolate from current
trends the probable outline of future developments. They must
also suggest ways in which the future can be modified. Department
policy officers and diplomats, however, have as an important
charge the maintenance of good and friendly relations with other
countries. In this framework innovation and new directions of
policy are often resisted. The President and the Secretary of
State, if they are to affect the future, need planners, not encum-
bered with existing arrangements, to look at the future impact
of current decisions, constantly to search for new directions and to
suggest initiatives.
3. Review and Challenge. Operational officials tend to become advo-
cates of the policies they have adopted. Policy inertia is an occu-
pational hazard. Planners therefore, independent of policy respon-
sibility, must take an adversary role, testing the rationale of deci-
sions, questioning assumptions, checking data, asking whether
full account has been taken of longer term objectives.
4. Reevaluation. However well informed in conception, however
balanced in formulation, however deft in execution, policies still
may fail. The ultimate test is not input but outcome; it is the test
of events. Planners must observe the actual effects of policy, and
reevaluate assumptions accordingly.
In examining the organization and procedures needed to fulfill
those planning functions, we have been impressed by several consid-
erations. In the first place planning activities have a close affinity to
the intelligence function. Often it is difficult to see where one leaves off
and the other begins. In at least one aspect of policy, the anticipation
of the probable affects of alternative courses of action, the role of intel-
ligence and the role of policy planning are indistinguishable. In gen-
eral, both must look to the future: the processes of prediction, antici-
pation and forecasting are critical to both activities. For this reason
we emphasize the need for the closest collaboration between the plan-
ners and the intelligence analysts, and for the attention of both to the
development and use of improved forecasting and predictive
techniques.
In the second place it is clear that planners must be insulated from
operational tasks, but not isolated from operational realities. Orga-
nizationally this presents a dilemma. The history of planning staffs
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demonstrates that most influential planners have stayed close to oper-
ations, at some cost to the quality and independence of their planning.
Planning staffs which have achieved full insulation from the drafting
of next week's speech or tomorrow's cable have had little impact. A
blend is needed.
Finally, the national and world trends frequently highlighted in this
report?the interaction of domestic and foreign concerns, and the
press of global issues such as food, population and energy?bring a
major new dimension to the problem of organizing for planning in
foreign affairs. Planners must move into a number of specialized fields
as well as the more traditional foreign policy and national security
areas. Moreover these trends and issues, more than political and
national security subjects, cut more sharply across agency interests;
planning has a government-wide dimension.
Mindful of these considerations, the Commission sets forth its
recommendations in two parts: those which concern the products of
policy planning and those which relate to the organization and struc-
ture of the government for planning.
PRODUCTS OF THE PLANNING PROCESS
The results of the planning process will be varied. In some cases,
planners will argue alternative interpretations orally to senior policy-
makers. In others, they will prepare written memoranda or briefs, or
be active participants in interagency exercises. In still others, they
should develop extensive papers of an advocacy or forecasting nature,
or introduce timely initiatives into policy development. All of these
are appropriate to the planner's role. Adaptation to the particular
needs is healthy, and an attempt to force planning products into a
single framework would be counterproductive and sterile.
Two sorts of planning products, however, are of special importance.
Neither is the exclusive responsibility of formal planning staffs, but
both depend upon them for success. One is the periodic ?State of the
World Report"; the other, a "Global Systems Critical List."
"State of the World Report." We have suggested that an essential
element of any effective system for the conduct of foreign policy is
clear enunciation of national goals, priorities and interests, and of the
current world situation in relation to them; that is, a strategic concept
for foreign policy. We therefore strongly recommend that:
The practice of developing and making public a periodic Presi-
dential "State of the World Report," be reintroduced.
Such a report could have a major impact in developing a policy
consensus at a time when the need for a new articulation of national
purpose is strongly felt. Although a Presidential document, the strat-
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egy should be developed under the leadership of the Secretary of
State, who should assign its preparation to his planning staff, which
in turn should draw upon the expertise of the many departments
involved and especially on the NSC staff. It should have a strategic
focus; a comprehensive statement of the nature of U.S. purposes, the
structure of U.S. policies and the extent?and limits?of U.S. respon-
sibilities in the world. It should also have an economic component.
While a variety of schedules for preparation of such a report would
be possible (annual, biennial) the Commission considers the best
approach to be a major report during the first year of each new
administration which would then be updated annually.
Global Systems Critical List.* The Commission believes that farsighted
and comprehensive policy cannot be developed in the absence of a
better awareness of both the possible catastrophic effects and the
major new opportunities arising out of the uses of the world's physical
resources and environment, and from new developments in science
and technology. An authoritative inventory of these dangers and
opportunities should be developed to alert both government and public
to those problems which must receive prompt and intensive attention
if serious long-term problems are to be avoided. Such an inventory
would be an integral part of the "anticipation" role for policy plan-
ning. Since it should draw on the highest and most objective levels
of scientific skill, and since it must be protected from political pres-
sures, we believe that responsibility for the development and updating
of such a listing should be jointly delegated by both branches of
government to a prestigious and independent organization of scien-
tists. Accordingly, we recommend that:
A "Global Systems Critical List of Problems and Opportunities"
be authorized by act of Congress to be prepared by an organization
such as the National Academy of Sciences.
Such a List should probably be organized in terms of specific areas?
for example, ocean use, atmospheric degradation, or world food sup-
plies?and the problems and opportunities ranked in importance,
according to established criteria. The criteria would focus on the
social and economic costs of adverse developments, or of opportunities
foregone. Tentative findings might first be evaluated by a system of
panels and then submitted by the Academy to the Congress and the
President. We believe that relevant committees of the Congress might
hold hearings. By resolution or otherwise the Congress could express
its views on the Critical List.
*The Global Systems Critical list Procedure suggested here is discussed in
detail in the report to the Commission by Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Ney,
"Organizing for Global Environmental and Resource Interdependence." (Ap-
pendix B)
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Such a List should be revised periodically, the versions serving as
a stimulus to the reordering of governmental priorities. The President,
probably with the assistance of his principal science adviser, might
prepare a "President's Report on the Global Systems Critical List"?
an "impact statement"?which would indicate the Administration's
estimate of how United States' interests are affected by developments
included in the Critical List, and what the Administration proposed
to do about them. The science adviser can also have a follow-up
responsibility.
ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNING
Given the mixed success of foreign policy planning efforts in the
past, conscious effort is needed to build a planning process which
will facilitate the viewing of current policy choices in the light of
forecasts of the future and longer term national goals. Many activities
which currently characterize planning, and some that do not, will
need to be linked together in a way which provides necessary separa-
tion of functions but close interaction among them. It will not be
simple to find a pattern of organization which will permit the plan-
ners to concentrate on long-range issues and avoid diversion into
day-to-day operations. Certain broad lines are evident, however.
To begin with we believe planning for foreign policy must have a
government-wide dimension. Though a strong Policy Planning Staff
in the State Department is a clear necessity, the manifold kinds of
issues facing the nation, the interaction of foreign and domestic aspects
of those issues, and the involvement of multiple departments in the
issues?all point to the need for a Presidential capability for plan-
ning. We recommend, therefore, that:
The President should create a Council of International Planning
((Y IP), modeled in structure on the Council of Economic Advis-
ers ((Y E A), to serve him directly and in a manner of his choosing
in the planning for foreign policy.
We visualize that this CIP, like the CEA, would be composed of a
few-3-5?respected "thinkers," knowledgeable in foreign affairs and
supported by a minimum staff. The CIP presumably would concen-
trate on a few carefully selected problems?the Global Systems Crit-
ical List would be of special interest?and would call upon the re-
sources of the departments and agencies, as well as the academie world,
for research support. We would hope that the CIP would be close
enough to operations to give its work a necessary relevance, but suffi-
ciently detached to give it freedom to walk less traveled roads.
The history of Department of State planning organizations since
1947 clearly suggests that each Secretary of State will have his own
notions of how such groups can be most useful. It also reveals that pro-
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posals to insulate planners from operations so that they do not become
mired in day-to-day concerns are partially misguided. Unless a plan-
ning organization is useful to the Secretary and the Department in
helping them cope with current situations, it is likely to atrophy or
decline into irrelevance. No planning staff, however well organized
and adroitly managed, will be effective if the Secretary himself does
not believe in the planning function.
The Commission believes that organization of the Planning Staff
in the State Department should reflect the emphases described earlier.
It should be constantly pressed to concentrate on the key concerns of
strategic concepts, anticipation and initiative, review and challenge,
and reevaluation.
The organizational structure of the staff will probably not in itself
be important, the selection of personnel being far more critical. Never-
theless, we would make the following broad recommendations con-
cerning staffing organization:
A single, highly competent officer, personally selected by the
Secretary, should be given full time responsibility for the work on
the "State of the World Report."
Regular members of the Policy Planning Staff would normally
be expected to involve themselves at one time or another in each
of the planning functions?anticipation, challenge, reevaluation,
and the formulation of strategic concepts.
The Director of the Policy Planning Staff should have one deputy
to lead the work of the staff in fulfilling the role of anticipation and
initiatives, and another deputy responsible principally for the chal-
lenge and reevaluation functions.
We have concentrated our attention on the government-wide
coordination of planning and forecasting, and on the organization of
the State Department's Policy Planning Staff as the most critical
elements for general foreign policy. We believe that improved plan-
ning capacities are also needed in other parts of government.
The use of external experts assembled through the National Acad-
emy of Sciences to prepare the "Global Systems Critical List" is but
one example of what we believe will be an increasing need to draw
upon outside resources in order effectively to accomplish many plan-
ning functions. The development of new problems and the use of
emerging new analytical techniques will require the highest compe-
tence available, sometimes on relatively short notice. In many cases
the appropriate persons will be unable or unwilling to leave current
positions for full-time government employment.
The Commission has considered the possibility, of formalizing a
link to outside scholars by establishing an external analytic group
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linked to the Policy Planning staff but outside the government and
maintained by contractual funds. Such an arrangement might help in-
sure that valuable expert opinions, advice and research?including
the latest "academic" techniques?are available to help meet the official
planners' needs. We have not presented such a recommendation, how-
ever, being persuaded that such a single external resource would tend
to inhibit the utilization of a broader range of experts throughout the
country, and it would therefore prove restrictive in actual operation.
At least for the present, therefore, we believe it preferable that steps
be taken to seek more widely, and more selectively, expert assistance
wherever it can be found, rather than attempting to induce the ablest
individuals to leave the institutions in which they are already working.
To assist in this purpose we recommend that:
An Advisory Committee be created by the State Department,
consisting of outside scholars and experts who can assist the Plan-
ning Staff keep abreast of new developments of substantive and
methodological kinds. An officer of the Policy Planning Staff should
be charged with matching the Staff's needs with, outside researchers
best qualified to meet them, and with being its link to the Advisory
Committee and the external research community.
The closest collaboration between the planning office and the external
research arm of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is
of course imperative. In order for this external participation in plan.
ning to be effective, additional resources will be needed, and better
management of the sometimes difficult relationship between govern-
ment and outside researchers and consultants must occur. The respon-
sible officer should identify needed policy research in time to be rele-
vant to policy concerns. He must establish necessary priorities among
them. Within the State Department, individual planners or groups of
planners working on specific projects should be allocated funds to
acquire the services of consultants. The relationship between planners
and outside experts should not necessarily be a comfortable one; a
major purpose of the relationship between the two groups would be
to compel planners periodically to reevaluate their own guiding
assumptions.
One major impediment to effective longer-range forecasting and
planning for foreign policy has been a strong reluctance to employ
new methodologies and analytic techniques. The instinctive feeling
of many foreign affairs practitioners that their area is only intermit-
tently susceptible to analysis and that intuition derived from experi-
ence is the only sure guide to policy and action is reinforced by the
complexities of some of these tools and by exaggerated claims some-
times made for them by proponents who have little experience with
the realities of the policy process.
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But as policy issues become more complex and technical, and as
new data are created bearing upon them, we believe that sustained
attention must be given to the applicability of computerized informa-
tion processing and analysis, more sophisticated decision aids, gaming
and simulations, and a variety of forecasting techniques for policy
analysis.* Much of the necessary refinement will come from the out-
side scholarly community, but making them more relevant to the
problems of policymakers and planners will depend upon a closer
interplay between those in government who appreciate what is needed,
and those outside with the requisite technical skills. Much more needs
to be known about where such approaches can be helpful, and where
they are not.
*A fuller discussion of these techniques, prepared for the Commission by
C.A.C.I., Inc., is printed separately in Appendix G.
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CHAPTER 11
BUDGETING AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
All foreign policy measures involve resources in some form or
degree--e.g., money, people, commodities, equipment, investment
capital, and technical know-how.* Sometimes the resources appear in
the budgets of foreign affairs agencies; sometimes in budgets of De-
fense or Agriculture or other agencies; sometimes in the private sector.
The effective treatment of resources in foreign policy analysis and
coordination has been a continuing problem for the foreign affairs
community. In 1962, the Herter Commission noted that the State
Department paid insufficient attention to the translation of foreign
policy objectives into action programs, personnel requirements, and
resource costs. A White House Task Force report in 1967 noted that:
?Outside the annual agency by agency budget review conducted
by the Bureau of the Budget, no office or institution reviews the
budgets of the foreign and national security affairs agencies from
the perspective of the priorities, commitments and requirements
of foreign policy.
In 1970, the State Department's program for self-improvement?
Diplomacy for the 70's?stated that "the inability to link resource
allocation to policy analysis was one of the Department's most serious
weaknesses." The report endorsed the view that "some form of foreign
affairs programming system is essential to the conduct of foreign
affairs and indispensable to the Department of State's responsibilities."
We agree, and in the discussion which follows we propose a number
of specific reforms.
Complexities of Budgeting in Foreign Affairs. A number of factors
makes the budget process less effective as a policymaking, decisiom
forcing activity in foreign affairs than in other areas.
First, in many cases, the resource aspect of foreign policy decision
is quite small relative to the importance of the policy, and is fre-
quently not a major factor in whether a decision is taken. For example,
a $20?$30 million grant of military equipment to Turkey or a $200
million economic aid grant to Egypt may be a small price relative
to a possible improvement in our relations with that country at a
*Much of this chapter is based upon the two studies: Budgeting Progra4ming
and Foreign Policy, by Arnold Nachmanoff ; and Congressional Use of its Money
Power to Control Foreign Policy, by Allen Schick, which appear in Appendix T.
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critical point. Overall, outlays for all foreign affairs programs, in-
cluding military assistance, are proposed at $9.1 billion in the FY
1976 budget, or about 3% of the Federal total that cannot in any way
be a measure of the relative importance of foregin policy activities.
Second, there may be no direct connection between the budget
process and policy decisions in the foreign affairs area. For example,
the importance of the decision to recognize a new country is in no
way related to the costs of opening an Embassy. Major decisions on
foreign economic policy?the floor price on oil, actions to bolster the
dollar on foreign exchanges, actions to reduce trade tariffs and
barriers?are largely made outside the budget, and may only in-
directly affect Federal outlays.
Third, difficulties arise in planning and budgeting for foreign
policy effectively within the annual budget process because so much
of policy depends upon external developments?actions and reactions
of others over which the U.S. policymakers have little or no control.
Swift-moving events do not fit the timing of the annual budget process,
causing either: (a) deferral of costs to a supplemental budget request
or (b) budgets no longer in tune with events (e.g., a U.S. withdrawal
in S.E. Asia).
Fourth, the problem is further complicated by the fact that bene-
fits are often hard to measure. The major foreign affairs expenditure
programs over the last 10-15 years have been resource transfers to
developing countries in various forms?AID programs or project
loans, technical assistance agreements, military aid, PL 480 ship-
ments. They helped provide the foreign exchange and capital required
for modernization. Usually our aid was tied to certain self-help or
policy changes intended to improve the development process. But to
measure real benefits from the U.S. transfers, one would have to deal
with the entire economy and all economic variables, which would be
difficult in any case.
A fifth complexity in treating resource allocation in the foreign
affairs area stems from the growing intermingling of foreign and
domestic programs in support of foreign policy. The impacts related
to foreign policy may be spread through the budgets of many domestic
areas. For example, expanded energy research and development out-
lays or new gasoline taxes have direct foreign policy relationships.
Investment by Mid-Eastern oil countries in U.S. airlines or aircraft
companies can trade off against direct budget or tax subsidies to
these companies. Outlays to produce or stockpile wheat may relate
more to the world food situation than to domestic needs. Research
and development on desalting reactors, fertilizers, rice production, or
military equipment may improve exports and allied capabilities more
than U.S. capabilities. Space cooperation with the USSR is funded
in the NASA budget.
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Finally, non-Federal resources may be most critically impacted
by foreign policy actions and must increasingly be taken into account.
These impacts may relate to stability of the dollar; the price consumers
pay for coffee, copper, and oil; the flow of investment capital to or
from the U.S., taxes on foreign earnings of multinational corpora-
tions; and the rate of overall inflation including the derivative eco-
nomic effects.
Despite these many and important difficulties, the budget process is
a critically important instrument for planning and control in the
conduct of foreign affairs, by no means confined to "heavy resource
activities."
With increasingly sophisticated techniques budgeting has been able
to relate activities only indirectly tied to major resource allocations
to program direction. We believe that the State Department and other
foreign affairs agencies under Cabinet level leadership, must utilize
the budgeting procedures to improve the overall conduct of foreign
policy.
In addition, the significant resources flowing through the Federal
budget related to international activities, must be dealt with on an
improved basis. The major programs within the $9.1 billion are mainly
for economic and financial assistance ($5.5 billion) and military as-
sistance ($2.8 billion). To these sums should be added the budgetary
affect of loans of the Export-Import Bank when it is included in the
Federal Budget starting in October, 1976 (estimated at $1.7 billion
in FY 1976).
The budgetary issues in foreign affairs will grow rather than dimin-
ish in the future, even as some of the bilateral aid programs decline.
The new budgetary needs will relate primarily to U.S. response to
increasingly critical issues of global interdependence which cut across
almost all areas of governmental concerns: energy, food, commodity
stockpiling, monetary arrangements use of space and oceans, nar-
cotics control. A Mid-East settlement could involve substantial U.S.
resource transfers. SALT negotiations will have important impact on
Defense and intelligence programs.
Organizational Levels of Concern. A comprehensive budgetary ap-
proach (incorporating planning, programing and evaluation as well
as the budget itself) will serve various decision-makers in different
ways. For example, an Ambassador can use a comprehensive country
program, covering the resources of all U.S. agencies, as a means both
of developing an optimum U.S. policy toward the country and of con-
trolling agencies' activities within policy directions. A Regional As-
sistant Secretary of State may use the system to ensure balance and
consistency among countries in the region. An agency head, such as
the AID administrator, may use the system to ensure that U.S. re-
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sources are targeted to the sectors in which they can make the greatest
developmental difference.
The Secreary of State, through the Policy Planning Staff and other
departmental staffs, can take all budget and nonbudget resource impli-
cations into account in formulating policy initiatives related to multi-
national issues (food, oil, oceans, arms control, etc.) and ensure that
allocations to regions and countries are consistent both with long-term
foreign policy objectives and move immediate tactical considerations.
Thus what are the general principles which should guide more effec-
tive use of resource management in the international arena?
We propose no radical or unconventional solutions. The processes
have largely been established; the "actors" are in place; and the tech-
niques of analysis are available. But the systems have worked in-
effectively and sporadically. The issue is to make existing processes
in the foreign affairs area work as they should, and this is frequently
harder than inventing new machinery.
Improving the Executive Budget Process. We recommend, first, that
The President should direct a key foreign policy advisor (log-
ically the Deputy Secretary of State) to become more deeply in-
volved in the review of significant budget and related activities of
foreign affairs agencies and domestic agencies which, have interna-
tional iimpReations; thus to ensure that these programs effectively
express the President's foreign policy objectives.
Past efforts to achieve this review have not been very successful,
primarily because the principals were too busy, the mandate was un-
clear, the payoff uncertain, and staff work inadequate. For example,
OMB staffs have on several occasions discussed with the Deputy Sec-
retary and Regional Assistant Secretaries of State budget issues of
other agencies late in the OMB review process. But the efforts were
not fruitful, primarily because of the eleventh hour approach to com-
plex issues.
To carry out this recommendation, State would have to designate
specific staffs at the Secretary's level and in the regional and functional
bureaus to participate throughout the year with OMB and the agen-
cies involved in the review of international programs and issues. OMB,
for its part, should be responsible for seeing that State is more effec-
tively involved in the budget decision processes, including those related
to domestic activities (e.g., energy programs, commodity stockpiling,
narcotics control, etc.).
Particularly close relations betweein, OMB and NSC should be
developed: the OMB Director and his staff should participate more
in the foreign policymaking process, and NSC personnel must be
involved in the budget process.
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Here again some steps have been taken. NSC staff members now
sit OP the OMB Director's Review of economic, military assistance and
PL 480 programs. But the contact and mutual involvement should be
broadened, and the division of responsibilities clarified.
Both agencies, with State, should work to improve the Federal Gov-
ernment's capacities to collect, process, and analyze global data relat-
ing to increasingly central issues of interdependence.
As foreign and domestic policy and programs become more inter-
twined, OMB must develop new ways of flagging and analyzing issues
which do not fall neatly into the foreign/domestic pattern in its
staffing. Coordination has been effective among the OMB program
divisions on matters like food, aid, space, desalting reactors, etc.;
but the issues are getting more complex and the ramifications harder to
deal with. Program analysts on domestic programs must compre-
hend the foreign policy implications, and vice versa. Thus, some
further degree of procedural innovation, perhaps involving estab-
lishment of new analytic staff or ad hoc staff teams, is required.
A limited interchange of personnel of State, NSC, and OMB
should be instituted to improve these interfaces. In addition pro-
cedures for assessing the cross-agency budgetary impact of new
international commitments should be reviewed and modified as
appropriate.
Country and Regional Programming. The record to date on country
and regional programming has been spotty. Yet there have been some
significant results, and the techniques, if intelligently applied, can
in other areas improve policy discussions, decision-making and pro-
gram implementation. It is clear, however, that the main utility is
going to be for those regional and country managers in the Depart-
ment of State where major resource related programs are involved.
The Country Analysis and Strategy Papers (CASP) of the Latin
American Bureau of State have been the most effective, enduring
example of foreign affairs programming. The CASP papers are
country based, strategy papers which relate U.S. interests and ob-
jectives to the changing country conditions and to proposed program
actions and resource levels. The papers are developed by the Country
Team under the supervision of the Ambassador and reviewed by an
Interdepartmental Group chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State.
Representatives of OMB and NSC participate. The reviews have
been effective in sharpening policy and objectives in relation to re-
sources and ongoing activity. But no institutional vehicle exists for
review of CASP's at higher levels of the State Department or the
NSC system, nor for monitoring consistency of agency budget requests
with CASP guidance.
In other regions of State, a CASP-like procedure has been tried
in the last few years, known as Policy Analysis and Resource Alloca-
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tion (PARA). PARA documents are not necessarily reviewed by the
Interdepartmental Regional Groups, though they may be in some
cases. The PARA process has been useful to the Bureau of African
Affairs, particularly in introducing realism into analyses of objectives
and field generated programs but has fallen into disuse.
Programming systems, if not carefully managed, can become paper
mills in which the cost in time and effort outweigh the benefit. We
are led to observe that the approach to these procedures should be selec-
tive and tailored to the needs and capabilities of country and regional
staffs. For example, the needs of Latin America and Europe will
differ considerably. Within a given region, not every country program
may need review each year; effort should be concentrated on areas
of priority and change. The techniques should not be attempted with-
out adequately trained staff. Finally, the time involved in the effort
should be kept within reasonable limits commensurate with the benefits
received. Our recommendations, therefore, are that:
The State Department, through the Deputy Secretary, should
continue to lead in extending Foreign affairs programming tech-
niques on a selective, step-by-step basis, supported by NSC and
OMB. Responsibility of the Assistant Secretaries of State for the
coordination of government programs in regions and countries
should be reaffirmed.
Annual policy and program reviews of specific country and re-
gional programs should be instituted with recommendations by the
Assistant Secretaries. on agency programs to be cycled into the
budget process.
Staff capabilities in regional bureaus for program analysis and
coordination should be appropriately strengthened.
The foreign policy machinery (NSC and State) should continue
to direct from time to time country and regional studies by ad hoc
teams with designated leadership where the above cited interagency
programming reviews might not produce the "fresh" policy options
and resource analysis required in the President's perspective.
Ambassadors, particularly in large countries, should promote
country programming techniques to meet their managerial needs.
These efforts should be directly integrated with State-led regional
and country reviews and with the agency-based budget processes.
Agency systems are essential to meet the responsibilities of agency
heads for resource management. Even within negotiated foreign policy
directions and country levels, each agency must see that programs are
targeted and implemented in the most effective manner. Thus, the
agency systems must continue to be strengthened under OMB's lead-
ership. Moreover, these analytic and budgetary efforts must both feed
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and reflect the central foreign policy processes (NSC studies, OMB
cross-cutting analysis, country programming at State and Ambassador
levels, etc.).
A Foreign Affairs Budget. From time to time recommendations are
made for a "Foreign Affairs Budget" directed by the Secretary of
State. The proposal, often modeled on the Defense Department ex-
perience, suggests that all programs of whatever agency which relate
directly to foreign affairs be consolidated into a single presentation on
which both the President and the Congress could act.
The Commission concludes that this device would not be a fruitful
approach in the present circumstances. In part the concept is a mis-
reading of what a budget actually is?an instrument of decision and
control, not an informative presentation. A budget requires a decision-
maker. A Foreign Affairs budget could be a valid instrument only
if the Secretary had direct responsibility for the programs involved.
Moreover, the diffusion of responsibility in the Congress over various
elements of Foreign Affairs related programs presents great obstacles.
It may well be useful, however, to develop for analytic purposes a
display of all budget?and perhaps all private?resources bearing di-
rectly on foreign affairs. Such a document could place before Execu-
tive policymakers and the Congress a broader framework of resources
bearing on international matters. It might start with direct Federal
outlays and over time be refined to include tax expenditures together
with some indication of indirect costs and benefits related to the non-
Federal sector. We would endorse such an effort.
Improvements in the Congressional Process. The appropriation and
authorization processes have up to now been a prime vehicle for Con-
gressional influence over foreign policy. Thus Congress has added
provisions to the authorization bills for economic assistance, military
aid and sales bills, USIA, State and Peace Corps annual authoriza-
tions, as well as Defense procurement and R&D authorizations. In some
cases, Congressional views have been signaled by budget reductions or
delay in enactment.
In the Congress, the interpenetration of foreign and domestic policy
brings about involvement of a larger number of Committees in inter-
national activities. On the authorization side, this involvement in-
cludes the House International Relations and the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committees, the Banking and Currency Committees (multi-
lateral aid), the Armed Services Committees (military assistance) ,
Ways and Means and Finance (trade and tax) , the Agriculture Corn-
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mittees, to name a few. A similar lineup occurs with regard to the ap-
propriations subcommittees.
The new Congressional budget procedures now being implemented
are designed to improve Congressional consideration of overall revenue
and outlay totals in the budget and the establishment of priorities of
National need within them. For the time being, it adds to the number
of Congressional bodies reviewing resource allocations in the inter-
national area.
Finally, it must be recognized that the way in which the existing
committees and the new entities address issues in their resource re-
views can either strengthen or weaken the programming and analysis
capabilities in the executive branch. Congress sets the tone through
the nature of the questioning, focusing on substantive, longer-term is-
sues using analysis, or employing primarily arbitrary and detailed
approaches (e.g., State travel allowances). Our recommendations are
that:
The two foreign relations committees should be Oven opportu-
nity to review and comment on the views and estimates of the Ap-
propriations Committees (submitted by March 15 to the House and
Senate Budget Committees) so that the latter committees could
consider the foreign policy implications of the recommendations
on appropriation items (for example, on agricultural production
or defense posture).
The two foreign relations committees should have representation
on the Budget Committees of both Houses to improve consideration
of issues which relate to domestic and international considerations.
Congress should move to simplify the process either by (a) limit-
ing the authorization bills to general levels of expenditure and by
placing more detailed revisions in more permanent legislation not
repeated each year (e.g., AID and MAP), or (b) adopting multi-
year authorizations which could focus review more effectively on the
direction and longer-term effectiveness of programs.
The latter procedure would be in line with domestic Federal grant
programs. For example, it may be desirable to adopt two-year authori-
zation for both economic and military assistance and, by alternating
them, to consider one in greater depth each year. This procedure would
help to expedite the authorization process. It also should make pos-
sible review of foreign relations authorizations for the foreign rela-
tions committees on more expeditious time schedules, much as the
Armed Services Committees do for far larger programs.
Although not presenting a recommendation on the matter, the
Commission concludes that the role of the appropriations process has
been substantially altered by the advent of short-term authorizations
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and the new Congressional budget process. As a logical extension of
the establishment of this process, it might be appropriate to explore the
possibility of combining authorizations and appropriations into a sin-
gle process handled by one set of House-Senate "Program" Commit-
tees. The "Program Committees" could meaningfully operate within
the overall budget and fiscal guidance provided in the Congressional
budget process.
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CHAPTER 12
PERSONNEL FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS*
THE PROBLEM?THE NEED FOR A STRATEGY
The environment for international relations is changing at an
accelerating rate, confronting the foreign policymaker with new
challenges and complexities.
Personnel systems and the people in them, however, tend to adapt
more slowly. In fact, unless personnel systems are managed effectively,
they and the "cultures" they produce can become obstacles to change
and vital adaption.
People are the most important ingredient in making foreign policy.
As all executives know, getting the right people in the right jobs
makes the difference between good or mediocre performance, or even
failure, in any enterprise. And people at the top who direct organiza-
tions count most.
However, sustained attention to personnel management and execu-
tive development in the federal career service appears to be at a low
ebb today. What is needed is a new initiative: a signal from the top
that Government is concerned about recruiting and developing talented
people, putting them to work productively on the complex problems
we face, and providing them with the opportunity to rise to top
responsibilities in the Nation's service.
Foreign affairs personnel management is of sufficient importance
to the Nation that it should lead other areas of government. An oppor-
tunity exists to introduce new concepts of personnel management,
particularly executive development. The experience can at an appro-
priate time be applied more broadly to the Federal Service.
Our proposed strategy for improving foreign affairs personnel sys-
tems is intended to provide the President, the Secretary of State, and
the heads of other involved agencies with the best qualified people
for the many kinds of tasks involved in formulating and executing
U.S. foreign policy in a rapidly changing environment. To this end,
we present recommendations in subsequent sections which deal with
*This chapter draws upon a number of studies produced for the Commission
by James W. Clark, Theodore P. LeVino and William K. Cordier, John P. White
and David S. C. Chu, William T. McDonald, Charles Parker, and R. B. Moon, all
of which are reprinted separately in Appendix P to the Commission's Report.
Other participants in the Personnel project are listed therein.
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the needs of the Department of State, of the Foreign Service, and of
the government as a whole in six major problem areas. Specifically,
these recommendations are designed:
?to build the State Department's capabilities for interagency lead-
ership in the functional issues of foreign policy.
?to define the role of the Foreign Service and deepen its foreign
assessment capabilities.
?to improve the State Department's Personnel management
capabilities.
?to broaden and accelerate the Foreign Service career.
?to institute an executive development program for the State De-
partment and the international activities of Government.
?to establish improved arrangements for employee-management
relations in the foreign affairs agencies.
