REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A000900130001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 303
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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June 1975
Report to the President
by the
COMMISSION ON
CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN
THE UNITED STATES
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June 1975
Report to the President
by the
COMMISSION ON
CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN
THE UNITED STATES
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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $2.85
Stock Number 041-015-00074-8
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COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500
Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Chairman
John T. Connor
C. Douglas Dillon
Erwin N. Griswold
Lane Kirkland
Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Ronald Reagan
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
David W. Belin,
Executive Director
Dear Mr. President:
Your Commission to Investigate CIA Activities
within the United States, having completed its
assignment in accordance with Executive Order
No. 11828 of January 4, 1975, herewith submits
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COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
VICE PRESIDENT NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER, Chairman
JOHN T. CONNOR
C. DOUGLAS DILLON
ERWIN N. GRISWOLD
LANE KIRKLAND
HAROLD A. BAKER
ERNEST GELLHORN
LYMAN L. LEMNITZER
RONALD REAGAN
EDGAR F. SHANNON, Jr.
BELIN, Executive Director
Senior Counsel
ROBERT B. OLSEN
WILLIAM W SCHWARZER
Counsel
MARVIN L. GRAY, Jr.
GEORGE A. MANFREDI
Special Counsel
RONALD J. GREENE
Special Counsel to
the Vice President
JAMES N. ROETHE
JAMES B. WEIDNER
R. MASON CARGILL
PETER R. CLAPPER
TIMOTHY S. HARDY
Counsel to
the Vice President
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Table of Contents
Page
Preface----------------------------------------------------------- IX
Part I.-Summary of the Investigation
Chapter 1. The Fundamental Issues-------------------------------- 3
2. The Need for Intelligence------------------------------- 6
3. Summary of Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations--_ 9
Part II. The CIA's Role and Authority
4. Intelligence and Related Activities by the United States
before 1947------------------------------------------ 45
5. The Sources of CIA Authority--------------------------- 48
6. Legal Analysis----------------------------------------- 58
Part III. Supervision and Control of the CIA
7. External Controls-------------------------------------- 71
8. Internal Controls-------------------------------------- 83
Part IV. Significant Areas of Investigation
9. The CIA's Mail Intercepts ---------------------- .-------- 101
10. Intelligence Community Coordination-------------------- 116
11. Special Operations Group-"Operation CHAOS"---------- 130
12. Protection of the Agency against Threats of Violence-Office
of Security------------------------------------------ 151
13. Other Investigations by the Office of Security-------------- 160
14. Involvement of the CIA in Improper Activities for the White
House---------------------------------------------- 172
15. Domestic Activities of the Directorate of Operations-------- 208
16. Domestic Activities of the Directorate of Science and Tech-
nology---------------------------------------------- 225
17. CIA Relationships with Other Federal, State, and Local
Agencies-------------------------------------------- 232
18. Indices and Files on American Citizens------------------- 240
19. Allegations Concerning the Assassination of President
Kennedy---------------------------------- --------- 251
Appendix I. Executive Order (Establishing a Commission on CIA
Activities Within the United States) ------------------ 271
II. Statement by the President---------------------------- 273
III. National Security Act of 1947, as Amended-------------- 275
IV. Biographical Information and Acknowledgements - - - - - - - - 279
V. Highlights of Civil Disturbances and Other Disorders in
the United States-January 1966 through January 1973-- 285
VI. Proposed Amendments to Statute---------------------- 292
VII. Assistance to and from Federal, State and Local Agencies- 294
(vii)
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Preface
President Gerald R. Ford created the Commission on CIA Activi-
ties within the United States on January 4, 1975. He directed the
Commission to determine whether any domestic CIA activities
exceeded the Agency's statutory authority and to make appropriate
recommendations. The findings, conclusions and recommendations
of the Commission are summarized in Chapter 3 and detailed with
full background in subsequent chapters.
A. Charges on CIA Domestic Activities
Charges that the CIA has conducted illegal activities within the
United States violating the rights of private citizens have aroused
concern :
-Because of the number and seriousness of alleged violations
of law; and
-Because many of the Agency's activities are necessarily
secret and therefore are not well understood by the American
people.
At the same time, many persons have voiced alarm that public
controversy and exposure would seriously impair the CIA's ability
to function-which in turn could seriously undermine the national
security. Therefore, the President took steps designed to ensure that
the charges would be fully and impartially investigated and that
necessary corrective actions would be taken.
B. The President's Order
The President requested a report on many of the charges from the
Director of Central Intelligence and received it in late December 1974.
On January 4, 1975, he issued Executive Order No. 11828 establishing
a Commission on CIA Activities within the United States.' He as-
signed this Commission three tasks :
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(1) Ascertain and evaluate any facts relating to activities conducted
within the United States by the Central Intelligence Agency which give
rise to questions of compliance with the provisions of 50 U.S.C. 403;
(2) Determine whether existing safeguards are adequate to prevent any
activities which violate the provisions of 50 U.S.C. 403;
(3) Make such recommendations to the President and to the Director of
Central Intelligence as the Commission deems appropriate.
President Ford appointed the members of the Commission and
designated Nelson A. Rockefeller, the Vice President of the United
States and former Governor of New York, who has held various posts
in the Federal Government since 1940, as Chairman. The other mem-
bers, all from private life, brought widely varied experience to the
Commission :
John T. Connor, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
Officer of Allied Chemical Corporation and former Secretary of
Commerce (under President Johnson) ;
C. Douglas Dillon, a Managing Director of Dillon, Read & Co.,
Inc., an investment banking firm, former Secretary of the Treas-
ury (under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson) and former
Ambassador to France and Undersecretary of State (under
President Eisenhower) ;
Erwin N. Griswold, lawyer, former Solicitor General (under
Presidents Johnson and Nixon) and former Dean of the Harvard
Law School;
Lane Kirkland, Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO ;
Lyman L. Lemnitzer, General, U.S. Army (Retired) and
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ;
Ronald Reagan, political commentator, former President of
the Screen Actors' Guild, and former Governor of California;
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr., Commonwealth Professor of English
and former President of the University of Virginia.
The President named David W. Belin, a lawyer from Des Moines,
Iowa, as the Commission's Executive Director. A staff of eleven
lawyers was recruited, primarily from the private practice of law and
with substantial investigative experience.
C. Conduct of the Investigation
The Commission has been determined from its inception to make
a thorough and vigorous investigation. Because of the sensitivity of
the CIA's intelligence and counterintelligence activities, and their
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XI
critical relationship to national security, the Commission recognized
that it must close its sessions to the public. But as a consequence it
has felt all the more an obligation to conduct a diligent investiga-
tion, assuring the American people that all serious questions of legal-
ity and propriety within the area of responsibility assigned to the
Commission have been carefully investigated and analyzed.
The CIA and other agencies were directed by the President to co-
operate with the Commission. Much of the evidence the Commission
examined has come from CIA files and personnel. But the Commission
has sought wherever possible to verify the evidence independently,
using available outside sources rather than relying solely on sum-
maries or analyses of materials supplied by the CIA or other divisions
of the federal government.
The Commission began weekly hearings within eight days after
its appointment and even before a full staff was available.
The Commission recognizes that no investigation of any govern-
mental intelligence agency can be certain of uncovering every relevant
fact. Nevertheless, the Commission believes that its investigation has
disclosed the principal categories of CIA activities within the United
States which might exceed its statutory authority or might adversely
affect the rights of American citizens.
D. Alleged Plans to Assassinate Certain Foreign Leaders
Allegations that the CIA had been involved in plans to assassinate
certain leaders of foreign countries came to the Commission's at-
tention shortly after its inquiry was under way. Although it was un-
clear whether or not those allegations fell within the scope of the
Commission's authority, the Commission directed that an inquiry be
undertaken. The President concurred in this approach.
The Commission's staff began the required inquiry, but time did
not permit a full investigation before this report was due. The Presi-
dent therefore requested that the materials in the possession of the
Commission which bear on these allegations be turned over to him.
This has been done.
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Part I
Summary
of the Investigation
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Chapter 1
The Fundamental Issues
In announcing the formation of this Commission, the President
noted that an effective intelligence and counterintelligence. capability
is essential to provide "the safeguards that protect our national in-
terest and help avert armed conflicts."
While it is vital that security requirements be met, the President
continued, it is equally important that intelligence activities be con-
ducted without "impairing our democratic institutions and funda-
mental freedoms."
The Commission's assessment of the CIA's activities within the
United States reflects the members' deep concern for both individual
rights and national security.
A. Individual Rights
The Bill of Rights in the Constitution protects individual liberties
against encroachment by government. Many statutes and the common
law also reflect this protection.
The First Amendment protects the freedoms of speech and of the
press, the right of the people to assemble peaceably, and the right to
petition the government for redress of grievances. It has been con-
strued to protect freedom of peaceable political association. In addi-
tion, the Fourth Amendment declares:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... -
In accordance with the objectives enunciated in these and other
Constitutional amendments, the Supreme Court has outlined the fol-
lowing basic Constitutional doctrines:
1. Any intrusive investigation of an American citizen by the
government must have a sufficient basis to warrant the invasion
caused by the particular investigative practices which are utilized;
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2. Government monitoring of a citizen's political activities re-
quires even greater justification;
3.-The scope of any resulting intrusion on personal privacy
must not exceed the degree reasonably believed necessary;
4. With certain exceptions, the scope of which are not sharply
defined, these conditions must be met, at least for significant in-
vestigative intrusions, to the satisfaction of an uninvolved gov-
ernmental body such as a court.
These Constitutional standards give content to an accepted principle
of our society-the right of each person to a high degree of individ-
ual privacy.
In recognition of this right, President Truman and the Congress-
in enacting the law creating the CIA in 1947-included a clause pro-
viding that the CIA should have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement
powers or internal security functions.
Since then, Congress has further outlined citizen rights in statutes
limiting electronic surveillance and granting individuals access to cer-
tain information in government files,' underscoring the general concern
of Congress and the Executive Branch in this area.
B. Government Must Obey the Law
The individual liberties of American citizens depend on government
observance of the law.
Under our form of Constitutional government, authority can be
exercised only if it has been properly delegated to a particular depart-
ment or agency by the Constitution or Congress.
Most delegations come from Congress; some are implied from the
allocation of responsibility to the President. Wherever the basic au-
thority resides, however, it is fundamental in our scheme of Constitu-
tional government that agencies-including the CIA-shall exercise
only those powers properly assigned to them by Congress or the
President.
Whenever the activities of a government agency exceed its authority,
individual liberty may be impaired.
C. National Security
Individual liberties likewise depend on maintaining public order
at home and in protecting the country against infiltration from abroad
' Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. Sees. 2510-20) and
Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a).
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and armed attack. Ensuring domestic tranquility and providing for
a common defense are not only Constitutional goals but necessary pre-
conditions for a free, democratic system. The process of orderly and
lawful change is the essence of democracy. Violent change, or forcing
a change of government by the stealthy action of "enemies, foreign or
domestic," is contrary to our Constitutional system.
The government has both the right and the obligation within Con-
stitutional limits to use its available power to protect the people
and their established form of government. Nevertheless, the mere
invocation of the "national security" does not grant unlimited power
to the government. The degree of the danger and the type of action
contemplated to meet that danger require careful evaluation, to ensure
that the danger is sufficient to justify the action and that fundamental
rights are respected.
D. Resolving the Issues
Individual freedoms and privacy are fundamental in our society.
Constitutional government must be maintained. An effective and effi-
cient intelligence system is necessary; and to be effective, many of its
activities must be conducted in secrecy.
Satisfying these objectives presents considerable opportunity for
conflict. The vigorous pursuit of intelligence by certain methods can
lead to invasions of individual rights. The preservation of the United
States requires an effective intelligence capability, but the preservation
of individual liberties within the United States requires limitations
or restrictions on gathering of intelligence. The drawing of reasonable
lines-where legitimate intelligence needs end and erosion of Con-
stitutional government begins-is difficult.
In seeking to draw such lines, we have been guided in the first
instance by the commands of the Constitution as they have been inter-
preted by the Supreme Court, the laws as written by Congress, the
values we believe are reflected in the democratic process, and the
faith we have in a free society. We have also sought to be fully
cognizant of the needs of national security, the requirements of a strong
national defense against external aggression and internal subversion,
and the duty of the government to protect its citizens.
In the final analysis, public safety and individual liberty sustain
each other.
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Chapter 2
The Need for Intelligence
During the period of the Commission's inquiry, there have been
public allegations that a democracy does not need an intelligence ap-
paratus. The Commission does not share this view. Intelligence is
information gathered for policymakers in government which illumi-
nates the range of choices available to them and enables them to exer-
cise judgment. Good intelligence will not necessarily lead to wise policy
choices. But without sound intelligence, national policy decisions and
actions cannot effectively respond to actual conditions and reflect the
best national interest or adequately protect our national security.
Intelligence gathering involves collecting information about other
countries' military capabilities, subversive activities, economic condi-
tions, political developments, scientific and technological progress, and
social activities and conditions. The raw information must be evaluated
to determine its reliability and relevance, and must then be analyzed.
The final products-called "finished intelligence"-are distributed to
the President and the political, military and other governmental
leaders according to their needs.
Intelligence gathering has changed rapidly and radically since the
advent of the CIA in 1947.1 The increased complexity of international
political, economic, and military arrangements, the increased destruc-
tiveness of the weapons of modern warfare, and the advent of elec-
tronic methods of surveillance have altered and enlarged the needs for
sophisticated intelligence. Intelligence agencies have had to rely more
and more on scientific and technological developments to help meet
these needs.
Despite the increasing complexity and significance of intelligence
in national policymaking, it is also important to understand its limits.
Not all information is reliable, even when the most highly refined
1 The CIA is only one of several foreign intelligence agencies in the federal government.
Others include the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelli-
gence branches of the three military services and the State Department's Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research.
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intelligence methods are used to collect it. Nor can any intelligence
system ensure that its current estimates of another country's inten-
tions or future capacities are accurate or will not be outrun by unfore-
seen events. There are limits to accurate forecasting, and the use of
deception by our adversaries or the penetration of our intelligence
services increases the possibility that intelligence predictions may
prove to be wrong. Nevertheless, informed decision-making is impossi-
ble without an intelligence system adequately protected from
penetration.
Therefore, 'a vital part of any intelligence service is an effective coun-
terintelligence program, directed toward protecting our own intelli-
gence system and ascertaining the activities of foreign intelligence
services, such as espionage, sabotage, and subversion, and toward
minimizing or counteracting the effectiveness of these activities.
Foreign Invasions of United States Privacy
This Commission is devoted to analyzing the domestic activities of
the CIA in the interest of protecting the privacy and security rights
of American citizens. But we cannot ignore the invasion of the privacy
and security rights of Americans by foreign countries or their agents.
This is the other side of the coin-and it merits attention here in the
interest of perspective.
Witnesses with responsibilities for counterintelligence have told the
Commission t at the United States remains the principal intelligence
target of the communist bloc.
The comm nists invest large sums of money, personnel and sophis-
ticated tech ology in collecting information-within the United
States-on our military capabilities, our weapons systems, our defense
structure and our social divisions. The communists seek to penetrate
our intelligence services, to compromise our law enforcement agen-
cies and to recruit as their agents United States citizens holding sensi-
tive government and industry jobs. In addition, it is a common prac-
tice in com unist bloc countries to inspect and open mail coming from
or going to /the United States.
In an open society such as ours, the intelligence opportunities for
our adversaries are immeasurably greater than they are for us in their
closed societies. Our society must remain an open one, with our tradi-
tional freedoms unimpaired. But when the intelligence activities of
other countries are flourishing in the free environment we afford them,
it is all the more essential that the foreign intelligence activities of
the CIA and our other intelligence agencies, as well as the domestic
counterintelligence activities of the FBI, be given the support neces-
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sary to protect our national security and to shield the privacy and
rights of American citizens from foreign intrusion.
The Commission has received estimates that communist bloc intel-
ligence forces currently number well over 500,000 worldwide.
The number of communist government officials in the United States
has tripled since 1960, and is still increasing. Nearly 2,000 of them are
now in this country-and a significant percentage of them have been
identified as members of intelligence or security agencies. Conserva-
tive estimates for the number of unidentified intelligence officers
among the remaining officials raise the level to over 40 percent.
In addition to sending increasing numbers of their citizens to this
country openly, many of whom have been trained in espionage, com-
munist bloc countries also place considerable emphasis on the train-
ing, provision of false identification and dispatching of "illegal"
agents-that is, operatives for whom an alias identity has been sys-
tematically developed which enables them to live in the United States
as American citizens or resident aliens without our knowledge of their
true origins.
While making large-scale use of human intelligence sources, the
communist countries also appear to have developed electronic collec-
tion of intelligence to an extraordinary degree of technology and
sophistication for use in the United States and elsewhere throughout
the world, and we believe that these countries can monitor and record
thousands of private telephone conversations. Americans have a right
to be uneasy if not seriously disturbed at the real possibility that their
personal and business activities which they discuss freely over the
telephone could be recorded and analyzed by agents of foreign powers.
This raises the real specter that selected American users of telephones
are potentially subject to blackmail that can seriously affect their
actions, or even lead in some cases to recruitment as espionage agents.
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Chapter 3
Summary of Findings, Conclusions,
and Recommendations
As directed by the President, the Commission has investigated the
role and authority of the CIA, the adequacy of the internal controls
and external supervision of the Agency, and its significant domestic
activities that raise questions of compliance with the limits on its
statutory authority. This chapter summarizes the findings and con-
clusions of the Commission and sets forth its recommendations.
A. Summary of Charges and Findings
The initial public charges were that the CIA's domestic activities
had involved :
1. Large-scale spying on American citizens in the United States
by the CIA, whose responsibility is foreign intelligence.
2. Keeping dossiers on large numbers of American citizens.
3. Aiming these activities at Americans who have expressed
their disagreement with various government policies.
These initial charges were subsequently supplemented by others
including allegations that the CIA :
-Had intercepted and opened personal mail in the United
States for 20 years;
-Had infiltrated domestic dissident groups and otherwise
intervened in domestic politics;
-Had engaged in illegal wiretaps and break-ins ; and,
-Had improperly assisted other government agencies.
In addition, assertions have been made ostensibly linking the CIA
to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.
It became clear from the public reaction to these charges that the
secrecy in which the Agency nesessarily operates, combined with the
allegations of wrongdoing, had contributed to widespread public mis-
understanding of the Agency's actual practices.
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A detailed analysis of the facts has convinced the Commission that
the great majority of the CIA's domestic activities comply with its
statutory authority.
Nevertheless, over the 28 years of its history, the CIA has engaged
in some activities that should be criticized and not permitted to hap-
pen again-both in light of the limits imposed on the Agency by law
and as a matter of public policy.
Some of these activities were initiated or ordered by Presidents,
either directly or indirectly.
Some of them fall within the doubtful area between responsibilities
delegated to the CIA by Congress and the National Security Council
on the one hand and activities specifically prohibited to the Agency
on the other.
Some of them were plainly unlawful and constituted improper
invasions upon the rights of Americans.
The Agency's own recent actions, undertaken for the most part in
1973 and 1974, have gone far to terminate the activities upon which
this investigation has focused. The recommendations of the Commis-
sion are designed to clarify areas of doubt concerning the Agency's
authority, to strengthen the Agency's structure, and to guard against
recurrences of these improprieties.
B. The CIA's Role and Authority (Chapters 4-6)
Findings
The Central Intelligence Agency was established by the National
Security Act of 1947 as the nation's first comprehensive peacetime
foreign intelligence service. The objective was to provide the President
with coordinated intelligence, which the country lacked prior to the
attack on Pearl Harbor.
The Director of Central Intelligence reports directly to the Presi-
dent. The CIA receives its policy direction and guidance from the Na-
tional Security Council, composed of the President, the Vice President,
and the Secretaries of State and Defense.
The statute directs the CIA to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate
intelligence obtained from United States intelligence agencies, and
to perform such other functions related to intelligence as the National
Security Council directs. Recognizing that the CIA would be dealing
with sensitive, secret materials, Congress made the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence responsible for protecting intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure.
At the same time, Congress sought to assure the American public
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that it was not establishing a secret police which would threaten the
civil liberties of Americans. It specifically forbade the CIA from
exercising "police, subpoena, or law-enforcement powers or internal
security functions." The CIA was not to replace the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in conducting domestic activities to investigate crime or
internal subversion.
Although Congress contemplated that the focus of the CIA would
be on foreign intelligence, it understood that some of its activities
would be conducted within the United States. The CIA necessarily
maintains its headquarters here, procures logistical support, recruits
and trains employees, tests equipment, and conducts other domestic
activities in support of its foreign intelligence mission. It makes nec-
essary investigations in the United States to maintain the security of its
facilities and personnel.
Additionally, it has been understood from the beginning that the
CIA is permitted to collect foreign intelligence-that is, information
concerning foreign capabilities, intentions, and activities-from Amer-
ican citizens within this country by overt means.
Determining the legal propriety of domestic activities of the CIA
requires the application of the law to the particular facts involved.
This task involves consideration of more than the National Security
Act and the directives of the National Security Council ; Constitutional
and other statutory provisions also circumscribe the domestic activi-
ties of the CIA. Among the applicable Constitutional provisions are
the First Amendment, protecting freedom of speech, of the press, and
of peaceable assembly; and the Fourth Amendment, prohibiting un-
reasonable searches and seizures. Among the statutory provisions are
those which limit such activities as electronic eavesdropping and
interception of the mails.
The precise scope of many of these statutory and Constitutional pro-
visions is not easily stated. The National Security Act in particular
was drafted in broad terms in order to provide flexibility for the CIA
to adapt to changing intelligence needs. Such critical phrases as "in-
ternal security functions" are left undefined. The meaning of the Di-
rector's responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure has also been a subject of uncertainty.
The word "foreign" appears nowhere in the statutory grant of
authority, though it has always been understood that the CIA's mission
is limited to matters related to foreign intelligence. This apparent stat-
utory ambiguity, although not posing problems in practice, has
troubled members of the public who read the statute without having
the benefit of the legislative history and the instructions to the CIA
from the National Security Council.
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Conclusions
The evidence within the scope of this inquiry does not indicate that
fundamental rewriting of the National Security Act is either necessary
or appropriate.
The evidence does demonstrate the need for some statutory and ad-
ministrative clarification of the role and function of the Agency.
Ambiguities have been partially responsible for some, though not
all, of the Agency's deviations within the United States from its
assigned mission. In some cases, reasonable persons will differ as to
the lawfulness of the activity; in others, the absence of clear guidelines
as to its authority deprived the Agency of a means of resisting pres-
sures to engage in activities which now appear to us improper.
Greater public awareness of the limits of the CIA's domestic author-
ity would do much to reassure the American people.
The requisite clarification can best be accomplished (a) through
a specific amendment clarifying the National Security Act provision
which delineates the permissible scope of CIA activities, as set forth
in Recommendation 1, and (b) through issuance of an Executive
Order further limiting domestic activities of the CIA, as set forth in
Recommendation 2.
Recommendation (1)
Section 403 . of the National Security Act of 1947 should be
amended in the form set forth in Appendix VI to this Report.
These amendments, in summary, would:
a. Make explicit that the CIA's activities must be related to
foreign intelligence.
b. Clarify the responsibility of the CIA to protect intelli-
gence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
(The Agency would be responsible for protecting against un-
authorized disclosures within the CIA, and it would be re-
sponsible for providing guidance and technical assistance to
other agency and department heads in protecting against un-
authorized disclosures within their own agencies and de-
partments.)
c. Confirm publicly the CIA's existing authority to collect
foreign intelligence from willing sources within the United
States, and, except as specified by the President in a pub-
lished Executive Order,' prohibit the CIA from collection ef-
1 The Executive Order authorized by this statute should recognize that when the collection of
foreign intelligence from persons who are not United States citizens results in the incidental
acquisition of information from unknowing citizens, the Agency should be permitted to make
appropriate use or disposition of such information. Such collection activities must be directed
at foreign intelligence sources, and the involvement of American citizens must be incidental.
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forts within the United States directed at securing foreign
intelligence from unknowing American citizens.
Recommendation (2)
The President should by Executive Order prohibit the CIA from
the collection of information about the domestic activities of
United States citizens (whether by overt or covert means), the
evaluation, correlation, and dissemination of analyses or re-
ports about such activities, and the storage of such information,
with exceptions for the following categories of persons or ac-
tivities:
a. Persons presently or formerly affiliated, or being con-
sidered for affiliation, with the CIA, directly or indirectly,
or others who require, clearance by the CIA to receive classi-
fied information;
b. Persons or activities that pose a clear threat to CIA fa-
cilities or personnel, provided that proper coordination with
the FBI is accomplished;
c. Persons suspected of espionage or other illegal activi-
ties relating to foreign intelligence, provided that proper co-
ordination with the FBI is accomplished.
d. Information which is received incidental to appropriate
CIA activities may be transmitted to an agency with appro-
priate jurisdiction, including law enforcement agencies.
Collection of information from normal library sources such as
newspapers, books, magazines and other such documents is not
to be affected by this order.
Information currently being maintained which is inconsistent
with the order should be destroyed at the conclusion of the cur-
rent congressional investigations or as soon thereafter as per-
mitted by law.
The CIA should periodically screen its files and eliminate all
material inconsistent with the order.
The order should be issued after consultation with the National
Security Council, the Attorney General, and the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence. Any modification of the order would be per-
mitted only through published amendments.
C. Supervision and Control of the CIA
1. External Controls (Chapter 7)
Findings
The CIA is subject to supervision and control by various executive
agencies and by the Congress.
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Congress has established special procedures for review of the CIA
and its secret budget within four small subcommittees.2 Historically,
these subcommittees have been composed of members of Con-
gress with many other demands on their time. The CIA has not as a
general rule received detailed scrutiny by the Congress.
The principal bodies within the Executive Branch performing a
supervisory or control function are the National Security Council,
which gives the CIA its policy direction and control; the Office of
Management and Budget, which reviews the CIA's budget in much
the same fashion as it reviews budgets of other government agencies;
and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which is
composed of distinguished citizens, serving part time in a general
advisory function for the President on the quality of the gathering
and interpretation of intelligence.
None of these agencies has the specific responsibility of overseeing
the CIA to determine whether its activities are proper.
The Department of Justice also exercises an oversight role, through
its power to initiate prosecutions for criminal misconduct. For a
period of over 20 years, however, an agreement existed between the
Department of Justice and the CIA providing that the Agency was
to investigate allegations of crimes by CIA employees or agents which
involved Government money or property or might involve operational
security. If, following the investigation, the Agency determined that
there was no reasonable basis to believe a crime had been committed,
or that operational security aspects precluded "prosecution, the case
was not referred to the Department of Justice.
The Commission has found nothing to indicate that the CIA
abused the function given it by the agreement. The agreement, how-
ever, involved the Agency directly in forbidden law enforcement activ-
ities, and represented an abdication by the Department of Justice
of its statutory responsibilities.
Conclusions
Some improvement in the congressional oversight system would be
helpful. The problem of providing adequate oversight and control
while maintaining essential security is not easily resolved. Several
knowledgeable witnesses pointed to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy as an appropriate model for congressional oversight of the
Agency. That Committee has had an excellent record of providing
effective oversight while avoiding breaches of security in a highly
sensitive area.
2 Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees and the Armed Services Committees
of the two houses.
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One of the underlying causes of the problems confronting the
CIA arises out of the pervading atmosphere of secrecy in which its
activities have been conducted in the past. One aspect of this has been
the secrecy of the budget.
A new body is needed to provide oversight of the Agency within
the Executive Branch. Because of the need to preserve security, the
CIA is not subject to the usual constraints of audit, judicial review,
publicity or open congressional budget review and oversight. Con-
sequently, its operations require additional external control. The au-
thority assigned the job of supervising the CIA must be given sufficient
power and significance to assure the public of effective supervision.
The situation whereby the Agency determined whether its own
employees would be prosecuted must not be permitted to recur.
Recommendation (3)
The President should recommend to Congress the establishment
of a Joint Committee on Intelligence to assume the oversight role
currently played by the Armed Services Committees.3
Recommendation (4)
Congress should give careful consideration to the question
whether the budget of the CIA should not, at least to some ex-
tent, be made public, particularly in view of the provisions of
Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution.4
Recommendation (5)
a. The functions of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advi-
sory Board should be expanded to include oversight of the CIA.
This expanded oversight board should be composed of distin-
guished citizens with varying backgrounds and experience. It
should be headed by a full-time chairman and should have a full-
time staff appropriate to its role. Its functions related to the CIA
should include:
1. Assessing compliance by the CIA with its statutory
authority.
2. Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence collection.
3. Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence estimates.
4. Assessing the quality of the organization of the CIA.
5. Assessing the quality of the management of the CIA.
6. Making recommendations with respect to the above sub-
jects to the President and the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, and, where appropriate, the Attorney General.
s see statement by Commissioner Griswold, Chapter 7.
"No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made
by Law; and a regular statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public
Money shall be published from time to time."
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b. The Board should have access to all information in the CIA.
It should be authorized to audit and investigate CIA expenditures
and activities on its own initiative.
c. The Inspector General of the CIA should be authorized to
report directly to the Board, after having notified the Director of
Central Intelligence, in cases he deems appropriate.
Recommendation (6)
The Department of Justice and the CIA should establish writ-
ten guidelines for the handling of reports of criminal violations
by employees of the Agency or relating to its affairs. These guide-
lines should require that the criminal investigation and the deci-
sion whether to prosecute be made by the Department of Justice,
after consideration of Agency views regarding the impact of pros-
ecution on the national security. The Agency should be permitted
to conduct such investigations as it requires to determine whether
its operations have been jeopardized. The Ageny should scrupu-
lously avoid exercise of the prosecutorial function.