The President and the Secretary of State must lead in developing
and implementing such a foward-looking personnel strategy in the
international area. They alone have the constitutional and legal respon-
sibility and the executive power to initiate and carry out reforms and
to overcome bureaucratic inertia and obstacles. A long view is required
in this area. While there are short-term benefits from personnel reform,
major changes in recruitment and executive development require 5-45
years for full payoff.
Congress also has an important responsibility in personnel matters.
It is, in effect, a Board of Directors for reviewing the operation, effec-
tiveness, and fairness of our personnel systems. In many ways more
continuity of viewpoint is found in the Congressional than in Executive
leadership. One might therefore expect Congress to take the longer
view in personnel management, but in practice this is not the case.
It tends to be more at home in dealing with the specifics of legislation,
cases of individuals needing redress, and the investigation of problem
areas. What is needed from Congress is consistent pressure on the
executive branch for tackling the hard issues of basic reform.
Before presenting our recommendations, we believe it is useful to
set forth in the following section our findings, particularly concerning
the fundamentally important area of executive development, which
emerge from our exploration of comparable personnel practices in
other fields.
LESSONS OF EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT
To most people in a system, their personnel problems are felt- to
be unlike those of other organizations. Unique features and problems
exist in any system, but the similarities in problems faced by large
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organizations of many kinds are often striking. This comparability is
especially true in the area of executive development?the preparation
of leaders for the future. Accordingly, the Commission undertook
studies of executive development (a) in multinational corporations
considered to be leaders in the field, (b) in the military establishment,
and (c) in federal agencies. Our main interest was in developing a
framework for approaching the problem in the foreign affairs area
and in identifying the basic criteria and conditions precedent in mak-
ing these systems work.
Corporations. The needs which lead corporations to undertake
special executive development are remarkably similar to those faced
in foreign affairs. The core problem is one of meeting challenges and
new dimensions, which force changes in executive tasks. Companies
growing in size, diversifying product lines and businesses and ex-
panding from national to international markets demand executives
who can adapt. In many cases, companies that made their names in one
business or set of products in the U.S. market over a matter of a few.
years have become conglomerates with 10-12 major subsidiaries, each
with varied product lines and operating in 20-30 national markets. The
production, marketing, financial, and legal complexities involved in
running these enterprises have mounted geometrically.
Such growing companies often find themselves with an executive
corps no longer attuned to the business they were in. An executive
usually had grown up primarily within one function or product line.
His approach to management, shaped by this predominant experience,
was not judged to be fully relevant to running either new businesses or
directing at the top corporate level.
The companies found executive broadening for top levels is not
easy. Each subsidiary has its own traditions and performance pres-
sures; its management husbands its own executive talent. Vision and
will are required for corporate management to overcome parochial
resistance and to select and develop executive talent across decen-
tralized units. Only thus can an organization survive in a changing
and competitive world.
The fundamental approach to executive development of such com-
panies has important lessons even for government. At junior pro-
fessional levels, companies recruit the best talent available to fill
specific jobs in a particular function. The junior officer is a "specialist"
first. On the basis of proven performance in a succession of specialist
jobs, plus training, he demonstrates his "generalist" or integrative
capabilities and works his way to executive levels to the top. The
executive role is earned by performance.
The Commission study indicates also that the executive manpower
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systems of leading multinational companies tend to have the following
characteristics in common:
1. The top executive is personally committed to and involved in
the system. He personally inspects plans, reviews progress, and
evaluates results.
2. Individual managers throughout the hierarchy are held account-
able for the development of subordinates. They recognize and
fulfill their obligations for delegating, coaching, encouraging,
helping subordinates get promoted, removing personnel who
can't perform, etc.
3. Producing an internal upward flow of competent executives is
a long-term proposition. No quick miracles are expected. Execu-
tive development is a "way of life."
4. Executives are promoted on the basis of performance and achieve-
ment, not loyalty, longevity or old school ties.
5. Employees understand they can realistically aspire to positions
at all levels in the hierarchy, including the very top. No class or
layers of positions are reserved for an external or elite candidate
stream.
6. Executives develop primarily on-the-job, and jobs are used de-
velopmentally. Patterns of experience, exposure, and challenge
have been identified as career planning frameworks, but not rigid
tracks. Training courses and workshops supplement work ex-
periences.
7. Special executive development staff functions are required. Al-
though line managers make the system work, staff dedicated to
this function with corporate-wide perspective serve as talent
scouts, candidate data sources, career counselors, systems con-
sultants to executives, etc.
8. An annual manpower plan review is commonly employed and
judged to be the single most potent tool in producing the desired
results.
In almost every personnel system studied, executive development
supplements but is separate from ongoing personnel and employee-
management activities. It is precisely because these regular processes
do not serve the needs of executive development that the special sys-
tems exist.
The Military. The process of developing the military executive (de-
fined as Major General/Rear Admiral and above) is similar in some
respectato that of business. Each of the four Services has multiple
subser vices an pecialties (artillery, submarines, fighters, missiles,
intelligence). A wide variation exists between skills required at the
beginning of careers and those needed in executives. In early years,
the Services need specialists proficient in weapons, unit command, and
tactics. In the career progression, a rigorous process is applied to find
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and develop men who have strategic, cross-specialty, and service-wide
capabilities. Quality is maintained by the highly competitive selection
process at the top (only .5% of the officer corps reach the executive
level), an orderly progression of broadening assignments in line and
staff capacities, and an extensive training component throughout the
career.
Personnel management is taken seriously by the military services.
The Director of Personnel is a three-star General reporting directly to
the Service Chief of Staff, who himself devotes considerable time and
attention to the personnel system. The Services build functional com-
petence into personnel management?both officers and civilians. They
use sophisticated manpower planning techniques.
The Federal Service. By and large, executive development in the
Federal Service is an agency responsibility. In response to guidance
and encouragement from OMB and the Civil Service Commission,
most agencies have established programs for developing and training
executives within their own confines. Some of these programs, such
as the Veterans Administration, TVA, and Internal Revenue Service
have been adjudged highly successful. But the larger Departments
have had difficulty in developing effective systems which cross the
large and highly autonomous bureaus.
The CSC's effort to establish a cross-agency Federal Executive
Service has considerable interest for this analysis. A bill was intro-
duced in Congress in 1971 which had five salient purposes:
?to provide agency heads with more flexibility in administering
supergrade executives, both as to numbers and pay scales (execu-
tive grades would be abolished and the numbers established by
agencies, after central review, with congressional approval after
a 90-day wait).
?to reduce the distinction between career and non-career executives
(the latter could be 25% of the total) , both selected on merit.
?to introduce a renewable three-year contract for career executives,
which if not extended by the agency, would result in retirement
or return to GS-15 status.
?to provide for flexible assignment or reassignment of career and
noncareer executives to any duties within the scope of the Service.
?to encourage executives to participate in training and develop-
ment programs.
This bill attempted to recognize the realities of executive employ-
ment and to introduce flexibility in managing and developing execu-
tives across bureaus and agencies. The legislation failed to pass the
Congress, but the Civil Service Commission is planning new and
modified proposals.
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STRENGTHENING THE STATE DEPARTMENT
Problems and Strengths. Over the last generation, the performance
of the State Department and its personnel has been subject to sub-
stantial criticism by Presidents, Secretaries of State, and other top
level foreign policy practitioners. A pattern to these criticisms can be
identified:
?slowness or lack of responsiveness to the needs and wishes of
Presidents and Secretaries.
?lack of Presidential or Secretarial perspective?the tendency to
be advocates of country and regional concerns rather than rigor-
ous integrators of U.S. national interests, domestic and foreign.
?lack of innovation or policy leadership.
?a preoccupation with bilateral relations in a world where foreign
policy issues are rapidly becoming multilateral.
?lack of both a specialization of talent and a managerial com-
petence and ability to interact constructively with "expert" agen-
cies in developing policy which reflects national interests.
?lack of appreciation of the currents of domestic opinion and
interests which affect foreign policy, particularly those coming to
focus in the Congress.
All of these criticisms reflect upon the quality of State's general
organization and direction as well as its personnel management.
In the more specific terms of personnel management, the prOblems
we found are similar to those of previous studies:
?sharply limited functional competence and a corresponding lack
of continuity in key areas.
?poor classification procedures and overgrading of jobs.
?overstaffing at senior levels (20% of FSOs are at senior levels?
FSO-2 and above).
?serious mismatching in rank of people and jobs.
?cumbersome promotion procedures.
?slow growth in responsibility and in promotion, especially in
middle grades.
?an archaic and unresponsive recruitment process.
?inability to make effective use of Civil Service and FSR
authorities.
?a continuing dichotomy in thinking about the Foreign Service
Officer and the rest of the Department.
?negligible manpower planning, including an almost total lack of,
if not disdain for, any executive development.
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The fact that the Department has not been able to deal adequately
with these problems has given rise to the disproportionate number
of external studies of personnel management which, together with
the history of unaccepted and unimplemented recommendations,
stands as convincing testimony to the dimensions of the problem.
On the other hand, the Department does have basic strengths in
the personnel area which should be built upon:
?the individuals in State, especially in the Foreign Service, are
considered to be of high quality, even by the senior officials who
decry State's corporate performance (a paradox which can be
resolved only by effective management).
?State possesses a wider variety of personnel authorities and thus
greater flexibility than almost any Department.
?foreign affairs is considered an attractive and challenging sub-
ject matter, a strong plus in recruitment.
Strengthening Functional Competence in Washington. In 1955, a pub-
lic committee appointed by Secretary Dulles and chaired by Henry
M. Wriston conducted a landmark study of both Washington and
overseas aspects of State's personnel management. The problems of
the mid-1950's, however, were significantly different from those of
today:
?The FSO Corps was small (about 1300) and, because of its
aversion to lateral transfer and troubles with recruitment, could
not meet the expanded demands of postwar diplomacy in Wash-
ington and abroad.
?The Departmental Service was strong and too clearly delineated
from the FSO Corps. It was predominantly Civil Service per-
sonnel who did not go overseas.
?The FSO spent too much time abroad, and in fact many officers
were not meeting the statutory requirement of 3 years in Wash-
ington out of their first 15 years in the Service.
The adopted solution, known as Wristonization, was to increase
the number of jobs designated to be filled by Foreign Service Officers,
notably in headquarters, and to blanket into the FSO Corps by lateral
entry Civil Service and FSR personnel filling those positions. In the
two years 1955-56, some 1100 officers were "Wristonized." By the end
of 1960, the FSO Corps had grown from 1300 to over 3700. Civil
Service professionals in Washington declined 18% in the same period.
Today, the major personnel problem facing the Department is not
the size and quality of the overseas staff or its competence in bilateral
politicial relations. It is the expertise and continuity of the Washing-
ton staff to support the Secretary in dealing with the complex policy
issues in the difficult interagency arena. The principal concern is
whether the Department has the functional competence and bureau-
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cratic skill to play an effective role at home and abroad in the develop-
ment and coordination of policy in complex fields of trade and invest-
ment, international monetary matters, food production, energy, deep
ocean rights, environment, military and arms control policy, technol-
ogy exchange, promoting nongovernment exchanges, etc. All of
these, it should be noted, are areas where domestic and foreign policy
are intermingled.
The Commission found widespread agreement that the effectiveness
of State Department personnel in these functional areas (in both func-
tional and geographic bureaus) is at a low ebb. The basic problems, it
would appear, stem from two shortcomings:
?the ineffective use of Civil Service and FSR authorities to hire
special competence required.
?the excessive reliance upon the FSO's in filling key jobs in Wash-
ington calling for functional competence.
The process of hiring functional specialists is revealing. When an
assignment comes open in a functional bureau, existing policy is to
use FSO's who are in need of Washington assignments. A functional
bureau chief may have identified a highly qualified candidate from
outside the Department, but such appointment requires an exception
to the policy by the Director General of the Foreign Service. The ex-
ception is granted after a time-consuming determination that no avail-
able FSO has the necessary qualifications: a process which can be
expected to take from nine months to two years, by which time, the
outside candidate has gone elsewhere.
Moreover, even if the FSO's have the requisite functional compe-
tence, they usually do not like assignments in the functional bureaus.
They tend to suffer through the 2-year tours, negotiating their next
assignment back in the "mainstream." In some instances, officers sent
to functional bureaus are those deemed less qualified for the mainline
assignments. Some are in senior grades and are "parked" in the func-
tional bureaus until retirement.
The problem is not statutory. The Department has flexible person-
nel authorities to obtain all of the talent it requires from a variety of
sources. Rather, it is strictly a policy imposed by the Department in
operating the current systems: a policy to use Foreign Service for all
possible jobs; a policy based on the dual assumption that anyone in
State should be willing to serve overseas and that everyone who is use-
ful in diplomatic relations overseas can be useful in Washington.
Focusing attention on the problem of increasing functional compe-
tence in Washington is not to drive a wedge between the field service
and the headquarters?the Foreign Service and the home service. It is
not to advocate going back to pre-Wriston days, or to eliminate head-
quarters assignments for Foreign Service officers. Rather it is to say
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that modern foreign policy, in support of the President and Secretary
of State, cannot be developed without a multitude of skills covering a
range of fields almost as broad as the Government itself. Not all these
skills can be in the State Department or Foreign Service, but the State
Department and Foreign Service should have enough to fulfill their
special function of assessing foreign implications of policy and actions,
and to play an appropriate role in developing national policy. We
recommend that:
The Department should develop an annual manpower plan in
which, each bureau chief should specify the kinds and mix of func-
tional and bilateral competence required for a 3-year period and
the way in which this talent will be acquired or developed.
Within the annual plan, to be approved by the Secretary, bureccu
chiefs (functional and geographic) should proceed to acquire the
personnel required, making effective use of all personnel authorities
without case-by-case approval of personnel authorities.
A viable professional system within the Civil Service authority
should be developed for adequate career appointments to attract
and retain qualified personnel.
The Department should request the necessary GS supergrades to
provide meaningful career ladders in the Civil Service category.
Functional bureau directors should participate in the informal
FSO assignments process and career planning to the same extent
that geographic bureaus do.
Role of the Foreign Service Officer. To come to a truly departmental
personnel strategy, it is necessary to think clearly about the role of
the Foreign Service Officer Corps and its contribution to the making
of national foreign policy. The 3500 FSOs comprise about 44% of the
total American professionals in the Department.
As background to the study of this issue, the Commission made an
extensive analysis of the "average" career in the Foreign Service and
its unique "culture." Several findings with respect to the career should
be stressed in summary:
?Two-thirds of the average career is spent abroad; one-third in
Washington in training and in duty assignments in State and
details to other agencies.
?The Foreign Service occupied positions have a very high repre-
sentational and operational content and experience (handling
cables, filing reports, handling visitors, communicating with the
foreign government, etc.). A smaller part of the career is devoted
to foreign assessment and policy analysis.
?Career development is slow, with a long middle period involving
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fairly routine work and little increase in job responsibility and
content from one assignment to the next.
?Relatively little opportunity is available for management expe-
rience; ordinarily, opportunity- to supervise 10 or more people
does not occur until after 20 years (individual in his late 40's).
?In spite of the cone system, most substantive officers are essen-
tially "generalists" on entrance and remain so during the career.
With limited exposure to the specialties (some strides have been
made in economics), primary emphasis in training and career
development remains with area studies and language.
?The career concept is the opposite of that found in industry and
the military, which take top performing specialists and make gen-
eralist executives. The Foreign Service takes generalists and
attempts to introduce them sufficiently to fields of specialization
to produce executives with integrative capability.
In developing a personnel strategy and suggesting change, a num-
ber of aspects of the Foreign Service "culture" need to be recognized:
?The entering FSO class in FY 1974 still comes predominantly
(60%) from the history/political science disciplines; economics
represented 13% of the total.
?The surest road to the top is considered to be the political cone.
?Tours of duty in another agency, a functional bureau, and even
most training courses are considered lost time out of the "main-
stream."
?Outsiders (lateral entrants) are often resented.
?Specialists and administrators are tolerated but second class
citizens.
?There is an exaggerated respect for rank and hierarchy.
?Good officers accept discipline and do not differ with supervisors,
especially ambassadors.
?If you pass the threshold review (FSO-6 to FSO-5) and "keep
your nose clean," you will make senior levels of the service with a
shot at the top.
?The mores of the system, its hierarchical structure, its professional
style, and its system of rewards are not conducive to creative
thinking.
?If you have not served abroad, you cannot really make foreign
policy.
From the foregoing, it is reasonable to conclude that the Foreign
Service Officer is first and foremost a diplomat?which is to say, an
expert in conducting bilateral relations. His major task is to man the
diplomatic posts and missions overseas and to provide the bilateral
operational and policy expertise in Washington.
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The FSO in our view, though now recruited as a generalist, becomes
essentially a specialist in conducting bilateral relations. In today's
world, he is not a "foreign affairs generalist" in the sense of seeing
national policies in Presidential and Secretarial perspectives. There
are too many streams of consideration and competences which must
be integrated with bilateral competence to produce foreign policy in
a world where multilateral issues will increasingly predominate. How-
ever, the FSO should have the opportunity to earn the broader desig-
nation by solid achievement in many subject matter areas, by reaching
out to broaden himself through assignments and training and by com-
peting with others within and outside the Departments.
In one area in particular the FSO must intensify his efforts and
develop his talents: the rigor and depth of foreign assessment. Some
analysis and assessment is now performed in connection with political,
economic, military, and technological reporting. But studies for this
Commission and others indicate that present reporting, while volu-
minous, too often focuses on description of events and conversations
and too little upon the meaning and longer-term possibilities. In
Chapter 9 we have discussed in considerable length the nature of this
assessment role.
An increase in analysis and in the ability to explore and present
bold policy and program options does not come simply by willing it
at the Secretary's level. It can only be the product of a broad, well-
conceived strategy which includes recruiting, developing, promoting
and encouraging people who are at home in this task. If we want
innovators and free systematic exploration of ideas, management must
set a new framework and behave in a way which demonstrates its
commitment. The Commission recommends that:
The Foreign Service should be recruited, trained, and sized to
its historic mission?that of 'representing U.S. interests in foreign
countries. This requires people willing to and psychologically at-
tuned to serve in alien and difficult situations and who have strong
basic competence in area studies and language.
A major change in emphasis, however, should be directed toward
improvement in rigorous short and longer term assessment of U.S.
interests and analytic reporting.
The officers should be broadened by experience and training for
the new assessment emphasis, particularly in the area of economics.
Improving Departmental Personnel Management. The problems of
personnel management, whether those of the functional bureaus or the
Foreign Service, are symptoms of a more fundamental problem. The
top management of State is of necessity so policy and externally
oriented that it has little time for sustained attention to internal man-
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agement. All Secretaries of State have shown interest in management
and a desire to make lasting improvements in the working of the
Department. But sustained attention to internal management strategy
and implementation has been lacking since the era of Marshall and
Acheson.
Past studies have focused on the number two man in the Depart-
ment, now the Deputy Secretary. Many have felt he should play the
role of "Mr. Inside," and preeminently concern himself with Depart-
mental management. As the alter ego of the Secretary, however, he
faces heavy policy pressures. He serves as Acting Secretary when
the Secretary is out of the country. He is on tap with the White House
and bears a large share of the burden of Congressional testimony. He
is also absorbed in interagency problems, particularly with Defense.
This problem is frequently exacerbated by fuzzy delineation of duties
between the Secretary and his Deputy. The "one-two relationship"
is always difficult, even with experienced managers involved.
The greatest need is to develop a clear Secretarial view in the man-
agement of the Department. We conclude that it is feasible and logical
to use the Deputy Under Secretary as the major vehicle for meeting
this need. There should be a clear Presidential and Secretarial charter
as to what is to be done. The individual selected for this position must
have the management and foreign policy stature and closeness to the
Secretary to do the job; there must be adequate arrangements for
reporting to the Secretary through the Deputy and for keeping abreast
of the evolving substance of foreign policy.
It is important to emphasize that the Secretary remains responsible
for the management of the Department and its personnel and that the
Deputy Under Secretary is acting for him. Also, personnel manage-
ment should be coupled with budget management under the Deputy
Under Secretary for Management. The combination of budget and
personnel provides the necessary strength to plan and carry out this
difficult assignment.
The vacuum in consistent management direction from the top has
been filled by the Foreign Service, the continuing body which cares
most. Today, it dominates the Department through the personnel
management function. The assignment process is, of course, a critical
element in this control.
The chief of personnel in the State Department is the Director Gen-
eral of the Foreign Service, who by law, must be a Foreign Service
Officer. The rotation in the job is high; there have been 13 Directors
General in 28 years. The person with the title of "Director of Per-
sonnel" reports to the Director General and is also an FSO. Moreover,
the four Deputy Directors of Personnel heading the major personnel
functions are FS0s, as are most of the other major subordinate jobs
in the personnel area.
This condition makes for a tendency to visualize personnel policy
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for the Department in terms of the needs and aspirations of the Foreign
Service Corps. It results in high turnover and lack of professionalism
in personnel activities. It must be changed if the Department wants
to develop a professional personnel function which meets in optimum
fashion its needs for special competence and continuity.
The Board of the Foreign Service is advisory to the Secretary of
State on procedures and policies related to administration of the For-
eign Service. It is established by Executive Order and all functions
are vested in the Secretary. The Board is composed of four officials
of State, one representative each from AID, USIA, Commerce, Labor
and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. OMB has observer
status. The current chairman is the Deputy Secretary.
In light of the proposals herein to strengthen Departmental person-
nel management, the role, functions, and membership of the Board
of the Foreign Service should be reviewed. Its main continuing func-
tion might be to advise the Secretary on cross-agency aspects of over-
seas representation and reporting by the Foreign Service. Perhaps it
should be given a wider role in advising on executive development and
cross-agency exchange and training.
The Commission recommends that:
Responsibility for Department-wide personnel management func-
tions should be centered in the Deputy Under Secretary for Man-
agement, who should be made Under Secretary.
A modern, professional personnel function should be established
at the Department level, with a Director reporting to the Under
Secretary for Management. His task would be to see that viable
careers are developed within all personnel categories and that all
systems work to the full benefit of the Department.
The Director General of the Foreign Service should report to the
Director of Personnel and should focus upon the administration of
the high mobility officer component (FSO s) within prescribed
Departmental policy.
The Board of the Foreign Service should be reviewed and reori-
ented to a new cross-agency mission as discussed above. The Under
Secretary for Management should lead the review and be designated
Chairman of the reconstituted Board.
The Under Secretary for Management should be responsible for
developing, for the Secretary's approval, an annual Department
manpower plan as a vehicle for determining the needs for and
deployment of people and skills over 3-5 years.
The Policy Planning Staff should play a key role in developing
for the Secretary's approval basic guidance as to the policy direc-
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tions, shifts in deployment emph,a,sis at overseas posts, and critical
competences to be acquired.
Executive Development. The Department needs a strong executive
development program to produce the pool of career executives to ful-
fill its policy leadership role. The program should be based upon the
following key principles:
?All personnel in all systems in the Department should have the
opportunity to rise to the top career jobs in Washington and
overseas based upon merit and performance.
?The GS, FSR/U, FSO, and FSS, and the major career ladders
created within each, would be considered "feeder systems" lead-
ing to a Foreign Affairs Executive Service at the top (GS-16 and
FSO/R, 0-2 and above).
?Jobs in the Executive Service, as designated by the Secretary,
would be filled, when vacant by a special "selection-in" process
involving full review of all potential candidates and recommenda-
tions by line managers and the proposed Executive Development
Staff.
?Key "stepping-stone" jobs throughout the Department would be
identified and used for career development purposes for candi-
dates from all systems.
?Supervisors at home and abroad would be made responsible for
identifying and developing candidates with executive potential,
and the supervisors would be evaluated on the performance in
this score.
The responsibility for administering State's Executive Develop-
ment Program on behalf of the Secretary should be placed on the
Under Secretary for Management. Based upon the experience in in-
dustry, a professional Executive Development Staff should be estab-
lished reporting directly to the Under Secretary and separate from the
Department's regular personnel activities. This staff, which might
number 10-12, would work with the Director of Personnel and other
Departmental officials in performing the following functions:
?knowing in depth the best promotion candidates in all systems
in the grades just below the executive level who might be qualified
for designated jobs;
?recommending to the Secretary candidates for designated execu-
tive job openings;
?developing overall policy and procedures for an executive man-
power system;
?assisting units of State in defining executive jobs accurately and
in developing annual executive manpower reviews; and
?monitoring the operation of the program from the perspectives
of the Secretary.
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The Executive Development Staff must be highly competent, objec-
tive professionals, and perceived as such throughout the organization.
They are not kingmakers. Their recommendations on filling designated
executive jobs, however, would supplement those of Department man-
agers and would be based upon independent and extensive investi-
gations, including interviews with the candidates, their subordinates,
their peers, and their supervisors. This procedure would provide the
Secretary with a new viewpoint in the selection of executive talent.
We further believe that the executive search and development
process in State is so important that it should look beyond the confines
of the Department. State's Executive Development Staff should be
aware of high potential candidates for the Executive Service from
other agencies and from outside the Government. This staff should
also actively create and monitor interagency assignments and private
sector exchanges for State personnel which contribute to the broad-
ening of experience.
Presidential appointments to key Departmental posts including
ambassadors, would continue to be made from the White House. It is
assumed, however, that the President would build his selection process
on State's Executive Development Program and would use the pool
of career executive talent to a large extent in making such appoint-
ments.
The Commission recommends that:
The Under Secretary for Management should establish an Execu-
tive Development Program administered by a professional staff
reporting directly to him (outside but related to regular Personnel
fun,ctions).
Promotions to designated executive jobs (largely FSO ?2 and
GS-16 and above) should be subject to special procedures of a For-
eign Affairs Executive Service (FAES).
Candidates would be "selected in" to executive jobs in the FAES
by the Secretary on the basis of recommendations from line man-
agers and the executive development staff.
The purpose of the Executive Development program would be
to find the best talent from all categories within the Department
based on the Secretary's defined needs. It should be part of a com-
mwnity-wide approach.
IMPROVING THE FOREIGN SERVICE CAREER
The Foreign Service, the most prestigious element of the State
Department, was established as a professional service by the Rogers
Act of 1924. Two basic elements of its British model were incorporated
into the U.S. version: (1) recruitment by examinations which meas-
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ured "generalist" talents, and (2) recruitment at university graduat-
ing age. These fundamentals?together with "rank-in-the-man," pro-
motion based on merit, and selection out?have formed the basis of
the present-day service.
The Service currently has just under 3500 officers, representing about
28% of State's total Americans, and 44% of its professionals. Unlike
most Personel systems the Service is not a pyramid tapering to the
top. The largest classes are in the mid-career (05-03). 20% are in the
senior levels, 02 and above (this compares with .5% in the military
services). Senior levels exceed the numbers in the junior levels, dis-
tribute (as of December 1974) over the various ranks as follows:
Career ambassadors and ministers
Senior threshold: 01
471
271
Senior levels (665)
02
347
03
609
04
836
Middle levels (2,181)
05
736
Junior threshold: 06
280
07
215
Junior levels (566)
08
71
Total
3,
412
The FSO strength analyzed at a different time is distributed over
six "cones of specialization" as follows:
Number
Percent
Executive/program direction
342
10
Political
1, 210
35
Economic/Commercial
813
23
Subtotal, substantive cones
2, 365
68
Consular
484
14
Administrative
608
18
Special (medical, etc.)
8
Total
3, 465
100
The Service is essentially a closed system with relatively few lateral
entrants at middle grades or above. In the last five years, lateral en-
trants have averaged about 100 per year, most of whom have been
transfers from within the Department. Moreover, the Service is highly
selective in its entrance requirements. For example, in FY 1974, 9,300
took the written foreign service exam; 1,300 passed; 400 took the oral
exam; and 144 entered the Service.
Major issue areas related to our proposed strategy are discussed
below.
Rank-in-the-man. A key characteristic of the Foreign Service is the
so-called rank-in-the-man, where individuals are promoted not because
they hold jobs of certain responsibility, but because their records indi-
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cate to peers that they have over the years equalled the standards of
the Service.
The rationale for rank-in-the-man appears to be threefold: it is best
suited to a high mobility service where the jobs are considered to have
very similar elements. It also reflects the needs of a disciplined service
in manning hardship posts and where there must be rotation to achieve
equity of treatment. It provides flexibility, since officers can be assigned
to jobs below their personal rank based upon the needs of the govern-
ment without penalizing their careers. In general, it provides personal
security in a highly transient business and permits spreading officers
of a more uniform competence over posts which vary in hardship and
professional demands.
The current rank-in-the-man system is appropriate to an overseas
high mobility service. But problems arise with such a system, limiting
its overall usefulness:
(a) A tendency exists to assume that all jobs are the same, leading to
loose position description and classification and making more difficult
the effective match of man and job. This situation encourages over-
grading and reduces the control that "positions" provide in the num-
bers of people in senior ranks.
(b) Less emphasis is put on performance in these jobs and on ac-
countability for results.
(c) Supervisors tend to have less say about who they are given by a
centralized assignment system and thus have less accountability for
building an effective team to do the job.
(d) Overt criteria are lacking as a basis for performance rating,
except "cooperating" and "staying out of trouble."
Thus, the rank-in-the-man system is not a panacea for all personnel
in the foreign affairs community. It is a device to be used sparingly
for the specific purposes for which it is best suited. For example, with
average tours of 2-3 years, it wreaks havoc with many Washington
headquarters assignments where the need is strong for greater sub-
stantive depth, continuity, and bureaucratic skill. Aside from the mili-
tary, most of the Government and all of the private sector use rank-in-
the-job systems?fully 96% of the U.S. labor force.
Several important modifications need to be made in the rank-in-the-
man approach to amerliorate some of its worst features.
First, we believe that the Service should operate on a rank-in-the-
job basis at the top similar to that of the CIA and the military. In
such an approach, after an officer has reached 03, his further promo-
tions would only be based upon selection by management into specific
jobs in the Foreign Affairs Executive Service which are classified at
02, 01, or above. Once in the Service, promotion would be based on
performance and job openings.
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Second, it may be desirable to adopt in the Executive Service some
of the features being considered by the CSC for the Federal Executive
Service?for example, the fixed term contracts renewable at the election
of both parties. If the Government does not renew the contract, the
officer would have the election of retiring (with 20 years or more
service), or accepting a job at the top career level (03).
Third, to increase the focus on achievement, the use of the annual
work statement should be explored. This statement (sometimes called
a "job contract") would be developed by the officer and his supervisor
to indicate the specific goals and areas of emphasis required for good
performance in the job. Evaluation at the end of the year would focus
on performance relative to these goals. This practice is increasingly
used in industry and has been introduced by CIA.
We recommend that:
A substantial improvement be made in job description and classi-
fication practices for all positions in the field and in Washington.
This is a prerequisite for responsible personnel management.
Rank-in-the-man should run only through 03. All promotions to
01 and 00 should be related to specific jobs.
Greater emphasis should be placed on performance and account-
ability in the job through annual work statement.
The Service should adopt some form of "climate analysis" or
reverse appraisal to get a better understanding of officer views of
the performance of supervisors.
Functional Competence in the Service. How much functional compe-
tence ca-n-Or should be built into an FSO system heretofore generalist
in outlook? There is no simple 'answer; but functional specialty should
be emphasized as much as the individual and the system can take
consistent with the basic mission of representation and foreign assess-
ment. Such specialization should be achieved through entrance proce-
dures, lateral entry, and job experience and training.