2. Internal Controls (Chapter 8)
Findings
The Director's duties in administering the intelligence community,
handling relations with other components of the government, and
passing on broad questions of policy leave him little time for day-to-
day supervision of the Agency. Past studies have noted the need for
the Director to delegate greater responsibility for the administration
of the Agency to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
In recent years, the position of Deputy Director has been occupied
by a high-ranking military officer, with responsibilities for maintain-
ing liaison with the Department of Defense, fostering the Agency's
relationship with the military services, and providing top CIA man-
agement with necessary experience and skill in understanding particu-
lar intelligence requirements of the military. Generally speaking, the
Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence have not been heavily
engaged in administration of the Agency.
Each of the four directorates within the CIA-Operations, Intel-
ligence, Administration, and Science and Technology-is headed by
a deputy director who reports to the Director and Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence. These four deputies, together with certain
other top Agency officials such as the Comptroller, form the Agency
Management Committee, which makes many of the administrative and
management decisions affecting more than one directorate.
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Outside the chain of command, the primary internal mechanism for
keeping the Agency within bounds is the Inspector General. The size
of this office was recently sharply reduced, and its previous practice
of making regular reviews of various Agency departments was ter-
minated. At the present time, the activities of the office are almost
entirely concerned with coordinating Agency responses to the various
investigating bodies, and with various types of employee grievances.
The Office of General Counsel has on occasion played an impor-
tant role in preventing or terminating Agency activities in viola-
tion of law, but many of the questionable or unlawful activities dis-
cussed in this report were not brought to the attention of this office.
A certain parochialism may have resulted from the fact that attor-
neys in the office have little or no legal experience outside the Agency.
It is important that the Agency receive the best possible legal advice
on the often difficult and unusual situations which confront it.
Conclusions
In the final analysis, the proper functioning of the Agency must
depend in large part on the character of the Director of Central
Intelligence.
The best assurance against misuse of the Agency lies in the appoint-
ment to that position of persons with the judgment, courage, and
independence to resist improper pressure and importuning, whether
from the White House, within the Agency or elsewhere.
Compartmentation within the Agency, although certainly appro-
priate for security reasons, has sometimes been carried to extremes
which prevent proper supervision and control.
The Agency must rely on the discipline and integrity of the men
and women it employs. Many of the activities we have found to be
improper or unlawful were in fact questioned by lower-level employees.
Bringing such situations to the attention of upper levels of manage-
ment is one of the purposes of a system of internal controls.
Recommendation (7)
a. Persons appointed to the position of Director of Central
Intelligence should be individuals of stature, independence, and
integrity. In making this appointment, consideration should be
given to individuals from outside the career service of the CIA,
although promotion from within should not be barred. Experi-
ence in intelligence service is not necessarily a prerequisite for
the position; management and administrative skills are at least
as important as the technical expertise which can always be
found in an able deputy.
b. Although the Director serves at the pleasure of the President,
no Director should serve in that position for more than 10 years.
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Recommendation (8)
a. The Office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.should
be reconstituted to provide for two such deputies, in addition to
the four heads of the Agency's directorates. One deputy would
act as the administrative officer, freeing the Director from day-to-
day management duties. The other deputy should be a military
officer, serving the functions of fostering relations with the mili-
tary and providing the Agency with technical expertise on mili-
tary intelligence requirements.
b. The advice and consent of the Senate should be required for
the appointment of each Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
Recommendation (9)
a. The Inspector General should be upgraded to a status equiva-
lent to that of the deputy directors in charge of the four director-
ates within the CIA.
b. The Office of Inspector General should be staffed by outstand-
ing, experienced officers from both inside and outside the CIA,
with ability to understand the various branches of the Agency.
c. The Inspector General's duties with respect to domestic CIA
activities should include periodic reviews of all offices within the
United States. He should examine each office for compliance with
CIA authority and regulations as well as for the effectiveness of
their programs in implementing policy objectives.
d. The Inspector General should investigate all reports from
employees concerning possible violations of the CIA statute.
e. The Inspector General should be given complete access to all
information in the CIA relevant to his reviews.
f. An effective Inspector General's office will require a larger
staff, more frequent reviews, and highly qualified personnel.
g. Inspector General reports should be provided to the National
Security Council and the recommended executive oversight body.
The Inspector General should have the authority, when he deems
it appropriate, after notifying the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, to consult with the executive oversight body on any CIA
activity (see Recommendation 5).
Recommendation (10)
a. The Director should review the composition and operation
of the Office of General Counsel and the degree to which this
office is consulted to determine whether the Agency is receiving
adequate legal assistance and representation in view of current
requirements.
b. Consideration should be given to measures which would
strengthen the office's professional capabilities and resources in-
cluding, among other things, (1) occasionally departing from the
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existing practice of hiring lawyers from within the Agency to
bring in seasoned lawyers from private practice as well as to hire
law school graduates without prior CIA experience; (2) occa-
sionally assigning Agency lawyers to serve a tour of duty else-
where in the government to expand their experience; (3) encourag-
ing lawyers to participate in outside professional activities.
Recommendation (11)
To a degree consistent with the need for security, the CIA
should be encouraged to provide for increased lateral movement
of personnel among the directorates and to bring persons with
outside experience into the Agency at all levels.
Recommendation (12)
a. The Agency should issue detailed guidelines for its em-
ployees further specifying those activities within the United
States which are permitted and those which are prohibited by
statute, Executive Orders, and NSC and DCI directives.
b. These guidelines should also set forth the standards which
govern CIA activities and the general types of activities which
are permitted and prohibited. They should, among other things,
specify that :
-Clandestine collection of intelligence directed against
United States citizens is prohibited except as specifically
permitted by law or published Executive Order.
-Unlawful methods or activities are prohibited.
-Prior approval of the DCI shall be required for any
activities which may raise questions of compliance with the
law or with Agency regulations.
c. The guidelines should also provide that employees with in-
formation on possibly improper activities are to bring it promptly
to the attention of the Director of Central Intelligence or the
Inspector General.
D. Significant Areas of Investigation
Introduction
Domestic activities of the CIA raising substantial questions of com-
pliance with the law have been closely examined by the Commission
to determine the context in which they were performed, the pressures
of the times, the relationship of the activity to the Agency's foreign
intelligence assignment and to other CIA activities, the procedures
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used to authorize and conduct the activity, and the extent and effect
of the activity.
In describing and assessing each such activity, it has been necessary
to consider both that activity's relationship to the legitimate national
security needs of the nation and the threat such activities might pose
to individual rights of Americans and to a society founded on the
need for government, as well as private citizens, to obey the law.
1. The CIA's Mail Intercepts (Chapter 9)
Findings
At the time the CIA came into being, one of the highest national
intelligence priorities was to gain an understanding of the Soviet
Union and its worldwide activities affecting our national security.
In this context, the CIA began in 1952 a program of surveying mail
between the United States and the Soviet Union as it passed through
a New York postal facility. In 1953 it began opening some of this mail.
The program was expanded over the following two decades and ulti-
mately involved the opening of many letters and the analysis of en-
velopes, or "covers," of a great many more letters.
The New York mail intercept was designed to attempt to identify
persons within the United States who were cooperating with the Soviet
Union and its intelligence forces to harm the United States. It was
also intended to determine technical communications procedures and
mail censorship techniques used by the Soviets.
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency approved com-
mencement of the New York mail intercept in 1952. During the en-
suing years, so far as the record shows, Postmasters General Summer-
field, Day, and Blount were informed of the program in varying de-
grees, as was Attorney General Mitchell. Since 1958, the FBI was
aware of this program and received 57,000 items from it.
A 1962 CIA memorandum indicates the Agency was aware that the
mail openings would be viewed as violating federal criminal laws pro-
hibiting obstruction or delay of the mails.
In the last year before the termination of this program, out of
4,350,000 items of mail sent to and from the Soviet Union, the New
York intercept examined the outside of 2,300,000 of these items,
photographed 33,000 envelopes, and opened 8,700.
The mail intercept was terminated in 1973 when the Chief Postal In-
spector refused to allow its continuation without an up-to-date high-
level approval.
The CIA also ran much smaller mail intercepts for brief periods
in San Francisco between 1969 and 1971 and in the territory of Hawaii
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during 1954 and 1955. For a short period in 1957, mail in transit
between foreign countries was intercepted in New Orleans.
Conclusions
While in operation, the CIA's domestic mail opening programs
were unlawful. United States statutes specifically forbid opening the
mail.
The mail openings also raise Constitutional questions under the
Fourth Amendment guarantees against unreasonable search, and
the scope of the New York project poses possible difficulties with the
First Amendment rights of speech and press.
Mail cover operations (examining and copying of envelopes only)
are legal when carried out in compliance with postal regulations on
a limited and selective basis involving matters of national security.
The New York mail intercept did not.meet these criteria.
The nature and degree of assistance given by the CIA to the FBI
in the New York mail project indicate that the CIA's primary pur-
pose eventually became participation with the FBI in internal security
functions. Accordingly, the CIA's participation was prohibited under
the National Security Act.
Recommendation (13)
a. The President should instruct the Director of Central In-
telligence that the CIA is not to engage again.in domestic mail
openings except with express statutory authority in time of war.
(See also Recommendation 23.)
b. The President should instruct the Director of Central Intelli-
gence that mail cover examinations are to be in compliance with
postal regulations; they are to be undertaken only in furtherance
of the CIA's legitimate activities and then only on a limited and
selected basis clearly involving matters of national security.
2. Intelligence Community Coordination (Chapter 10)
Findings
As a result of growing domestic disorder, the Department of Justice,
starting in 1967 at the direction of Attorney General Ramsey Clark,
coordinated a series of secret units and interagency groups in an effort
to collate and evaluate intelligence relating to these events. These
efforts continued until 1973.
The interagency committees were designed for analytic and not
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operational purposes. They were created as a result of White House
pressure which began in 1967, because the FBI performed only lim-
ited evaluation and analysis of the information it collected on these
events. The stated purpose of CIA's participation was to supply
relevant foreign intelligence and to furnish advice on evaluation
techniques.
The CIA was reluctant to become unduly involved in these commit-
tees, which had problems of domestic unrest as their principal focus.
It repeatedly refused to assign full-time personnel to any of them.
The most active of the committees was the Intelligence Evaluation
Staff, which met from January 1971 to May 1973. A CIA liaison
officer 4 attended over 100 weekly meetings of the Staff, some of which
concerned drafts of reports which had no foreign aspects.. With the
exception of one instance, there is no evidence that he acted in any
capacity other than as an adviser on foreign intelligence, and, to some
degree, as an editor.
On one occasion the CIA liaison officer appears to have caused a
CIA agent to gather domestic information which was reported to the
Intelligence Evaluation Staff.
The Commission found no evidence of other activities by the CIA
that were conducted on behalf of the Department of Justice groups
except for the supplying of appropriate foreign intelligence and
advice on evaluation techniques.
Conclusions
The statutory prohibition on internal security functions does not
preclude the CIA from providing foreign intelligence or advice on
evaluation techniques to interdepartmental intelligence evaluation
organizations having some domestic aspects. The statute was intended
to promote coordination, not compartmentation of intelligence
between governmental departments.
The attendance of the CIA liaison officer at over 100 meetings of the
Intelligence Evaluation Staff, some of them concerned wholly with
domestic matters, nevertheless created at least the appearance of im-
propriety. The Director of Central Intelligence was well advised to
approach such participation reluctantly.
The liaison officer acted improperly in the one instance in which he
directed an agent to gather domestic information within the United
States which was reported to the Intelligence Evaluation Staff.
4 The liaison officer was Chief of the CIA's Special Operations Group which ran Opera-
tion CHAOS, discussed in Chapter 11 of this Report.
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Much of the problem stemmed from the absence in government
of any organization capable of adequately analyzing intelligence col-
lected by the FBI on matters outside the purview of CIA.
Recommendation (14)
a. A capability should be developed within the FBI, or else-
where in the Department of Justice, to evaluate, analyze, and co-
ordinate intelligence and counterintelligence collected by the FBI
concerning espionage, terrorism, and other related matters of in-
ternal security.
b. The CIA should restrict its participation in any joint intelli-
gence committees to foreign intelligence matters.
c. The FBI should be encouraged to continue to look to the CIA
for such foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence as is rele-
vant to FBI needs.
3. Special Operations Group-"Operation CHAOS"
(Chapter 11)
Findings
The late 1960's and early 1970's were marked by widespread violence
and civil disorders.' Demonstrations, marches and protest assemblies
were frequent in a number of cities. Many universities and college
campuses became places of disruption and unrest. Government facil-
ities were picketed and sometimes invaded. Threats of bombing and
bombing incidents occurred frequently. In Washington and other
major cities, special security measures had to be instituted to control
the access to public buildings.
Responding to Presidential requests made in the face of growing
domestic disorder, the Director of Central Intelligence in August 1967
established a Special Operations Group within the CIA to collect, co-
ordinate, evaluate and report on the extent of foreign influence on
domestic dissidence.
The Group's activities, which later came to be known as Operation
CHAOS, led the CIA to collect information on dissident Americans
from CIA field stations overseas and from the FBI.
Although the stated purpose of the Operation was to determine
whether there were any foreign contacts with American dissident
groups, it resulted in the accumulation of considerable material on
domestic dissidents and their activities.
During six years, the Operation compiled some 13,000 different files,
including files on 7,200 American citizens. The documents in these files
and related materials included the names of more than 300,000 persons
and organizations, which were entered into a computerized index.
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This information was kept closely guarded within the CIA. Using
this information, personnel of the Group prepared 3,500 memoranda
for internal use; 3,000 memoranda for dissemination to the FBI; and
37 memoranda for distribution to White House and other top level
officials in the government.
The staff assigned to the Operation was steadily enlarged in response
to repeated Presidential requests for additional information, ulti-
mately reaching a maximum of 52 in 1971. Because of excessive isola-
tion, the Operation was substantially insulated from meaningful re-
view within the Agency, including review by the Counterintelligence
Staff-of which the Operation was technically a part.
Commencing in late 1969, Operation CHAOS used a number of
agents to collect intelligence abroad on any foreign connections with
American dissident groups. In order to have sufficient "cover" for
these agents, the Operation recruited persons from domestic dissident
groups or recruited others and instructed them to associate with such
groups in this country.
Most of the Operation's recruits were not directed to collect infor-
mation domestically on American dissidents. On a number of occa-
sions, however, such information was reported by the recruits while
they were developing dissident credentials in the United States, and
the information was retained in the files of the Operation. On three
occasions, an agent of the Operation was specifically directed to collect
domestic intelligence.
No evidence was found that any Operation CHAOS agent used or
was directed by the Agency to use electronic surveillance, wiretaps
or break-ins in the United States against any dissident individual or
group.