The cone system as an administrative device does appear to encour-
age and nurture a limited degree of special competence at least for the
short run. But it hardly produces the full range of special knowledge
at posts overseas, or more importantly, in Washington. For example,
economics as offered in the FSI 26-week course provides basic tools
that all FSO's in substantive jobs require. However, modern foreign
policy analysis requires far more intensive specialties at home and
abroad; such as in petroleum economics, international monetary sys-
tem and banking, labor economics, agricultural economics, technology
exchange, and trade promotion. FSO's should be encouraged to develop
some measure of these deeper skills.
Solid incentives must be built into the FSO career pattern to
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encourage "self study" in needed specialties. To this end there should
be a one-year program to be designed by individual officers at mid-
career to deepen substantive knowledge.
We recommend that:
The cone system, should be continued (although the program
direction cone would be rendered superfluous by the executive devel-
opment recommendations). Its basic purpose is to protect the con-
sular and administrative activities as viable career specialties and
to continue to upgrade the economic competence of the Service.
Its continued effectiveness should be reviewed from time to time.
All political officers should have the 26-week FSI course in eco-
nomics or its equivalent. The techniques, as well as substance, are
essential to good policy analysis.
Over time, the distinction between political and economic cones
should be dropped. Economics today provides a major context to all
international relations.
Intercone assignments should be increased where the purpose
is to broaden experience, rather than to accommodate an excess of
political officers. The exchange should be a two-way street where
Consular and Administrative officers receive political assignments.
Officers should be given incentives to pursue deeper substantive
issues of foreign policy. They should be rewarded for initiative (self
study) and excellence in their chosen fields through promotions,
assignments in their chosen fields, awards, and mid-career work,
study programs.
Recruitment. Methods of recruitment should be overhauled and pro-
fessionalized as a Departmental function. Moreover, the process should
be made much more effective both at the junior level and for lateral
entrance to acquire the needed, qualified people. The Department must
define far more clearly, the type of people and characteristics it wants
and develop an effective new recruitment strategy to broaden its appeal
to ability groups and to increase the responsiveness of the intake proc-
ess. Junior professional recruitment should be on a Department-wide
basis, with the opportunity to choose between predominantly head-
quarters or overseas service after two tours of satisfactory per-
formance.
We recommend that:
The Board of Examiners should be abolished and the Department
establish, a professional recruitment capability within its personnel
management function.
The examination procedures, written and oral, should be revised
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to pla,ce more emphasis on testing aptitudes, creativity, and analytic
capabilities than specific knowledge. New teckniques being employed
in industry can be adopted for this purpose.
The time from examination to entrance into the service should
be sharply shortened to fit more nearly the needs of high-quality
applicants.
The Department should systematically interview officials of col-
leges and universities to determine whether the Foreign Service is
obtaining the best qualified students from among those who might
be ?interested in a foreign affairs career.
More weight should be given to recruiting people at graduate level
or who have demonstrated desired competence in specialties, espe-
cially those with economic training and experience.
The Department should review entering salaries and take steps to
ensure that the Foreign Service is reasonably competitive with other
areas of Government and industry for the kind of talent it seeks.
For the first two tours of duty, or through the 06 level, Depart-
mental entrants should be on probationary status. Following careful
screening and the junior threshold review, the individual would be
given tenured officer status.
The individual should be able to opt at this point for a pre-
dominantly Washington or mobility career and for his area of
specialization.
Lateral transfers should be actively recruited?particularly of
people with demonstrated economic or appropriate technical
expertise.
Promotion, Assignment and Selection Out. The present promotion
system based upon the rankings of all individuals in a class by peer
panels based solely on written records is ineffective, costly, and per-
haps counterproductive. We agree with the five Task Forces in Diplo-
macy for the 70's which concluded that "the present highly competitive
promotion system tends to stifle creativity and promote conformity."
The cost, including loss of productive work, involved in gathering
promotion panels for the various classes and cones is high. With good
recruitment process, performance ratings in the probationary period,
and the junior threshold review, the current system of almost annual
?
reviews by promotion boards in mid-career would appear unnecessary.
Moreover, the promotion by class based roughly on seniority is not
far from existing practice.
In any system, adequate provision must be made for faster promo-
tion of outstanding performers. Fast promotion should be governed
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by Departmental guidelines and based primarily on the recommenda-
tion of line supervisors. These could of course be reviewed centrally
for accuracy and consistency.
By the same token, provisions should allow for "passing over" for
promotion or selecting out those persons who do not meet standards.
In light of current legal and procedural problems with selection out,
the passing over of promotions may be a more effective, and equitable
way to respond to less than satisfactory performance in a given period
in an officer's career. This process also should be based upon the line
manager reports (immediate supervisor and next higher echelon).
Perhaps selection out might require substandard ratings by two or
more raters and then be subject to review by a Special Review Panel
now being proposed.
Assignment is a management responsibility to be taken with full
knowledge of the needs of the Department and the desires of the indi-
vidual. In general, line managers at home and abroad who are account-
able to the Secretary for the performance of their units should have
greater responsibility for personnel assignments, subject to require-
ments of the central process.
In the longer term, it would appear that the assignment process of
rank-in-man mobility services must reckon more and more with desires
of individuals for self-development and with personal and family con-
siderations. One step in this direction would be a system of formal
notification of assignments coming open in the upcoming transfer
season (May-August).
We recommend that:
A new system be installed of semiautomatic promotions in the
middle grades from P'S 0-5 through FS 0-3. The junior threshold
examination (FS 0-6 to FS 0-5) should be continued.
Provision should be made for more rapid promotion based on
exceptional performance on the job, and for "passing over promo-
tion" for those with, less satisfactory performance in a given period,
but who might not be eligible for selection out in, the current en-
vironment.
Selection out for time in class and low performance should be con-
tinued but adapted to the semi-automatic promotion approach.
The Department should seek authority for 20-year retirement to
help reduce the pressures toward overstaffing in higher grades coml
to permit officers who are not selected into the Executive Service
to pursue second careers.
The Under Secretary for Management should exercise greater
oversight over the assignment process.
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A form of job posting should be adopted under which all officers
are notified of assignments coming vacant and have an opportunity
to make their preferences known and to participate in career
planning.
Career Development. A major concern for the younger officers in
the service is the nature of assignments in the early stages of the
career and the long, slow progression through jobs with little policy
and managerial content. Indeed, many believe this midcareer problem
to a major impediment to effective development and retention of bright
young officers.
Various solutions to this problem must be considered:
First, the most important improvement to the FSO career at junior
and middle echelons would be to slim the top of the Corps, halt the
overgrading of jobs, and to place real responsibility earlier in an
officer's career. This change will help officers develop earlier and indi-
cate those with potential for the top.
Second, a large number of jobs in the service need not be manned
by the college-trained, generalist officers and can be filled more effec-
tively from other sources. The Department may have gone too far
in blanketing routine jobs into the Service. This determination can
only be made on the basis of job-by-job analysis.
Third, assignments to other executive agencies and the private sec-
tor at mid-career levels can provide the variety of programmatic and
managerial experience required. This broadening should also include
assignments to Congress, foundations, industries, labor unions, state
and local governments to fit the FSO for the role he must play in
today's world. This arrangement is not an easy prescription to carry
out; but it must be done as a part of a vigorous Executive Develop-
ment Program.
It is recommended that:
All PRO jobs should be rigorously reexamined to determine which
can be reclassified downward and made available to more junior
officers. This should apply to ambassadorial and DOM positions.
Routine jobs at the bottom of the Service should be reviewed to
be sure they require university trained "generalists." Those jobs
which do not should be filled from other sources of talent as
appropriate.
The 200 or so stepping-stone jobs which provide managerial expe-
rience should be clearly identified and husbanded for developments
of those with indicated management potential.
More assignments should be made outside the State Department
in jobs with managerial and programmatic content. State should
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take initiative to reinvigorate and expand the exchange programs
under-way.
All DCM's at larger posts (Class I and II) should have had a
prior tour of duty with significant management experience in or
out of State.
"Leave-without-pay" service outside the Executive Branch in
activities which broaden managerial or functional experience should
be encouraged, and the service outside should count for purposes
of promotion and retirement. Such services could include industry
(e.g., petroleum, banking), foundations, universities, congressional
staffs, or state and local governments.
The detail of FSO's to state and local governments should be
effectively implemented under the Pearson Act. (This will require
changes in the law and appropriations limitations.)
For high performance/ potential officers, anew program should be
mounted for deepening functional competence through one-year
period of work-study at mid-career levels (12-15 years in the
service), to be designed by the officers involved, with, guidance and
approval by the Department.
GOVERNMENT-WIDE APPROACH
A President with responsibilities for the conduct of foreign rela-
tions in today's world must be concerned with the quality of people
and effectiveness of personnel management beyond the State Depart-
ment. This concern recognizes the increasing importance of other For-
eign Affairs and "domestic" agencies in this arena.
The Foreign Affairs Agencies. Four agencies comprise this cate-
gory: AID, USIA, ACDA, and ACTION. All have separate personnel
systems, but are under the general policy supervision of the Secretary
of State. Many of the foregoing considerations and recommendations
relating to the State Department and the Foreign Service also apply
to AID and USIA (e.g., relation of mobility elements to Washington
functional experts recruitment, promotion, selection out, executive
development, etc.) and particularly to the FSIO's of USIA. However,
even though their personnel systems are closely related to those of
the. State Department, there are major issues relating to personnel,
management in AID and USIA which require separate attention.
AID is in the painful process of shrinking its work force to fit several
conditions: the reductions in levels of development lending; greater
reliance on contractor personnel and country nationals in implementing
technical assistance initiatives; and the withdrawals from Southeast
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Asia. When completed, AID management hopes to have a slimmed
down agency in line with program and foreign policy directions. The
short-term problem is to accomplish the reduction in force (RIF)
without completely demoralizing key personnel.
AID's greatest problem in personnel management lies in the un-
certainties as to the future of the Agency. If one wanted to create a
difficult context to try to attract and retain high-quality development
professionals, it would be hard to outdo the present situation. AID
has no permanent authorization. Each year Congress debates the very
existence of the program, and for four out of the last five years did
not pass an authorization or appropriation bill until well into the year
in question, relying instead on continuing resolutions.
A recommendation in Chapter 5 suggests that AID continue to
be the State Department operating arm for the implementation of
bilateral assistance, including security, development, and disaster re-
lief programs. The forms and techniques of AID may change over time.
The sectoral emphasis may shift as they have in the past (from agri-
culture, to health, to population control, etc.) , the countries of con-
cern may vary, but it is hard to conceive of a nation of wealth and
economic and technological know-how without substantial involve-
ment in bilateral aid.
We recommend that:
The executive branch and Congress should undertake a compre-
hensive assessment of the role and scope of the economic develop-
ment program,. An effective personnel program, cannot be operated
in the present conditions of uncertainty. It is a propitious time to
reexamine AID's longer-term mission.
If the program is to be continued, AID or its successor agency
should develop a "compatible" but separate personnel system de-
signed to attract and retain high-quality development professionals.
USIA is currently an independent agency reporting to the Presi-
dent. In Chapter 9 we have recommended combining information
and cultural activities, now carried out by the State Department and
USIA into a new autonomous agency called the Information and
Cultural Affairs Agency (ICA). The Director of ICA would report
to the Secretary. Press relations programs would be transferred di-
rectly to State, and VOA would be established with its own Board as
a separate entity.
The principal personnel issue stemming from the foregoing pro-
posals is whether the FSIO's should continue to be administered as
a separate but related service under the jurisdiction of the Director
of ICA, or whether they should be administered as a new cone in
the FSO Corps. Treating FRO's as a cone of State's Foreign Service
would tend to emphasize the close relationship to the Department
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an,d: theoretically make the interchange of assignments easier. It
might give the FSIO's a better chance at becoming a DCM and Am-
bassador. However, we believe that the arguments for a separate but
related personnel system somewhat outweigh those for amalgamation.
USIA has generally been a better administered agency whose Director
pays considerable attention to the assignment and development of
personnel. Its smaller size (only 900 FSIO's) worldwide means that
its personnel problems are more manageable. Also, its function is
essentially a specialty of its own.
Until the State personnel management capability is considerably
improved, we conclude that USIA (ICA) personnel functions, like
budget and administration, should remain separate. The proposed
conal amalgamation always remains as a future option.
We recommend that:
USIA's personnel system, under the new agency we have pro-
posed, should continue as a separate system with "compatible" regu-
lations. FSIO's should not be merged as a cone 9f the FSO Corps.
The new agency should develop the unique kind of staff required
to coordinate and manage the increasingly important exchanges
and contracts through private channels.
The "Domestic" Agencies. The so-called "domestic" agencies have
entered the world of international relations in a large way. Today,
some 6,600 employees of domestic agencies serve in international ac-
tivities on a full-time basis in Washington and overseas. Perhaps
5,000 of these can be considered involved in a policy rather than an
operational capacity. Of the 5,000 total, 3,000 are considered pro-
fessionals, and 250 are at executive levels, GS-16 or above.
Most of the major Departments have Offices of International Af-
fairs, some headed by Assistant Secretaries. Most carry on extensive
contacts with foreign governments, professional groups, and indi-
viduals either from locations abroad or from headquarters. Many
more people in these agencies have part-time or intermittent con-
cern with internatiolial activities.
Several of the Agencies, notably Agriculture and Treasury, have
distinct personnel services related to international activities. They
tend to recruit university graduates for a career entirely within the
international area. The international careerist, usually with a primary
background in economics, is put through a planned career path which
includes initial headquarters experience. On the basis of performance
in this area, the individual is selected for a tour abroad, followed by
alternating tours at higher levels, both at home and abroad as Agri-
cultural (130) or Treasury (34) attaches. The overseas tours may
be in several countries. Language and country training is increasingly
stressed, and is obtained through the Foreign Service Institute: By
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and large, the professional quality of the people is high, and these
attaches serve as valued members of the embassy staffs, usually within
the Economic section. The attaches are Civil Service employees and
do not have many of the benefits of the Foreign Service. The question
of "diplomatic status" has been a frequent matter of contention be-
tween these agencies and the State Department.
Commerce and Labor have similar, though not as well developed,
international services. Their activities in the foreign area are grow-
ing, particularly in Commerce, with the emphasis on trade promo-
tion, East-West trade, and technology exchange. These agencies
however, do not have separate services for persons abroad; the com-
mercial and labor work is performed by FS0s. (Commerce does have
about 15 trade fair directors overseas.) Personnel exchange programs
are in effect with both agencies (the Commerce-State exchange runs
about 20 people each way).
The time has come to give more systematic attention to the quality
of these "domestic" international functions. They are important con-
tributors to the substance of foreign policy. The President is best
served if they are strengthened.
We recommend that:
The President should direct key domestic agencies (through the
Secretary of State, OMB, and the Civil Service Commission) to
take steps to strengthen their personnel systems in order to partici-
pate more effectively in the development and execution of foreign
policy.
General rules and standards should be issued to guide develop-
ment of a family of compatible, agency-run systems.
The Foreign Affairs Executive Corps. The importance and complexity
of foreign policy development and implementation today requires ex-
perienced, broadly trained executives. The need is evident for a more
comprehensive approach to this problem; i.e., developing a govern-
ment-wide pool of such executives who can direct staff and line
operations in the international arena. A President can no longer as-
sume that executive talent will be available to develop imaginatively
and to administer sensitively the foreign policy required. He cannot
assume that job experience in any one agency "feeder" system, or sub-
system, is broad enough to permit handling the streams of variable
which will confront the foreign affairs executive.
An initiative in foreign affairs executive development is urgently
needed. The populations are small enough to work with (some 2,150 out
of 10,000 Federal executives) . The President's special concerns for in-
ternational relations are clear. Moreover, one cabinet officer, the Secre-
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tary of State, has leadership responsibility in the area and "owns"
a lar?;e portion of the "assets."
Our study has identified about 2,155 executive level jobs (super-
grade or FSO-2 and above) in the foreign affairs area as follows:
Was
Overseas
Total
State
562
479
1, 041
Other Foreign Affairs agencies
445
401
846
Other departments and agencies
236
32
268
Total
1, 243
912
2, 155
All but about 100 of the above are career officials.
We recommend that:
The President designate certain executive jobs and the men who
hold them as part of a Foreign Affairs Executive Service. The
designated jobs would be filled only after a systematic executive
search across the various agencies' feeder systems.
The President should instruct the Head of &id Agency involved
to improve Executive Development Programs within his agency,
based on policy guidelines to ensure that each "feeder" system makes
an optimum contribution to the government-wide approach.
Prime responsibility for support to the President in implementing
the Foreign Affairs Executive Service would be placed in the Sec-
retary of State, under a Presidential charter. It would be accom-
plished largely through expansion of the Executive Development
Staff reporting to the Under Secretary for Management.
This staff should also organize an annual executive manpower
review to monitor progress of agency programs and key individuals
with executive potential.
Legislation may eventually be required to give the government-wide
function more teeth. However, we believe it could operate initially as
outlined within existing law, relying on the President's general re-
s?ponsibilities as Chief Executive and for conducting foreign policy.
The way in which the State Department reacts is important to the
success of this program. If agencies believe that all the best jobs
go to the Foreign Service Offices, there will be little interest in the
system. The key will be the perceived quality of the candidates and the
fairness of State's administration of these activities.
The Foreign Affairs Executive Service could be staffed from the
Executive Office of the President rather than the Department of State.
This approach has substanital organizational logic. But Congressional
history, the desirability of placing responsibility in a Department with
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an adequate charter, and the climate of the times support putting
the function in State.
The Foreign Service Institute (FSli. Improving the quality of person-
nel and executives across the government in international affairs will
depend very heavily on the FSI. The FSI should be considered a
national training institution operated by State to meet the needs
of all agencies in this field. Its curriculum should be reviewed and
developed accordingly. Its effort should be coordinated with some
of the management training offered by the Civil Service Commission
and the universities.
We recommend that:
The FSI program should be expanded to handle the principal
language and foreign affairs training for all agencies. Its name
should be changed to Foreign Affairs Institute (FAI) to recognize
the broader mission.
The funding of FAI should be made entirely reimbursable with
State and other participants paying their share of the costs in the
form of tuition. A revolving fund should be established to permit
financial planning on along -term basis.
Steps should be taken to provide better FAI facilities in the
Washington area. Appropriations should be sought for this pur-
pose.
State should develop a process for providing an annual statement
of training requirements and for evaluation of performance i91
meeting those requirements.
The current Director has done a commendable job and deserves
strong Department support in developing plans for the new mission
and facilities. When the position does become vacant, a new Direc-
tor should be sought nationwide in an effort to find a person of dis-
tinguished attainments in foreign policy administration, both as a
practitioner and educator.
The faculty mix should be altered to include more members from
relevant graduate schools who have demonstrated ability to work
with experienced adults; some should also come from other training
centers engaged in development of public and private executives.
This is not a job for FS0s.
EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Recent developments in employee-management relations (EMR)
in many ways add to the inflexibilities and uncertainties of effective
personnel management in the foreign affairs agencies. To develop
perspective in this complex field, the Commission conducted, through
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consultants and staff, an extensive review of history and operations
under the relevant Executive Orders.
From the point of view of effective personnel management, the
compromise arrangement which led to E.O. 11636 has not in general
worked well, and the future problems under the order will probably
grow. What was intended originally as continuing consultation within
the family of the Foreign Service is fast becoming a complex adver-
sary, legalistic personnel governance system where the lines between
management and the "union" are hard to find. The need again is to
foster a truly departmental management position in dealing with
EMR matters.
Management Role. The State Department was slow in organizing
itself to handle employee-management relations. It has not yet devel-
oped the professional expertise and continuity required. A small Em-
ployee-Management relations (EMR) office is attached to the Director
General. However, The American Foreign Service Association
(AFSA), which is at once a professional organization and the em-
ployee representative organization, has tended to ignore this office
and to deal directly with senior levels, and the Department let this
happen. Moreover, it has never been clear who in the Department senior
levels was in charge of EMR. The Deputy Under Secretary for Man-
agement and the Deputy Secretary have dealt with various issues de-
pending on whom AFSA approached.
The Role of the Board of the Foreign Service. The Board was chosen
as the keystone of the EMR system apparently because it seemed to fit
its policy responsibilities related to the Foreign Service. However, it
has proven particularly ill-suited to labor relations. Its members,
particularly the majority of seven from the foreign affairs agencies,
have little experience in labor relations. It has fashioned no machinery
to keep itself alerted to upcoming issues, has inadequate staff for these
purposes, and has not monitored sufficiently the consultation among
the three foreign affairs agencies.
Conflict of Interest. The employee-management procedures for both
E.O. 11491 and E.O. 11636 were made for the traditional rank-in-the-
job employment systems rather than a rank-in-the-man system such
as the Foreign Service. The distinction between management and em-
ployee is almost impossible to define in the latter. Most of the senior
officials of the Department?that is, management?are members of
AFSA, the employee agent. All would benefit from concessions to
AFSA relating to overseas benefits which are under the Secretary of
State's jurisdiction. Thus, FSO's serving under special Presidential
appointment sit on both sides of the employee-management table in
the "consultation" situation, a situation which does not fit established
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practice in the labor-relations field. It does not conform to the role the
Foreign Service wants to play (the diplomat-manager) in supporting
the Secretary and the President. It certainly does not adequately pro-
tect the public.
The Commission concludes that the best interests of all parties would
be served by exempting at least the Presidentially appointed FSO's
from the adversary, bargaining arrangements of E.O. 11636. In this
sense, the original position of the Department requesting an exclusion
of the Foreign Service from E.O. 11491 appears to have been correct.
Foreign Service Officers operating in disparate posts abroad do have
a right to express their needs collectively through negotiators who
represent the best qualities of the Service. This representation could
continue to be done by AFSA, not as an agency-wide, exclusive bar-
gaining agent, but as a professional organization. Individual griev-
ancies could be handled through the existing Grievance Panel or some
similar arrangement.
Consultation. In the Department's employee-management proce-
dures, consultation has become an adversary proceeding where the
Department's personnel manual is considered the "contract." All Man-
ual changes are checked with AFSA; where AFSA opposition is
known, delay and paralysis in the personnel function results. To
remedy this problem the Executive Order should be clarified so that
the management of the three agencies cannot be stopped from taking
action on any pending matter whose "consultability" is being urged
by the employee organization. Moreover, management must be free,
without prior consultation, to change personnel policies and practices
in areas reserved for management under the Order.
Rolling Negotiations. The system of item-by-item negotiations based
on the Executive Order's provision for regular consultation should
be amended to provide for more comprehensive written agreements
over a fixed period. This change would help reduce the confusion
which arises from the large number of agreement understandings
being processed piecemeal in the Department at any one time. More-
over, contrary to good labor-management practice, the agreement
once signed can be reopened under pressure from the employee
organizations.
Only one solution would appear to deal adequately with the fore-
going problems, is administratively simple, and fits longer term needs.
We recommend an approach along the following lines:
Revoke E.O. 11636 as it now stands.
Continue to exempt Foreign Service Officers as Presidential
appointees from the main provisions of ?0. 11491.
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Extend a similar exemption to FSIO's and F SR's of the three
agencies?i.e. all rank-in-the-man professionals.
Provide for representation of the above officers through AF SA,
or other organizations, as professional associations.
Provide all other employees of State, AID, and USIA representa-
tion and bargaining rights under E .0 . 11491.
At the same time, Department should take appropriate steps to im-
prove its ability to cope with employee-management relations, in-
cluding:
Establishing a single focal point in State for mobilizing the nec-
essary management resources to conduct effective EMI?: the
proposed Under Secretary for Management, supported by an exper-
ienced professional staff with continuity.
Enforcing the use of this Office as the management channel in
dealing with employee organizations.
Clarifying its EMI? policies.
It is not easy to roll back the clock. But there are times when this
must be done, when the alternative is to proceed in a direction which
may be harmful to all parties. It is not clear, for example, that the
present drift toward making AFSA an agency-wide industrial type
"union" is in the long-term interests of Foreign Service Officers. There
would appear to be longer-term costs, not only to the prestige of the
FSO Corps in Congress and the public but also to the effectiveness of
its members as a part of foreign 'affairs management.
If a separate Executive Order for Foreign Affairs agencies is deemed
necessary, a new Executive Order is recommended to strengthen the
program along the following lines:
The Board of the Foreign Service should be taken out of the
employee-management relations business. In its place, general over-
sight should be given to a new seven-man Foreign Affairs Council
composed of representatives of State (two members including the
chairman), AID, USIA, Labor, CSC and OMB who have expertise
in the EMI? field. The council would be advisory to the Secretary as
to the operation of the EMR system and as to policy required to
make the system work.
The Disputes Panel should continue to settle all cases brought,
subject only to review by the heads of Foreign Affairs agencies.
There should be provision for fixed-period contracts, thus elimi-
nating the current "rolling" negotiations.
Interagency consultation requirements should be strengthened.
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Discretionary benefits should be removed from the bargaining
either by amending the Order or by a8signing the determination to
OMB ,USC, or some agency outside State.
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS AND THE
ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS
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CHAPTER 13
EXECUTIVE-CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS
Looking to the problems ahead, the Commission believes that a new
era of cooperation between the executive and legislative branches in
foreign relations is vital to the security of our nation and to the peace
of the world. We need a new unity in the government that builds, both
at home and abroad, a renewed spirit of confidence.
In the first 12 chapters of this Report, we have sought to anticipate
future challenges to American foreign policy. We have analyzed the
need for adaptation of current organizational arrangements within
the Executive Branch to help meet those challenges in the best inter-
ests of the American people during the years ahead.
In Chapter 14, the Commission will address itself to the need for
changes in the organizational arrangements of Congress that will
strengthen the Congressional role in the conduct of foreign policy.
We have noted two future challenges to American foreign policy,
and the need to improve current organizational arrangements to meet
those challenges. The first is that the major foreign policy problems
of the future will increasingly arise from the tightening economic
and physical interdependence of nations. The second is that problems
of interdependence will sharply affect the domestic economy of this
country and therefore merge with domestic political issues, but the
processes of our foreign policymaking are still too much designed as
though foreign and domestic policy are distinct.
These two perceptions place a special burden on the Commission
to examine Congressional-Executive relationships, and the internal
organization of the Congress. The Commission believes that, even with
respect to the traditional diplomatic and national security issues of
foreign policy, the Congress until recently has deferred excessively to
executive leadership, and allowed some of its powers to lapse. The
Executive filled the vacuum created by Congressional deference. We
have examined how a better balance might be struck without consti-
tutional surgery or excessive reliance by Congress upon its power of
the purse. We have been guided in our search for improvement by our
view of the probable issues of the future, not by an attempt through
organizational means to correct mistakes of the past.
If we are correct in believing that the foreign policy agenda of the
future will be less concerned with such traditional questions as the
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recognition or non-recognition of foreign regimes, the overseas basing
of U.S. forces, or levels of supporting assistance to allied governments,
and focused more on the newer problems of global resource access,
labor migration, commodity pricing, the relations of currencies, pro-
tection of the global environment and the like, then foreign policy
will far more intimately affect domestic politics and the domestic
economy. It will touch the American public more directly, and will
involve the Congress to a greater degree. Moreover, the Constitution
gives the Congress the sole power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations. As that commerce becomes central to our foreign relations,
the Congressional role must inevitably grow. The Congress, then, must
be prepared to play, effectively and responsibly, a broader role than
before in those issues with both foreign and domestic dimensions.
This conclusion seems to be at least broadly accepted by the Con-
gress itself. From November 1973 through June 1974, the Commission
conducted an extended survey of the views of Members of Congress
on the making of U.S. foreign policy. (The survey is presented as
Appendix M to this report, which also includes a listing of the major
political and foreign policy actions of the period.) A number of views
expressed in the survey will be referred to in this report; the central
themes of the survey responses were a deep dissatisfaction with the
role of Congress in the making of foreign policy, the desire that Con-
gress play a larger foreign policy role, despite an acceptance of the
major direction of U.S. foreign policy.
Under the Constitution, the Congress and the executive Share im-
portant responsibilities with the executive in regard to foreign policy?
war powers, treaty powers, and the appointive process. As we have
already noted, Congress has the sole power to regulate foreign com-
merce, but in practice substantial powers have been delegated to the
executive. In order to meet these responsibilities there must be genuine
communication and a full flow of information between the two
branches of government. The exercise of these shared responsibilities
in an increasingly competitive and complex world places an extraor-
dinary burden on the executive and legislative leaders of this great
democracy.
We seek balance and effectiveness in the future conduct of our inter-
national relations. We seek no radical shift in power between the
branches. The Commission believes that in the future, as in the past,
the executive branch must conduct our relations with other countries.
In fulfilling his constitutional responsibilities the President must have
the flexibility to negotiate effectively and provide responsible leader-
ship in meeting international demands of increasing complexity. But
to provide for a fuller sharing of responsibilities in that broad region
where both branches must act together, and to assure that the Con-
gress can fulfill its constitutional responsibilities to participate in the
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formulation and implementation of foreign policy, we make sugges-
tions of two kinds. This chapter discusses those concerning the rela-
tion of the executive to the Congress. The next proposes several means
of strengthening the capacities of the Congress to meet its expanded
role and enlarged responsibilities. The Commission notes that the
Congress has already made substantial progress in dealing with both
issues. Indeed, many of our recommendations seek merely to strengthen
or qualify steps already taken or proposed.
TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE SHARING OF AUTHORITY AND
RESPONSIBILITY
Both the Constitution and the political realities of our system re-
quire that major issues of foreign policy be resolved only on the basis
of shared participation and responsibility between the Congress and
the executive. The Commission offers a number of proposals to facili-
tate that sharing. These are offered in the knowledge that, historically,
whenever there has been a shift of influence from one branch toward
another, the shift has initially been accompanied by conflict and excess.
The Commission does not believe that Congressional control of foreign
policy is an appropriate remedy for executive control, or that either
can act alone. The Commission believes cooperation is requisite if the
nation is to deal steadily, thoughtfully, and responsibly with the
broad and complex range of foreign policy concerns now before us.
The basic theme of these proposals, therefore, is to seek new ways in
which the President and Congress participate jointly in the formula-
tion and maintenance of policies responsible both to the exigencies of
the outer world and the concerns of the American electorate.
WAR POWERS
Probably the greatest source of friction and misunderstanding be-
tween the Congress and the executive branch in recent years has been
the heated controversy over the President's use of the armed forces
in hostilities abroad. The Commission has reviewed the efforts already
made to ensure shared responsibility and joint action with respect to
the Nation's war powers, and it endorses the principles of P.L. 93-148,
enacted in 1973 and known as the War Powers Resolution, though it
recognizes that there may be constitutional questions to be resolved. It
does so in the belief that the Resolution is in keeping with the intent
of the Founding Fathers and the public expectation, rooted in that
intent, that Congress participate in the decisions of war and peace.
The Resolution establishes procedures for the President and Congress
in the exercise of war powers and is designed, through reporting and
consultation requirements, to result in an early sharing of responsibil-
ity for such decisions.
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There appear to be public misconceptions about the Resolution's
purpose. The most concise statement of Purpose is recited in the legis-
lation. We quote:
"It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the
framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the
collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will
apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hos-
tilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities
is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of
such forces in hostilities or in such situations."
The first tests of the Resolution have come in the past few months.