Activity of the Operation decreased substantially by mid-1972. The
Operation was formally terminated in March 1974.
Conclusions
Some domestic activities of Operation CHAOS unlawfully exceeded
the CIA's statutory authority, even though the declared mission of
gathering intelligence abroad as to foreign influence on domestic dis-
sident activities was proper.
Most significantly, the Operation became a repository for large
quantities of information on the domestic activities of American citi-
zens. This information was derived principally from FBI reports or
from overt sources and not from clandestine collection by the CIA,
and much of it was not directly related to the question of the existence
of foreign connections.
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It was probably necessary for the CIA to accumulate an information
base on domestic dissident activities in order to assess fairly whether
the activities had foreign connections. The FBI would collect infor-
mation but would not evaluate it. But the accumulation of domes-
tic data in the Operation exceeded what was reasonably required to
make such an assessment and was thus improper.
The use of agents of the Operation on three occasions to gather
information within the United States on strictly domestic matters was
beyond the CIA's authority. In addition the intelligence dissemina-
tions and those portions of a major study prepared by the Agency
which dealt with purely domestic matters were improper.
The isolation of Operation CHAOS within the CIA and its inde-
pendence from supervision by the regular chain of command within
the clandestine service made it possible for the activities of the Opera-
tion to stray over the bounds of the Agency's authority without the
knowledge of senior officials. The absence of any regular review of
these activities prevented timely correction of such missteps as did
occur.
Recommendation (15)
a. Presidents should refrain from directing the CIA to perform
what are essentially internal security tasks.
b. The CIA should resist any efforts, whatever their origin, to
involve it again in such improper activities.
c. The Agency should guard against allowing any component
(like the Special Operations Group) to become so self-contained
and isolated from top leadership that regular supervision and
review are lost.
d. The files of the CHAOS project which have no foreign intelli-
gence value should be destroyed by the Agency at the conclusion
of the current congressional investigations, or as soon thereafter
as permitted by law.
4. Protection of the Agency Against Threats of Vio-
lence-Office of Security (Chapter 12)
Findings
The CIA was not immune from the threats of violence and disrup-
tion during the period of domestic unrest between 1967 and 1972. The
Office of Security was charged throughout this period with the respon-
sibility of ensuring the continued functioning of the CIA.
The Office therefore, from 1967 to 1970, had its field officers collect
information from published materials, law enforcement authorities,
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other agencies and college officials before recruiters were sent to some
campuses. Monitoring and communications support was provided to
recruiters when trouble was expected.
The Office was also responsible, with the approval of the Director
of Central Intelligence, for a program from February 1967 to De-
cember 1968, which at first monitored, but later infiltrated, dissident
organizations in the Washington, D.C., area to determine if the groups
planned any activities against CIA or other government installations.
At no time were more than 12 persons performing these tasks, and
they performed them on a part-time basis. The project was termi-
nated when the Washington Metropolitan Police Department devel-
oped its own intelligence capability.
In December, 1967, the Office began a continuing study of dissident
activity in the United States, using information from published and
other voluntary knowledgeable sources. The Office produced weekly
Situation Information Reports analyzing dissident activities and pro-
viding calendars of future events. Calendars were given to the Secret
Service, but the CIA made no other disseminations outside the Agency.
About 500 to 800 files were maintained on dissenting organizations
and individuals. Thousands of names in the files were indexed. Report
publication was ended in late 1972, and the entire project was ended
in 1973.
Conclusions
The program under which the Office of Security rendered assistance
to Agency recruiters on college campuses was justified as an exer-
cise of the Agency's responsibility to protect its own personnel and
operations. Such support activities were not undertaken for the pur-
pose of protecting the facilities or operations of other governmental
agencies, or to maintain public order or enforce laws.
The Agency should not infiltrate a dissident group for security
purposes unless there is a clear danger to Agency installations, opera-
tions or personnel, and investigative coverage of the threat by the
FBI and local law enforcement authorities is inadequate. The
Agency's infiltration of dissident groups in the Washington area went
far beyond steps necessary to protect the Agency's own facilities, per-
sonnel and operations, and therefore exceeded the CIA's statutory
authority.
In addition, the Agency undertook to protect other government de-
partments and agencies-a police function prohibited to it by statute.
Intelligence activity directed toward learning from what sources a
domestic dissident group receives its financial support within the
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United States, and how much income it has, is no part of the authorized
security operations of the Agency. Neither is it the function of the
Agency to compile records on who attends peaceful meetings of such
dissident groups, or what each speaker has to say (unless it relates to
disruptive or violent activity which may be directed against the
Agency).
The Agency's actions in contributing funds, photographing people,
activities and cars, and following people home were unreasonable
under the circumstances and therefore exceeded the CIA's authority.
With certain exceptions, the program under which the Office of
Security (without infiltration) gathered, organized and analyzed
information about dissident groups for purposes of security was
within the CIA's authority.
The accumulation of reference files on dissident organizations and
their leaders was appropriate both to evaluate the risks posed to the
Agency and to develop an understanding of dissident groups and
their differences for security clearance purposes. But the accumulation
of information on domestic activities went beyond what was required
by the Agency's legitimate security needs and therefore exceeded the
CIA's authority.
Recommendation (16)
The CIA should not infiltrate dissident groups or other orga-
nizations of Americans in the absence of a written determination
by the Director of Central Intelligence that such action is neces-
sary to meet a clear danger to Agency facilities, operations, or
personnel and that adequate coverage by law enforcement agen-
cies is unavailable.
Recommendation (17)
All files on individuals accumulated by the Office of Security in
the program relating to dissidents should be identified, and, ex-
cept where necessary for a legitimate foreign intelligence activity,
be destroyed at the conclusion of the current congressional inves-
tigations, or as soon thereafter as permitted by law.
5. Other Investigations by the Office of Security (Chap-
ter 13)
A. Security Clearance Investigations of Prospective
Employees and Operatives
Findings and Conclusions
The Office of Security routinely conducts standard security investi-
gations of persons seeking affiliation with the Agency. In doing so, the
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Office is performing the necessary function of screening persons to
whom it will make available classified information. Such investigations
are necessary, and no improprieties were found in connection with
them.
B. Investigations of Possible Breaches of Security
1. Persons Investigated
Findings
The Office of Security has been called upon on a number of occasions
to investigate specific allegations that intelligence sources and methods
were threatened by unauthorized disclosures. The Commission's in-
quiry concentrated on those investigations which used investigative
means intruding on the privacy of the subjects, including physical and
electronic surveillance, unauthorized entry, mail covers and intercepts,
and reviews of individual federal tax returns.
The large majority of these investigations were directed at persons
affiliated with the Agency-such as employees, former employees, and
defectors and other foreign nationals used by the Agency as intelli-
gence sources.
A few investigations involving intrusions on personal privacy were
directed at subjects with no relationship to the Agency. The Commis-
sion has found no evidence that any such investigations were directed
against any congressman, judge, or other public official. Five were
directed against newsmen, in an effort to determine their sources of
leaked classified information, and nine were directed against other
United States citizens.
The CIA's investigations of newsmen to determine their sources of
classified information stemmed from pressures from the White House
and were partly a result of the FBI's unwillingness to undertake such
investigations. The FBI refused to proceed without an advance opinion
that the Justice Department would prosecute if a case were developed.
Conclusions
Investigations of allegations against Agency employees and opera-
tives are a reasonable exercise of the Director's statutory duty to pro-
tect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure if
the investigations are lawfully conducted. Such investigations also as-
sist the Director in the exercise of his unreviewable authority to termi-
nate the employment of any Agency employee. They are proper unless
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their principal purpose becomes law-enforcement or the maintenance
of internal security.
The Director's responsibility to protect intelligence sources and
methods is not so broad as to permit investigations of persons having
no relationship whatever with the Agency. The CIA has no authority
to investigate newsmen simply because they have published leaked
classified information. Investigations by the CIA should be limited
to persons presently or formerly affiliated with the Agency, directly or
indirectly.
Recommendation (18)
a. The Director of Central Intelligence should issue clear guide-
lines setting forth the situations in which the CIA is justified in
conducting its own investigation of individuals presently or for-
merly affiliated with it.
b. The guidelines should permit the CIA to conduct investiga-
tions of such persons only when the Director of Central Intelli-
gence first determines that the investigation is necessary to
protect intelligence sources and methods the disclosure of which
might endanger the national security.
c. Such investigations must be coordinated with the FBI when-
ever substantial evidence suggesting espionage or violation of
a f ederal. criminal statute is discovered.
Recommendation (19)
a. In cases involving serious or continuing security violations,
as determined by the Security Committee of the United States
Intelligence Board, the Committee should be authorized to rec-
.ommend in writing to the Director of Central Intelligence (with
a copy to the National Security Council) that the case be referred
to the FBI for further investigation,-under procedures to be devel-
oped by the Attorney General.
b. These procedures should include a requirement that the FBI
accept, such referrals without regard to whether a favorable pros-
ecutive opinion is issued by the Justice Department. The CIA
should not engage in such further investigations.
Recommendation (20)
The CIA and other components and agencies of the intelligence
community should conduct periodic reviews of all classified ma-
terial originating within those departments or agencies, with a
view to declassifying as much of that material as possible. The
purpose of such review would be to assure the public that it has
access to all information that should properly be disclosed.
Recommendation (21)
The Commission endorses legislation, drafted with appropriate
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safeguards of the constitutional rights of all affected individuals,
which would make it a criminal offense for employees or former
employees of the CIA wilfully to divulge to any unauthorized per-
son classified information pertaining to foreign intelligence or the
collection thereof obtained during the course of their employment.
2. Investigative Techniques
Findings
Even an investigation within the CIA's authority must be con-
ducted by lawful means. Some of the past investigations by the Office
of Security within the United States were conducted by means which
were invalid at the time. Others might have been lawful when con-
ducted, but would be impermissible today.
Some investigations involved physical surveillance of the indi-
viduals concerned, possibly in conjunction with other methods of in-
vestigation. The last instance of physical surveillance by the Agency
within the United States occurred in 1973.
The investigation disclosed the domestic use of 32 wiretaps, the
last in 1965; 32 instances of bugging, the last in 1968; and 12 break-ins,
the last in 1971. None of these activities was conducted under a judicial
warrant, and only one with the written approval of the Attorney
General.
Information from the income tax records of 16 persons was obtained
from the Internal Revenue Service by the CIA in order to help de-
termine whether the taxpayer was a security risk with possible con-
nections to foreign groups. The -CIA did not employ the existing
statutory and regulatory procedures for obtaining such records from
the IRS.
In 91 instances, mail covers (the photographing of the front and
back of an envelope) were employed, and in 12 instances letters were
intercepted and opened.
The state of the CIA records on these activities is such that it is
often difficult to determine why the investigation occurred in the first
place, who authorized the special coverage, and what the results were.
Although there was testimony that these activities were frequently
known to the Director of Central Intelligence and sometimes to the
Attorney General, the files often are insufficient to confirm such
information.
Conclusions
The use of physical surveillance is not unlawful unless it reaches
the point of harassment. The unauthorized entries described were
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illegal when conducted and would be illegal if conducted today. Like-
wise, the review of individuals' federal tax returns and the inter-
ception and opening of mail violated specific statutes and regulations
prohibiting such conduct.
Since the constitutional and statutory constraints applicable to
the use of electronic eavesdropping (bugs and wiretaps) have been
evolving over the years, the Commission deems it impractical to apply
those changing standards on a case-by-case basis. The Commission
does believe that while some of the instances of electronic eavesdrop-
ping were proper when conducted, many were not. To be lawful today,
such activities would require at least the written approval of the
Attorney General on the basis of a finding that the national security
is involved and that the case has significant foreign connections.
Recommendation (22)
The CIA should not undertake physical surveillance (defined
as systematic observation) of Agency employees, contractors or
related personnel within the United States without first obtain-
ing written approval of the Director of Central Intelligence.
Recommendation (23)
In the United States and its possessions, the CIA should not
intercept wire or oral communications 6 or otherwise engage in
activities that would require a warrant if conducted by a law en-
forcement agency. Responsibility for such activities belongs with
the FBI.
Recommendation (24)
The CIA should strictly adhere to established legal procedures
governing access to federal income tax information.
Recommendation (25)
CIA investigation records should show that each investigation
was duly authorized, and by whom, and should clearly set forth
the factual basis for undertaking the investigation and the results
of the investigation.
C..Handling of Defectors
Findings
The Office of Security is charged with providing security for per-
sons who have defected to the United States. Generally a defector
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can be processed and placed into society in a few months, but one de-
fector was involuntarily confined at a CIA installation for three years.
He was held in solitary confinement under spartan living conditions.
The CIA maintained the long confinement because of doubts about
the bona fides of the defector. This confinement was approved by the
Director of Central Intelligence; and the FBI, Attorney General,
United States Intelligence Board and selected members of Congress
were aware to some extent of the confinement. In one other case a
defector was physically abused; the Director of Central Intelligence
discharged the employee involved.
Conclusions
Such treatment of individuals by an agency of the United States
is unlawful. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Inspector
General must be alert to prevent repetitions.
6. Involvement of the CIA in Improper Activities for
the White House (Chapter 14)
Findings
During 1971, at the request of various members of the White House
staff, the CIA provided alias documents and disguise material, a
tape recorder, camera, film and film processing to E. Howard Hunt.
It also prepared a psychological profile of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg.
Some of this equipment was later used without the knowledge of
the CIA in connection with various improper activities, including
the entry into the office of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Ellsberg's psychiatrist.
Some members of the CIA's medical staff who participated in the
preparation of the Ellsberg profile knew that one of its purposes was
to support a public attack on Ellsberg. Except for this fact, the in-
vestigation has disclosed no evidence that the CIA knew or had rea-
son to know that the assistance it gave would be used for improper
purposes.
President Nixon and his staff also insisted in this period that the
CIA turn over to the President highly classified files relating to the
Lebanon landings, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, and
the Vietnam War. The request was made on the ground that these
files were needed by the President in the performance of his duties,
but the record shows the purpose, undisclosed to the CIA, was to
serve the President's personal political ends.
The Commission has also investigated the response of the CIA
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to the investigations following the Watergate arrests. Beginning in
June 1972, the CIA received various requests for information and
assistance in connection with these investigations. In a number of
instances, its responses were either incomplete or delayed and some
materials that may or may not have contained relevant information
were destroyed. The Commission feels that this conduct reflects poor
judgment on the part of the CIA, but it has found no evidence that
the CIA participated in the Watergate break-in or in the post-Water-
gate cover-up by the White House.
Conclusions
Providing the assistance requested by the White House, including
the alias and disguise materials, the camera and the psychological
profile on Ellsberg, was not related to the performance by the Agency
of its authorized intelligence functions and was therefore improper.
No evidence has been disclosed, however, except as noted in con-
nection with the Ellsberg profile, that the CIA knew or had reason
to know that its assistance would be used in connection with improper
activities. Nor has any evidence been disclosed indicating that the
CIA participated in the planning or carrying out of either the Field-
ing or Watergate break-ins. The CIA apparently was unaware of the
break-ins until they were reported in the media.
The record does show, however, that individuals in the Agency
failed to comply with the normal control procedures in providing
assistance to E. Howard Hunt. It also shows that the Agency's failure
to cooperate fully with ongoing investigations following Watergate
was inconsistent with its obligations.
Finally, the Commission concludes that the requests for assistance
by the White House reflect a pattern for actual and attempted misuse
of the CIA by the Nixon administration.
Recommendation (26)
a. A single and exclusive high-level channel should be estab-
lished for transmission of all White House staff requests to the
CIA. This channel should run between an officer of the National
Security Council staff designated by the President and the office
of the Director or his Deputy.
b. All Agency officers and employees should be instructed that
any direction or request reaching them directly and out of regu-
larly established channels should be immediately reported to the
Director of Central Intelligence.
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7. Domestic Activities of the Directorate of Operations
(Chapter 15)
Findings and Conclusions
In support of its responsibility for the collection of foreign intel-
ligence and conduct of covert operations overseas, the CIA's Direc-
torate of Operations engages in a variety of activities within the
United States.
A. Overt Collection of Foreign Intelligence within the
United States
One division of the Directorate of Operations collects foreign intel-
ligence within the United States from residents, business firms, and
other organizations willing to assist the Agency. This activity is con-
ducted openly by officers who identify themselves as CIA employees.
Such sources of information are not compensated.
In connection with these collection activities, the CIA maintains
approximately 50,000 active files which include details of the CIA's
relationships with these voluntary sources and the results of a federal
agency name check.
The division's collection efforts have been almost exclusively con-
fined to foreign economic, political, military, and operational topics.
Commencing in 1969, however, some activities of the division re-
sulted in the collection of limited information with respect to Amer-
ican dissidents and dissident groups. Although the focus was on
foreign contacts of these groups, background information on domestic
dissidents was also collected. Between 1969 and 1974, when this ac-
tivity was formally terminated, 400 reports were made to Operation
CHAOS.
In 1972 and 1973, the division obtained and transmitted, to other
parts of the CIA, information about telephone calls between the
Western Hemisphere (including the United States) and two other
countries. The information was limited to names, telephone numbers,
and locations of callers and recipients. It did not include the content
of the conversations.
This division also occasionally receives reports concerning criminal
activity within the United States. Pursuant to written regulations,
the source or a report of the information received is referred to the
appropriate law enforcement agency.
The CIA's efforts to collect foreign intelligence from residents
of the United States willing to assist the CIA are a valid and neces-
sary element of its responsibility. Not only do these persons provide
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a large reservoir of foreign intelligence; they are by far the most
accessible source of such information.
The division's files on American citizens and firms representing
actual or potential sources of information constitute a necessary part
of its legitimate intelligence activities. They do not appear to be
vehicles for the collection or communication of derogatory, embar-
rassing, or sensitive information about American citizens.
The division's efforts, with few exceptions, have been confined to
legitimate topics.
The collection of information with respect to American dissident
groups exceeded legitimate foreign intelligence collection and was be-
yond the proper scope of CIA activity. This impropriety was recog-
nized-in some of the division's own memoranda.
The Commission was unable to discover any specific purpose for
the collection of telephone toll call information or any use of that
information by the Agency. In the absence of a valid purpose, such
collection is improper.
B. Provision and Control of Cover for CIA Personnel
CIA personnel engaged in clandestine foreign intelligence activities
cannot travel, live or perform their duties openly as Agency employ-
ees. Accordingly, virtually all CIA personnel serving abroad and
many in the United States assume a "cover" as employees of another
government agency or of a commercial enterprise. CIA involvement in
certain activities, such as research and development projects, are also
sometimes conducted under cover.
CIA's cover arrangements are essential to the CIA's performance
of its foreign intelligence mission. The investigation has disclosed
no instances in which domestic aspects of the CIA's cover arrange-
ments involved any violations of law.
By definition, however, cover necessitates an element of deception
which must be practiced within the United States as well as within
foreign countries. This creates a risk of conflict with various regula-
tory statutes and other legal requirements. The Agency recognizes this
risk. It has installed controls under which cover arrangements are
closely supervised to attempt to ensure compliance with applicable
laws.
C. Operating Proprietary Companies
The CIA uses proprietary companies to provide cover and perform
administrative tasks without attribution to the Agency. Most of the
large operating proprietaries-primarily airlines-have been liqui-
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dated, and the remainder engage in activities offering little or no
competition to private enterprise.
The only remaining large proprietary activity is a complex of fi-
nancial companies, with assets of approximately $20 million, that
enable the Agency to administer certain sensitive trusts, annuities,
escrows, insurance arrangements, and other benefits and payments
provided to officers or contract employees without attribution to CIA.
The remaining small operating proprietaries, generally having fewer
than ten employees each, make nonattributable purchases of equip-
ment and supplies.
Except as discussed in connection with the Office of Security (see
Chapters 12 and 13), the Commission has found no evidence that any
proprietaries have been used for operations against American citizens
or investigation of their activities. All of them appear to be subject
to close supervision and multiple financial controls within the Agency.
D. Development of Contacts With Foreign Nationals
In connection with the CIA's foreign intelligence responsibilities,
it seeks to develop contacts with foreign nationals within the United
States. American citizens voluntarily assist in developing these con-
tacts. As far as the Commission can find, these activities have not
involved coercive methods.
These activities appear to be directed entirely to the production
of foreign intelligence and to be within the authority of the CIA. We
found no evidence that any of these activities have been directed
against American citizens.
E. Assistance in Narcotics Control
The Directorate of Operations provides foreign intelligence sup-
port to the government's efforts to control the flow of narcotics and
other dangerous drugs into this country. The CIA coordinates clandes-
tine intelligence collection overseas and provides other government
agencies with foreign intelligence on drug traffic.
From the beginning of such efforts in 1969, the CIA Director and
other officials have instructed employees to make no attempt to gather
information on Americans allegedly trafficking in drugs. If such in-
formation is obtained incidentally, it is transmitted to law enforce-
ment agencies.
Concerns that the CIA's narcotics-related intelligence activities may
involve the Agency in law enforcement or other actions directed
against American citizens thus appear unwarranted.
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Beginning in the fall of 1973, the Directorate monitored conver-
sations between the United States and Latin America in an effort to
identify narcotics traffickers. Three months after the program began,
the General Counsel of the CIA was consulted. He issued an opinion
that the program was illegal, and it was immediately terminated.
This monitoring, although a source of valuable information for
enforcement officials, was a violation of a statute of the United States.
Continuation of the operation for over three months without the
knowledge of the Office of the General Counsel demonstrates the
need for improved internal consultation. (See. Recommendation 10.)
8. Domestic Activities of the Directorate of Science and
Technology (Chapter 16)
Findings and Conclusions
The CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology performs a va-
riety of research and development and operational support functions
for the Agency's foreign intelligence mission.
Many of these activities are performed in the United States and
involve cooperation with private companies. A few of these activities
were improper or questionable.
As part of a program to test the influence of drugs on humans, re-
search included the administration of LSD to persons who were un-
aware that they were being tested. This was clearly illegal. One
person died in 1953, apparently as a result. In 1963, following the In-
spector General's discovery of these events, new stringent criteria
were issued prohibiting drug testing by the CIA on unknowing per-
sons. All drug testing programs were ended in 1967.
In the process of testing monitoring equipment for use overseas, the
CIA has overheard conversations between Americans. The names of
the speakers were not identified; the contents of the conversations were
not disseminated. All recordings were destroyed when testing was con-
cluded. Such testing should not be directed against unsuspecting per-
sons in the United States. Most of the testing undertaken by the Agency
could easily have been performed using only Agency personnel and
with the full knowledge of those whose conversations were being re-
corded. This is the present Agency practice.
Other activities of this Directorate include the manufacture of alias
credentials for use by CIA employees and agents. Alias credentials
are necessary to facilitate CIA clandestine operations, but the strictest
controls and accountability must be maintained over the use of such
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documents. Recent guidelines established by the Deputy Director for
Operations to control the use of alias documentation appear adequate
to prevent abuse in the future.
As part of another program, photographs taken by CIA aerial
photography equipment are provided to civilian agencies of the
government. Such photographs are used to assess natural disasters,
conduct route surveys and forest inventories, and detect crop blight.
Permitting civilian use of aerial photography systems is proper.
The economy of operating but one aerial photography program dic-
tates the use of these photographs for appropriate civilian purposes.
Recommendation (27)
In accordance with its present guidelines, the CIA should not
again engage in the testing of drugs on unsuspecting persons.
Recommendation (28)
Testing of equipment for monitoring conversations should not
involve unsuspecting persons living within the United States.
Recommendation (29)
A civilian agency committee should be reestablished to oversee
the civilian uses of aerial intelligence photography in order to
avoid any concerns over the improper domestic use of a CIA-de-
veloped system.
9. CIA Relationships With Other Federal, State, and
Local Agencies (Chapter 17)
CIA operations touch the interest of many other agencies. The CIA,
like other agencies of the government, frequently has occasion to give
or receive assistance from other agencies. This investigation has con-
centrated on those relationships which raise substantial questions un-
der the CIA's legislative mandate.
Findings and Conclusions
A. Federal Bureau of Investigation
The FBI counterintelligence operations often have positive intelli-
gence ramifications. Likewise, legitimate domestic CIA activities occa-
sionally cross the path of FBI investigations. Daily liaison is there-
fore necessary between the two agencies.
Much routine information is passed back and forth. Occasionally
joint operations are conducted. The relationship between the agencies
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has, however, not been uniformly satisfactory over the years. Formal
liaison was cut off from February 1970 to November 1972, but rela-
tionships have improved in recent years.
The relationship between the CIA and the FBI needs to be clarified
and outlined in detail in order to ensure that the needs of national
security are met without creating conflicts or gaps of jurisdiction.
Recommendation (30)
The Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the
FBI should prepare and submit for approval by the National
Security Council a detailed agreement setting forth the juris-
diction of each agency and providing for effective liaison with
respect to all matters of mutual concern. This agreement should
be consistent with the provisions of law and with other applicable
recommendations of this Report.
Findings and Conclusions
B. Narcotics Law Enforcement Agencies
Beginning in late 1970, the CIA assisted the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) to uncover possible corruption within
that organization. The CIA used one of its proprietary companies to re-
cruit agents for BNDD and gave them short instructional courses.
Over two and one-half years, the CIA recruited 19 agents for the
BNDD. The project was terminated in 1973.
The Director was correct in his written directive terminating the
project. The CIA's participation in law enforcement activities in the
course of these activties was forbidden by its statute. The Director
and the Inspector General should be alert to prevent involvement of
the Agency yin similar enterprises in the future.
C. The Department of State
For more than 20 years, the CIA through a proprietary conducted
a training school for foreign police and security officers in the United
States under the auspices of the Agency for International Development
of the Department of State. The proprietary also sold small amounts of
licensed firearms and police equipment to the foreign officers and their
departments.
The CIA's activities in providing educational programs for for-
eign police were not improper under the Agency's statute. Although
the school was conducted within the United States through a CIA
proprietary, it had no other significant domestic impact.
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Engaging in the firearms business was a questionable activity for a
government intelligence agency. It should not be repeated.
D. Funding Requests From Other Federal Agencies
In the spring of 1970, at the request of the White House, the CIA
contributed $33,655.68 for payment of stationery and other costs for
replies to persons who wrote the President after the invasion of
Cambodia.
This use of CIA funds for a purpose unrelated to intelligence is
improper. Steps should be taken to ensure against any repetition of
such -an incident.
E. State and Local Police
The CIA handles a variety of routine security matters through liai-
son with local police departments. In addition, it offered training
courses from 1966 to 1973 to United States police officers on a variety
of law enforcement techniques, and has frequently supplied equipment
to state and local police.
In general, the coordination and cooperation between state and'
local law enforcement agencies and the 'CIA has been exemplary,
based upon a desire to facilitate their respective legitimate aims and
goals.
Most of the assistance rendered to state and local law enforcement
agencies by the CIA has been no more than pan effort to share with law
enforcement authorities the benefits of new methods, techniques, and
equipment developed or used by the Agency.
On a few occasions, however, the Agency has improperly become
involved in actual police operations. Thus, despite a general rule
against providing manpower to local police forces, the CIA has lent
men, along with radio-equipped vehicles, to the Washington Metropoli-
tan Police Department to help monitor anti-war demonstrations. It
helped the same Department surveil a police informer. It also provided
an interpreter to the Fairfax County (Virginia) Police Department to
aid in a criminal investigation.
In compliance with the spirit of a recent Act of Congress, the CIA
terminated all but routine assistance to state and local law enforce-
ment agencies in 1973. Such assistance is now being provided state and
local agencies by the FBI. There is no impropriety in the CIA's fur-
nishing the FBI with information on new technical developments
which may be useful to local law enforcement.
For several years the CIA has given gratuities to local police offi-
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cers who had been helpful to the Agency. Any such practice should
be terminated.
The CIA has also received assistance from local police forces. Aside
from routine matters, officers from such forces have occasionally
assisted the Office of Security in the conduct of investigations. The
CIA has occasionally obtained police badges and other identification
for use as cover for its agents.
Except for one occasion when some local police assisted the CIA
in an unathorized entry, the assistance received by the CIA from state
and local law enforcement authorities was proper. The use of police
identification as a means of providing cover, while not strictly speak- .
ing a violation of the Agency's statutory authority as long as no police
function is performed, is a practice subject to misunderstanding and
should be avoided.
10. Indices and Files on American Citizens (Chapter 18)
Findings
Biographical information is a major resource of an intelligence
agency. The CIA maintains a number of files and indices that include
biographical information on Americans.
As a part of its normal process of indexing names and information
of foreign intelligence interest, the Directorate of Operations has in-
dexed some 7,000,000 names of all nationalities. An estimated 115,000
of these are believed to be American citizens.
Where a person is believed to be of possibly continuing intelligence
interest, files to collect information as received are opened. An esti-
mated 57,000 out of a total of 750,000 such files concern American
citizens. For the most part, the names of Americans appear in indices
and files as actual or potential sources of information or assistance to
the CIA. In addition to these files, files on some 7,200 American
citizens, relating primarily to their domestic activities, were, as already
stated, compiled within the Directorate of Operations as part of
Operation CHAOS.
The Directorate of Administration maintains a number of files on
persons who have been associated with the CIA. These files are main-
tained for security, personnel, training, medical and payroll purposes.
Very few are maintained on persons unaware that they have a rela-
tionship with the CIA. However, the Office of Security maintained
files on American citizens associated with dissident groups who were
never affiliated with the Agency because they were considered a threat
to the physical security of Agency facilities and employees. These
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files were also maintained, in part, for use in future security clearance
determinations. Dissemination of security files is restricted to persons
with an operational need for them.