Pursuant to its requirements, reports were submitted by the President
to the Congress concerning military evacuations at Da Nang, Phnom
Phen and Saigon, and the recovery of the merchant ship, Mayaguez,
and its crew. All four reports, filed as required within 48 hours after
armed forces were introduced, involved military operations of an
emergency nature and of short duration. As a result, only the consulta-
tion and reporting sections of the Resolution have been tested.
If the War Powers Resolution is to produce increased cooperation
between Congress and the executive branch, there must be a willingness
on the part of the executive to consult with Congress and a Congres-
sional willingness to assume new responsibilities for the sensitive and
urgent decisions concerning the use of force abroad. In the discussion
of a new Joint Committee in the following chapter we suggest one
device for assisting the Congress to meet those responsibilities.
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
A second source of confrontation and dispute in recent years between
Congress and the executive branch has been the use of sole executive
agreements with foreign governments. "Sole executive agreements"
are international agreements not concluded as treaties or as executive
agreements to which Congress has concurred, but by executive action
alone. Some agreements have made or implied commitments to foreign
countries concerning matters for which Congress shares constitutional
responsibility. Some have required appropriations of money or the use
of armed forces or have altered terms of an existing treaty.
The Commission believes that the advantages to the executive for
freedom to enter into such arrangements must be balanced against the
necessity for public awareness of them and the opportunity, through
the Congress, for review and recourse as to their terms. Congressional
views, as the survey earlier referred to indicates, are similar. Two
recent developments should be helpful in bringing about a more coop-
erative system for the formulation and implementation of international
agreements. The Department of State has revised its regulations con-
cerning these agreements. They now provide that there should be
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consultation with Congressional leaders and appropriate committees
whenever there is a question whether an international agreement should
be concluded as a treaty or by executive agreement. If this procedure
is followed, Congress will have an early opportunity to comment upon
proposed sole executive agreements and to examine the constitutional
authority for such agreements along with its own constitutional
responsibilities.
In 1972 Congress enacted a law on the transmittal of U.S. agree-
ments to Congress (1 U.S.C. Section 112 (b) ), requiring that the text
of all executive agreements be submitted to Congress within 60 days
after they are concluded. Special provisions were made for transmittal
of executive agreements on a confidential basis when, in the opinion
of the President, disclosure would be prejudicial to national security.
The Commission believes that these executive and legislative actions
would be strengthened, and shared responsibility for international
agreements further assured if Congress made clearer its view as to
when the nation is committed to assist another nation by use of armed
force, or material or financial resources. The Senate provided precedent
for this in 1969 in enacting Senate Resolution 85 on "National Com-
mitments," and again in 1970 when it passed a resolution concerning
the Spanish Bases agreement, stating that nothing in that agreement
"shall be construed as a national commitment by the U.S. to the defense
of Spain."
Rather than relying upon its power of the purse or using a case-by-
case basis for proclaiming its opposition to a particular sole executive
agreement it seems advisable that:
The Congress should adopt, by concurrent resolution, a statement
that a national commitment?meaning a promise to assist a foreign
country, government or people by the use of the armed forces or
financial resources of the United States, either immediately or upon
the happening of certain events?results only from affirmative
action taken by the Legislative and Executive Branches of the
United States Government by means of a treaty, statute, or con-
current resolution of both Houses of Congress specifically provid-
ing for such commitment.
EMERGENCY POWERS
The scope of a third set of executive powers, and the procedures
appropriate to their use should also, we believe, be established by the
Congress. These are the far reaching powers deriving from national
emergencies. As the work of the Special Committee on the Termina-
tion of the National Emergency has shown, four Presidential proc-
lamations of national emergency are currently in effect. Of these, two?
declared in 1950 by President Truman in response to the Korean
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conflict, and in 1971 by President Nixon to implement currency
restrictions and enforce controls on foreign trade?were generated by
problems of foreign relations.
Pursuant to these proclamations, over 470 provisions of federal law
have come into effect, delegating extraordinary authority to the execu-
tive. The actual emergencies have now ended, but the formal states of
emergency endure and the country remains, in effect, in a state of
emergency rule. The matter is no mere technicality; the prolonged
continuation of such powers diminishes the constitutional role of Con-
gress in foreign policy, and puts at unnecessary risk the Constitutional
balance of government.
The Commission believes, therefore, that:
The national emergencies should be terminated by law and that all
statutes delegating authority in time of national emergency should
be repealed or revised to conform to the provisions of the proposed
National Emergencies Act.*
The Commission further recommends that:
Any future declarations of national emergency should specify the
statutory powers required to meet such an emergency; that all na-
tional emergencies should be terminable at any time by concurrent
resolution or by Presidential proclamation; and that in the absence
of extension by Congress, provision should be made for termination.
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
As Congressional responses to the survey questions indicate, many
Members of Congress appear deeply concerned about the inadequacy
of its information relating to foreign policy issues. A number of the
recommendations made in this report seek to address that problem.
Here we address two of its aspects: first, executive privilege; then the
security classification system.
Despite recent changes in attitudes of both the Executive and Con-
gress concerning the sharing of information, the possibility of future
constitutional confrontations, particularly over information relating
to the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, has led the
Commission to explore means to avert or diminish that possibility.
The Commission is mindful that any request by Congress for informa-
tion may present a direct conflict between the right of Congress to
know and the duty of the President to protect the national interest and
the confidentiality of his advice.
We assume that non-emergency legislation and certain other statutes that
cannot be immediately repealed will be retained until Congress enacts appropri-
ate new legislation. In its actions thus far on emergency legislation Congress has
followed this practice.
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The Commission therefore believes it useful to note a number of
general principles, and to recommend the establishment of certain
clarifying procedures.
We believe that a claim of executive privilege with respect to
matters within the purview of the executive departments should be
asserted only by the President personally. When so asserted, any such
claim should be considered carefully and respectfully both by the
Congress and, if the matter should come to litigation, by the judiciary.
There are kinds of information?involving, for example, confidential
advice, or information received under assurances of confidentiality, or
matters properly subject to claims of individual privacy?which pre-
sent a substantial basis for claims of executive privilege. On the other
hand, Congress has a right to the fullest access to information neces-
sary for the fulfillment of its own constitutional responsibilities in the
making of national defense and foreign policy.
We believe, therefore, that:
Congress should establish procedures to limit the occasion& for
dispute between the two branches, and to provide for the swifteat
resolution of conflicts should they arise. These procedures should
regularize the process whereby either House or a committee of either
House may seek information. They should also establish the steps
whereby, if that information is denied and the House or committee
in question should deem the claim of privilege unjustified, the matter
can be referred to the federal courts for expeditious resolution.
A CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM BASED ON STATUTE
One assertion on which virtually all informed observers of the
conduct of U.S. foreign affairs agree is that far too much information
has been classified, classified too highly, and classified too long. As a
result of the wide consensus on this point, a number of corrective
actions have recently been taken, most notably the Freedom of In-
formation Act Amendments of 1974. These reforms, however, have
not touched what we regard as the root of the problem; namely, that
the current classification system operates without any statutory basis.
We believe that procedures so important and potentially so dangerous
as those which restrict the ability of a free people to review the
operations of its own executive departments must be defined and
circumscribed by law. We believe, moreover, that the provisions of
such a law, while fully responsive to the executive's legitimate re-
quirements for secrecy in foreign policy, should balance those interests
more evenly against the nation's rights to examine what is being done
in its name, and why.
Accordingly:
We propose that the Congress consider legislation establishing
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a comprehensive system for classification based on the following
guidelines:
?The mandatory classification, in one of several degrees of classi-
fication, of specified types of information relating principally
to the national defense and the sources and meth,ods of
intelligence.
?The mcndatory exemption f om classification of other specified
types of information, relating principally to U.S. actions in viola-
tion of U.S. law.
?The discretion, lodged in appropriate officials, to classify or
exempt from classification all other information on the basis
of specified criteria which balance the need for secrecy against
the potential value of disclosure.
?A comprehensive system of automatic downgrading and
declassification.
?The application of specified sanctions to persons violating the
terms of the system, including criminal penalties for the un-
authorized release of properly classified information, and sig-
nificant administrative sanctions applicable to overclassification.
?The availability of legal process to resolve any questions arising
from classification decisions.
Oversight of this system, we believe, should become the responsibil-
ity of the Joint Committee on National Security proposed in the
following chapter, or if such a committee is not established, of the
appropriate standing committees of the House and Senate.
CONGRESS AND THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS
In recent years the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has made
several changes in the process of confirmation of Ambassadors and
other foreign policy officials designed both to improve the competence
and suitability of nominees, and to insure their greater respon-
siveness to later inquiries from the Congress. The Commission
strongly endorses these measures. It believes that nominees should be
questioned closely concerning possible conflicts of interest and political
contributions, and that, as the Committee now requires, they should
assure their willingness to later appear in order to provide requested
information and, with proper safeguards of confidentiality, to express
personal as well as administration views. Every effort should be made
by both the executive and legislative branches of our government to
insure that every ambassador sent abroad has the ability and the
qualifications to represent our country with distinction.
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In both the review of candidates and in the consideration of
nominees, the Senate should continfu,e to require of persons under
consideration familiarity either with the country to which the
nominee is to be accredited, or experience in the formulation or
practice of U.S. foreign policy, or some other substantial and rele-
vant set of qualifications.
INCREASED USE OF REPORT-BACK AND TIME-LIMIT PROVISIONS
Our final recommendation on the sharing of responsibility for
foreign policy between the two branches of government relates to
Congressional responsibility for the review and oversight of policies
and programs. This is a subtle and complex process, not a mechanical
one. Much of the most effective oversight is necessarily performed
informally and depends upon good working relations between
the two branches. Nevertheless, we believe that the expanded use of
two specific devices should prove useful.
The Commission recommends greater use of report-back require-
ments for both executive testimony and written reports from
executive officials to the Congress, and more frequent incorporation
of statutory time limits in proposed legislation, particularly on new
programs and policies.
At present, executive officials rarely know when, whether, or how
they will be required to account to the Congress for their actions in
implementing particular foreign policy programs or policies. The use
of statutory provisions incorporated in authorizing legislation,
specifying the times at which executive officials should expect to ap-
pear before appropriate committees to report on program performance
would better assure both timely executive attention to program re-
view and evaluation, and more considered and regular performance
by Congress of its own oversight responsibilities. Similarly,
greater use of statutory provisions automatically terminating program
and policy authority in the absence of Congressional renewal estab-
lishes a schedule of regular and substantial Congressional
review.
Achieving a better relationship between the executive and Con-
gressional branches is not enough. Indeed, by requiring more of the
Congress, such a balance simply increases the need to ensure that the
Congress is organized and equipped to meet its new responsibilities
effectively. The following chapter addresses those needs.
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CHAPTER 14
CONGRESSIONAL ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES
In the previous chapter we have addressed the changing relation of
the Congress to the executive in foreign affairs. The effect of our rec-
ommendations?as of the inevitable trend of events?is to place a
greater burden on the Congress. But new responsibilities may require
improved capabilities. We turn now, therefore, to consideration of
changes in the organization and procedures of the Congress which
might assist the Congress to meet its growing foreign affairs respon-
sibilities. We begin with three aspects of the roles and functions of
Congressional committees.
MODIFICATIONS OF COMMITTEE JURISDICTION
Since economic relations seem certain to constitute a growing pro-
portion of future foreign policy, the Commission has considered at
some length how to improve the ability of the Congress to consider
economic questions in the light of their foreign implications. We con-
clude that some further adjustment in Committee jurisdictions may
be helpful.
In the House we propose that the Committee on International
Relations be accorded "special oversight functions" over reciprocal
tariff agreements, in addition to its other responsibilities for trade
policy issues.
Moreover, we believe it important that, with increasing reliance on
foreign trade instead of aid, and with greater use of international
financial organizations to dispense foreign aid funds:
The House Committee on International Relations should exercise
concurrent legislative oversight over international financial organi-
zations, together with, the House Committee on Banking and
Currency.
Two related recommendations appear in Chapter 11. One proposes
that the Foreign and International Relations Committees should have
some opportunity to comment on estimates of the Appropriations
Committees. The other suggests that, in both Houses, those two com-
mittees should be represented on the Budget Committees.
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We believe that these changes will substantially improve the ability
of the House to act on foreign economic issues with a greater aware-
ness of their implications for our relations with other countries as
well as of their domestic significance.
In the Senate, Committee jurisdictions in the foreign affairs field
seem more nearly satisfactory. The Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee has considerably broader jurisdiction than the Committee on
International Relations, including "measures to foster commercial in-
tercourse" and international financial institutions. The rules of the
Senate, furthermore, provide far greater jurisdictional flexibility al-
lowing the referral of legislation to two or more committees. However,
Senate committee jurisdiction and workloads have not been systemati-
cally reviewed for nearly 30 years (the last review culminated in the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946). And despite the heavy work-
loads which spread Senators far too thin, the number of subcommittees
has increased since then from 34 to more than 120?many with over-
lapping foreign policy responsibilities. This tendency to proliferate
subcommittees, the Commission believes, defeats one of the main pur-
poses of the Legislative Reorganization Act.
Moreover, while precise congruence between House and Senate juris-
diction is not essential, recent House changes affecting foreign policy
matters may suggest useful adjustments in the Senate.
From the point of view of improving Congress' ability to consider
foreign policy matters efficiently and effectively, therefore, a review
by the Senate of its own committee system now seems appropriate.
The Commission strongly recommends such a review.
THE USE OF SUBCOMMITTEES
The Commission has noted the increased use of foreign policy sub-
committees in the Congress. Subcommittees have distinct advantages
over full standing committees as working units. They can respond
more quickly to changing developments. Their procedures can be rela-
tively informal, facilitating the exchange of views among Members
and between Members and witnesses. They present greater opportuni-
ties for Members to develop expertise and to establish direct relation-
ships with executive branch officials. Finally, they facilitate the hold-
ing of joint hearings, both within and among committees of the House
and Senate, thus improving coordination in the Congress, and at the
same time reducing the multiple demands for testimony from key
executive officials.
Even in the Senate, where competing demands make it especially
difficult for Members to participate fully in all the subcommittees to
which they are assigned, hearings and preliminary action by even two
or three interested Senators in subcommittee may be preferable to less
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frequent and detailed deliberations at the full committee level. In
short, despite practical limitations, particularly in the Senate, active
subcommittees can increase both the scope and depth of Congres-
sional consideration of foreign policy matters.
The Commission therefore recommends fuller utilization of sub-
committees to strengthen the basis of committee action, and to pro-
vide greater interchange with working-level executive officials at
the Assistant and Under Secretary levels. It also recommends in-
creased use of joint hearings by subcommittees to meet part of the
need, expressed clearly in Congressional responses to the survey,
conducted by this Commission, for better coordination of the actions
of the Congress in the foreign policy field.
In view of the growing links between nations, and the growing im-
portance of problems?like resource access, arms sales, oceans policy,
food and population?which affect many states, the Commission be-
lieves that subcommittees on foreign affairs may be most useful if
organized on a functional rather than a regional basis. The Commis-
sion therefore commends the experimental use of such functional sub-
committees by the Committe on International Relations, and the crea-
tion of a Foreign Assistance and Economic Policy Subcommittee by
the Foreign Relations Committee.
A NEW JOINT COMMITTEE
However useful the recommendations above concerning committee
jurisdictions may prove, and however powerfully they may be rein-
forced by the proposals made below concerning committee staffs and
analytic support, those recommendations leave untouched at least two
major problems. One is that since political, military and economic
aspects of foreign policy have become interlocked?and since many
foreign and domestic policy issues undoubtedly will become so?Con-
gress should contain some forum in which those interrelations can be
directly weighed. This is particularly true in time of crisis when
specialized standing committees, pressed for action, might benefit from
help in appreciating how particular aspects of policy decisions relate
to those being considered by other committees.
The second is that the Congress is requiring increased consultation
with senior foreign policy officials of the executive branch at the same
time that an increasing number of specialized committees are neces-
sarily concerning themselves with the foreign policy aspects of their
responsibilities. The result is the potential for a burdensome and un-
sustainable demand on senior executive officials for multiple appear-
ances before Congress?a problem particularly severe when fast-
moving events require the full and direct attention of the same officials
in the conduct of policy.
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Neither speed nor policy coordination are Congress' particular
strengths?nor can they be. The greatest strength of the legislative
process is its unique ability to explore alternatives and to weigh and
resolve widely disparate points of view. Its strength in deliberation
however, does not relieve Congress of responsibility for reasonable
efficiency and coordinating capacity. Indeed, if Congress is to play the
greater foreign policy role which this Commission endorses, those
capacities will increasingly be demanded of it. And as the staff survey
of Congressional views indicates, most Members, while regarding
policy coordination primarily as the responsibility of the executive,
also favor changes to improve Congress' own efficiency in the coordina-
tion process.
With these problems in mind, the Commission considered a number
of proposals. It concluded that a single innovation may be materially
helpful.
In the Commission's view, a Joint Committee on National Secu-
rity should be established. It should perform for the Congress the
kinds of policy review and coordination now pert ormed in the execu-
tive branch by the National Security Council, and provide a central
point of linkage to the President and to the officials at that Council.
In addition it should take responsibility for Congressional oversight
of the Intelligence Community.
We believe this Committee should serve as the initial recipient and
reviewer of reports and information from the executive branch on
matters of greatest urgency and sensitivity directly affecting the secu-
rity of the nation. It should advise the party leaders and relevant stand-
ing committees of both Houses of Congress on appropriate legislative
action in matters affecting the national security, and should assist in
making available to them the full range of information and analysis
needed to enable them to legislate in a prompt and comprehensive
manner.
The existence and activities of such a Joint Committee should in
no way substitute either for direct consultation between the President
and Congressional party leaders, or for the regular legislative and
investigative functions of the present standing committees in each
House. Rather, it should supplement these?providing a more sys-
tematic and comprehensive exchange of information, analysis and
opinion than has proved possible under the existing committee and
leadership system.
For both operational and security reasons, the Joint Committee
should be small?containing not more than 20 Members. It should
include the leaders of the key foreign, military, and international eco-
nomic policy committees from each House, and several Members-at-
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Large appointed by the party leaders to represent them and to enhance
the Committee's representativeness of the Congress as a whole.
The Commission recommends that the Joint Committee be vested
with the following specific jurisdictions and authorities:
?Receipt, analysis and referral (along with, any recommenda-
tions it may consider appropriate) of reports from the Presi-
dent under the War Powers Act.
?Receipt and review of analytic products of the intelligence
community.
?Oversight (in conjunction with the executive branch) of the
system of information classification discussed above.
?Establishment and maintenance of facilities and procedures for
storage and handling of classified information and materials
supplied to the Congress.
?Establishment of a code of conduct to govern the handling by
C ommittee members of classified or sensitive information.
The successful experience of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
illustrates the usefulness of legislative authority in helping assure a
Committee's effectiveness. The Commission does not recommend that
the proposed Joint Committee be vested with broad authority to
report proposed legislation to the House and Senate. In general, any
legislative recommendations of the Joint Committee should be re-
ported to relevant standing committees for their consideration. The
Commission finds, however, two narrow and specific areas in which
the Joint Committee might usefully have authority to report legisla-
tion directly to the floor of each House just as the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy is empowered to do.
We propose that the Joint Committee:
?Consider the creation of a statutory system of information classi-
fication, and (if intelligence oversight is assigned to it).
?Be granted authority for annual authorization of funds for the
intelligence community.
The Commission believes strongly that more systematic arrange-
ments for Congressional oversight of the intelligence community are
needed on a permanent basis. It believes that such oversight should
be conducted by a Joint Committee of the Congress, and preferably
one capable of assessing intelligence products and activities in the
context of our total foreign policy. The Commission therefore believes
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the proposed Joint Committee on National Security would be the
appropriate body for that task.
In the event that this Committee is not established, however, the
Commission recommends that a Joint Committee on Intelligence
be established to assume the task of Congressional oversight of the
intelligence community.
The Commission well understands that establishing a Joint Com-
mittee on National Security, and making it function effectively, would
be difficult. While the Congressional survey indicates majority sup-
port among Members for greater joint efforts in Congress, it also
suggests many doubts and practical problems. The Commission has
carefully considered these difficulties. It concludes, nevertheless, that
the likely impact of the Joint Committee upon Congress' capacity
to play a more meaningful foreign policy role fully justifies the efforts
and concessions necessary to create it and to make it work.
CAPACITIES FOR EVALUATION AND REVIEW
The Commission believes that the necessity for closer supervision
of foreign programs and policies is not limited to the intelligence
field. Many programs outlive the circumstances which made them
useful, and we expect that in the future, as the world changes at
increasing rates, many more will do so. We believe, therefore, that
the Congress must meet far more systematically than before its
responsibilities for the evaluation and review both of major programs
and of the policies on which they are based. The expanded use of
time-limit and report-back provisions, discussed in the previous chap-
ter, should contribute to that end. We offer here several additional
proposals.
More Effective Use of Reports. Increased efforts should be made to
consolidate, rationalize, and improve the quality and use of written
reports to Congress from executive branch agencies required by law.
At a minimum, we believe that:
A central Congressional repository for such reports, efficient pro-
cedures for making them available to all interested Members, and
convenient means for maintaining security of classified reports,
should be developed, as proposed above, by the Joint Committee on
National Security.
Attaining the Promise of CRS. Equally important is the availability
of supporting analytic resources to supplement committee staffs. Over
the last several years Congress has substantially expanded the Congres-
sional Research Service, strengthened the General Accounting Office,
and created the Office of Technology Assessment and the Congres-
sional Budget Office to supplement its other facilities. But this rapid
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growth in research capability has still not provided Congress with
adequate research and informational capacity on foreign policy issues.
The central problem, we believe, is that the Congressional Research
Service has never reached the levels of usefulness that either the
Congress or CRS itself have sought. Despite more than a doubling in
size since 1970, a substantial growth in committee requests for policy
research, and the imaginative use by CRS of automated information
systems, the relationship between CRS and the Congress is character-
ized on both sides by a certain amount of frustration. Researchers lack
the freedom and support to address major policy issues in depth; the
Congress lacks assurance that CRS will provide timely and useful
studies of program alternatives.
The Commission finds that the major difficulty is that there exists
no body representing the interests of the Congress as a whole and
authorized to provide CRS with policy guidance, assistance in secur-
ing resources, and some measure of insulation against the lower prior-
ity concerns which deflect it from sustained work on major issues.
The Commission, therefore recommends that Congress designate
the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations as responsible for
performing those functions, thus insuring that some part of the CRS
staff is able to focus steadily on issues to which Congress as a whole
accords high priority.
The General Accounting Office and International Organizations. The
Commission believes that the GAO, working with executive officials,
can usefully assist international organizations to develop more compre-
hensive capabilities for financial review and program evaluation. The
objective review by the Congress of the work of international organi-
zations should form the major basis for the support of such organiza-
tions as they come to play increasingly important roles. Meanwhile, the
Congress should continue to press, through both executive branch rep-
resentatives and GAO, for more adequate accounting of international
programs to which the U.S. has contributed, and for better informa-
tion on the work and effectiveness of international organizations.
More Effective Use of Analytic Resources. The remaining deficiencies
in Congressional use of program information and research result, we
believe, from insufficient central supervision of its own growing re-
sources, and relatively low levels of Congressional use of independent
non-governmental sources of analysis. Accordingly:
The Commission recomneauls that the House Commission on In-
formation and Facilities, created as part of the Committee Reform
Amendments of 1974, look with special care at the research support
available to Congress when legislating in foreign policy. We also
suggest that the Information Commission seek better management
of Congressional We of research by designating the Joint Committee
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on Congressional Operations to oversee research organizations; and
that it seek to facilitate wider use by the Congress of the policy re-
search capabilities of universities and non-profit research centers.
One ready means of helping to achieve this last goal would be for
the Foreign and International Relations Committees periodically to
publish a summary of their research interests and priorities. The sum-
mary should specify the major questions pertinent to future foreign
policy determinations on which the Congress would most welcome
assistance, and should note the major study requests from foreign
policy committees to CRS. Such a document, we believe, would encour-
age many public and private research organizations to orient planned
research toward Congressional interests and concerns, and thus to
increase the availability of independent analysis and information
useful to the Congress without need for additional research bureauc-
racies.
The Commission, recommends the publication of such a sum-
mary of Congressional foreign affairs research interests.
Congressional Staff Support. One of the most important develop-
ments on Capitol Hill since World War II has been the creation of a
professional staff to help the Congress in its consideration of signifi-
cant policy issues. Prior to Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946 the committees of Congress dealing with foreign policy had little
or no professional assistance. Committee reports?as well as speeches
and background materials for the Congress?were normally prepared
in the executive branch of the government or by outside sources. As a
result, Congress was simply not equipped to discharge its responsi-
bilities effectively.
Since their inception in 1947, the professional staffs on Capitol Hill
have grown considerably in size. This has been a necessary develop-
ment for two reasons: the growing complexity of foreign policy prob-
lems; and the increasingly heavy legislative burdens that have fallen
on all Members of Congress and the resultant need for staff help in
all areas.
Both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Inter-
national Relations Committee have by custom hired professional bi-
partisan staffs. The Commission notes, however, that this tradition
has been eroded somewhat in recent years as divisions over foreign
policy have developed both within the major political parties and
between them. In particular, the authority of the committee staff
directors has diminished as their ability to recruit their own staffs has
been limited. The present practice is for members of the Committees
to request that one staff member be assigned to them alone. Whatever
the merits of this procedure, the Commission believes that committee
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staff members should be appointed because of their professional quali-
fications and be available to serve members of both parties as the need
arises. This principle should prevail whether or not the committee
chooses to designate minority and majority staff members.
The Commission understands the desire of many Members of
Congress for more professional assistance. This is especially true of
some junior members of the Senate and House whose status in those
bodies does not entitle them to very much staff support. In this con-
nection, we note the recent action of the Senate to enable junior mem-
bers to employ the professional assistance they need to handle their
major committee responsibilities. We caution that the benefits of this
action will not be worth the costs in lowered professional standards if
staff directors do not have some voice in the hiring of such staff.
The Commission has no general recommendations to make with
respect to congressional staffing, but makes two further observations.
First, in any further expansion of congressional staff the emphasis
should be on quality rather than quantity. Clearly the Congress should
not seek to duplicate the vast array of professional talent found in the
executive branch; it should emphasize good staffs rather than large
ones. Second, the Commission believes it advisable for the Congress
to add some expertise in the fields of international economics and in the
relationship between science and technology and foreign policy. These
are fields which will engage the attention of Congress increasingly
as the years go by.
E. Increasing Attentiveness to Foreign Affairs.
We conclude our observations on the Congress and foreign affairs
with three proposals intended to better equip Congress and the public
to deal knowledgeably with a world in which foreign affairs in all
aspects will touch our lives more powerfully and directly than
heretofore.
International Contact. The Commission believes that substantial
international contacts, by familiarizing Members of Congress with
overseas conditions and foreign perspectives, have a beneficial effect
upon the making of U.S. foreign policy and on the ability of Members
to perform their legislative responsibilities wisely.
In the judgment of the Commission, more extended travel by
Members, the preparation of special reports based on staff travel
abroad (particularly Foreign and International Relations Commit-
tees investigative staff), and increased travel by teams of Members
rather than individyals are highly desirable.
Full, written reports by staff and Members prior to and following
travel abroad, as currently required under Foreign Relations Com-
mittee rules, are particularly valuable in helping assure coordinated,
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purposeful travel and a broad sharing of findings among interested
Members and staff.
Foreign travel reporting requirements should be extended to the
entire Congress, and an improved system of circulating, monitor-
ing, and evaluating these reports developed.
Policies issued in 1974 by each House regarding financing of staff
travel might serve as a model and first step toward more comprehensive
gnidelines.
The Commission endorses detailed and timely financial disclosure,
in a form conveniently accessible to the public and the pro's, of the
costs of all foreign travel and the sources of travel funds, whether
utilized by Members of Congress or other Government officials.
Congressional Participation in International Negotiations. Similarly,
the Commission endorses greater participation by Members of Con-
gress in international negotiations, particularly multilateral negotia-
tions, as an important means of increasing the first-hand information
available to Members on foreign policy and its conduct. With the pos-
sible exception of Congressional delegates to the annual meetings of
the UN General Assembly, however, we believe the roles of Congres-
sional participants in such negotiations should ordinarily be limited
to those of observers and advisers rather than plenary participants,
particularly in cases where agreements growing out of such negotia-
tions may be subject to specific Congressional review or approval.
Congress might usefully specify the appropriate degree of advisory
participation of Members in important international negotiations in
the legislation directing or authorizing such negotiations.
Public Understanding of Foreign Policy Issues. At many earlier points
in this report we have stressed the importance we attach to the devel-
opment and articulation of guiding conceptions of U.S. purpose and
policy in the world. We have proposed a number of measures designed
to encourage greater attention to this need in the executive branch.
But Congress has an important parallel function to perform.
Through carefully organized hearings Congress can provide the
critical review of U.S. purposes, and of their relation to shorter-
term policy, necessary to test their soundness and coherence, and to
generate the public understanding and support without which, in
the and, they cannot succeed.
The Foreign and International Relations Committees have a special
responsibility in this regard. History suggests, moreover, that the
public will respond positively to the thoughtful and probing review of
major foreign policy issues; the China Policy hearings of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee in 1966 provide an excellent model.
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Those hearings, moreover, demonstrated the importance of televi-
sion coverage. The Commission believes that public awareness of for-
eign policy questions requires television coverage of major foreign
policy hearings and Committee deliberations.
We recommend that:
Recent trends toward opening the deliberations of Congress on
major foreign policy :Issues be encouraged. C ommittee hearings
should routinely be open for television. At the discretion of the
House and Senate, under their respective rules, consideration should
also be given to making floor debates on major foreign policy issues
available to public and commercial television on a case-by-case basis.
The Commission believes that whatever strains on the normal func-
tioning of Congress might occur as a result would be more than offset
by increased public understanding of the foreign policy issues facing
the nation, and by public support for some of the difficult choices
ahead.
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ANNEXES
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Annex A
COMMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY VIEWS
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Supplementary Statement of Congressman
William S. Broomfield
In the spirit of candor, objectivity, and tolerance of dissent that has
characterized the deliberations of the Commission, I have received
permission from the Chairman, the Honorable Robert D. Murphy, to
have the following supplemental statement included as an annex to
the Commission Report.
The submission of these remarks should not be construed as either
dissent from the bulk of the Commission recommendations or as cri-
ticism of the manner in which the Commission has conducted its im-
portant business. During my association with the Commission I have
consistently been impressed with the professionalism and fairness of
the Chairman, the members, and the staff.
The purpose of this statement is to register my strong oppositimi
to the Commission recommendations on "Public Diplomacy", especially
as they pertain to the reorganization of United States Information
Agency (USIA) and increased autonomy for the Voice of Amer-
ica (VOA) ;.to underscore my strong support for the establishment of
a Joint Committee to oversee intelligence activities; and to offer some
comments regarding the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and
the military attache system.
The Commission on the Organization of the Government for the
Conduct of Foreign Policy, in Chapter 9, has endorsed the recom-
mendations of the Stanton Panel to restructure the United States In-
formation Agency by (a) giving greater autonomy to the Voice of
America, (b) creating an Information and Cultural Agency (ICA),
on the model of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, (A CDA) ,
to handle our "long-range" public diplomacy and (c) incorporating
USIA's daily informational activities into a new State Department
Office of Policy Information.