The Office of Legislative Counsel maintains files concerning its rela-
tionships with congressmen.
Conclusions
Although maintenance of most of the indices, files, and records of
the Agency has been necessary and proper, the standards applied by
the Agency at some points during its history have permitted the ac-
cumulation and indexing of materials not needed for legitimate intelli-
gence or security purposes. Included in this category are many of the
files related to Operation CHAOS and the activities of the Office of
Security concerning dissident groups.
Constant vigilance by the Agency is essential to prevent the collec-
tion of information on United States citizens which is not needed for
proper intelligence activities. The Executive Order recommended by
the Commission (Recommendation 2) will ensure purging of non-
essential or improper materials from Agency files.
11. Allegations Concerning the Assassination of Presi-
dent Kennedy (Chapter 19)
Numerous allegations have been made that the CIA participated in
the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The Commission staff
investigated these allegations. On the basis of the staff's investigation,
the Commission concludes that there is no credible evidence of CIA
involvement.
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Part II
The CIA's Role andAuthority
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Introduction
The legal authority of the Central Intelligence Agency derives
primarily from the National Security Act of 1941 and the implement-
ing directives of the National Security Council.
The Act, written in broad terms, is properly understood only
against the historical background. Chapter 4 discusses this back-
ground.
Chapter 5 sets forth the statutory language and describes the legis-
lative history, the subsequent National Security Council directives,
and the administrative practice.
Chapter 6 analyzes the scope of the CIA's legal authority for its
activities within the United States.
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Chapter 4
Intelligence and Related Activities by
the United States before 1947
The United States, like other countries, has long collected intelli-
gence. Until World War II, however, its activities were minimal.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower described the prewar United States
intelligence system as "a shocking deficiency that impeded all construc-
tive planning." 1 It was not until the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
was established during the second World War that the organized col-
lection of intelligence began on a substantial scale, although the FBI
was active in Latin America in the late 1930's and during the war.
Even before Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was
acutely aware of deficiencies in American intelligence. When calling
on William J. Donovan, a New York lawyer who later headed OSS,
to draft a plan for an intelligence service, he bluntly observed : "We
have no intelligence service." 2 Donovan's study recommended that a
central unit be established to coordinate intelligence activities and
to process information for the President. As a result, OSS was created
to operate in certain major theaters.
The function of OSS was to collect and analyze strategic informa-
tion required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to conduct special op-
erations not assigned to other agencies. Other intelligence services of
the State Department and the military services were maintained to
collect tactical intelligence directly related to their specific missions.
OSS relied primarily on three operating staffs : (1) the Secret
Intelligence division, assigned to overseas collection, generally in-
volving espionage; (2) the X-2 division, the counterespionage unit
which protected the security of espionage agents; (3) the Research
and Analysis division, which produced intelligence reports for policy
makers. The OSS also performed other functions, varying from
propaganda to paramilitary operations.
1 D. D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 32 (1948).
2 H. H. Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment, p. 61 (1970).
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By the end of the war, approximately 13,000 employees were en-
gaged in the intelligence and special operations activities of the OSS.
It supplied policymakers with essential facts and intelligence esti-
mates. It also played an important role in directly aiding military
campaigns. Nevertheless, OSS never received complete jurisdiction
over all foreign intelligence activities. In the Southwest Pacific
Theater, its activities were limited. Moreover, although the jurisdic-
tional boundaries between the FBI and the military services were
never made entirely clear, the FBI had been assigned responsibility
for intelligence activities in Latin America. Friction inevitably de-
veloped among the FBI, the military and OSS during the war.
On October 1, 1945, following the end of the war, President Tru-
man ordered that OSS be dissolved as an independent body. Several
of the branches of OSS continued and were absorbed by other agen-
cies. Research and intelligence evaluation was assigned to the State
Department, and espionage and related special operations were trans-
ferred to the jar Department.
Even before OSS was dismembered, however, proposals had been
drawn up for a postwar centralized intelligence system. These early
plans, and the discussions concerning them, led ultimately to the cre-
ation of the CIA. The participants in these early discussions all be-
lieved strongly that a postwar intelligence capability was necessary.
They differed only in their views concerning the proper structure and
role fora centralized agency.
The original plan General Donovan submitted to President Roose-
velt in November 1944 called for separation of intelligence services
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Direct Presidential supervision was
recommended.
To avoid duplication and ensure effective coordination, Donovan
proposed an "organization which will procure intelligence both by
overt and covert methods and will at the same time provide intelli-
gence guidance, determine national intelligence objectives, and cor-
relate the intelligence material collected by all Government agencies."
Under this plan, a powerful centralized agency would have domi-
nated the intelligence services of several departments. Donovan's
memorandum also proposed that this agency have authority to conduct
('subversive operations abroad" but "no police or law enforcement func-
tions, either at home or abroad."
Several centralized approaches were offered in response as soon as
Donovan's plan was distributed for comment. The Navy took the lead
in opposing a complete merger of intelligence services. It asserted that
the Donovan proposal was not feasible since each operating depart-
ment had individual needs which required "operating intelligence
peculiar to itself." It proposed a Central Intelligence Agency in name
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47
only whose function would be to coordinate intelligence information,
"as far as practicable, [to] unify all foreign intelligence activities, and
to synthesize all intelligence developments abroad." The Army con-
curred in the Navy's opposition to a tightly centralized intelligence
service.
The State Department preferred an interdepartmental committee
organization chaired by the Secretary of State. The Department con-
tended that, in peacetime, the Secretary of State should supervise all
operations affecting foreign relations.
The Joint Chiefs also favored coordination but opposed tight cen-
tralization. Their opposition to intelligence collection by a central
agency was placed on the narrower ground that collection of intelli-
gence should generally by carried out by existing departments except
when done by clandestine methods. They also objected to Donovan's
proposal that the new agency engage in foreign covert operations
(such as OSS propaganda and paramilitary actions) because "subver-
sive operation abroad does not appear to be an appropriate function of
a central intelligence service." This aspect of the original Donovan
plan was not, thereafter, specifically included in any proposal.
The FBI also developed its own proposal for postwar intelligence.
It would have assigned responsibility for "civilian" intelligence to the
FBI on a world-wide basis and left "military" intelligence to the
armed services.
On January 22, 1946, in response to this policy debate, President
Truman issued a directive establishing the Central Intelligence Group
(CIG). The final directive was developed by the Bureau of the Budget
as a compromise. The CIG was directed to coordinate existing depart-
mental intelligence and to perform those intelligence functions which
the National Intelligence Authority (NIA), a forerunner of the Na-
tional Security Council, concluded should be performed centrally. The
CIG supplemented but did not supplant departmental intelligence
services, although the FBI did abruptly withdraw its intelligence
service from Latin America.
The NIA and CIG were replaced one and one-half years later by the
National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. The
CIA's organization and role reflected the CIG compromise between
competing concepts of tight centralization and loose confederation. The
CIA was only one of several agencies assigned intelligence functions.
Most of the specific assignments given the CIA, as well as the pro-
liibitions on police or internal security functions in its statute, closely
follow the original 1944 Donovan plan and the Presidential directive
creating the CIG.
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Chapter 5
The Sources of CIA Authority
The National Security. Act of 1947 charges the CIA with the duty
of coordinating the intelligence activities of the federal government
and correlating, evaluating and disseminating. intelligence which
affects national security. In addition, the Agency is to perform such
other functions and duties related to intelligence as the National
Security Council may direct. The statute makes the Director of Central
Intelligence responsible for protecting intelligence sources and
methods.
Congress contemplated that the CIA would be involved in all
aspects of foreign intelligence, including collection. It understood
that the Agency would engage in some activities, including some overt
collection, within the United States.,
The statute expressly provides that the Agency shall have no law
enforcement powers or internal security functions. This prohibition
is an integral part of the definition of the CIA's authority. It reflects
Congress' general understanding that CIA activities in the United
States would be justified only to the extent they supported the CIA's
basic foreign intelligence mission.
This understanding has been reflected in the National Security
Council Intelligence Directives and the other documents which fur-
ther define the Agency's jurisdiction.
Determining the scope of the Agency's authority within the United
States is primarily a matter of drawing the line between the respon-
sibility of the CIA and that of the FBI, while ensuring adequate
coordination to avoid gaps in coverage. The areas posing the most
substantial problems in this respect have involved counterintelligence
and the preservation of the security of intelligence sources and
methods.
Three terms used in this report require definition :
(1) overt collection-intelligence collection activities which disclose the identity of
the collecting agency to the source of the information.
(2) clandestine collection-secret collection activities where the source of the informa-
tion is unaware of the identity or existence of the collector.
(3) covert activities-activities, including collection, that are secret, and deniable as
having links to'the United States government.
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A. The Statutes
The National Security Act of 1947 replaced the National Intel-
ligence Authority with the National Security Council, composed of the
President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other
Secretaries and Under Secretaries when appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate.3 Subsequent legislation
added the Vice President as a member. The Act also created the
Central Intelligence Agency and placed it under the direction of the
National Security Council.
The Agency's statutory authority is contained in Title 50 U.S.C.
Sections 403 (d) and (e) :
(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several
government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it
shall be the duty of the [Central Intelligence] Agency, under the direction of
the National Security Council-
(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such
intelligence activities of the government departments and agencies as relate
to national security ;
(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the
coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies
of the government as relate to the national security ;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security,
and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within
the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities :
Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforce-
ment powers, or internal security functions :
Provided further, That the departments and other agencies of the Gov-
ernment shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate de-
partmental intelligence :
And provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be
responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure;
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such
additional services of common concern as the National Security Council
determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally ;
(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence
affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from
time to time direct.
(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved
by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the
Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security
shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such
intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such depart-
ments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided,
shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation,
evaluation. and dissemination:
Provided, however, That upon the written request of the Director of Central
3 Under the original statute, the Director for Mutual Security and the Chairman of the
National Security Resources Board were included as members. Both these positions have
since been abolished.
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Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make
available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correla-
tion, evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national security.
The Director of Central Intelligence, who heads the CIA, is ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The position of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, added to the
statute in 1953, is subject to similar appointment provisions. At no
time may both positionsbe filled by military officers.
Other provisions of the 1947 Act give the Director of Central In-
telligence complete authority over the employment of CIA per-
sonnel. He may, in his discretion, dismiss any employee whenever "he
shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of
the United States." His decision is not subject to judicial or Civil
Service review.
In the 1949 CIA Act, Congress enacted additional provisions per-
mitting the Agency to use confidential fiscal and administrative pro-
cedures. This Act exempts the CIA from all usual limitations on the
expenditure of federal funds. It provides that CIA funds may be
included in the budgets of other departments and then transferred to
the Agency without regard to the restrictions placed on the initial
appropriation. This Act is the statutory authority for the secrecy of
the Agency's budget.
The 1949 Act also authorizes the Director to make expenditures for
"objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature" on
his personal voucher and without further accounting. In order to
protect intelligence sources and methods from disclosure, the 1949
Act further exempts the CIA from having to disclose its "organiza-
tion, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or number of personnel
employed."
B. The Legislative History
The 1947 Congressional hearings and debates reflect .a dual concern.
Congress accepted the need for a centralized intelligence agency that
would supply the President with a complete and accurate picture of
the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign countries. On the
other hand, there was considerable congressional concern over possi-
ble misuses of this new agency. The comments of Representative
Clarence Brown (Republican-Ohio) are illustrative:
I am very much interested in seeing the United States have as fine a foreign
military and naval intelligence as they can possibly have, but I am not interested
in setting up here in the United States any particular central policy[sic] agency
under any President, and I do not care what his name may be, and just allow him
to have a gestapo of his own if he wants to have it.
Every now and then you get a man that comes up in power and that has an
imperialist idea.
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The House, in the course of its deliberations, added language to the
bill submitted to Congress by President Truman which detailed the
specific functions given to the CIA. In doing so, it generally followed
the language of the Presidential directive which had established the
Central Intelligence Group, the CIA's predecessor. The inclusion in the
1947 Act of specific functions and prohibitions, therefore, was to
ensure that a President could not alter the CIA's basic functions with-
out first obtaining the approval of Congress.
1. Authority To Collect Intelligence
The statutory functions of the Agency include coordinating in-
telligence activities and correlating and evaluating intelligence. The
statute itself does not expressly authorize the Agency to engage in
intelligence collection. Congress left this matter to the National
Security Council, which was authorized to direct the Agency to per-
form "other functions and duties related to intelligence" and "addi-
tional services of common concern," which are "for the benefit of the
existing intelligence agencies."
It is clear from the legislative history that Congress expected the
National Security Council to give the CIA responsibility and au-
thority for overseas espionage. The National Intelligence Authority
had given this responsibility to the predecessor Central Intelligence
Group in 1946. Witnesses and congressmen were reluctant to discuss
such matters publicly, but General Hoyt Vandenberg, Director of the
CIG, told the Senate committee in secret session :
If the United States is to be forced by conditions in the world today to enter
clandestine operations abroad, then such operations should be centralized in one
agency to avoid the mistakes indicated, and we should follow the experience
of the intelligence organizations of other countries which have proven success-
ful in this field.
Some witnesses during the congressional hearings opposed giving
the CIA any responsibilities for collection of intelligence and urged
that the authority of the National Security Council to assign additional
functions to the CIA be deleted so that the CIA could not collect in-
telligence. Congress did not agree. Although two congressmen ex-
pressed disapproval of any CIA collection, the general provisions were
not challenged during the floor debates. They remain in the statute as
authority for the CIA to collect intelligence at the direction of the
National Security Council.
2. The Meaning of "Intelligence"
The 1946 Presidential Directive expressly restricted the Central
Intelligence Group to activities connected with foreign intelligence.
Although the 1947 National Security Act does-not contain this ex-
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press restriction, there was a general understanding in and out of
Congress that the CIA's activities would be similarly confined.
An exchange between General Vandenberg and Congressman Chet
Holifield (Democrat-California), later the floor manager of the CIA
statute, is indicative :
GENERAL VANDENBERG. The National Intelligence Authority and the Central
Intelligence Group have nothing whatsoever to do with anything domestic ; so
when we: talk about the Central Intelligence Group or the NIA, it always means
foreign intelligence, because we have nothing to do with domestic intelligence.
Representative HOLIFIELD. That was my understanding, and I wanted it con-
firmed.
In testifying before a House committee, Navy Secretary James For-
restal said :
The purposes of the Central Intelligence Authority. [sic] are limited definitely
to purposes outside of this country, except the collation of information gathered
by other government agencies.
Regarding domestic operations, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is work-
ing at all times in collaboration with General Vandenberg. He relies upon them
for domestic activities.
When Representative Brown asked whether additional limitations
should be attached because the CIA "might possibly affect the rights
and privileges of the people of the United States," General Vanden-
berg responded :
No, sir ; I do not think there is anything in the bill, since it is all foreign in-
telligence, that can possibly affect any of the privileges of the people of the
United States. . . . I can see no real reason for limiting it at this time.
The agency has never disputed that its authority is restricted to for-
eign intelligence.
3. Activities Within the United States
The fact that the CIA is restricted to activities relating to "foreign
intelligence" does not, of course, tell us what those activities are and
whether they may be conducted within the United States. Allen
Dulles, testifying before a House committee, made the point :
They would have to exercise certain functions in the United States. They would
have their headquarters in the United States.
More importantly, an exchange between Dulles and Congressman
Manasco (Democrat-Alabama) during the closed House hearings in-
dicates that Congress understood the Agency would have authority to
collect foreign intelligence in this country from knowing sources :
-Representative MANAsco. Limit it [collection] to foreign countries, of course.
Mr. DULLES. There is one-little problem there. It is a very important section of
the thing, the point I raised there. In New York and Chicago and all through
the country where we have these business organizations and philanthropic and
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other organizations who send their people throughout the world. They collect
a tremendous amount of information. There ought to be a way of collecting that
in the United States, and I imagine that would not be excluded by any terms of
your bill.
Representative MMANASCO. The fear of the committee as to collecting informa-
tion on our own nationals, we do not want that done, but I do not think the com-
mittee has any objection to their going to any source of information that our
nationals might have on foreign operations. Is that your understanding?
Representative WADSWORTPI. (Republican-New York) Yes.
Representative IIANAsco. They could go to Chicago and talk to the presidents
of some of the machinery firms that have offices all over the world.
Mr. DULLES. That must be done.
Less clear from the legislative history is whether Congress contem-
plated that the CIA would collect foreign intelligence within the
United States by clandestine means, so that the source of the intelli-
gence would be unaware that information was being provided to the
CIA. As stated above, there was a general reluctance to discuss openly
the subject of clandestine collection. Accordingly, the absence of dis-
cussion of the subject provides little guidance.
The 1946 Presidential directive to the predecessor CIG contained
express authority only for clandestine collection "outside of the United
States and its possessions," but there is no corresponding provision in
the 1947 National Security Act.
Neither Dulles nor Vandenberg in their testimony (quoted in part
above) referred to clandestine collection as an activity the Agency
might be assigned within the United States. On the other hand, Con-
gress failed to include this activity among the prohibitions expressly
incorporated in the statute.
4. Protecting Intelligence Sources and Methods
The responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence "for pro-
tecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized dis-
closure" reflects congressional recognition that the intelligence func-
tion necessarily involves sensitive materials and that secrecy is critical.
This language was originally inserted in the early drafts of the
Act in response to the expressed concern of some military officials that
a civilian agency might not properly respect the need for secrecy. Con-
gress was also aware of the concern that United States espionage laws
were ineffective in preventing unauthorized disclosure of classified
information.
The statute does not provide the Director of Central Intelligence
with guidance on the scope of this responsibility or on how it is to be
performed; nor does it grant him additional authority to discharge
this responsibility. The legislative debates did not focus on these
issues.
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5. Prohibition Against the Exercise of Police and Law Enforce-
ment Powers and Internal Security Functions
The 1947 Act explicitly limits the CIA's domestic role by prohibit-
ing the Agency from exercising law enforcement or police powers or
undertaking internal security functions. This prohibition was taken
almost verbatim from the 1946 Presidential directive.
Although the wording of the prohibition was not specifically dis-
cussed in congressional hearings or debates, several congressmen and
witnesses expressed their concern that the CIA neither invade the
FBI's jurisdiction nor become a secret police.
Dr. Vannevar Bush, the Chairman of the Joint Research and Devel-
opment Board, responding to a question about the CIA's exercise of
domestic police and related activities, stated :
I think there is no danger of that. The bill provides clearly that it is not con-
cerned with intelligence on internal affairs, and I think this is a safeguard
against its becoming an empire.
We already have, of course, the FBI in this country, concerned with internal
matters, and the collection of intelligence in- connection with law enforcement
internally. We have had that for a good many years. I think there are very few
citizens who believe this arrangement will get beyond control so that it will be
an improper affair.
Representative Brown questioned Secretary Forrestal closely about
possible domestic activities of the CIA :
Representative BROWN. This Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Di-
rector, should he decide he wants to go into my income tax records, I presume
he could do so, could he not?
Secretary FORRESTAL. I do not assume he could.
I think he would have a very short life-I am not referring to you, Mr. Brown,
but I think he would have a very short life.
General Vandenberg spoke for many when he said :
I very strongly advocate that it [the CIA] have no police, subpoena, law en-
forcement powers or internal security functions.
6. "Services of Common Concern" and "Other Functions and Du-
ties Related to Intelligence"
The statute grants broad authority to the National Security Council
to assign the CIA other responsibilities in the intelligence field, sub-
ject to the prohibition on law enforcement powers or internal security
functions. The preceding discussion shows that Congress specifically
expected that collection of intelligence would be among those respon-
sibilities. Other such services of common concern were mentioned by
General Vandenberg before the Senate Committee on the Armed
Services :
[I]t is necessary for a central intelligence agency to perform other [functions]
of common concern to two or more agencies. These are projects which it is be-
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lieved can be most efficiently or economically performed centrally. An example
of such a service is the monitoring of foreign.voice broadcasts. . . . Similarly, we
have centralized the activities of the various foreign document branches which
were operated by some of the services individually or jointly during the war.
Neither the congressional hearings nor the floor debates discussed
the limits on the power of the NSC to assign particular activities to
the CIA as "other functions and duties related to intelligence." The
broad language reflected concerns that American experience with
peacetime intelligence needs and requirements was extremely limited.
Several witnesses-cabinet officers, military leaders and intelligence
experts-testified before Congress that the NSC should be allowed
flexibility in its direction if the CIA was to be responsive to changing
- conditions and if the United States was to develop an effective intel-
ligence service.
Under the authority of this "other functions" proviso, the Na-
tional Security Council has assigned the CIA responsibility for for-
eign covert operations of a political or paramilitary nature.
C. Practice "Under: the National Security Act
The National Security Council provides the CIA and other intel-
ligence agencies with guidance. and direction through National Se-
curity Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID's) and other official
memoranda.
By means of these. documents,, the NSC exercises its statutory au-
thority -to assign the CIA services. of common concern and other
functions and duties.related to intelligence. The NSC has also. given
some greater specificity to the.duties of correlation, evaluation, and
dissemination which: are specifically assigned in the statute. Only those
directives which -are pertinent to the Commission's . inquiry are dis-
cussed- below.
Since 1947, the CIA has had, under NSC directive, the responsibility
for ~ all espionage ' (that is, clandestine collection of foreign intelli-
gence) and clandestine counterintelligence activities conducted outside
the United States and its possessions. In 1948, the National Security
Council added the responsibility for overt collection of foreign intel-
ligence within the United States. However, the NSC has not assigned
the' CIA' responsibility for clandestine collection of foreign intelli-
gence in the United States.
The CIA has a number of miscellaneous responsibilities of an. intel-
ligence-gathering nature. Perhaps the most important for purposes of
this Commission is the?responsibility assigned it by the NSC for deal-
ing with persons who defect-to the United States overseas. (Defections
within this country are the responsibility of the FBI.) The Director of
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Central Intelligence has implemented this assignment by issuing direc-
tives which set forth the details for the defector program.
Under the National Security Council directives, the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence has primary responsibility for the identification of
impending crises and the transmission of relevant intelligence to the
appropriate officials. The Director also has the responsibility for
national intelligence-information required for the formulation of
security policy which transcends the exclusive competence of any one
department. The CIA is responsible for the regular production of cur-
rent intelligence to meet the day-to-day needs of the President and
other high-level officials. While these directives do not expressly pro-
hibit the production of intelligence on purely domestic matters, it is
clear that their focus is on overseas events.
In connection with the statutory responsibility of the Director of
Central Intelligence for the protection of intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure, the National Security Council
has directed that each agency or department be responsible for the
protection of its own sources and methods, and that the Director call
upon these other bodies as appropriate to investigate any unauthorized
disclosures and report to him. The Director, has in turn, delegated these
responsibilities to the Security Committee of the United States Intel-
ligence Board, a board composed of the heads of the various intelli-
gence agencies.
A particularly difficult security problem is presented by "leaks" of
classified information to the news media. Usually there is no way of
determining which agency is the source for any particular disclosure.
At present all "leak" cases are referred to the Security Committee for
discussion and appropriate action. The Security Committee has been
given the authority to consider the problems caused by the "leak,"
including the degree of harm to the national interest, and to make
reports and recommendations for corrective action as appropriate.
The Committee, however, has no authority to direct either the FBI
or any member agency to investigate "leaks."
The position of the FBI during the 1960's and early 1970's was firm :
the FBI would not handle "leak" cases unless directed to do so by
the Attorney General. This was a reflection of the attitude of Director
J. Edgar Hoover. He felt that investigation of news "leaks" was an
inappropriate use of FBI resources, because, most of the time, the
source of such a "leak" could not be discovered, and often when the
source was discovered, it turned out to be a high-ranking official
against whom no action would be taken. As a result, the CIA, under
Presidential pressure, has occasionally investigated such "leaks" itself,
relying on the "sources and methods" proviso for authority.
The FBI's internal security authority and the CIA's foreign intelli-
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gence responsibilities result in frequent contact, particularly in the
area of counterintelligence. The FBI has responsibility for "in-
vestigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive
activities and related matters" regarding the security of the United
States. The CIA has the corresponding authority overseas. It also
maintains central records and indices of foreign counterintelligence
information. The NSC has assigned to the Director of Central Intelli-
gence responsibility for establishing procedures to ensure the central-
ized direction and prior coordination of foreign and domestic counter-
intelligence activities.
Close coordination between the two agencies is required in many sit-
uations such as a visit by a foreign intelligence officer to this country
to engage in espionage. The "transfer" of responsibility for counter-
intelligence requires constant cooperation between the CIA and FBI.
Such coordination has not always existed, but the Commission was
informed by representatives of both the CIA and the FBI that good
relations and efficient liaison presently exist between the two agencies.
A formal memorandum between the CIA and the FBI in. February
'1966 provides the most detailed statement of the understanding by
the two agencies of their respective authorities. For example, the FBI
must be kept advised of clandestine CIA personnel in the United
States. Where CIA handling of agents in this country is inadequate
to protect the FBI's internal security interest, the FBI has unre-
stricted access to them.
The 1966 memorandum does not solve all problems. It does not out-
line or indicate in. any specific degree the limits on CIA's activities
related to foreign intelligence. No reference is made to the CIA's role
within the United States to protect intelligence sources and methods,
or to .its power to conduct investigations for this purpose. This has been
a troublesome area, as the FBI has declined to investigate the person-
nel of CIA or any other government agency suspected of a breach of
security unless there is substantial evidence of espionage. Within the
last year, work has begun to supplement and rewrite this memorandum
to improve coordination and avoid future conflicts or gaps of
jurisdiction.
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Chapter 6
Legal Analysis
Introduction
The CIA, like every other agency of the federal government,
possesses only that authority which the Constitution or duly enacted
statutes confer on it. And, like every other agency, it is subject to
any prohibitions or restraints which the Constitution and applicable
statutes impose on it.
Congress vested broad powers in the CIA. Its purpose was to create
an effective centralized foreign intelligence agency with sufficient
authority and flexibility to meet new conditions as they arose.
But the Agency's authority under the Act is not unlimited. All its
functions must relate in some way to foreign intelligence. The Agency
is further restricted by the Act's prohibition on law enforcement
powers and internal security functions, as well as by other Constitu-
tional and statutory provisions.
Determining the lawfulness of particular Agency conduct requires
analysis of its authority as well as any applicable restrictions. The
process does not always produce clear and precise answers. Difficult
questions of statutory and Constitutional interpretation are involved.
There are few, if any, authoritative judicial decisions. The legislative
history and the experience under the Act are an uncertain guide.
In many instances, the only appropriate test is one of reasonable-
ness. Different persons are likely to hold different opinions as to what
the statutes and Constitution authorize or prohibit in particular
circumstances.
Legal questions are only the beginning of a complete analysis of
the issues. A distinction must be drawn between what the law
authorizes or prohibits and what may be desirable or undesirable as
a matter of public policy. Activities which the law authorizes may,
nonetheless, be undesirable as a matter of policy. Conversely, policy
may create a compelling need for activities which have not been au-
thorized; to the extent that no Constitutional restrictions pose an abso-
(58)
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lute barrier, authority for such activities may be sought if it does
not now exist.
.In the Commission's recommendations, both law and policy are
considered. This chapter, however, is intended to deal ? only with the
applicable law.
A. The Extent of the CIA's Authority
1. The Authority of the CIA as to Foreign Intelligence
Although the National Security Act does not expressly limit the
CIA's intelligence activities to foreign intelligence, it appears from
the legislative history as a whole and the consistent practice under
the statute that the Agency's responsibility is so limited.
In deciding what constitutes "foreign intelligence," the subject
matter of the information and not the location of its source is the
principal factor that determines whether it is within the purview of
the CIA.1 This conclusion is supported by that portion of the legisla-
tive history which indicates the CIA may collect foreign intelligence
in this country by overt means.
"Foreign intelligence" is a term with no settled meaning. It is used
but not defined in National Security Council Intelligence Directives.
Its scope is unclear where information has both foreign and domestic
aspects.
The legislative history indicates general congressional concern that
the Agency should not direct activities against United States citizens
or accumulate information on them. However, Congress did not ex-
pressly prohibit any activities by the CIA except the exercise of law
enforcement and internal security functions.
We believe the congressional concern is properly accommodated by
construing "foreign intelligence" as information concerning the capa-
bilities, intentions, and activities of foreign- nations, individuals or
entities, wherever that information can be found. It does not include
information on domestic activities of United States citizens unless
there is reason to suspect they are engaged in espionage or similar
illegal activities on behalf of foreign powers.
The authority of the CIA to collect foreign intelligence in this
country by clandestine means is also unclear. The Act neither ex-
pressly authorizes such collection nor expressly prohibits it. The
National Security Council has never formally assigned this responsi-
bility to the CIA. The Commission concludes that the CIA's authority
in this area needs clarification.
1 See also Heine v. Rana, 261 F. Supp. 570 (D. Md. 1966), vacated and remanded, 399
F. 2d 785 (4th Cir. 1968).
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2. Support Activities
In order to carry on its authorized intelligence functions within and
without the United States, the CIA must necessarily engage in a
variety of support activities. Such activities include the operation of
its headquarters, the recruitment and training of employees, the pro-
curement of supplies, communication with overseas stations, and
the like.
The Commission finds that the authority to conduct foreign intel-
ligence operations includes the authority to conduct such otherwise
lawful domestic activities as are reasonably necessary and appro-
priate by way of support. This includes the authority to use those
unusual cover and support devices required by the clandestine nature
of the CIA.