I endorse the Stanton Panel findings citing the importance of our
public diplomacy effort and the substantial achievements of USIA in
this field. I acknowledge that the current relationship between Cul-
tural Affairs (in the State Department) and USIA is cumbersome
and ineffective. However, I have yet to see any convincing evidence
that the Stanton recommendations on the reorganization of USIA
would increase the effectiveness of our informational activities over-
seas. I maintain that, if implemented, they might well lead to bureau-
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cratic confusion and neglect of this important aspect of our diplomacy.
Specifically, I would cite the following considerations:
?There is something to be said for the continued existence of an
independent agency of the United States Government concerned
solely with our information policy abroad. USIA has had its
problems, but by and large it has performed a difficult and thank-
less task In a credible, highly professional manner. If the Agency
is split up and subsumed under the State Department, there is a
good possibility that our informational activities overseas will
receive less?rather than more?high level attention and coor-
dination than is the case today.
?There is no good reason to assume that the Department of State
could manage an expanded, world-wide information apparatus
more effectively than the United States Information Agency.
?The recommendations of the Stanton Panel regarding the reor-
ganization of USIA are opposed by various professional orga-
nizations such as the American Foreign Service Organization, the
American Federation of Government Employees, and the AFL?
CIO. They are also opposed by several former Directors of USIA
and the VOA. The State Department has yet to comment officially
on them.
?The proposed fragmentation of USIA functions would increase
the problems of Congressional oversight and would, in all prob-
ability, result in increased costs to the taxpayer.
?The present logical inconsistencies in our public diplomacy effort
can best be rectified by the simple expedient of transferring Cul-
tural Affairs to the United States Information Agency and per-
mitting the Agency to retain its present status.
I am particularly concerned with the proposal to grant increased
autonomy to the Voice of America for the purpose of making it more
"objective." I strongly believe that, as long as VOA is supported by
the United States Government, it should reflect Government policy.
The American taxpayer cannot reasonably be expected to support an
"international CBS" or an American BBC.
I am concerned over what will happen in the future when it comes
to public attention that the VOA is broadcasting to the world, at
public expense, news and commentary contrary to U.S. policy or the
convictions of many Americans. We could well face a situation in
which VOA comes under strong public attack, with its very future in
jeopardy.
While I would not object to an autonomous, privately financed VOA
that could broadcast anything acceptable to its contributors, I will con-
tinue to oppose any move toward independence for the Voice as long
as it is publicly supported and designed to serve as an instrument of
American foreign policy.
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Joint Committee on National Security. I support the Commission's
recommendation (Chapter 14) that a Joint Committee on National
Security be established, but believe responsibility for oversight of the
intelligence community should be vested in a separate joint committee.
I will accordingly introduce legislation designed to establish a 14-
member Joint Committee on Intelligence Oversight effective Janu-
ary 3, 1976. This proposal in no way obviates the need for the Joint
Committee on National Security recommended by the Commission.
Defense intelligence Agency WIA/OVIiIitary Attaches. During its de-
liberations, the Commission devoted considerable time to the status
and performance of the Defense Intelligence Agency. The Commis-
sion report, however, makes no recommendations regarding DIA
and its place in the intelligence community (Chapter 7). I am not
convinced that DIA, as presently constituted, is either an effective or
an essential element in our intelligence effort. If the Agency is to be
preserved as a separate entity, serious consideration should be given to
means of strengthening it and making it more effective.
I will propose that the House International Relations Subcommittee
on Oversight hold hearings this year to evaluate the mandate and per-
formance of DIA, with the objective of identifying areas in which the
Agency can be strengthened and made to operate more effectively. I
endorse the Commission's suggestion to upgrade the military attache
system.
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Supplementary Remarks of Mrs. Charles Engelhard
To be introduced to the intricacies of the organization of our gov-
ernment as it is devoted to the formulation and implementation of
foreign policy is to be reminded again of how complicated modern
life is. To receive that introduction against the background of the
events that took place between June, 1973 and July, 1975 is to under-
stand how difficult it is to disentangle ourselves from the mistakes
of the past in order to better prepare for the future. My inability
for reasons of health, to participate directly in the final delibera-
tions of the Commission at which final judgments were reached com-
pounds my dilemma in taking a position on the commission report.
Accordingly I am filing for publication with the report these sup-
plementary remarks.
I believe the Commission has made important contributions. One
in particular, which I hope will not be overlooked, is the Commis-
sion's examination of the problem of personnel management in the
State Department (Chapter 12). It is refreshing to have it stated
clearly that the function of the United States Foreign Service is
diplomacy and that the nourishment of that ancient art is the con-
tinuing professional purpose of that Service. It is equally refresh-
ing to see recognized the fact that proficiency in diplomacy does not
automatically lead to proficiency in the management of large organiza-
tions. The Commission's recommendation to the President that he
establish a Foreign Affairs Executive Service to man the heights
of the foreign affairs bureaucracy appeals to me as a very helpful
innovation, since Foreign Service Officers should constitute the bulk
of this service, but to enter they would have to compete with others
in the foreign affairs agencies.
I am sorry that the implications of this management innovation
were not more consistently considered throughout the Commission
report. This is particularly the case in the several discussions of
economic policy, rightly considered by the Commission to be the
generator of most new issues on the foreign policy agenda. In my
view the Commission assigns to the State Department an unrealistic
degree of responsibility for the formulation of foreign economic
policy (Chapter 5).
No foreign office in a major country has that responsibility. This is
because in all countries, not just ours, economic policy forms a bridge
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between foreign policy and domestic policy. The Economic Commit-
tee of the Commission received what was to me very persuasive testi-
mony, particularly from the Committee's Special Advisor, to the effect
that in the future the Treasury Department and the Secretary of
the Treasury would increasingly become the President's principal
Cabinet advisor on economic policy. This is already happening, not
as a result of conscious plans but rather through the force of events.
I believe the time has come to recognize and assist the evolution
and broadening of the Treasury Department as a kind of ministry
of finance and economics in the United States and to begin to equip that
department for its enlarged tasks. In international economic matters
this is even more important than. strengthening the State Depart-
ment. Indeed, the State Department may only be effective in economic
matters to the degree that it can count on the support of a strong
Treasury Department.
This is a novel idea in the United States because the public does not
yet perceive the Secretary of the Treasury to be the first among cabinet
equals in economic policy. Yet this is increasingly the fact because in the
cabinet only the Secretary of the Treasury can devote full time to eco-
nomic policy in its broad aspects. The Secretary of State needs the sup-
port and the responsibilities of a strong Treasury Department in eco-
nomic policy just as he needs the support and the responsibilities of a
strong Defense Department in military-security policy. If in foreign
policy the Secretary of State is first among equals in his relations with
the Secretaries of Treasury and Defense, he can only be as effective
as are the bridges built between State and Treasury on the one hand,
and State and Defense on the other.
I am pleased that the Commission report leans in the direction of
giving greater responsibilities to cabinet officers and urging that these
officers, rather than White House staff, serve and, be seen to serve, as
the President's closest foreign policy advisors. The alternative is to
continue the practice of giving to the National Security Advisor and
related White House offices line responsibilities for which they cannot
be held accountable by the Congress. The Commission report is right
in cautioning against trying to lay down the law to future Presidents
about the organization of future White Houses. However, the general
principle of encouraging a greater degree of "cabinet government" in
the United States is one to which I adhere. For this reason such sug-
gestions as the installation of a White House Council on International
Planning (Chapter 10)' appear to me to be inconsistent with the gen-
eral philosophy of the report. Nor has the Commission made a persua-
sive case for such a Council.
I am pleased that the Commission in the end rejected suggestions
that a large staff of intelligence analysts be created in the neighbor-
hood of the White House. Given the necessarily fragmented missions
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and tasks of the intelligence community, and the fact that the most im-
portant intelligence, decisions are inevitably political, the risks of over-
centralization of intelligence operations in a democracy are to me
greater than the risks of too little central control. It will take time to
restore public confidence in our intelligence operations, but I do not
believe that the time would be shortened by pretending that faulty or-
ganization was a primary cause of the loss of public confidence. Testi-
mony before the Commission did not support such a conclusion.
On the other hand the suggestion that the Director of Foreign Intel-
ligence have an office in the White House does seem sensible to me. This
officer is now appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by
the Congress. He is charged, in addition to managing his agency, with
acting as "chairman of the board" of the intelligence community. He
must have ready and constant access to the President to perform his
duties effectively. Giving him an office in the White House underlines
his dual role and also underlines the need today for continuity as well
as correction in intelligence operations. I am persuaded by what I have
learned in service to this Commission that this country's security has
already been weakened by interruptions in the orderly work of the in.
telligence community, however inevitable those interruptions may have
been. We must all hope that the damage is repaired as soon as possible.
In my view the Commission report pays too little attention to the
greatly increased vibrance of American democracy over the past
decade, the great increase in the number of legitimate participants in
the day-to-day workings of the political process. Infinite possibilities
lie hidden in this fact, but very real problems as well. It is not, for
instance, for lack of information that our democracy has such a hard
time making up its mind these days. It is that the decision making
processes have become clogged both in the Executive and in the
Congress.
I am sorry that the Congressional chapters (13 and 14) and chapter
8 fail to recognize these facts. These chapters discuss important sub-
jects without, I think, asking the right questions. An important excep-
tion is the recommendation for a Joint Committee of the Congress on
National Security and Intelligence. This could be a hopeful step in
the direction of a better working relationship between the Congress
and the Executive.
The important thing is that that relationship be kept "working,"
not that it be forced into a rigid pattern of legal rituals. It is natural
that Congress in its effort to lessen the likelihood of a repetition of
past mistakes should wish to enact new laws governing such subtle
and evolving matters as Executive Privilege. Insofar as such laws
illustrate principle, they may do some good and little harm. But inso-
far as they suggest to the public that the Federal courts should be
invited into these matters (except in a Constitutional crisis) they ere-
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ate the impression that questions such as the information the President
deems to be "privileged" should be adjudicated legally rather than
resolved politically. In these matters we must look to the strengthening
of our polities, rather than our legal system.
Finally, I think that the Commission's dissertation on "multi-
lateral diplomacy" (Chapter 9) is rather mis-leading. If it is true that
international problems will be aired with ever greater frequency in
international organization, it does not follow that the character of
diplomacy has significantly changed?or will do so. For the most part
"multi-lateral diplomacy" is simply the extension of government-to-
government diplomacy into international organizations. The difference
is one of quantity more than quality, for international organizations
rarely decide matters or resolve problems; rather they ratify deci-
sions that have been negotiated previously through government-to-
government channels.
It is a mistake in my view to compound organizational problems by
pretending that "multilateral diplomacy" is more than it really is.
I do not argue for less participation in international organizations,
but for more realistic participation. This means promoting a diversity
of views through a diversity of official presences, rather than a con-
formity of views that could result from too much State Department au-
thority relative to other departments. The State Department should
maintain firm political oversight of international organizations, but
that should involve the objective of promoting a diversity of views.
Too many debates in the United Nations, among other places, convey
a false picture of conformity among the governments whom the de-
baters represent. This is possible because these organizations lack real
authority, and delegations, therefore, feel they can promote the image
of conformity, under such slogans as "the Third World," when in
reality little real conformity exists.
These remarks should not be construed to be a formal dissent from
the Commission report. On the contrary I was honored to be asked to
serve as a Commissioner and welcome the publication of the report for
the stimulus to public debate it should provide. One of the conse-
quences of the "rapidly changing" world to which the Commission
report so frequently refers is the difficulty of reaching consensus over
a broad range of issues. That the Commission failed to do this is in
my view only realistic. Earlier official reports covering the same broad
ground were in general based on a broad consensus. They also were
notably ineffective insofar as the implementation of their recom-
mendations is concerned. Perhaps this Commission, by airing its dif-
ferent views, can in the end make a greater contribution.
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Comments By Senator Mike Mansfield
With regret I must record my differences with some segments of the
Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for
the Conduct of Foreign Policy. My regret stems from several sources.
I recognize how much time and attention Ambassador Robert Murphy
gave to the activities which he faithfully chaired. Other members of
the Commission are distinguished, busy citizens whose service in this
undertaking obviously is not diminished by my disagreement with some
of their decisions. My own participation in the arduous, frustrating
work of editing staff-offered language necessarily had to be minimal
because of my Senate duties.
My expression of personal disappointment naturally does not mean
that there are not useful observations, wise comments and helpful
recommendations contained in the pages of the Commission's report.
On the whole, however, I fear that the ratio of effort to result has not
been up to expectations. A surfeit of words masks an absence of
clarity. Thin gruel is being served in a very thick bowl.
Whatever the reasons, the Commission paid little attention to the
circumstances in which the legislative mandate for the Commission
was created. The declared purpose was to look determinedly forward
and not backward but the result is not in harmony with that purpose.
In establishing the Commission, the Comimttee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate called for an investigation of the mechanisms for the
conduct of foreign policy at a time of intense confrontation between
the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government. But
the Commission seems to have interpreted its mandate largely as an
invitation to conduct a sort of elaborate management study of cer-
tain Executive Departments, notably the Department of State.
Looking back to 1972, one has to remember that at that time the
executive branch had sought to block every avenue to deny Congress
a role in U.S. foreign policy, mainly in regard to Indochina. The so-
called doctrine of Executive privilege had been invoked and extended
to the point where it was offensive to representative government ;*
*See the testimony of former Attorney General Kleindienst on April 10, 1973,
before three Senate subcommittees, as follows:
"Senator Muskie. I am talking about 21/2 million employees of the executive
branch; * * *
(Continued)
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efforts by Senate committees to obtain information were blocked,
evaded or ignored; the White House had come to a point of virtual
belligerancy in its relations with the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee.
One can read the several hundred pages of the Commission's report
without gaining much more than an inkling of this background. That
is not to imply that a partisan or institutional bias should have been
the motivating force behind the Commission's work. But to ignore the
atmosphere in which the Commission created represents a distortion of
its purpose.
Even a cursory reading of the Commission's report is likely to im-
press the reader with its timidity and its paucity of substance. The
Commission's mandate was to make a full and comprehensive study
of all Government agencies concerned with foreign policy and to come
up with recommendations which might be quite sweeping in char-
acter?including the abolition of certain "services, activities and func-
tions not necessary to the efficient conduct of foreign policy * *
Unfortunately, the obvious lack of any consensus among the Commis-
sioners has meant that in the various drafts of the report it has been
necessary to water down progressively every recommendation. What
is left leaves much to be desired.
Perhaps most remarkable is the almost total absence?until one
reaches the concluding chapters?of any consideration of the role of
the Congress in foreign policy. It may be argued that there are refer-
ences to the Congress scattered through the report. These often amount
to little more than a passing notation that there is indeed a legislative
branch of our Government. It is astonishing to discover that the first
article of the Constitution of the United States seemingly has been
almost overlooked in the Commission's report. It may be that the re-
versal of roles which has placed Article II in the preeminent position
is a mere recognition of fact. If so, then the American people should
be informed accordingly by this report. The entire thrust of the Com-
mission report goes toward enshrining the preeminence of the execu-
tive branch in the conduct of foreign policy. This appears to reflect
a belief that the inflated role of the Presidency should not only be
continued but bolstered, notwithstanding the experiences of the last
several years.
(Continued)
"Mr. Kleindienst. You do not have the power to compel me to come up here if
the President directs me not to * *
"Senator Muskie. Does that apply to every one of the employees of the Federal
branch of the United States?
"Mr. Kleindienst. I think if the President directs it, logically, I would have
to say that is correct." (p. 46, Vol. 1, Hearings on Executive Privilege, Secrecy
in Government, Freedom of Information, before the Subcommittee on Intergov-
ernmental Relations of the Committee on Government Operations and the Sub-
committees on Separation of Powers and Administrative Practice and Procedure
of the Committee of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate).
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The structuring of the Commission itself did little to counter the
emphasis on the executive point of view. While Congressional mem-
bers and appointees were named soon after the enactment of Public
Law 92-352, the White House delayed its appointments process for a
half-year. Moreover, far from serving as a balancing force, much of the
staff talent was not used, or was diverted into "make-work" projects.
Most of the material printed in the appendices apparently had almost
no effect on the Commission's findings.
The Commission is made up of duly appointed members. However,
on occasion, a spokesman for an absent member who, in fact, had no
legal status in the Commission's study, was accorded unusual weight.
This spokesman sat at the table as a quasi-alternate Commissioner,
despite my relayed objections. This dubious practice had the effect of a
further diminution in the consideration of the Congressional role
in foreign policy.
Lack of appreciation of the role of Congress appears as early as the
second page of Chapter I. An illustration is provided to underscore
the supposed importance of differences in the decision-making proc-
ess?and the story is both incomplete and misleading. The fact is that
after the Geneva Protocol was sent to the Senate for advice and consent
to ratification it was discovered that there was no clear policy on
whether tear-gas and herbicides were covered, and a letter went to
the President of the United States from the Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee requesting clarification. It took several
years of argument before the issue was at least theoretically resolved.
The renunciation of use in herbicides, in fact, did not come until well
after the ending of U.S. military actions in Vietnam. It is not likely?
as stated?that the decisions of the two Presidents "would have been
similar."
There are typical exhortations in the Congressional report about
creating a new era of cooperation between Congress and the executive
branch. We have heard such language for twenty or more years. In-
variably what is proposed is a one-way street. In practice, it is Con-
gress that is expected to "see the light" and accept the executive posi-
tion. Much of the discussion in Chapters 13 and 14 would not be needed
if the executive branch took seriously its duty to share information
and to consult fully and freely with the Congress. The pendulum has
swung so far toward the executive for so long that anything like a re-
turn to a vertical position is greeted with cries of outrage from the
Executive Departments. By the same token, proposals for new com-
mittees ,and other such devices would be seen as irrelevant if proper
use were made of the existing standing committees.
This last point leads me to a discussion of the Commission's major
proposal of a new "Joint Committee on National Security." (This
should not be confused with the idea of a Joint Committee on Intelli-
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gence?a subject to which I will return). First, the report speaks ap
provingly of a proliferation of subcommittees and staffs?a concept
with which I entirely disagree?and then it finds that the executive
branch will have problems dealing with such an increased number
of power centers. So the old idea of a Joint Committee on National
Security is brought out once again.
My objections to such a new committee are numerous. First, such
a committee would cut across the jursidictions and tasks assigned
existing standing committees and in time inevitably would decrease
their authority and powers. Second, it would become a favorite tool
of the executive for centralizing Congressional oversight functions
and diminishing their scope. Third, the committee would have no
promise of access?quite the contrary?to NSC materials and delibera-
tions, so it would be a one-way street. Fourth, the report anticipates
that the Committee would be composed of the most senior members
of Congress and would squeeze out the junior members. Fifth, it would
presumably take over intelligence oversight in time, but that would
not be the main function and it could easily drop out of view. Sixth,
it could become a barrier to the dissemination of sensitive material to
standing committees, while having little or no power itself to initiate
legislation. Seventh, and not necessarily finally, giving such a com-
mittee control over report means control over information and soon
over action; a "super-committee" might easily fall under executive
dominance and reduce the overall authority of the Congress.
The Commission report reiterates time and time again themes like
interdependence, the inter-relationships between foreign and domestic
policies and the importance of economic issues. One might think these
themes only recently discovered, instead of ideas we have long con-
sidered truisms. They certainly do not justify the creation of some
amorphous Joint Committee on National Security.
Although the discussions of war powers, executive agreements,
executive privilege and comparable topics are relatively brief, they
do raise questions that require answers not yet forthcoming from
the executive branch. In my view, Congress should move slowly on the
issues of executive agreements and executive privilege: in the first case
because before legislating we need further information, which even
the State Department apparently does not possess; in the second case
because I am fearful of giving the Presidency under the rubric of
Congressional reform more power than the office now has under the
Constitution. As for the war powers resolution, however, I believe there
is every reason to press the executive vigorously on the consultation
and reporting sections of the law. These have been tested several times
in recent months and the executive responses have been far from
adequate.
Returning to the subject of intelligence, I would strongly emphasize
the fact that both the executive and legislative branches have been
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inexcusably lax in supervising intelligence activities. But I am also
disappointed with the Commission's findings in this regard. After
giving a brief outline of the "intelligence community" the report goes
on to make some modest suggestions which represent little if any
advance over the conclusions of the Rockefeller Commission, which
had a substantially more restricted mandate. Everything is accepted
as given and some delicate tinkering with the machinery apparently
is considered a sufficient response to the profound issues which have
emerged in this connection.
It is intolerable that the public should still be burdened with a
swollen, expensive and inefficient intelligence "community." Since the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was established in the early 1960s
to consolidate and replace the several military intelligence agencies,
I recommend that the task be accomplished and the latter abolished
as soon as possible. If the Service chiefs say that is impossible, then the
DIA should go out of existence forthwith as an expensive redundancy.
I would also recommend that the National Security Agency (NSA) ,
thousands of employees larger than the CIA, be dramatically reduced
in size?especially so long as each of the armed services maintains its
own cryptologic agency.
My belief is that the CIA, with all its blemishes, remains at the heart
of our intelligence operations. A full house-cleaning must be under-
taken as the facts come in (obviously some may never be known) and
the agency's standing thereafter at the center of the intelligence com-
munity should be restored and strengthened. I agree that the Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI) should be given enhanced control over
coordinating intelligence and should have the fullest access ?to the
President. I do not, however, agree that a White House office is needed
or is desirable for that purpose?it would be far too seductive a place
for the DCI. While the DCPs deputy clearly must take over more
of the running of the CIA, I believe the time is long overdue to make
both officials civilians. The practice of having either one a military
man began a generation ago when the CIA was just beginning; it is
no longer necessary or desirable especially when virtually every other
intelligence component is run by military officers.
To accomplish the necessary restructuring of the so-called intelli-
gence community I would look primarily to the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence. Thereafter, I would hope to see the creation of
a Joint or Senate Committee on Intelligence, which was first proposed
twenty-one years ago. Such a Committee should have the most exten-
sive oversight powers possible, it should include members of more
recent vintage in its ranks. There might very well be, moreover, a
limited term of office (on the order of four to six years) for members
serving on such a Committee.
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Finally, on the intelligence issue, I must register my dissent from
two propositions in the Commission's report. Granted there is a certain
logic in renaming the CIA the Foreign Intelligence Agency, the
accompanying implication that we need a "domestic intelligence
agency" is distasteful and subject to misinterpretations; the frequent
name changes experienced by the Soviet KGB also cause me to reject
such a course. Secondly, I disagree with the Commission's views of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) which
has long been of dubious value as an impartial reviewing agency. It
would be easier, cheaper and logical to abolish it.
With the several exceptions described briefly above, I would like to
associate myself with ft number of Supplementary Remarks of Com-
missioner Engelhard. This is especially the case with her views on the
value of the Commission's effort to strengthen the departments and
the cabinet, on the proper balance between State and Treasury on
economic policy responsibilities, and on the cliches surrounding the
phrase "multilateral diplomacy." At the same time, I would warn
against stressing the importance of economic events and the need for
economic "experts" to the point where they become fads.
In conclusion, I would repeat my belief that there are a number of
useful ideas and observations in the Commission's report, but that they
seem to me too few in volume and significance to have justified all the
time, effort and money required for their production.
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Supplementary Remarks by Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Vice President of the United States
In July 1972 when the Commission on Organization of the Govern-
ment for the Conduct of Foreign Policy was established, the situation,
both at home and abroad, was quite different from the situation in the
world today.
?American forces were deeply involved in helping South Viet-
nam meet an all-out invasion from North Vietnam.
?The President had made historic first trips to the Peoples Republic
of China, where the important Shanghai Communique was issued,
and the Soviet Union, where the first Strategic Arms Limitations
Agreement was signed.
?An uneasy tension loomed over the Middle East.
?News of a break-in at the Watergate had just come to the public's
attention.
?There were important elements of strained relations between the
Administration and the Congress.
Much has happened in the intervening three-year period, during
which the Commission's report has been developed. Dramatic events
have tested the vitality and resilience of our great nation:
?The President and the Vice President resigned from office and
were replaced under the provisions of the 25th Amendment of
the Constitution.
?A dangerous war in the Middle East has been followed by nego-
tiations which may lead toward a lasting peace.
?An oil embargo has demonstrated our growing lack of energy
independence, and a quadrupling of oil prices has affected the
economies of industrial nations around the world.
?The resulting inflation and subsequent recession have caused high
unemployment and a great challenge to the free nations of the
world.
?Our sacrifices to support the independence and freedom of Indo-
china came to a traumatic and tragic ending.
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?The Cyprus dispute between Greece and Turkey and Communist
gains in Portugal and elsewhere have threatened the solidarity of
NATO's western and southern Mediterranean flanks.
?A younger, more restive Congress has been elected.
The United States has rebounded from this difficult period under
the leadership of a strong new President. In President Ford we have
gained a great leader with the courage and vision to deal with the
difficult challenges we face in the international area. He is especially
dedicated to working constructively and openly with the Congress.
The President is backed by an extraordinarily skillful Secretary of
State to whom America owes a great debt for steady and imaginative
initiatives in U.S. foreign policy during a tumultuous and complex
period. His brilliant contributions are in many ways unprecedented
in our history. In his joint capacities as Assistant to the President and
Secretary of State, he has been able to be most effective in assisting
the President in building a safer and better world.
In trying to develop a report which both reflects the lessons of
history and anticipates the organizational problems we will face in
the future, the Commission has had to cope with this difficult period
of transition. Although I was only privileged to participate in Com-
mission deliberations during the final five months of its existence, I
have been impressed with the ambitious range of issues it undertook
to study and with its dedicated efforts to grapple with extremely
complex problems.
Creative organizational recommendations can help us better meet
economic, military and ideological challenges.
One of the limiting aspects of this Commission's interpretation of
its charter has been the decision not to attempt to project American
purposes and objectives for the future as a framework for evaluating
various organizational mechanisms.
If we do not act on the basis of a clear conception of our national
interests?our human goals, economic and financial needs, and polit-
ical purposes?the assessment of organizational structures must
necessarily be narrow.
We must be organized in the years ahead to ensure that democracy
will continue to be a dynamic force in the world, dedicated to the best
interests and well being of peoples everywhere and to respect for
human dignity, justice and freedom. We must enhance our economic
strength and national vitality. We must recognize that threats to our
national security while far more complex are as real today as in the
past and far more serious for the future.
But while the third century of our national existence presents com-
plex dangers; at the same time, it offers increased and exciting new
opportunities for building a better world.
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A question we must face is how all open society, dedicated to the
ideals of freedom, democracy and human rights, can protect itself
and work in partnership to strengthen those who share the same
ideals, in a world of ideological, military, political, and economic
competition with closed societies. For this reason we must have a
strong sense of national purpose and dedication to our basic beliefs
in human justice and freedom with a powerful military, a skillful
intelligence service, and a vigorous and healthy economy, which is
essential for the protection and expansion of equal opportunity and
respect for human dignity.
In competing with authoritarian governmental structures, a democ-
racy has inherent organizational disadvantages. Our system depends
on effective Executive leadership together with effective and construc-
tive cooperation between the Congressional and Executive branches.
The Commission has made a number of excellent suggestions for
future organization. I believe, however, that more creative proposals
might have been developed in some areas for strengthening our democ-
racy to meet the challenges we face. This is particularly true in the
area of Congressional-Executive relations.
Congressional-Executive Relations. The Congress shares the respon-
sibility with the Executive in regard to foreign policy, but the rela-
tionship can be destructive if it paralyzes the President in meeting his
broad responsibilities for national security and world peace.
The process of conducting and implementing our foreign policy is
complex. The Congress has injected itself more assertively into that
process. There has been a return swing of the power pendulum?which
has tended to shift over the years between the President and the
Congress.
Although tension between branches is inherent in our system, we
need a renewed unity of purpose and a spirit of confidence, both at
home and abroad, especially at this moment in history.
This thought was cogently expressed by the Prime Minister of Sing-
apore in a May 8, 1975 toast to the President when he called for the
* * * restoration of confidence in the capacity of the United
States to act in unison in a crisis. No better service can be done to
non-Communist governments the world over than to restore con-
fidence that the American government can and will act swiftly and
in tandem between the Administration and Congress in any case of
open aggression, and where you have a treaty obligation to do so.
Disunity within Congress itself, like organizational problems within
the Executive, can also complicate the process of cooperation. Today,
some of the challenges to past practices within the Congress make it
more difficult for the President and the Congress to find a concerted
position.
These developments have contributed to a number of foreign policy
difficulties, and to the appearance in recent times of a disorganized.
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fragmented, and often immobilized American foreign policy. The fol-
lowing are just a few examples:
?The exclusion of four important friendly oil producing nations
from many benefits of the 1974 Trade Act, even though they did
not participate in the oil embargo of 1973.
?The exclusion of the Soviet Union from Most Favored Nation
trading status, with a markedly negative impact on Jewish emi-
gration.
?The cutoff of military assistance and sales to Turkey, a key mem-
ber of NATO with borders on both the Soviet Union and the
volatile Middle East.
Broad goals have usually not been at issue. Rather, it has more often
been a question of different views on tactics to achieve objectives. The
situation is complicated by the fact that lobbies, both domestic and
foreign, are increasingly influential in Congress on foreign policy is-
sues. Failure to develop a concerted position has resulted in legislation
and policies which are counter-productive, in most cases, to the aims
of the sponsors of these restrictive resolutions.
The dangerous result has been an international perception by some
that the U.S. does not always act responsibly?even in accordance with
its own interests. The image of 536 individuals' hands on the tiller of
the Ship of State does not inspire confidence that we will hold a steady
course.
Surely, the Founding Fathers did not intend the Congress to have
a veto on the day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs. The President
must have the flexibility to manage our foreign relations, to negotiate
with foreign governments, and to take those measures necessary to
safeguard our national interests, always with appropriate participa-
tion by the Congress.
We need the proper measure of Congressional involvement and the
processes which best serve our national interests. We need to build
mutual confidence and genuine communication. Greater understand-
ing and cooperation from the Executive must be matched by a sense
of responsibility and trust on the part of the Congress.
Our co-equal branches of government need to build together a new
spirit of cooperation. A dynamic Executive-Congressional partner-
ship can usher in a new period of achievement in foreign relations.
The Commission's report could have made more creative suggestions
for bolstering this essential cooperation.
?In the chapters on the Executive branch there is not enough
emphasis on the shared responsibilities of the two branches and
the important Executive responsibility of liaison with Congress.
In recognition of this, the new President, his staff, and Cabinet
officers have made a special effort to strengthen contact and com-
munication with the Congress.
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?In Chapter 13, which deals directly with Executive-Congressional
relations, the collective impact of the recommendations seems to
amount to a further curtailment of Executive flexibility.
The Commission has also attempted in the chapter on Executive-
Congressional relations to cover in a short space questions which raise
deep and difficult Constitutional issues that do not lend themselves to
brief treatment. The questions of war powers, executive privilege and
executive agreements are three of these complex issues which have a
long history of Judicial, Congressional and Executive argument.
Although I have some reservations about the formulations on these
subjects, I am gratified by modifications during Commission delibera-
tions. I commend to the attention of those interested in the complicated
questions of executive privilege and executive agreements the attached
letter from Attorney General Levi, which he thoughtfully prepared on
behalf of the Commission during the course of earlier discussions.
The net impact of the formulations in these areas and in other areas
addressed in the chapter, such as time limiting provisions in legislation
and a system for statutory classification, may restrict the needed flexi-
bility of the Executive in day-to-day operations.
While I question the practicality of defining by statute, rules for the
entire classification system of the government, I wholeheartedly en-
dorse the Commission's call for legislation to provide criminal sanc-
tions for persons who endanger the national interest by releasing
classified information. I endorse, as well, the Commission's call for
more responsible handling of classified materials on Capitol Hill,
believing this will facilitate a fuller exchange of information without
jeopardizing security interests.
Executive. In the Executive area, there is a commendable tendency
in the report to encourage greater participation by the various depart-
ments involved with foreign policy. However, some de-emphasis on the
role of the President's staff is also implied. It would be a mistake to
take any step that would diminish the President's ability to receive
a full presentation of conflicting views on broad questions of national
interest and to make decisions.
The President must have a competent staff to be well informed, to
ensure that the views of the many departments and agencies concerned
with foreign policy are fairly represented, and to convey his policies
to the departments which must implement them. The President must
take the lead in providing policy guidance and ensuring that the
activities of our government are consistent with that policy.
Pitting one department against another without systematic resolu-
tion of controversial issues at the Presidential level would lead to un-
coordinated policies by competing agencies. The President would have
less understanding of the implications of conflicting views. He might
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well be deprived of well-thought-out options for the many significant
policy decisions which only he can make.
Intelligence. Because of the growing complexities of the challenges to
free societies, no national requirement is more important today than
an effective intelligence service.
With regard to the question of direction of the intelligence com-
munity, the Commission was divided on the issue of whether the Na-
tional Security Council Intelligence Committee should be chaired by
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or the
Director of Central (Foreign) Intelligence. The Committee is designed
to provide policy guidance on intelligence from the perspective of the
intelligence user. I believe it would be a mistake to give leadership of
this Committee to anyone other than a policymaker. That guidance is
best provided, under the current system, by the Assistant to the Presi-
dent for National Security Affairs, who is in a position to understand
the concerns of the President, the principal intelligence consumer.
Another committee associated with Intelligence is the Forty Com-
mittee which considers proposals for actions that lie in that grey area
between diplomatic action and declared war. The report may be overly
critical of a supervisory system which has functioned well. The pri-
mary reason the Committee has met less frequently over the last year
has been a cutback of activity resulting from concern about the large
number of persons who must be informed about such operations. The
proposals in Chapters 7 and 14 of the report for establishing a small
committee on intelligence or one on national security could well pro-
vide the solution to this problem.
With regard to oversight of intelligence, the Commission has noted
the recommendations of the Commission on CIA Activities Within
the United States concerning the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board. These recommendations have important implications
for improved Executive oversight, including the assessment of the
quality of foreign intelligence collection, estimates, organization, and
management; and assessment of compliance by CIA with its statutory
authority.
Other Areas. Although I have minor reservations about other aspects
of the lengthy report, I mention here only five areas:
?United States Information Agency. The Stanton recommenda-
tions concerning USIA deserve most careful consideration and
appear to have merit. However, there should be further evalua-
tion of them, and an especially careful study of the pros and
cons associated with creating an independent Voice of America
(VOA) . In contemplating any change it would be necessary to
assure that VOA will have policy guidance from the Department
of State.
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?Defense Budget. Although I strongly favor taking those meas-
ures necessary to guarantee continued American military secu-
rity, I do not believe that the Commission's suggestions will
overcome existing organizational problems associated with De-
fense budgeting. The President needs to be presented with genuine
alternatives for structuring our forces in order to make those de-
cisions which will safeguard our security and most effectively uti-
lize our national resources. Military security has first priority, but
it must be harmonized with domestic concerns and economic con-
straints.
?Embassy Communications. In endorsing a strong role for the Am-
bassador in managing the country team overseas, the formula-
tions in Chapter 9 of the report concerning his right to access to
all communications, rather than just official communications, goes
beyond his actual requirements.
?Energy. The Commission was not able to deliberate sufficiently to
develop proposals for solving the immense organizational prob-
lems associated with obtaining energy independence. These need
urgent examination.
?General Research. The studies commissioned by the Staff are of
uneven quality and, as indicated in the preface, have not been re-
viewed or approved by the Commission as a whole.
Overall, the report contains a number of imaginative and valuable
contributions. A thorough consideration by the Executive and the Con-
gress of the findings of the Commission will undoubtedly lead to con-
structive improvements in organization.
I have thoroughly enjoyed working with the distinguished members
of the Commission and have great respect for the diverse views of the
individual members. We are all indebted to the skillful leadership of
our Chairman, Ambassador Robert M. Murphy, and to the dedicated
efforts of Director Francis 0. Wilcox, Counsel William B. Spong, Jr.,
and the other devoted members of the Staff. I am especially grateful
to General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (Ret), and Captain Jon-
athan T. Howe, USN, who have so ably assisted me in meeting my
own responsibilities to the Commission.
Enclosures:
(1) Letter of June 13, 1975 from Attorney General Edward H. Levi to the Vice
President.
(2) Statement of Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia before the Sub-
committee on Separation of Powers, Committee on the Judiciary, United
States Senate, May 15, 1975.
Enclosure (1)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, D.C., June 13, 1975.
HOD. NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER,
Vice President, Ezecutive Office Building, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT: You have asked for my views on those portions of a
draft report which deal with executive privilege and executive agreements. The
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draft is now being considered by the Commission on the Organization of the Gov-
ernment for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, of which you are a member.
The areas of executive privilege (or confidentiality) and executive agreements
do not lend themselves to easy description or analysis. The draft proposals present
legal and practical problems of considerable difficulty.
I. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
The proposal before the Commission with respect to executive privilege
recognizes there are circumstances in which the confidentiality of the kxecutive
must be preserved. But in proposing to legislate the bounds of that confidentiality,
the proposal, it seems to me, overleaps the initial question of whether such legis-
lation would have any utility.
I think it must be emphasized at the outset that this supposed utility should
not be taken for granted. If confidentiality is a constitutionally-based doctrine,
its limits may not be determined by statute. Although the statute may have some
persuasive force, the scope of the doctrine must necessarily be'defined in a com-
mon-law manner by a series of specific congressional demands and executive
acquiescences or refusals, followed, perhaps, by litigation over the latter. If
executive privilege is not rooted in the Constitution, the question remains
whether it might not be preferable for Congress to determine the question of the
reasonableness of refusal of access on a case-by-case basis, rather than in advance
when the variety of circumstances surrounding each demand cannot be foreseen.
I believe the broadest recorded use of executive privilege occurred in the 1950s
when President Eisenhower forebade any employee of the Department of De-
fense from testifying, with respect to internal advice, in what was then known as
the "Army-McCarthy hearings." The President felt that the hearings were harass-
ing employees of the Department down to the lowest levels and that his order
was necessary to preserve morale and insure forthright advice-giving within the
Department. The Committee and the Congress declined to challenge that Presi-
dential assertion of confidentiality?and I think rightly so in the particular con-
text. I would not, however, contend that such a broad assertion of confidentiality
against the Congress would always be reasonable and should always go unchal-
lenged. This is precisely the result, however, that the present proposal (assuming
its constitutionality) would produce. I would no more like the opposite prescrip-
tion, rendering such an assertion of confidentiality always unlawful.
The lesson of history is that the reasonableness of an assertion of confidential-
ity simply cannot be determined in advance on the basis of neat categories. It
depends upon an incalculable number of factors. I think it would be unfortunate
for Congress to commit itself to a position?either accepting or rejecting the
assertion?in advance, on the basis of abstract criteria and in ignorance of the
factual context in which the issue is posed. Though some confidentiality should
be permitted, even if there were no constitutional right, it would seem preferable
for Congress to determine that question on a case-by-case basis. These considera-
tions lead me to suggest that legislation in this area will not only be extremely
difficult to draft, but may not be in the best interests of either the Congress or
the Executive.
Executive confidentiality is a constitutional doctrine
The doctrine of executive privilege, like the companion doctrines of legislative
and judicial privilege, arises from the necessity to protect the decisional processes
and communications essential to the effective functioning of one of the great
branches of government.
The constitutional doctrine of executive confidentiality draws support from
cases finding inherent powers and immunities in the practical necessities of
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government. Practical necessity is the basis for much constitutional doctrine.
Examples are numerous. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316 (1819),
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall upheld the power of Congress to create the Bank of
the United States and the immunity of the Bank from state taxation, basing
his decision on the federal government's need for such an instrumentality to
operate effectively and the concomitant impropriety of state interference with
essential federal functions. In In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), the Supreme Court
upheld the inherent executive power to protect a Justice of that Court by assign-
ing a federal marshal to travel with him to California and the consequent im-
munity of the marshal from state prosecution for a killing necessarily per-
formed by him in carrying out his duties.
Some confidentiality is inherent in the existence, purpose, and structure of
the government created by the Constitution. As I have stated elsewhere,* protec-
tions against unwarranted intrustions, whether by the governor or the public,
have become an essential feature of our legal system. The recognition of the
need for confidentiality reflects a basic truth about human beings, whether
in the conduct of their private lives or in their service with the government.
Confidentiality is a prerequisite to the enjoyment of many freedoms we value
most. This need applies not only to individuals but also to groups, professions,
and other social organizations. The effective pursuit of social, economic, and
political goals often demands privacy of thought, expression, and action. The
claim of the news media for a privilege to protect the confidentiality of their
sources of information is based on a belief that public disclosure of news
sources, coupled with the embarrassment and reprisals that might ensure, could
well deter informers from confiding in reporters. It would diminish the free
flow of information. Another manifestation of the need for confidentiality of
groups may be found in the law's protection of trade secrets. The exercise of First
Amendment rights also includes the right of the people to make their wishes
known to their representatives. Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). Commnications protected by
the First Amendment may require confidentiality so that they will not be
chilled. Many will not speak candidly to their government about the problems
of politics and economic interest if they know their remarks may be made public
in some future law suit. The Supreme Court applied the right of confidentiality to
membership lists in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Although the
state had a legitimate interest in seeking the NAACP's membership lists, the
interest was not sufficiently strong to overcome the First Amendment value in
preserving the organization's advancement of its beliefs and ideas from the
chilling effect that disclosure of the identity of its members would probably have.
Last term in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974), the Supreme
Court noted that confidentiality at the highest levels of government involves all
the values normally deferred to in protecting the privacy of individuals, and in
addition, "the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective,
and even blunt or harsh opinions in presidential decision-making." The Court ob-
served that "human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemina-
tion of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances
and for their own interests to the detriment of the decision-making processes."
Id., at 708. For these reasons, the Court held that the Executive's right of con-
fidentiality is based in the Constitution. The Court stated:
"The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and in-
extricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution." Id.,
at 708.
*See Address by Attorney General Edward H. Levi, Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, April 28, 1975
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"Nowhere in the Constitution. * * * is there any explicit reference to a
privilege of confidentiality, yet to the extent this interest relates to the
effective discharge of a President's powers, it is constitutionally based."
Id., at 711.
These considerations lead me to conclude that executive confidentiality is a
constitutional doctrine and that "to the extent this interest relates to the effective
discharge of a President's powers," it cannot be diminished by legislation. This
indicates, as I have noted above, that the proposal for legislation now before
the Commission could not narrow the scope of the privilege but might conceivably
broaden it.
There is, of course, no reason why Congress might not allow greater confiden-
tiality than the Constitution requires, but the instances in which that would be
prudent are better determined individually than by broad and rigid rules made in
advance. There are simply too many variables involved in each case to enable
any abstract general scheme to be satisfactory. Since, by definition, the entire
matter is always within the initiative of Congress anyway (it is congressional
requests that we are considering), it makes more sense to handle the problems
as they arise on a case-by-case basis.
The considerations discussed so far relate to the inadvisability of any legisla-
tion in these complex fields where every ease will involve a blend of constitu-
tional law and prudential choice. There are also, however, particular aspects of
the proposal now before the Commission that pose serious problems. I turn next
to these.
The criteria for disclosure
The outline of the recommendation is that executive privilege may be claimed
only by the President in person and only with respect to three types of
information:
(1) Confidential advice concerning policy choices, excluding, however,
factual information underlying or included in such advice;
(2) Information the disclosure of which would violate established rights
of individual privacy, or breach of understandings with foreign governments
concerning information supplied by them;
(3) Information as to which it can be shown that the harm to the national
interest flowing from disclosure outweighs any congressional needs.
It should first be noted that there appears to be no warrant in the case law
for a requirement that the President claim the privilege in person. There is no
constitutional reason, for example, why he cannot delegate his privilege to the
Secretary of State where matters of foreign relations are concerned. Indeed, in
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1. 8 (1952), dealing with the government's
evidentiary but related privilege against disclosure, the Court expressly stated
that the privilege could be invoked by a department head. No reason has been
offered as to why a different rule should obtain when the privilege invoked is of
a constitutional order, especially since the result in either case is the same?
the information is denied. As you are no doubt aware, current Presidential
directives reserve the assertion of executive privilege against the Congress to
the President alone. I believe this is a sound policy expressive of the mutual
respect which should exist between the branches. But it is not in my view consti-
tutionally required, nor can it be legislatively imposed.
Each of the three criteria for the application of the privilege poses serious
problems. It is doubtful, for instance, that a realistic distinction can always
be drawn, as the first rule requires, between confidential advice concerning
policy choices and the factual information underlying or included in such advice.
Nor is it clear, in the second criterion, that constitutes "established rights of
individual privacy." There are many legitimate expectations of privacy that
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decent government ought to humor that are not "established" by the Constitu-
tion or any statute or regulation.
But it is the third criterion that may be the most objectionable aspect of the
proposal, and it is objectionable both from a practical and legal standpoint.
As applied specifically to the field of foreign affairs, it may be useful to recall
briefly the long constitutional tradition which the proposal on executive privi-
lege would affect. On January 24, 1794, the Senate requested the President to
lay before the Senate the correspondence between the Minister to France and the
Department of State. 1 Senate Executive Journal 147. President Washington
complied with that request "except in those particulars, which, in my judgment,
for public consideration, ought not to be communicated." 1 Richardson, Messages
and Papers of the Presidents 152. Secretary of State Randolph advised President
Washington that the message "appears to have given general satisfaction" and
that "Mr. M-d-n" (presumably James Madison) recognized "that the discretion
of the President was always to be the guide." The Writings of George Washington
(Bicentennial Edition) Vol. 33, p. 282 fn. 8.
It is, of course, well known that resolutions of inquiry seeking information in
the field of foreign relations traditionally contained the clause "if not incom-
patible with the public interest." See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corps., 299 U.S. 304, 321 (1936). And there have been many instances in which
members of the legislative branch recognized that even in the absence of such
clause the Executive had the right and indeed the duty to withhold information
the disclosure of which in his opinion would be injurious to the public interest.
See, e.g., Congressman Sprague, Register of the Debates in Congress, 19th Con.,
1st Sess., col. 1274 (1826) Congressman Mitchell, ibid ; Senators Teller, Allison,
and Lodge. 40 Con. Rec. 24-25 (1905).
I do not really believe that the standard for the assertion of executive priv-
ilege in the foreign affairs field which the present proposal would establish is
any different from that which Presidents have heretofore used. To be sure, re-
fusals to disclose have generally been based simply upon the "public interest"?
but I do not believe that was meant to assign some absolute value to the secrecy
of certain information, without regard to the purpose for which it was sought by
the Congress. I think, in short, that the proposal's formulation?that the harm
of disclosure must outweigh any congressional need?is as apt an expression of
the proper test as can be devised. The issue, however, is who will be the judge
of the proper application of the test. Historically, it has been the President.
Under the present proposal, it will be the courts. A volume could be written
about the problems which this disposition raises. It shall limit myself to one
particular point?namely, that the Supreme Court has clearly indicated its
unwillingness and, indeed, its inability to assess military and foreign policy
considerations, much less balance them against congressional needs.
In C. & S. Airlines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948), the Supreme
Court said the following:
"The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for
foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and
ought not to be published to the world. It would be intolerable that courts,
without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions
of the Executive taken on information properly held secret. Nor can courts
sit in camera in order to be taken into executive confidences. But even if
courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of executive decisions as
to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided
by our Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive
and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of
prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly respon-
sible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions
of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor respon-
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sibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political
power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry." (Emphasis supplied).
Again, in United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953), the Court held with
respect to military and state secrets.
"It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the
case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will
expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should
not be divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is appro-
priate, and the court should not jeopardize the security which the privilege
is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by
the judge alone, in chambers."
It is true that these cases, especially Waterman, rest to some extent on the
political question doctrine which was narrowed by Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962). Nevertheless, even in that case the Court acknowledged and defined po-
litical questions from the decision of which the courts will abstain:
"* * * A texturally demonstratable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department, or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding with-
out an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discre-
tion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of govern-
ment; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question." At p. 217. (Emphasis
added).
I conclude from this statement that the degree of necessary protection for mili-
tary and state secrets?at least when the issue arises in the context of a disagree-
ment between the legislative and executive branches?is a political question into
which the courts will not intrude. The case law following Baker v. Carr supports
this analysis.
With respect to the confidentiality of intra-governmental communications, the
Supreme Court has taken the position that courts may determine whether, in the
context of a criminal trial, the need for disclosure outweighs the need for keeping
the infomation confidential. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-713
(1974). In that case, however, the Court expressly pretermitted the question
whether courts may similarly determine, in the context of the legislative process,
whether the need for disclosure to Congress outweights the Executive's need for
keeping the information confidential. It should be evident that this latter task
would often require courts to make judgments of a distinctly political nature,
including predictions on the scope and consequences of proposed legislative
actions, and would be alien to the traditional role and expertise of the judiciary.
The wisdom of assigning that responsibility to courts is open to serious doubt, as
well as is the very justiciability of the issues which the Commission's scheme
seeks to have resolved. Plainly enough, the precedent established by the Nixon
case cannot easily be extended to encompass Congressional demands for informa-
tion, even where the basis for withholding the information rests solely on the
general need of government for confidentiality in its decision-making processes.
In addition, the Court in the Nixon case emphasized that a more difficult ques-
tion would be presented if "diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets were
involved," and noted that "[al s to these areas of Art. II duties of the courts have
traditionally shown the utmost deference to presidential responsibilities." 418
U.S. at 706, 710. The Court then specifically reaffirmed the holdings in Waterman
and Reynolds that the courts will not reexamine the President's determinations
in the field of state secrets for the reasons (a) that the judiciary must defer
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to the President's superior expertise in that field, and (b) that such examina-
tion?even in camera?might compromise the information.
The balancing of incommensurable interests contemplated by the third rule,
then, presents a non-justiciable question.
The provision for in camera inspection
The proposal contemplates that disagreements over confidentiality between
the Executive and the Congress shall be resolved by the Judiciary and that the
latter should proceed upon in camera inspection of the disputed materials. This
procedure would prove unsatisfactory for all parties concerned. Obviously, even
in camera inspection has some undesirable chilling effect upon the candor of the
decision-making processes within the Executive branch. But that is not the
only point.
The first problem is that of security, especially where the documents involved
reveal national security or foreign policy information. The very process of in
camera inspection increases the possibility that the confidentiality of documents
will be violated. The documents must be removed from their usual custodians,
assembled, and then analyzed by new personnel, themselves unfamiliar with
the problems to which they relate. When they reach the court, the documents
are accessible to the judge and any other personnel whose assistance he requires.
If an appeal follows, the documents must pass through the hands of the district
judge, the judges of the Court of Appeals, and the Justices of the Supreme Court,
including any number of clerks whose assistance the various judges think neces-
sary. In these circumstances, it is simply impossible that confidentiality could
consistently be maintained. This conclusion implies no disrespect for the federal
judiciary. It is a simple fact of life that as the circle of persons who know
a secret widens, the likelihood of a leak increases until it becomes a virtual
certainty.
If in camera inspection is unsuited to the needs of the Executive, it is equally
unsuited to the processes and needs of the Judiciary. In camera procedures
make it impossible for the courts to develop on intelligible law of privilege.
Each judge will make his determination to maintain the confidentiality of docu-
ments in secrecy. Since the document is confidential, he will be unable to explain
his decision. A district judge faced with an in camera decision will not have the
benefit of guidance from candid and extensive opinions either by other district
judges or by appellate judges. This will serve to make the outcome of the
process unpredictable and thus create an uncertainty that will itself threaten
the expectation of confidentiality.
For good and sufficient reasons, the courts have not made use of in camera
procedures in their consideration of other privileges. Privileges comparable to
executive privilege (lawyer-client, priest-penitent, husband-wife) come into
being upon a showing that the relationship required by the law exists. In no
privilege of this sort does the court examine documents or testimony. Rather,
when the relationship is shown, the privilege comes into operation and the
matter is at an end. The traditional practice with respect to other privileges
should give pause to those who would impose a wholly different procedure for
executive privilege in the present context.
Those same considerations led the Supreme Court in Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165 (1967), to reject the government's suggestion that the district judge
should examine the fruits of an illegal wiretap in camera to determine if they
were relevant to the case before turning them over to the defendant. "Although
this may appear a modest proposal," the Court stated, "* * * winnowing this
(irrelevant) material from those items which might have made a substantial
contribution to the case against a petitioner is a task which should not be en-
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trusted wholly to the court in the first instance." The Court then went an to
point out the difficulties of the task in an in camera proceeding. "An apparently
innocent phrase, a chance remark, a reference to what appears to be a neutral
person or event, the identity of a caller or the individual on the other end of the
telephone, or even the manner of speaking or using words may have special
significance to one who knows the more intimate facts of an accused's life * * *.
In our view the task is too complex, and the margin for error too great, to rely
wholly on the in camera judgment of the trial court." 394 U.S. at 182.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit?perhaps the most
experienced appellate court in the country with procedures of this type, and
certainly in times past an exponent of in camera procedures (see Committee for
Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir. 1971)?has com-
mented on the difficulties of in camera inspection in Freedom of Information
Act cases. In Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 977, the Court stated: "Such an examination may be very burdensome, and
is necessarily conducted without benefit of criticism and illumination by a party
with the actual interest in forcing disclosure." Id. at 825. "The problem is com-
pounded at the appellate level. * * * Frequently trial courts' holding * * * are
stated in very conclusory terms." Ibid. The Court concluded: "Such an invest-
ment of judicial energy might be justified to determine some issues. In this area
of the law, however, we do not believe it is justified or even permissible." Ibid.,
The fundamental difficulty with the present proposal, in my opinion, is that
It seeks to achieve certainty, and to provide for easy resolution of disagreements
between the two elected branches, where, in the nature of things, those goals
are simply not achievable. The degree of confidentiality which should be ac-
corded the Executive in various fields, and the degree of access to the innermost
workings of the Executive which should be accorded to the Congress, will (and
in my view must) vary from era to era, depending upon many factors which are
inherently not within the competence of courts to assess?factors as funda-
mentally political as the degree of confidence which the Nation has in its Chief
Executive, and the degree of support which it gives to the particular congres-
sional inquiry at hand. To be sure, the Commission's proposal may initially
appear to have the virtue of definition. But it is the very uncertainty and tension
inherent in the separation of powers doctrine that has long been thought to be
the source of the genius for government that is manifest in our Constitution.
II. EXECITITVE AGREEMENTS
The draft report on Executive agreements proposes that Congress pass legis-
lation requiring, among other things, that all international agreements be sent
to Congress within 30 days of signing and come into effect 60 days following
transmittal unless either House passes a resolution of disapproval. International
agreements subjected to this process would include bilateral or multilateral
Executive agreements; diplomatic notes embodying agreements; significant
agency-to-agency agreements, or any other administrative arrangements which
purport to bind the United States. According to the draft, agreements would be
reviewed in this manner even when already authorized by existing legislation,
treaty, or the constitutional authority of the President.
Since 1972, the Secretary of State has been required to transmit to Congress
"the text of any international agreement, other than a treaty" under the Case
Act, Public Law 92-403, 1 E.S.C. 112b (Supp. III, 1973).* The legislative history
*The Act does not interfere, however, with the existing powers of the President to con-
clude agreements pursuant to statutes, treaties, and the Constitution.
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of that Act, and the administrative practice under it have given the words
"international agreement" a meaning in keeping with the purpose of the
statute?to keep Congress informed of significant agreements. Thus the House
Report on the Case Act states:
"What constitutes an international agreement.?During committee hear-
ings a State Department spokesman raised the question of what kind of ar-
rangements constitute international executive agreements within the
meaning of the legislation. Ile pointed out that many exchanges involve
administrative working details for carrying out a treaty or agreement or
are in the nature of commercial contracts relating to sales of equipment and
commodities.
"Clearly the Congress does not want to be innundated with trivia. At the
same time, it would wish to have transmitted all agreements of any sig-
nificance." H. Rept. 92-1301."
The draft goes far beyond the understanding reflected in the House Report and
would include not only agreements of significance but "any other administra-
tive arrangements which purport to bind the U.S." Such administrative ar-
rangements and agreements are "as broad as the scope of our foreign relations."
See Digest of United States Practice in International Law (Rovine ed., 1973),
p. 187. Although the numbers may have increased in recent years, there is noth-
ing new about this practice. A classic exposition was furnished in 1905 by the
famous American scholar on international law, John Bassett Moore:
"The conclusion of agreements between governments, with more or less
formality, is in reality a matter of constant practice, without which current
diplomatic business could not be carried on. A question arises as to the rights
of an individual, the treatment of a vessel, a matter of ceremonial, or any
of the thousand and one things that daily occupy the attention of foreign
offices without attracting public notice; the governments directly concerned
exchange views and reach a conclusion by which the difference is disposed
of. They have entered into an international 'agreement'; * * * the secre-
tary of state of the United States * * * has engaged in routine trans-
actions of this kind, * * * since the foundation of the government. * * *
Without the exercise of such power it would be impossible to conduct the
business of his office." Treaties and Executive Agreements, 20 Pol. Sci.
Quarterly 385, 389-90 (1905).
Under the draft proposal no agreement or arrangement could take effect for
at least GO days from the time of transmittal. It should be obvious, however,
that many types of agreements and arrangements, such as those for cease fire
or disaster relief, must be put into force immediately if they are to have any
effect. Moreover, anyone who has been involved in complex negotiations can
appreciate the delicacy of compromise often involved and the danger that
agreements once negotiated can "come unravelled" if not concluded immediately.
See, e.g., Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements, Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
92d ,Cong., 2d Sess., p. 259 (1972). To take an example from recent events, sup-
pose that the President had been able to negotiate an agreement for the release
of the crew of the Mayaguez. Would it have made sense to postpone the im-
plementation of such an agreement?and indeed even to withhold our acceptance
of it?for a period of 60 days?
I have been speaking only of the impracticality of the restrictions which
this proposal would place upon Presidential action. Ordinarily, such imprac-
ticality relates only to the desirability of suggested legislation. When, however,
it reaches such a level that it seriously impairs the performance of constitu-
tionally prescribed Presidential functions, it raises constitutional as well as
pragmatic difficulties. I believe that to be the case here.
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The effect of an across-the-board transmittal and 60-day delay requirement
might be so severe that "current diplomatic business could not be carried on."
See J. B. Moore, supra. As a result, the power of the President as "sole organ of
the federal government in the field of international relations" would be impaired.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318, 320 (1936) ;
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942) ; United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324, 330 (1937). In Pink, the Supreme Court noted the importance of the
power of the President to enter an Executive agreement which removed obstacles
to United States recognition of the Soviet government. As to that power, the
Court said:
"Effectiveness in handling - the delicate problems of foreign relations
requires no less. Unless such a power exists, the power of recognition
might be thwarted or seriously diluted. No such obstacle can be placed in
the way of rehabilitation of relations between this country and another
nation, unless the historic conception of the powers and responsibilities of
the President in the conduct of foreign affairs (see Moore, Treaties and
Executive Agreements, 20 Pol. Sc. Q. 385, 403-417) is to be drastically
revised." 315 U.S. at 229-30.
The obstacles to foreign relations in all spheres presented by the proposed bill
might be such that it would reach to the very ability of the President to perform
"that control of foreign relations which the Constitution vests in the President
as part of the Executive function." 39 Op. A.G. 484, 486 (1940). Thus, as broadly
applied the bill would be unconstitutional.
Even assuming, however, that the transmittal and 60-day suspension require-
nient would not, in its general application to all Executive agreements, violate
the Constitution, there are at least some Executive agreements which Congres-
sional restrictions, however reasonable, cannot reach. Some subjects, such as
the recognition of foreign governments and the conclusion of operational arrange-
ments on the battlefield, are confided exclusively to the President by the Consti-
tution, and are not subject to limitation by Congress. See Art. II, sections 2 and
3; United States v. Pink supra; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 139 (1866).
The serious constitutional problems I have alluded to?arising from incapaci-
tating overall impairment of Presidential foreign affairs powers, and, more nar-
rowly, from any attempted restriction of the Presidential authority in those few
areas where that authority is exclusive?pertain to the effects of the present
proposal. An independent constitutional problem appears when one considers
the means by which those effects are sought to be achieved. Even in those
broad areas in which Presidential action is subject to congressional control,
that control cannot be asserted through the device of one-House veto, which
is not a constitutional permissible form of legislative action. This is so far two
reasons: First, because it evades the clear constitutional provision for Presi-
dential participation in the legislative process through the veto power. And
second, because it represents an impermissible delegation of legislative author-
ity, which the Constitution vests in both Houses, to only one of them.
The Department has discussed these points at length before the Subcom-
mittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee, in con-
nection with consideration of pending legislation which would treat Executive
agreements in a manner somewhat similar to the present proposal. I attach a
copy of the testimony presented by Assistant Attorney- General Antonin Scalia,
which, at pages 14-23, treats the points here at issue. In my opinion the pro-
visions of the Constitution, their legislative history, and the historical prac-
tice demonstrated with unusual clarity that the one-House veto here proposed
is invalid.
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It should be clear that the issues raised by executive privilege and executive
agreements are exceedingly complex. Both subjects touch close upon the center
of our governmental process?and the former, of course, extends much beyond
merely the field of foreign affairs. It would be unrealistically ambitious to seek
to discuss even one of these subjects with any completeness in a letter of this
sort. There is an enormous body of scholarship on both subjects which warrants
consideration. There have also been extensive congressional hearings?which
have not induced the Congress to take any generalized action in the area of
executive privilege, and have caused it to exercise its supervision over executive
agreements only through individual statutes limiting the nature of agreements
which the President may make (e.g., Public Law 480, relating to the sale of
agricultural commodities, 7 U.S.C. 1701) and through the notice provisions of
the Case Act. With respect to both executive privilege and executive agreements,
there is ample reason for proceeding with such caution and deliberateness.
I will be pleased to provide whatever further assistance I can to facilitate your
consideration of these issues.
Respectfully,
EDWARD H. LEVI, Attorney General.
Enclosure (2)
STATEMENT OF ANTONIN SCALIA, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL ON EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS (5. 1251 AND S. 632) ; BEFORE THE Sue-
COMMITTEE ON SEPARATION OF POWERS, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S.
SENATE, MAY 15, 1975
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee : The Office of Legal Counsel
has often participated in hearings conducted by this Subcommittee concerning
separation of powers problems. The records of those hearings remain as useful
studies on issues that few had focused on previously. This is particularly so in
the case of executive agreements. The hearings on that subject which you
conducted in 1972 collected the views of scholars, both in and out of government,
and brought together important source materials: the 668-page printed record
is a basic reference tool for students of this area. Congressional Oversight of
Executive Agreements, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Separation of
Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 3475, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
As a result of that earlier work, your deliberations today have been greatly
simplified. The 1972 hearings clearly established not only that the executive
agreement was a useful tool for the conduct of this Nation's business, but also
that its constitutional ligitimacy was solidly based. Our own 1972 statement
described that basis in some detail. We noted that executive agreements had a
history going back to the First Congress (1 Stat. 232, 239), and that they had
been upheld in major opinions of the Supreme Court. E.g., United States V.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). See Statement of Ralph E. Erickson, Assistant
Attorney General, in Hearing, supra at 307-328.
By the time the hearings were completed, we believe a consensus was reached
on legal fundamentals. Thus, when this Subcommittee issued its report on Con-
gressional Oversight of Executive Agreements (Committee Print, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess.), it recognized that other types of international agreements besides treaties
exist and have been approved by the Supreme Court (p. 4). The Subcommittee
report explains (p. 6) :
"American constitutional law recognizes, in the Constitution itself and
in judicial opinion, three basic types of international agreement. First in
order of importance is the treaty, an international bilateral or multilateral
compact that requires consent by a two-thirds vote of the Senate prior to
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ratification . . . Next is the congressional-executive agreement, entered into
pursuant to statute or to a preexisting treaty. Finally, there is the 'pure' or
'true' executive agreement, negotiated by the Executive entirely on his
authority as a constituent department of government.
"It is the prerogative of the Executive to conduct international negotia-
" tions ; within that power lies the lesser, albeit quite important, power to
chose the instrument of international dialog."
Although the Subcommittee believed that Congress should have a greater role
in the review of international agreements, it refrained at that time from recom-
mending specific legislation. It did not endorse the Ervin bill ( S. 3475, 93d
Cong.) which made all executive agreements subject to veto by concurrent
resolution of Congress. The Report recognized that the bill was not "a finished
product of legislative drafting" but "a basis for beginning a study and dialog
which may lead to more detailed and refined legislation" (p. 12).
The bills before us today, S. 632 introduced by Senator Bentsen and S. 1251
introduced by Senator Glenn, differ in significanct respects from the original Ervin
bill. Both provide for review of executive agreements, the former by concurrent
resolution of Congress and the latter by resolution of the Senate alone. We do
not believe that either is an appropriate measure that we can support.
S. 632 more closely resembles the bill on which the 1972 hearings were held,
but contains a major difference: The original bill purported to regulate all
executive agreements and to make them subject to veto by concurrent resolution;
section 5 of S. 632, however, excepts "any executive agreements entered into by
the President pursuant to a provision of the Constitution or prior authority given
the President by treaty or law." Persumably, this change reflects the conclusion
drawn by the Subcommittee from its earlier hearings?that there- are legitimate,
well accepted areas for the conclusion of executive agreements under existing
law. The problem with S. 632 is that, by including all these areas within the excep-
tion, it leaves nothing upon which the bill would operate?nothing, that is,
except unlawful executive agreements, which it is not the President's intent
ever to conclude. In other words, in my view S. 632 has r.?, effect, unless one
adopts an interpretation which would cause it to expand rather than to constrict
Presidential power.
Let me explain: All executive agreements rely for their authority upon the
Constitution, which empowers the President, and the President alone, to make
agreements with foreign nations. In addition to the agreement-making authority,
however, the President also requires authority to deal with the particular
substantive area which the agreement affects. In some cases this authority is
likewise conferred by the Constitution?as is the case, for example, with an
agreement to recognize a foreign nation or to coordinate military tactics in the
event of an attack upon the United States. When, however, the substance of
the agreement is a matter over which the Congress exercises control, then if the
President is relying upon the Constitution alone he must expressly or impliedly
either (a) condition the performance of the agreement upon the enactment of
appropriate legislation or (b) condition the very effectiveness of the agreement
upon the enactment of appropriate legislation. Thus, for example, the President
could, under the Constitution alone, enter into a bilateral agreement for the
reduction of tariffs which states that the reductions will only occur when the
Congress passes implementing legislation?or which recites that the agreement
itself will be effective only upon the passage of implementing legislation. (A
prominent historical example of an agreement of the latter sort was the
executive agreement providing for establishment of the United Nations Head-
quarters District in New York City, which was to be "brought into effect" only
1 We note that S. 632 has no section 4.
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after appropriate action by the Congress 22 U.S.C. 287, note; see Op. A.G. 469
(1946).) If the President desires to do any more than this with respect to a
substantive area that is within congressional control, he must rely not upon
the Constitution alone but also upon the laws and treaties of the United States.
When, to take a common example from actual practice, he makes an executive
agreement for the distribution of United States funds to foreign countries, he
relies not merely upon the Constitution but also upon the provisions of the
Freign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. 2151, et seq.
It should appear from the foregoing that executive agreements made under
the Constitution alone and those made under the Constitution and the laws and
treaties of the United States comprise the totality of executive agreements which
the President can now lawfully make; and since both categories are covered
by the exception in S. 632, I am at a loss to explain what remains to be covered
by the other provisions of the bill.
The one possible explanation does not seem to me a plausible estimate of the
congressional intent. It might be argued that S. 632 is meant to be an implied
grant of authority to the President to enter into unconditional executive
agreements with any substantive content whatever?so long as those which
deal with matters not within his constitutional power, or not previously
placed within his power by statute or treaty, are submitted to the Congress pur-
suant to the concurrent resolution feature of the legislation. This would amount
to an increase rather than a decrease of the President's executive agreement
authority. I think it unlikely that was intended; and even if it were intended, we
would oppose it. There is no reason why the need for congressional approval, when
it exists, cannot be met?as it is under current law?through the normal legislative
process rather than by the artificial concurrent resolution procedure which
S. 632, if interpreted as I have just described, would establish.
The fact that Section 5 of S. 632 swallows the rest of the bill can only be
understood (if not entirely explained) by referring to the history of its
development. Last year, a bill similar to S. 632 was introduced, exempting
only executive agreements made pursuant to "specific" provisions of the Consti-
tution or laws. S. 3830. 93d Cong., 2d Sess. That language would, of course, have
left substantial areas of lawful executive agreement upon which the remainder
of the bill could operate. The Senate Judiciary Committee reported the bill out,
but deleted the requirement that authority be "specific." It explained that the
change was made, "to make clear that the bill would not deprive the President
of any implied powers which he may have to make executive agreements." S. Rep.
93-1286 on S. 3830. The bill thus amended was reported out without hearings
and passed the Senate without debate. 120 Cong. Rec. S19867-69 (Nov. 21, 1974,
daily ed.). It is consistent with this history to surmise that, in its concern to
preserve implied Presidential authority, the Judiciary Committee overlooked
the fact that it was reducing the effective scope of the bill to coverage of only
unauthorized agreements.
The other bill before you,- S. 1251, has a broader scope than S. 632. Indeed,
it can be read as being wider than existing understandings of what normally
constitute executive agreements. Section 3 of S. 1251 defines executive agreement
to include "any bilateral or multilateral international agreement or under-
standing, formal or informal, written or verbal, other than a treaty, which
involves, or the intent is to leave the impression of, a commitment of manpower,
funds, information, or other resources of the United States." No exceptions are
made. Under Section 2 (a ) all such agreements must be transmitted to the Senate
and are subject to a 60-day waiting period unless the Senate sooner passes a
resolution of approval or disapproval. (The House has no role to play under
S. 1251.)
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I had intended to say that the Department of Justice is rarely involved in
the making of executive agreements, and thus would leave discussion of the
practical problems involved in the 60-day waiting period to other agencies. With
the broad definition that S. 1251 contains, however, I am not sure such a state-
ment would be accurate. On any one day there may- be innumerable informal
arrangements made by individuals or units in the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation which might be considered to fall within the definition. For
example, an oral agreement between I&NS officials and Mexican authorities that
the Service will deliver over certain illegal immigrants on a certain day at a
certain time could be thought to qualify.
I will indeed leave it to the other agencies to expand further upon such ex-
amples, since I am sure their problems would be even greater than ours. I do
want to note however, my strong view that the definition of S. 1251 is in-
advisably broad?so broad that, if interpreted literally, it is plainly unworkable.
You should also be aware, moreover, that even at this cost it does not achieve
the apparent intent of eliminating all doubt that every possible agreement
must be submitted to the Congress. That isto say, one can reasonably take the
position that "informal understandings" do not ordinarily constitute, or even
give the impression of, a binding commitment of the United States to provide
manpower, funds, information, or other resources. In other words, your de-
pendence upon good-faith submission of important agreements by the executive
branch would not be eliminated by this strange definition; nothing will have
been accomplished but a muddying of the waters.
Thus, each of the two bills presents at the outset difficult questions of con-
struction. In this respect, they represent extremes. S. 632 is on its face so nar-
row that one is at a loss to construe it sensibly without making it meaningless;
S. 1251 is so broad that, if taken literally, it could create serious administrative
problems for the executive branch.
Beyond this, both bills raise fundamental issues concerning the proper roles
of Congress and the Executive. They have the potential of precipitating con-
stitutional conflict affecting virtually the entire field of our foreign affairs. No
one can deny that in many areas Congress can and does legislate standards
for the making of executive agreements. A good example is the P.L. 480 pro-
gram, under which the President is authorized to negotiate and carry out
agreements with friendly countries for the purchase and sale of agricultural
commodities. 7 U.S.C. 1701. Congress has frequently reviewed and amended
that program, through normal legislative methods, to adapt it to changing
conditions. Congress has set the standards, in as much detail as it wished, for
making the agreements, and the executive branch has carried out the law.
By thus focusing on a particular subject area over which it has clear legis-
lative competence under the Constitution, Congress has carefully and intelli-
gently controlled the executive agreement process.
Unfortunately, the bills before us do not legislate on specific substantive
areas of concern to the Congress; but attempt to subject all executive agree-
/Dents to a requirement of subsequent Congressional approval. In doing this,
they carry Congress beyond its proper function of making laws under Article I
of the Constitution, and thrust it into the role of executing the laws, reserved
to the President under Article II. The balance of my testimony will be devoted
to a discussion of the precise manner in which these bills would violate specific
provisions of the Constitution; but my basic appeal is to the inherent repug-
nance of the overall scheme to our accepted constitutional framework. As our
system operates, the Congress makes the laws, within its fields of competent
authority, in as much detail as it desires; the President executes those laws,
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with due regard for the congressional intent; and the Judiciary determines
the laws to be of no effect when they exceed congressional authority and deter-
mines the President's application of the laws to be of no effect when it is
inconsistent with valid congressional prescription. This rough division of gov-
ernment power is what the doctrine of separation of powers is all about.
Under this proposed legislation, however, the Congress would seek to control
executive action not by passing laws before the fact, but by requiring authorized
actions under existing law to be submitted for its approval. These bills are the
approximate equivalent, in the foreign affairs field, of a law that would purport
to render all executive orders and regulations under domestic law ineffective
until presented for congressional endorsement. I would hope it is apparent upon
the face of the matter?and even to one who is not familiar with the specific
clauses of the Constitution violated by such an arrangement?that this is simply
not the manner in which the United States Government is supposed to function.
When, under such an arrangement, the Congress attempts to deny effect to an
executive action validly taken under existing law, it is usurping the function
of the Executive; and when it purports to invalidate such action on the basis
that the action was not authorized, it is usurping the function of the Judiciary.
I would hope, in short, that it would be entirely clear, even without the more
technical discussion which I am about to embark upon, that when the Con-
stitution established a system in which the Congress makes the laws and the
President executes them, it did not envision or permit a system in which the
Congress could pass a law which says: "The President may do anything within
his authority we have not otherwise prohibited, so long as he submits all of that
action for our prior approval."
Turning now to a more legalistic discussion of the problem: As the bills are
drafted, there are two basic constitutional defects. First, Congress cannot in any
manner restrict or modify powers which the Constitution reserves to the Presi-
dent alone. Second, as to those Presidential powers?conferred by the Con-
stitution, treaty or statute?which are subject to congressional restriction or
modification, Congress cannot impose such restriction or modification by the
device of concurrent resolution or Senate resolution. As far as the first point is con-
cerned, it is clear that some subjects, such as the recognition of foreign govern-
ments or the conclusion of operational arrangements on the battlefield are ex-
clusively Presidential in nature and not subject to limitation by Congress, even
by statute. See Art. II, sections 2 and 3; United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937) ; United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203. 229 (1942). Cf. Ex parte Milligan,
71 U.S. 2, 139 (1866). It would be difficult to anticipate or describe all of the
circumstances in which the President's exclusive powers might form the sub-
ject matter of executive agreements. In practice they have done so rarely, and
executive agreements of this sort constitute by far the smallest category. The
1973 Report of your Subcommittee (p. 34) includes an ingenious and not unlikely
example: an executive agreement to grant a Presidential pardon to an alien in
this country in exchange for like treatment of an American abroad. Since the
pardon power is vested in the President alone (see Art. II, section 2), it would
be difficult to see how Congress could negate such an agreement, even by statute
passed over the President's veto. A fortiori the concurrent resolution and Senate
veto established by the present bills would be ineffective. With respect to execu-
tive agreements asserting only exclusive Presidential powers, then, ?the present
bills would contravene the Constitution.
I turn next to agreements whose subject matter involves Presidential powers
(conferred by the Constitution, statute or treaty) which are constitutionally
subject to congressional control. In my view it is clear that such agreements
are valid and binding unless Congress limits the Presidential powers in question
by the one means available to it under the Constiution : legislation passed by both
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Houses and submitted to the President for his approval. Congress cannot repeal
or amend or restrict Presidential powers by concurrent resolution as provided
in S. 632 or by resolution of the Senate alone as provided in S. 1251, since this
would distort the constitutional legislative process by avoiding the President's
veto.
The difficulty is not solved by the fact that this legislation itself must pass
over the President's veto. For this legislation does not purport to remove Presi-
dential power to enter executive agreements (it is doubtful that it could con-
situtionally do so) or Presidential power to act in all of those substantive areas
which the category of executive agreements we are now discussing might deal
with. The legislation would leave the power, but subject it to a congressional
restriction which is simply not envisioned by the Constitution. One might
reasonably ask, if the Congress can do the greater (take away the power entirely),
why can it not do the lesser (subject the use of the power to congressional
approval) ? I can best explain by an analogy to the law of property: A person
is entirely free under the common law to refuse to sell his real property, but if
he chooses to sell it he cannot subject it to continuing restrictions, so-called
"restraints on alienation," which are inconsistent with full title in the new
owner. So also, the Congress has authority to deprive the President completely
of substantive powers in a number of fields; but unless it is willing to take
that drastic step, it cannot leave the powers intact and yet subject them to
formal restrictions other than those that can subsequently be imposed by the
normal legislative process. The need for this doctrine should be obvious: With-
out it, the carefully drawn legislative procedure of the Constitution could be
dntirely evaded by a congressional grant of enormously broad powers and
authorities to the President, subject only to the condition that Congress approve
their exercise by concurrent resolution. In effect, our laws would thereafter be
made by the Congress alone, without any effective Presidential participation.
The language and history of the Constitution indicates that the veto power
of the President was intended to apply to all actions of Congress which have
the force of law. It would be difficult to conceive of language and history which
make the point more explicitly. Two provisions of Article I, section 7 are
involved. The Constitution provides, first, that every bill which passes the House
of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented
to the President for his approval or disapproval. If disapproved it does not
become law unless repassed by a two-thirds vote of each House. (Art. I, sec. 7,
clause 2).
The problem that we face today was foreseen by the Framers. At the Constitu-
tional Convention it was recognized that Congress might evade the above-
described provision by passing "resolutions" (the precise language of these pro-
posals) rather than the bills. During the debate on this clause, James Madison
observed that
"if the negative of the President was confined to bills; it would be evaded
by acts under the form and name of Resolution, votes &c * *
Madison believed that additional language was necessary to pin this point down
and therefore
"proposed that 'or resolve' should be added after 'hill' * * * with an ex-
ception as to vote of adjournment &c."
Madison's notes show that "after a short and rather confused conversation on
the subject," his proposal was, at first, rejected. 2M. Farrand, The Records of
the Federal Convention of 1737, 301-02 (1937 Rev. ed.) ("Farrand"). However,
at the commencement of the following day's session, Mr. Randolph. "having
thrown into a new form" Madison's proposal, renewed it. It passed by a vote of
9-1. 2 Farrar(' 303-05. Thus, the Constitution today provides?not in clause 2
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of section 7, dealing with the passage of legislation (which has its own Presi-
dential veto provision), but as an entirely separate clause 3?the following:
"Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate
and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of
Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States;
and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being
disapproved by him shall be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House
of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in
the Case of a Bill."
It should be apparent from the wording of this provision, and from its formula-
tion as a separate clause apart from the clause dealing with legislation, that
it was intended to protect the President against all congressional evasions of his
veto power, and not merely those that were formally connected with the legis-
lative process. Of course, the fact that it refers only to concurrent resolutions,
and not to one-House resolutions such as S. 1251 would provide, was not meant
to sanction avoidance of the Presidential veto by the latter process; rather, the
omission was meant to exclude from the veto requirement those instances in
which, under the Constitution, the Senate has authority to take binding action
on its own?to wit, in ratifying treaties and in confirming the appointment of
Federal officers (Article II, section 2). The Framers probably never even en-
visioned that, apart from those constitutionally prescribed instances, a single
House would purport to take any legally effective action on behalf of the entire
Congress. In other words, the provision of S. 1251 for a one-House resolution is
not in literal violation of section 7, clause 3 of the Constitution only because it
has, in addition to the defect which that provision addresses, the defect of
being an unlawful delegation of congressional power to one of its Houses.
The purpose of the veto was not merely to prevent bad laws but to protect the
Powers of the President from inroads of the kind represented by S. 632 and
S. 1251. Leading participants in the Convention of 1787, such as James Madison.
Gouverneur Morris and James Wilson, pointed out that the veto would protect the
office of President against "encroachments of the popular branch" and guard
against the legislature "swallowing up all the other powers." 2 Farrand 299-300,
586-87. In The Federalist (No. 73), Hamilton states that the primary purpose
of conferring veto power on the President is "to enable him to defend him-
self." Otherwise he "might be gradually stripped of his authorities by succes-
sive resolutions, or annihilated by a single vote." We are faced in this proposed
legislation with precisely the situation these quotations describe. The actions of
the President in carrying out one of his principal functions?as the sole instru-
ment for the actual conduct of our foreign relations?will be subjected to impair-
ment and reversal by congressional vote without protection of the Presidential
veto.
Despite the explicit language of the Constitution and the clear evidence of the
original understanding contained in the remarks of the Framers, statutes have
existed for some years which provide for congressional action by concurrent
resolution. Moreover, although Presidents have vetoed proposed laws because
of the unconstitutionality of such provisions, and have even more frequently reg-
istered their constitutional objections in signing statements, they have sometimes
accepted such provisions in silence, and have on several occasions even proposed
legislation containing them. This is to be explained, one presumes, by the Presi-
dential determination of acute need for legislation which could not be obtained
without the objectionable provision. Former Justice (and before that Attorney
General) Jackson recounted that when President Roosevelt signed without
objection the Lend Lease Act of 1941,55 Stat. 32, he addressed an internal memo-
randum to the Attorney General stating, for the record, that in view of the
importance of the, legislation he felt constrained to sign the bill in spite of the
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fact that in his view section 3(c) purported to give legislative effect to congres-
sional action not presented to the President and this violated Article I, section 7
of the Constitution. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1353,
1357-58 (1953).
The argument suggests itself that repeated congressional use of such provi-
sions, and occasional Presidential acceptance, comprise a constitutional practice
which establishes their validity. This cannot be so. Custom or practice may indeed
give conclusive content to vague or ambiguous constitutional provisions, but it
cannot overcome the explicit language of the text?especially when that text is
supported by historical evidence that shows it means precisely what it says.
Moreover, if one is to rely upon practice, it must be both accepted and long
standing. Repeated Presidential objections destroy the first of these character-
istics, and the clear record of history eliminates the second. Use of the concur-
rent resolution is in fact a very recent phenomenon, and flatly contradicts what
was the accepted understanding and usage until the second third of this century.
A careful analysis of the historical practice was compiled by the Senate Judiciary
Committee in 1897. It shows that from the First Congress through the nine-
teenth century concurrent resolutions were limited to matters "in which both
Houses have a common interest, but with which the President has no concern."
They never "embraced legislative provisions proper." S. Rep. No. 1335, 54th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1897). The report concluded that the Constitution requires
that resolutions must be presented to the President when "they contain matter
which is properly to be regarded as legislative in its character and effect." Id.
at 8, quoted in part in 4 Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives
? 3483. A concise formulation of the understanding may be found in Congressman
Mann's statement that a concurrent resolution has "no force beyond the confines
of the Capitol". 42 Cong. Rec. 2661 (1908).
It was not until the 1930's that enactments of the present sort first appeared,
see R. Giannane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional Reso-
lutions and Committees, 66 .Harv. L. Rev. 569, 575 (1953), and not until very re-
cent years that they became fairly frequent. It has been recognized, even by
their supporters, that they raise difficult constitutional issues. See, e.g., Memo-
randum of Senator Javits on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 107 Cong. Ree.
15039 (1961) ; L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 120-123 (1972).
If, then, we are to give any credit to constitutional custom, we believe that it
argues persuasively against the validity of congressional action by concurrent
resolution. The tradition begun with the adoption of the Constitution and con-
tinued uniformly until relatively recent years is entitled to far greater weight
than a disputed current practice.
I may add, that while the present bills present the occasion for our expression
of concern about the concurrent resolution, they alone are by no means what
prompts it. The Office of Legal Counsel has been concerned for some time with
the dramatic increase in the number of legislative proposals which provide for
concurrent resolutions, one-House vetos, and committee vetos. Unless the Con-
gress comes to see the necessity of adhering to the clear language of the Consti-
tution I fear that erosion of the separation of powers in this fashion will continue
rapidly to accelerate. It is for this reason that I have discussed the point in
such depth.
I apologize, Mr. Chairman, for the length of this statement which, as long as
it is, does not exhaust the difficult and important problems with which it deals.
For both the reasons I have discussed?the inappropriate scope of coverage and
the concurrent resolution and one-House veto provisions?we oppose the enact-
ment of both S. 6.q9. and S. 1251.
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ANNEX B
AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION
Public Law 92-352
92nd Congress, H. R. 14734
July 13, 1972
21n 2tit
'Fo provide authorizations for certain agencies condueting the foreign _relations
of the United States, and for other purposes.
Foreign Rela-
tions Authori-
zation Act of
1972.
Be it enacted by the Senate and Ilmme of Representatives of the
nited .State& of America in rongreo assembled, That this Act may
be cited as the "Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972".
TITLE VI?STUDY COMMISSION RELATING TO
FOREIGN POLICY
C ompensati
258
FINDINGS AND PURPOSE
SEC. 601. It is the purpose of this title to establish a study commis-
sion which will submit findings and recommendations to provide a
more effective system for the formulation and implementation of the
Nation's foreign policy.
COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY
SEC. 602. (a) To carry out the purpose of section 601 of this Act,
there is established a Commission on the Organization of the Govern-
ment for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (hereafter referred to in
this title as the "Commission").
(6) The Commission shall be composed of the following twelve
members:
(1) four members appointed by the President, two from the
executive branch of the Government and two from private life;
(2) four members appointed by the President of the Senate, two
from the Senate (one from each of the two major political parties)
and two from private life; and
(3) four members appointed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, two from the House of Representatives (one
from each of the two major political parties) and two from
private life.
(c) The Commission shall elect a Chairman and a Vice Chairman
from among its members.
(d) Seven members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum.
Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers, but shall be
filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made.
(e) Each member of the Commission who is not otherwise employed
by the United States Government shall receive $145 a day (including
traveltime) during which he is engaged in the actual performance of
his duties as a member of the Commission. A member of the Commis-
sion who is an officer or employee of the United States Government
shall serve without additional compensation. All members of the
Commission shall be reimbursed for travel, subsistence, and other nec-
essary expenses incurred by them in the performance of their duties.
DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION
SEC. 603. (a) The Commission shall study and investigate the orga-
nization, methods of operation, and powers of all departments, agen-
cies, independent establishments, and instrumentalities of the United
States Government participating in the formulation and implementa-
tion of United States foreign policy and shall make recommendations
which the Commission considers appropriate to provide improved
governmental processes and programs in the formulation and imple-
mentation of such policy, including, but not limited to, recommenda-
tions with respect to?
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July 13, 1972 - 9 -
Pub. Law 92-352
86 STAT. 498
(1) the reorganization of the departments, agencies, independ-
ent establishments, and instrumentalities of the executive branch
participating in foreign policy matters;
(2) more effective arrangements between the executive branch-
and Congress, which will better enable each to carry out its
constitutional responsibilities;
(3) improved procedures among departments, agencies, inde-
pendent establishments, and instrumentalities of the United States
Government to provide improved coordination and control with
respect to the conduct of foreign. policy;
(4) the abolition of services, activities. and-functions not neces-
sary to the efficient conduct of foreign policy; and
(5) other measures to promote peace, economy, efficiency, and
improved administration of foreign policy.
(b) The Commission shall submit a comprehensive report to the
President and Congress, not later than June 30, 1974, containing the
findings and recommendations of the Commission with respect to its
study and investigation. Such recommendations may include proposed
constitutional amendments, legislation, and. administrative actions the
Commission considers appropriate in carrying out its duties. The
Commission shall cease to exist. on the thirtieth day after the date on
which it files the comprehensive report under this subsection.
POWERS OF THE COMMISSION
Report to
Co, !,ress;
termination.
SEC. 604. (a) The Commission or, on the authorization of the Com- Hearings.
mission, any subcommittee or member thereof, may, for the purpose
of carrying out the provisions of this title, hold such hearings and
sit and act at such times and places, administer such oaths, and require;
by subpena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such wit-
nesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence,
memorandums, papers, and documents as the Commission or such
subcommittee or member may deem advisable. Subpenas- may be subpenas.
issued under the signature of the Chairman of the Commission, of any
such subcommittee, or any designated member, and may be served by
any person designated by such Chairman or member. The provisions
of sections 102 through 104 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States (2 U.S.C. 192-194) shall apply in the case of any failure of
any witness to comply with any subpena.or to testify when summoned
under authority of this section.
(b) The Commission is authorized to secure directly from any
executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, inde-
pendent establishment, or instrumentality information, suggestions,
estimates, and statistics for the purposes of this title. Each such
department, bureau, agency; board, commission, office, establishment,
or instrumentality is authorized and directed, to the extent authorized
by law, to furnish, such information, suggestions, estimates, and
statistics directly to the Commission, upon request made by the Chair-
man or Vice Chairman.
STAFF OF THE COMMISSION
SEC. 605. (a) The Commission shall have power to appoint and fix
the compensation of such personnel as it deems advisable, without
regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing 80 Stat. 378.
appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the 5 USC 101 et
provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such !SS.
title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates. 5 USC 5101,
5331.
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Pub. Law 92-352 - 10 - July 13, 1972
(b) The Commi(sion is authorized to procure the services of experts
and consultants in accordance with svotion 31(19 of title 3. United
States Code, but at rates not to exceed the daily rate paid a pert4m
occupying it position at GS-18.
88 STAT. 499
80 Stat. 416?
F.X11.No5.a or THE COMMISSION
SEC. 606. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title.
Approved July 13, 1972.
Public Law 93-126
93rd Congress, H. R. 7645
October 18, 1973
21n 2Ict
87 STAT. 451
To authorize appropriations for the Department of State, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of 1?epresentatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act
may be cited as the "Department of State Appropriations Author-
ization Act of 1973".
Department of
State Appropri-
ations Authori-
zation Aot of
1973.
STUDY COMMISSION RELATING TO FOREIGN POLICY
SEC. 4. Section 603(b) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
86 Stat. 498? of 1972 (22 U.S.C. 2823(b)), relating to the reporting date for the
Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct
of Foreign Policy. sinnainded by striking out "J um, :10, 1974" and
inserting in lieu thereof "June 30, 1975".
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ANNEX C
LIST OF WITNESSES
June 25, 1973
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI?Professor, Columbia University
HERMAN KAHN?Director, The Hudson Institute
MCGEORGE BuNDy?President, The Ford Foundation
July 30, 1973
Panel: Members from the United Nations Association?United States
of America, National Policy Panel on Foreign Policy Decision
Making.
HOWARD C. PETERSON?Chairman of the Board, The Fidelity
Bank, Philadelphia
BERNARD L. GLADIEUX?Vice President and Executive Director;
Knight, Gladieux & Smith, Inc.
THOMAS L. HUGHES?President, Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace
DAVID A. MORSE?Partner, Surrey, Karask, Morse & Sehan
ADAM YARMOLINSKI?Ralph Waldo Emerson University Profes-
sor, University of Massachusetts
HUGH SMY'FHE?Department of Sociology, Brooklyn College and
the Graduate Center, City University of New York
ELMORE JACKSON?Vice President for Policy Studies (UNA?
USA)
DEAN RUSK?Professor, University of Georgia Law School
September 17, 1973
Panel #1: Intelligence and Information for Policy and Operations
RAY C. CLINE?Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
RODGER P. DAVIES?Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau
of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
RICHARD L. SxEmER?Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
SAMUEL C. FRY, Jr.?Director, Operations Center, Executive Sec-
retariat, Department of State
Panel #2: Overseas Establishments
WILLIAM G. BowntER?Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
LEWIS HOFFACKER?Special Assistant to the Secretary and Co-
ordinator for Combating Terrorism, Department of State
WILLIAM G. BDADFoRD?Executive Director, Bureau of African
Affairs, Department of State
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EDWARD L. PECK?Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs, Department of State
THOMAS W. McELHINEy?Inspector General of the Foreign
Service
Panel #3: Domestic Interests and Foreign Affairs
W. MARSHALL WRIGHT?Assistant Secretary of State for Cow
gressional Relations, Department of State
JULIUS L. KATZ?Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of
Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State.
ABRAHAM KATZ?Director, Office of OECD Affairs, Department
of State
ANTHONY GEBER?Director, Office of Economic Policy, Bureau
of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
Panel #4.? Personnel for Foreign Affairs
WILLIAM 0. HALL?Director General, Foreign Service
MARY S. OLmsTEAD?Deputy Director of Personnel for Policy,
Classification and Evaluation, Department of State
HEYWARD IsHAm?Minister-Counselor, American Embassy in
Paris
HARRY A. BARNES, JR.?Deputy Executive Secretary, Executive
Secretariat, Department of State
October 15, 1973
JOHN A. HANNAH?Former Administrator, Agency for International
Development (AID)
MICHAEL P. BALZANO?Director, ACTION/Peace Corps
NICHOLAS CRAW?Associate Director Designate, ACTION/Peace
Corps
DONALD HEss?Associate Director for International Operations,
ACTION/Peace Corps
WALTER C. HOWE?Deputy Director, ACTION/Peace Corps
MAURICE T. WILLIAMS, Administrator, AID
JAMES R. FowLER?Special Assistant to the Director, USIA
October 16, 1973
JAMES KEOGH?Director, USIA
EUGENE P. Kopp?Deputy Director, USIA
G. RICHARD MONSEN?Special Assistant to the Director, USIA
November 19, 1973
WILLIAM E. CoLey?Director, Central Intelligence
JOHN WARNER?Genera/ Counsel, CIA
WILLIAM J. PoRTER?Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
RAY C. CLINE?Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
November 20, 1973
ALBERT C. HALL?Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
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Vice Admiral VINCENT DE POIX?Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency
Maj. Gen. WILLIAM M. SCHONING, USAF, Director of Policy Plan-
ning, ISA, Department of Defense
December 14, 1973
JAMES R. ScHLEsINGER?Secretary of Defense
ROBERT C. HILL?Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs, Department for State
Maj. Gen. WILLIAM M. SCHONING, USAF? Acting Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Policy Plans and National Security Council Affairs,
Department of Defense
Adm. THOMAS H. MooRER?Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Vice Adm. RAY PERT- -Head of the Security Assistance Agency and
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Security Assistance, Department of
Defense
Lt. Gen. Louis T. SEITH?Director of the Plans and Policy Director-
ate, JCS
DENNIS J. DooLiN?Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA
JAMES H. NOTES?Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA
ROGER E. SHIELDS?Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA
February 25, 1974
Hon. GEORGE P. SHULTZ?Secretary of the Treasury
Hon. FREDERICK B. DENT?Secretary of Commerce
Hon. EARL L. BUTZ?Secreaary of Agriculture
Hon. WILLIAM D. EBERLE?President's Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations
February 26, 1974
PETER M. FLANIGAN?Executive Director, Council on International
Economic Policy (CIEP)
Hon. WILLIAM J CASEY?Under Secretary of State for Economic Af-
fairs on International Economic Policy, Department of State.
March 25, 1974
Panel: Former Officials
JOHN J. McCLoY?Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy
GEORGE BALL?Senior partner, Lehman Bros.
CLARK CLIFFORD?Partner, Clifford & Miller
March 26, 1974
Panel: Young Government Officers
PETER 0. SUCHMAN?Director, Office of Trade Policy, Depart-
ment of the Treasury
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THOMAS D. BoyArr?Director, Office of Cypriot Affairs, Bureau
of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
KENNETH H. TORP?FSO, Urban Mass Transportation Group,
Department of Transportation
MICHAEL A. G. MICHAUD?Office of Iranian Affairs, Department
of State
SANDRA VOGELGESANG?BUreall of Economic and Business Affairs,
Department of State
RAYMOND F. Smrrx?Bureau of African Affairs, Department of
State
Panel: Young Former Government Officials
WALTER B. SLOCOMBE?Partner, Caplin & Drysdale
ANTHONY K. LAKE?Director, International Voluntary Services
C. FRED BERGSTEN?Smior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
ROGER MORRIS?Program Director, Humanitarian Policy Studies,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
JAMES WooLsEY?Attorney, Shea & Gardner
April 22, 1974
Congressman RICHARD BOLLING?Ch,airman, Select Committee on
Committees, U.S. House of Representatives
Panel: Academic Experts on Congress
RANDALL B. RipLEY?Chairman of Department of Political Sci-
ence, Ohio State
ALTON FRyE?Director, Institute for Congress Project, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace
Dr. LEWIS A. DExTER?Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, The Smithsonian Institution
Panel: Is Congress Equipped To Fulfill Its Responsibilities in the
Formulations and Implementation of Foreign Policy ?
CARL MARcy?Former Staff Director, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee
PAT M. HoLT?Staff Director, Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee
MARIAN A. CzARNEciii?Chief of Staff, House Foreign Affairs
Committee
CHARLES N. GELLNER?Chief, Foreign Affairs Division, Congres-
sional Research Division, The Library of Congress
J. KENNETH FASICK?Director, International Division, General
Accounting Office
April 23, 1974
JEROME LEVINSON?Counsel, Subcommittee on Multinational Corpora-
tions, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Panel: Coordinating Foreign Economic and Agricultural Policy
Senator JAMES B. PEARSON
Senator JACOB K. JAVITS
Senator CLIFFORD P. HANSEN
Congressman BARBER B. CONABLE, JR.
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May 20, 1974
Panel: The Constitution and Foreign Policy
Louis HENKIN?Hamilton Fish Professor of Constitutional Law,
Columbia University
GERHARD CAspER?Professor of Law and Political Science, Uni-
versity of Chicago
THOMAS EHRLicH?Dean, Stanford University Law School
RICHARD FALK?Albert Milbank Professor of International Law
and Practice, Princeton University
EUGENE ROSTOW?Sterling Professor of Law and Public Service,
Yale University
Panel: Congressional Budgeting, Appropriations and Oversight of
Foreign Policy Expenditures
Senator EDMUND S. MUSKIE
Senator CHARLES H. PERCY
Senator LAWTON CHILES
Congressman JOHN B. ANDERSON
Panel: The Role of the President in Foreign Policy
ARTHUR SCHLESINGER?Albert Schweitzer Professor of
ties, City University of New York
Louis W. KoENIG?Professor of Government, New York Uni-
versity.
HARRY C. McPHERsoN?A ttorney
Senator CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, Jr.
WILLIAM G. MILLER?Staff Director, Special Committee to Ter-
minate the National Emergency
June 17, 1974
Panel: The Foreign Policy Role of Party Leaders in Congress
Senator MIKE MANsrIELD--Majority Leader, U.S. Senate
Senator HUGH SCOTT?Minority Leader, U.S. Senate
Congressman THOMAS P. O'NEILL, JR.?Majority Leader, House
of Representatives
Congressman JOHN B. ANDERSON?Chairman, House Republican
Conference
June 18, 1974
Panel; Constitutional Aspects of Congressional-Executive Relations
JOHN MURPHY?Professor of Law, University of Kansas
STANLEY FUTTERMAN?Associate Professor of Law, New York
University School of Law
RITA HAUSER?Attorney
W. TAYLOR REVELEYITT?Attorney
RICHARD FRANK?Director of the International Project, Center
for Law and Social Policy
Panel: National Security
Congressman CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI
Senator STUART SYMINGTON
Senator SAM P. NUNN
Congressman LUCIEN N. NEDZI
Congressman WILLIAM G. BRAY
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July 22, 1974
Senator J. WILLIAM FuLDRIGHT?Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee
Senator GEORGE D. AIICEN
July 23, 1974
Senator HUBERT H. HumPEIREY
Dr. FRED C. TREE?Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA)
ALBERT M. CHRISTOPHER?Special Assistant to the Director and Execu-
tive Secretary, ACDA
September 23, 1974
Panel: Some Lessons from Other Reports of Previous Commissions
ISAIAH FRANK?School of Advanced International Studies, Johns
Hopkins University
JAMES FREY?Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office
of the President.
ANDREW M. ROUSE?Executive Vice President, Insurance Co. of
North America (INA) Corp.
MILTON S. EisENHowER?President Emeritus, The Johns Hop-
kins University
September 24, 1974
ELETarr L. RICHARDSON?Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Cen-
ter for Scholars, the Smithsonian Institution
GEORGE F. KENNAN?Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton Uni-
versity
October 8, 1974
Public Hearings: Philadelphia, Pa.
ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, Jr.?Executive Director, Foreign Policy
Research Institue
GEORGE PACKARD?Executive Editor, The Evening and Sunday
Bulletin
JAMES A. MICHENER?Author and Member of U.S. Advisory
Commission on Information
HAROLD E. SYAssEN?Former Special Assistant to President
Eisenhower
JOSEPH S. CLARK?Former U.S. Senator and Chairman, Coali-
tion of National Priorities and Military Policy
ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER?Former Assistant Director, Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency
NORMAN D. PALMER?Professor of Political Science, University of
Pennsylvania
HELEN CARRoEL?Former President, Women's International
League for Peace and Freedom, Pennsylvania Branch
HOWARD FRAZIER?Executive Director, Promoting Enduring
Peace, Inc.
LEWIS VAN DUREN?President, Pennsylvania Bar Association
JEROME SiESTACK?Chairman, International League for the
Rights of Man
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SAMUEL HAS?President, Foreign Policy Association
COVEY T. OtavER?Former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs
PATRICIA PARKMAN?Poliey and Legislation Secretary, Friends
Peace Committee
JAMES DOTJGHERTY?Professor of Political Science, St. Joseph's
College
PETRO DiAcHENEo?Executive Board Member of the Ukrainian
Political Science Association
November 12, 1974
Public Hearings: Atlanta, Ga.
JOHN CROWN?Associate Editor, Atlanta Journal
Hon. MAYNARD JACKSON?Mayor of Atlanta
RONDO CAMERON?Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Cen-
ter for Scholars, the Smithsonian Institution
His Excellency, JIMMY CARTER?Governor of Georgia
RICHARD WALKER?Director, Institute of International Studies,
University of South Carolina
DAVID ANTHONY?Chairman, Asian Studies Department, Ran-
dolph-Macon Women's College
PAUL KATTENBURG?Professor, Department of Government and
International Studies, University of South Carolina
PAUL BLACKSTOCK?Professor, Department of Government and
International Studies, University of South Carolina
JEFFREY ARPAN?Professor, Institute of International Business,
Georgia State University
HARRY H. RANSOM?Professor, Department of Political Science,
Vanderbilt University
CRAWFORD BARNErr?Chairman, Atlanta Committee on Foreign
Relations
STANLEY JONES?President, Atlanta Chapter, United Nations
Association
DWIGHT FERGUSON?Atlanta Friends Committee
December 3, 1974
Public Hearings: Chicago, Ill.
ALEX R. SEITH?Deputu Chairman, Foreign Affairs Task Force,
National Democratic Party
MORTON A. KAPLAN?Professor of Political Science, University of
Chicago
LOWELL LivEzEy?Executive Director, The World Without War
Council
HAROLD G. MATER?Professor of Law and Director of Transna-
tional Legal Studies, Vanderbilt University
ROBERT MCLELLAN?Vice President, International and Govern-
ment Relations, FMC Corp.
Panel: Businessmen
PHILIP ODEEN?Vice President for Planning, Wilson Sporting
Goods
STEVEN LAZARUS?Executive Vice President, Baxter Laboratories
International
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JAMES H. INGERsoLL?Vice President, International, Borg-War-
ner Corp.
Dr. ROBERT AMBER?Professor of International Economics, Uni-
versity of Chicago Business School
EDNA RoBERTs?Program Chairman, Women's International Lea-
gue for Peace and Freedom, Chicago North Shore Branch
GEORGE D. KAROAZES?President, Hellenic Foundation.
EVERETTE B. HARRIs?President, International Monetary Market,
Chicago Mercantile Exchange
DAVID P. EARLE ITT?Senior Attorney, First National Bank of
Chicago
ALFRED F. Miossr?Executive Vice President, Continental Illinois
National Bank & Trust Co.
MAURICE R. GREENBERc--President, American International
Group
January 28, 1975
Public Hearings: San Francisco, Calif.
GEORGE CHRISTOPHER?FOrMer Mayor of San Francisco; Presi-
dent, Christopher Commercial Corp.
WILLIAM M. ROTH?Former Ambassador in Charge of Kennedy
Round, GATT Negotiations; President, Roth Properties.
ROBERT NORTH?Professor of Political Science, Stanford Uni-
versity
JOHN A. BouN, JR.?Vice President, International Division,
Wells Fargo Bank
DENNIS O'BRIEN?Associate Professor of History and Interna-
tional Affairs; California State University
ROBERT GOMPERTS?President, California Council for Interna-
tional Trade
Panel: International Economic Policy
THOMAS CIRISTIANSEN?Manager, International Trade Relations,
Hewlett-Packard Co.
RICHARD HoLToN?Dean, Graduate School of Business Adminis-
tration, University of California
B. T. ROCCA, JR.?Director, Pacific Commodities Exchange
HARRY ASHMORE?Senior Fellow, Center for the Study of Do-
mocracy
ROBERT PICKUS?President, World Without War Council
ROBERT ARELLANES?Director of Ethnic Studies, California State
University
MILLIE LIVINGSTON?Women's International League for Peace
and Freedom
EUGENE MmALy?Former Director of Planning, the Peace Corps
JEROME DonsoN?Management Consultant, former Foreign Serv-
ice Officer
JOHN H. KLINGER?Coalition to Cut Military Spending
January 29, 1975
Public Hearings: San Francisco, Calif.
DONALD GREEN?Associate Executive Director, Stanford Research
Institute
HENRY W. SPIELMAN?Vice Chairman, Executive Committee,
Friends 'Committee on Legislation of California
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ROGER DAVIDSON?Professor of Political Science, University of
California at Santa Barbara
RICHARD CONLON?Senior Vice President, Business International
Corp.
RALPH GOLDMAN?Professor of Political Science, San Francisco
State University
Representatives of the United States Labor Party
ERN ST B. HAAS?Professor of Political Science, University of
California
March 3, 1975
Hon. HENRY KissiNuEu?Secretary of State
March 17, 1975
General ANDREW GooDPAsTER?Consuitant to the President
March 31, 1975
Hon. WILLIAM P. ROGERS? Former Secretary of State
Hon. WILLIAM E. Simox?Secretary of Treasury
April 3, 1975
Subcommittee Meeting
American Foreign Service Association
American Federation of Government Employees
KENNETH R. GIDDENS, Assistant Director, USIA(VOA)
JAMES KEOGH, Director, USIA
April 28, 1975
American Foreign Service Association
American Federation of Government Employees
May 12, 1975
Hon. JAMES R. ScHLEsiNGER?Secretary of Defense
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ANNEX D
RESEARCHERS AND CONSULTANTS
The Effectiveness of Organizational Change
Principal Investigator: National Academy of Public Administra-
tion, Roy W. Crawley, Executive Director
Other Investigators: John E. Harr, Melbourne Spector, Manuel
DeAngelis, Michael Harmon Chester Crocker, Dominick Del-
Guidice, Leland Barrows, William T. McDonald, Erasmus H.
Kloman
Reviewers: James W. Fesler, Frederick C. Mosher, Richard Bar-
ratt, Harold Seidman, Wayne Thompson, I. M. Destler, Edmund
Gullion
The Adequacy of Current Organization: The Interaction of U.S. and
Foreign Economics
Principal Investigator: Griffenhagen-Kroeger, Inc., Edward K.
Hamilton, President
Other Investigators: Matthew Golden, Joan Ann Hochman,
William Seelbach, Elizabeth Stabler, Edward Skloot, Katheryn
Voight, Linda S. Graebner, Bruce Brittain, L. Peter Henschel,
Anne Rightor-Thornton, Edward Graziano
Reviewers: Richard N. Cooper, Anthony Solomon, I. M. Destler,
Francis Bator, Sidney Weintraub
The Adequacy of Current Organization: National Security (Defense
and Arms Control)
Principal Investigator: Graham T. Allison, Harvard University
Other Investigators: John P. Crecine, Frederick A. Morris, Ted
Greenwood, Thomas Garwin, John Steinbruner, Robert Coulam,
Arthur Alexander, Henry S. Rowan, Gregory F. Treverton,
Richard Neustadt, Jay Philip Urwitz, J. Mark Twry, Priscilla
Clapp, Henry B. Miller, Ernest May, Burton E. Rosenthal,
Barry Carter, Forrest Frank, Robert Klitgaard, Robert L.
Galucci, Edwin A. Deagle, Jr., Ann Karalakas
Reviewers: Francis Bator, Henry Rowen, Richard Neustadt,
William Capron, Thomas Schelling, Morton Halperin, Law-
rence Lynn
The Adequacy of Current Organization: Coordination in Complex
Settings (South Asia)
Principal Investigators: Lloyd I. and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph,
University of Chicago
Other Investigators: Philip K. Oldenburg, Roger E. Sack,
Muzammel Hug, Gerald A. Heeger, Stephen P. Cohen, Stephen
Blake, James W. Bjorkman, Stanley Kochanek, Charles Lenth,
Barnett Rubin, Allen Emdin, Harinder Shourie, Anthony
Moulton, Susan G. Hadden, Robert F. Rich, Walter Andersen
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Reviewers: William Barnds, Charles E. Lindblom, Anthony K.
Lake, I. M. Destler, W. Dean Howells, L. Bruce Laingen, How-
ard Wriggins, John Lewis, Eric Griffel, Lee T. Stull
The Adequacy of Current Organization: Global Environmental and
Resource Interdependence
Principal Investigators: Joseph S. Nye/Robert 0. Keohane
Other Investigators: Raymond F. Hopkins, Elihu Bergman,
Gordon MacDonald, Ann Hollick, Irvin Bupp, J. C. Dorian,
Eugene Skolnikoff, Thomas Schelling, Victor Basiuk, Alton
Frye, Dixon Long, Ernst B. Haas, John Ruggie, Abram Chayes
Reviewers: Harvey Brooks, James Grant, Henry Nau, Roger
Williams, Graham T. Allison, I. M. Destler, Nathaniel
McKitterick
The Conduct of Routine Relations (Latin America)
Principal Investigator: Abraham F. Lowenthal (Council of For-
eign Relations, and Center for International Affairs, Princeton)
Other Investigators: Edward Gonzalez, Harry Weiner, Robert
Pastor, Gregory F. Treverton, Roger Sack, Donald Wyman,
Marie Jones, Ernest May
1?eviewer s : Joseph S. Nye, Stephen P. Krasner, Harrison Wagner,
Stephen Spiegel, Robert Trice, I. M. Destler, Anthony K. Lake,
Morton Halperin, Roger Morris, William D. Rogers, Harry
Schaludeman, Graham T. Allison
Minimizing Irrationality in Decision-Making
Principal Investigator: Alexander L. George (Stanford Univ.)
Other Investigators: David K. Hall, Charles Herrmann, Mar-
garet Herrman, Ole Holsti, David Homburg, Richard Smoke,
Robert Keohane
Congressional Survey
Principal Investigator: Roger Majak (Commission Staff)
Other Investigators: William B. Carter III, Philip Marcus, D.
Alan Rudlin, James Schwartz, Margaret E. G. Vanderhye
Consultants: Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Roger P. Davidson,
Lewis A. Dexter, John Kingdon, Donald Matthews, Warren
Miller, Institute for Social Research (University of Michigan)
Problems in the Conduct of United States Foreign Policy: A Compila-
tion of Recent Critiques
Principal Investigator: J. Daniel O'Flaherty
Survey of Previous Reports on Organizational Reform in the Foreign
Affairs Community
Principal Investigator: John Elting Treat (Commission Staff)
The Future Environment
Principal Investigator: Peter L. Szanton (Commission staff)
Other Investigators: Ernest May, Francis Bator, Jean Meyer,
David Apter, Karl Deutsch, Robert R. Bowie, Samuel P. Hunt-
ington, Lawrence Krause, Franklin Lindsay, Abraham F.
Lowenthal, Edwin 0. Reischauer, Adam B. Ulam
Intelligence Analytical Issue Papers
Principal investigator: William R. Harris, Jr.
Other Investiaators : William Barnds, Robert Macy, Frank Schaf,
Clinton Kelly, Taylor Belcher, Thomas Brown, John Elliff,
Chester Cooper, R. Jack Smith, John Huizenga, Laurence Lynn,
Harry Ransom, Hugh Cunningham, John Bross
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Reviewers: John Huizenga, Laughlin Campbell, Ray Cline, Paul
Blackstock, Laurence Lynn, Robert Kiley
All-Source Study
Principal Investigator: James J. Hitchcock
Economic Analytic Papers
investigators: Kenneth Dam, Mortimer Goldstein, Myer Rash-
ish, Nathaniel McKitterick
Reviewers: Theodore Geiger, Willis Armstrong, I. M. Destler,
Sidney Weintraub, Bernard Norwood, Robert Burt, Charles
Levy
Policy Planning
Principal Investigator: Commission Staff
Other investigator: Lincoln P. Bloomfield
Reviewers: Robert R. Bowie, Chester L. Cooper, Henry Owen
Confidentiality
Principal Investigator: Commission Staff
Other investigator: Emily Scheketoff
Ethical Considerations
Principal investigator: William B. Carter, III (Commission
Staff)
Other investigators: Francis Winters, Donald McHenry, Fred K.
Kirchstein
Reviewers: Robert Osgood, Paul Nitze, Charles Runyon, Clyde
Ferguson, John Salzberg, Ernest LeFever, Carl Marcy, Wil-
liam O'Brian, Albert Jakira
Advisory Commissions
Principal Invsetigator: Chester A. Crocker
Posts and Missions
Principal Investigators: Foy D. Kohler, William 0. Hall, Robert
Schaetzel, Godfrey Harris, T. McAdams Deford
Multilateral Diplomacy
Principal Investigators: Richard Gardner, Harlan Cleveland,
Charles W. Yost
Reviewers: Joseph S. Nye, Gerard Mangone, William 0. Hall,
Samuel DePalma, Nathaniel Pelcovits
Improvement of Foreign Service Reporting
Principal Investigators: William D. Coplin and Michael K.
O'Leary (Prince Analysis, Inc.)
Other Investigators: Robert F. Rich, Rodger M. Govea, David I.
Kapuscinski, Donald J. McMaster, Terry Ann Richmond
Modern Techniques
Principal Investigators: Warren R. Phillips and Richard E.
Hayes (CACI, Inc.)
Public Opinion
Principal Investigators: Commission Staff
Reviewers: Edward Korry, Richard Broady, Bernard Cohen,
William Watts, Chalmers Roberts, Hon. Jonathan Bingham,
Hon. Carol Laise, Hon. William Mailliard, Hon. George Mc-
Ghee, Murray Marder, Pat Holt, William Bundy, David Cohen,
Lloyd Free
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Resources for Foreign Affairs: Personnel
Principal Investigator: James W. Clark
Other Investigators: William T. McDonald, Richard B. Moon,
Peter W. Bridges, Susan Irving, Theodore P. Levino, William
Cordier, David S. L. Chu, John P. White, Charles Parker, Jr.,
Lewis Silverberg, James Mackle, Godfrey Harris, Frederick
Bohen, Louis Schwartz, Jr.
Reviewers: L. Dean Brown, Stanley M. Cleveland, William J.
Crockett, T. McAdams Deford, Ralph A. Dungan, Roger W.
Jones, Frederick C. Mosher, George S. Newman, Alfred Puhan.
Comparable Patterns of Other Governments (Britain, France, Ger-
many)
Principal Investigator: Atlantic Institute for International Af-
fairs, John W. Tuthill, Director General
Other Investigators: William Wallace, Helen S. Wallace, Judith
D. Trunzo, Francois Sauzey, Xenia Ryschenkow, James Sattler,
Wolfgang Hager, Karl Kaiser, Pierre Uri, Joseph W. Harned.
Resources for Foreign Affairs.. Budget
Principal Investigators: Allen Schick, Arnold Nachmanoff
State Department Response to a New Foreign Policy Objective: The
Narcotics Control Case
Principal Investigator: Thomas J. Peters
Graham T. Allison
Fred Bergsten
Lincoln Bloomfield
Robert Bowie
Emilio Collado
Richard N. Cooper
William Coplin
I. M. Destler
Philip Farley
Isaiah Frank
OTHER CONSIHMANTS
Edward Fried
Hugh Heclo
Grant Hilliker
Thomas L. Hughes
Arnold Kanter
Robert Komer
Anthony K. Lake
John Leddy
Abrham Lowenthal
Lawrence Lynn
Carl Marcy
Richard Moorsteen
Roger Morris
Michael O'Leary
Randall B. Ripley
Vincent Rock
Walter B. Slocombe
Carl Stover
James Woolsey
Peter Zimmerman
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ANNEX E
CONTENTS OF APPENDIX VOLUMES I THROUGH VII
VOLUME I
APPENDIX A : FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE FUTURE
1. The Future World Environment: Near-term Problems for U.S.
Foreign Policy by PETER L. SZANTON.
2. The International Community in the Next Two Decades by ZBIG-
NIEW BRZEZINSKI.
3. The Tasks Ahead for U.S. Foreign Policy by ROBERT R. BOWIE.
4. Toward an Open Foreign Policy by MCGEORGE BUNDY.
APPENDIX B : THE MANAGEMENT OF GLOBAL ISSUES
Organizing for Global Environmental and Resource Interdepend-
ence by J. S. NYE, ROBERT O. KEOHANE, et al.
APPENDIX C: MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY
1. The Management of Multilateralism by HARLAN CLEVELAND.
2. Foreign Policymaking in a New Era?The Challenge of Multi-
lateral Diplomacy by RICHARD N. GARDNER.
3. Conduct of Multilateral Diplomacy by the United States Gov-
ernment by CHARLES W. YOST.
VOLUME II
APPENDIX D : THE USE OF INFORMATION
Towards a More Soundly Based Foreign Policy: Making Better
Use of Information by ALEXANDER L. GEORGE, Stanford University,
et al.
APPENDIX E : FIELD REPORTING
Towards the Improvement of Foreign Service Field Reporting by
WILLIAM D. COPLIN, MICHAEL K. O'LEARY, ROBERT F. RICH, et al.,
Prince Analysis, Inc.
APPENDIX F : POLICY PLANNING
1. Organizing for Policy Planning by LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD.
2. Commentaries by ROBERT R. BOWIE, CHESTER L. COOPER, and
HENRY OWEN.
APPENDIX G : ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Utilization of Computer Technology and Formal Social Science
in Foreign Policy Decision-making by WARREN R. PHILLIPS and
RICHARD E. HAYES, CACI, Inc.
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VOLUME III
APPENDIX H : CASE STLTDIES ON U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY: 1965-r-74
Cases on a Decade of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy: 1965-74 by
EDWARD K. HAMILTON et al., Griffenhagen-Kroeger, Inc.
APPENDIX I : CONDUCT OF ROUTINE RELATIONS
The Making of U.S. Policies Toward Latin America: The Conduct
of 'Routine' Relations by ABRAHAM F. LOWENTHAL et al.
APPENDIX .j: FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY
1. Economic Intelligence and Analysis by KENNETH W. DAM.
2. Personnel for U.S. Economic Activities Overseas by MORTELVIER D.
GOLDSTEIN.
3. The Personnel System for the Conduct of Foreign Economic
Policy by SIDNEY WEINTRAUB.
4. A Critical Appraisal of U.S. International Economic Policy
Coordination by STEPHEN D. COHEN.
VOLUME IV
APPENDIX K : ADEQUACY OF CURRENT ORGANIZATION: DEFENSE AND ARMS
CONTROL
Findings, Recommendations and Case Studies on the Adequacy of
Current Organization: Defense and Arms Control, by GRAHAM T.
ALLISON, et al.
VOLUME V
APPENDIX L : CONGRESS AND EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS
1. The Constitution and Foreign Policy
a. "A More Effective System" for Foreign Relations: The
Constitutional Framework, by Louis HENKIN.
b. Comments by GERHARD CASPER, THOMAS EHRLICH, EUGENE
ROSTOW, and RICHARD A. FALK.
2. Congressional Organization
a. Foreign Policy Aspects of the House Select Commission
on Commissions by Representative RICHARD BOLLING.
b. The Role of the President in Foreign Policy by ARTHUR
SCHLESINGER, JR.
3. Congressional Leadership
a. Congressional Leadership and Foreign Policy by Senator
MIKE MANSFIELD.
b. Congressional Party Leadership and the Impact of Con-
gress on Foreign Policy by RANDALL B. RIPLEY.
4. Foreign Economic Policymaking by Senator JAMES B. PEARSON.
5. Congress and Foreign Policy by Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT.
6. Problems in the Conduct of Foreign Policy
a. Public Participation in the Foreign Policy Process by
RICHARD A. FRANK.
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b. Foreign Policy Information by STANLEY N. FurrERmAN.
c. Executive Privilege in the Conduct of Foreign Policy by
RITA A. HAUSER.
d. The Power to Make War by W. TAYLOR REVELRY III.
APPENDIX M : CONGRESSIONAL SURVEY
Report of a Staff Survey of Congressional Views on the Organiza-
tion of Government Conduct of Foreign Policy by R. ROGER MAJAK.
APPENDIX N : CONGRESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY
1. Congress and National Security: A Look at Some Issues by Rep-
resentative CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI.
2. Foreign Policy and Unnecessary Nuclear Secrecy?the Need
for More Coordination Among the Committees Involved by Senator
STUART SYMINGTON.
3. Department of Defense Response to Senator MIKE MANSFIELD:
Information for Consideration by the Commission. . . .
VOLUME VI
APPENDIX 0 : MAKING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE EFFECTIVE : CASE STUDIES
Making Organizational Change Effective: Case Analysis of At-
tempted Reforms in Foreign Affairs by staff and consultants of the
National Academy of Public Administration.
APPENDIX P: PERSONNEL FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. Foreign Affairs Personnel Management by JAMES W. CLARK.
2. The Foregin Service Personnel System by R. BARTLETT MOON.
3. Developing the Military Executive by DAVID S. C. CI-1u and
JOHN P. WHITE.
4. Executive Manpower Systems and Overseas Assignment Prac-
tices in Multinational Corporations by THEODORE P. LEVINO and
WILLIAM K. CORDIER.
5. Organization for Presidential Personnel Management Respon-
sibilities with Particular Reference to Foreign Affairs Personnel by
CHARLES PARKER.
APPENDIX Q : POSTS AND MISSIONS
1. The Role of the Ambassador by FOY D. KOHLER.
2. Is the Ambassador an Endangered Species, or Merely Obsolete?
by J. ROBERT SCHAETZEL.
3. The Organization and Management of United States Overseas
Missions?Issues and Options by WILLIAM 0. HALL.
4. Overseas Posts and Missions by T. MCADAMS DEFORD.
APPENDIX R : COMPARATIVE FOREIGN PRACTICES
Problems in the Organization of United States Foreign Policy:
Comparative Foreign Practices," by staff and consultants of the At-
lantic Institute for International Affairs.
APPENDIX S : ADVISORY PANELS
The President's External Advisors in Foreign Policy by CHESTER A.
CROCKER.
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APPENDIX T: BUDGETING AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS COORDINATION
1. Budgeting, Programming, and Foreign Policy by ARNOLD
NACHMANOFF.
2. Congressional Uses of its Many Powers to Control Foreign
Policy by ALLEN SCHICK.
VOLUME VII
APPENDIX U: INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS ANALYSES
1. Intelligence Functions by WILLIAM J. BARNDS.
2. Intelligence and Policymaking in an Institutional Context by
WILLIAM J BARNDS.
3. Comments On Barnds' papers by JOHN W. HITIZENGA, LAWRENCE
E. LYNN, JR. and HARRY HOWE RANSOM.
4. Issues on Intelligence Resource Management by ROBERT M. MACY.
5. Clandestine Operations by TAYLOR G. BELCHER.
6. Intelligence Support for Foreign Policy in the Future by RUS-
SELL JACK SMITH.
7. Congress and American Secret Intelligence Agencies by HARRY
HOWE RANSOM.
8. Intelligence, Covert Operations, and Foreign Policy by PAUL W.
BLACKSTOCK.
APPENDIX v: COORDINATION IN COMPLEX SETTINGS
The Coordination of Complexity in South Asia by LLOYD I. Ru-
DOLPH, SITSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH, University of Chicago, et al.
APPENDIX W : ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS: FOREIGN POLICY
1. Ethical Considerations and Foreign Policy by DONALD F. MC-
HENRY, with the assistance Of FRED K. KIRSCHSTEIN.
2. Ethical Considerations and National Security Policy by FRANCIS
X. WINTERS, S.J.
APPENDIX X : THREE INTRODUCTORY RESEARCH GUIDELINES
1. The Commission's Studies Program by PETER L. SZANTON.
2. Alternative Organizational Models for the Conduct of Foreign
Policy by WILLIAM I. BACCHUS and R. ROGER MAJAK.
3. Problems in the Conduct of United States Foreign Policy: A
Compilation of Recent Critiques by J. DANIEL O'FLAHERTY.
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THIS REPORT IS EMBARGOED FOR PUBLICATION
TO 3:00 P.M., SATURDAY, JUNE 28, 1975, AND
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JUNE 28, 1975.
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