3. Protection of Sources and Methods
The National Security Act requires the Director of Central Intel-
ligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure. The Commission believes that this provision and the in-
herent authority of the Director authorize the Agency to take reason-
able measures not otherwise prohibited to protect the facilities and
personnel of the Agency from outside threats and to ensure good
security practices by persons affiliated with the Agency.
What measures are reasonable in a particular case depends on all the
facts and circumstances. No general rule can be laid down, but some
relevant factors can be suggested. Among them are :
-The degree of danger to the security of the Agency;
-The sensitivity of the activities involved;
-The extent and nature of the Agency's intrusions on individ-
ual privacy; and,
-The alternative means of protection available.
Because of the uncertainty inherent in a test of reasonableness, the
Commission in the chapters which follow has recommended both stat-
utory changes and a number of restrictions on the means which the
Agency may employ to protect its sources and methods..
On rare occasions, the Agency has asserted that the Director's au-
thority permits him to investigate any unauthorized disclosure that
jeopardizes intelligence sources and methods. This claim has been
made in cases where there was no reason to believe the disclosure came
from a person in any way related to the Agency. Although the statu-
tory language and legislative history are not precise, the Commission
finds that such an interpretation is unwarranted, especially in light
of the applicable NSCID that makes the CIA responsible only for
unauthorized disclosures from the Agency.
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In our judgment:
(a) The investigative authority of the Director is limited to
persons affiliated with the Agency-that is, employees (including
former employees and applicants for employment), contractors
and their employees, knowing sources of intelligence, agents and
similar persons used by the Agency in operations, and others who
require clearance by the CIA for access to classified information.
Such investigations must be conducted in a lawful manner con-
sistent with the requirements of the Constitution and applicable
statutes.
(b) Investigation of breaches of security by employees of other
government agencies is the responsibility of the heads of those
agencies or of the FBI.
(c) The CIA has no authority to investigate newsmen.
The Commission proposes statutory changes as well as an Executive
Order to olarify these matters.
4. Other Authority
The CIA derives some authority from federal statutes of general
application. The Economy Act of 1932 2 authorizes government
agencies to provide services and equipment to each other where that
course would be in the best interest of the government. Public
Law 90-331 requires all federal agencies to assist the Secret Serv-
ice in the performance of its protective duties. The authority granted
in these acts is often exercised by the CIA, but our investigation has
disclosed no improprieties arising from that exercise.
The CIA may from time to time be delegated some of the President's
inherent authority under the Constitution in matters affecting foreign
relations. The scope of the President's inherent authority and the
power of the Congress to control the manner of its exercise are difficult
Constitutional issues not raised by the facts found by the Commission
in carrying out its assignment.
B. The Restrictions on CIA's Authority
1. The Prohibition on Law Enforcement Powers or Internal Se-
curity Functions
The statutory proviso that "the Agency shall have no police, sub-
pena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions" was
initially designed to prevent the CIA from becoming a national secret
police force. It was also intended to protect the domestic jurisdiction
of the FBI. The statute does not define the terms used.
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Many matters related to foreign intelligence or the security of the
Agency also relate to law enforcement or internal security. For exam-
ple, an unauthorized disclosure of classified information by an Agency
employee may also violate the espionage acts or other criminal statutes.
Additionally, the Agency in the ordinary course of its business has
relationships of various types with law enforcement agencies. Some
of these relationships may raise questions of compliance with the
proviso.
The Commission finds that whether Agency activity is prohibited
depends principally on the purpose for which it is conducted. If the
principal purpose of the activity is the prosecution of crimes or pro-
tection against civil disorders or domestic insurrection, then the activ-
ity is prohibited. On the other hand, if the principal purpose relates to
foreign intelligence or to protection of the security of the Agency, the
activity is permissible, within limits, even though it might also be
performed by a law enforcement agency.
For instance, the mere fact that the Agency has files on or contain-
ing the names of American citizens is not in itself a violation of the
statutory prohibition on law enforcement or internal security func-
tions. The test is always the purpose for which the files were accumu-
lated and the use made of them thereafter.
The Commission does not construe the proviso to prohibit the CIA
from evaluating and disseminating foreign intelligence which may be
relevant and useful to law enforcement. Such a function is simply
an exercise of the Agency's statutory responsibility "to correlate and
evaluate intelligence relating to the national security." Nor do we
believe that the CIA is barred from passing domestic information to
interested agencies, including law enforcement agencies, where that
information was incidentally acquired in the course of authorized
foreign intelligence activities. Indeed, where the Agency has informa-
tion directly relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation, as it did
in connection with the Watergate investigation, the Agency is under
a duty to bring its evidence to the attention of the appropriate
authorities.
So long as the Agency does not actively participate in the activities
of law enforcement agencies, we find that it is proper for it to furnish
such agencies with thebenefits of technical developments and expertise
which may improve their effectiveness.
In the past, the Agency has conducted some technical training of
members of state and local police forces through the Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration. A 1973 statute prohibited this prac-
tice. The. Agency has interpreted the statute to evidence congressional
intent that it terminate furnishing such training directly to local law
enforcement agencies as well. The Commission approves the Agency's
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decision to leave to the FBI such training of state and local police
officers.
2. Constitutional Prohibitions
The Central Intelligence Agency, like all organs of government,
is required to obey the Constitution. The protections of the Constitu-
tion extend generally to all persons within the borders of the United
States, even aliens who have entered the country illegally.
a. The First Amendment.-The First Amendment to the Constitu-
tion protects among other things freedom of speech, of the.press, and
of political association from abridgement by the government. These
freedoms are not absolute. The Amendment, as Mr. Justice Holmes
noted, does not "protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic." Nevertheless, government conduct which inhibits the
exercise of these Constitutional, rights raises a substantial Constitu-
tional question.
The interception of private communications and the undue
accumulation of: information on political views or activities of Ameri-
can citizens could have some inhibiting effect. Because the Commis-
sion has found these activities were improper for- other reasons, it is
unnecessary to explore the First Amendment questions in detail.
b. The Fourth Ame, dment.-The Fourth Amendment. prohibits
unreasonable searches and: seizures. In ordinary criminal cases, law
enforcement officers must obtain a judicial warrant before searching
a person's residence, hotel room, or office, except in "exigent circum-
stances." When the Supreme. Court held in 1967 that private conversa-
tions were protected by the Fourth Amendment, it. made it clear that
all wiretaps and other forms of surreptitious electronic surveillance
were within the field of investigative activities that ordinarily require
..prior judicial approval.
It isunclear whether the President can act without such approval
in some cases where the national security is involved. The Supreme
Court recently held that a warrant is required in.national security
cases having "no significant connection with a foreign power, its
agents or agencies." 3 However, the Court expressly reserved decision
on whether a significant-foreign connection would justify a?different
result. Some lower courts have held that no warrant is required in
such cases.
Neither the- Fourth Amendment nor any other Constitutional, or
?statutory provision prohibits physical surveillance-the observation
of the:,public comings and goings of an individual-unless such sur-
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veillance reaches the point of harassment. The use of undercover
aents or informers is also largely uncontrolled by legal standards.4
c. Waiver and Consent-Constitutional rights may be waived in cer-
tain circumstances. The Supreme Court has held that a valid waiver
must be knowing and voluntary, and the evidence of such a waiver must
be clear and unequivocal. The government cannot make waiver of Con-
stitutional rights a condition of public employment, unless the demand
for such a waiver is reasonably related to a proper governmental objec-
tive and the waiver is the least restrictive means available to achieve
that objective. Whether a particular waiver is valid depends on all the
facts of the case.
3. Statutory Prohibitions
a. The Omnibzts Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.-Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 5 prohibits the
interception of private conversations through wiretaps or other forms
of electronic eavesdropping unless one party to the conversation con-
sents or a judicial warrant is obtained. The statute expressly does not
affect whatever power the President has to order warrantless wire-
taps or eavesdropping in national security cases. An Executive Order,
dated June 30, 1965, permits warrantless wiretaps so long as the written
approval of the President or the Attorney General is obtained.
The statute defines "interception" to mean "the acquisition of the
contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical, or other device." A number of judicial de-
cisions have held that the Act does not prohibit the collection of long-
distance telephone billing records. These records show the telephone
number called, the date and time of the call, and,' in some cases, the
names of the parties. They do not indicate the content of the call.
A different question is posed by the acquisition of communications
incidental to the testing of interception equipment to be used abroad.
On the face of the statute, such activities appear to be prohibited.
b. Statutes Protecting the United States Mails.-Opening first-class
mail to examine its contents without a lawfully issued warrant is
illegal .6 The statutes set forth no exception for national security
matters.
The examination of the exterior of first-class mail without opening
it presents a different problem. Lower federal courts have held that
these so-called "mail covers" are valid if they are conducted within
the framework of the postal regulations and there is no unreasonable
delay of the mail. The Supreme Court has not passed on this issue.
4 Hoffa N,. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
18 U.S.C. sec. 2510 at seq.
18 U.S.C. sees. 1701-1703.
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c. Disclosure of Income Tax Information.-Federal statutes, Execu-
tive Orders, and Internal Revenue Service regulations prohibit dis-
closure of information from federal income tax returns except under
carefully defined procedures. There is no exception to these require-
ments for the CIA. Indeed, CIA inspection of tax returns was one form
of improper activity specifically mentioned in the 1947 Act's legislative
history.
d. Other Statutes.-The Commission has not attempted to identify
or, analyze all statutes which might conceivably apply to activities by
the, CIA or on its behalf. Whether in any particular case a criminal or
other prohibitory statute restricts the authority of the CIA within the
United States is a question of interpretation of that statute in light of
the National Security Act. The statute may contain an express or im-
plied exception for activities required in the interest of national secur-
ity ;. on the other hand, it may be an unqualified prohibition on certain
conduct. Only an analysis of the language, any relevant legislative his-
tory, and the underlying policies can answer the question in a par-
ticular case.
Conclusions
The evidence within the scope of this inquiry does not indicate
that fundamental rewriting of the National Security Act is either
necessary or appropriate.
The evidence does demonstrate the need for some statutory and ad-
ministrative clarification of the role and function of the Agency.
Ambiguities have been partially responsible for some, though not
all, of the Agency's deviations within the United States from its
assigned mission. In some cases, reasonable persons will differ as to
the lawfulness of the activity; in others, the absence of clear guide-
lines as to its authority deprived the Agency of a means of resisting
pressures to engage in activities which now appear to us improper.
Greater public awareness of the limits of the CIA's domestic
authority would do much to reassure the American people.
The requisite clarification can best be accomplished (a) through a
specific amendment clarifying the National Security Act provision
which delineates the permissible scope of CIA activities, as set forth
in Recommendation 1, and (b) through issuance of an Executive
Order further limiting domestic activities of the CIA, as set forth in
Recommendation 2.
Recommendation (1)
Section 403 of the National Security Act of 1947 should be
amended in the form set forth in Appendix VI to this Report.
These amendments, in summary, would:
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a. Make explicit that the CIA's activities must be related to
foreign intelligence.
b. Clarify the responsibility of the CIA to protect intelli-
gence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
(The Agency would be responsible for protecting against un-
authorized disclosures within the CIA, and it would be respon-
sible for providing guidance and technical assistance to other
agency and department heads in protecting against unauthor-
ized disclosures within their own agencies and departments.)
c. Confirm publicly the CIA's existing authority to collect
foreign intelligence from willing sources within the United
States, and, except as specified by the President in a published
Executive Order ,7 prohibit the CIA from collection efforts
within the United States directed at securing foreign intelli-
gence from unknowing American citizens.
Recommendation (2)
The President should by Executive Order prohibit the CIA from
the collection of information about the domestic activities of U.S.
citizens (whether by overt or covert means), the evaluation, corre-
lation, and dissemination of analyses or reports about such activi-
ties, and the storage of such information, with exceptions for the
following categories of persons or activities :
a. Persons presently or formerly affiliated, or being con-
sidered for affiliation, with the CIA, directly or indirectly, or
others who require clearance by the CIA to receive classified
information ;
b. Persons or activities that pose a clear threat to CIA
facilities or personnel, provided that proper coordination with
the FBI is accomplished;
c. Persons suspected of espionage or other illegal activ-
ities relating to foreign intelligence, provided that proper
coordination with the FBI is accomplished.
d. Information which is received incidental to appropriate
CIA activities may be transmitted to an agency with appro-
priate jurisdiction, including law enforcement agencies.
Collection of information from normal library sources such as
7 The Executive Order authorized by this statute should recognize that when the collection
of foreign intelligence from persons who are not United States citizens results in the incidental
acquisition of information from unknowing citizens, the Agency should be permitted to make
appropriate use or disposition of such information. Such collection activities must be directed at
foreign intelligence sources, and the involvement of American citizens must be incidental.
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newspapers, books, magazines, and other such documents is not
to be affected by this order.
Information currently being maintained which is inconsistent
with the order should be destroyed at the conclusion of the cur-
rent congressional investigations, or as soon thereafter as per-
mitted by law.
The CIA should periodically screen its files and eliminate all
material inconsistent with the order.
The order should be issued after consultation with the National
Security Council, the Attorney General, and the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence. Any modification of the order would be per-
mitted only through published amendments.
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Part III
Supervision and Control
of the CIA
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Introduction
The President has directed the Commission to determine whether
existing safeguards are adequate to. ensure that future domestic CIA
activities do not exceed the Agency's authority. We have, therefore,
examined CIA's external and internal controls.
Control over the CIA is exercised both within the Agency and
externally by control of policy, resources and operations. First, poli-
cies are established, written into regulations and issued as guidelines.
Second, resources such as money, property and personnel are allo-
cated to activities consistent with this guidance. Third, direct super-
vision of CIA activities seeks to ensure that activities of the organiza-
tion are consistent with policy guidance.
In this part of the report, we first examine the supervision of the
CIA externally and then explain how the CIA has been controlled
internally.
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Chapter 7
External Controls
Because of the CIA's intelligence role and the resulting special need
for secrecy, the Agency is subject to different external checks from
other government agencies.
It does not fit within any regular pattern of executive supervision
and control.
Its development during a period of "cold war," in which the needs
for national security supported a broad construction of CIA's author-
ity, limited control by Congress over its activities.
Until recently, there has been little public scrutiny of its activities.
Devices which have been utilized for external control of CIA are
as follows :
A. Control by the Executive Branch
1. The National Security Council and Related Bodies
Primary executive control over CIA activities is exercised by the
National Security Council (NSC), which by statute is responsible for
supervising the CIA.
Despite its nominally supervisory position, the control exercised by
the NSC relates almost entirely to basic policies and allocation of
resources.
NSC determines where and how the CIA should undertake some
activities and their scope. The NSC generally does not consider the
desirability of specific operational methods, questions of administra-
tive management, or whether particular projects are within the CIA's
statutory authority.
The current members of the NSC are the President, Vice President,
and Secretaries of State and Defense; although not members of the
NSC, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff attend all NSC meetings as observers and
advisers.
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The NSC establishes policy for the CIA primarily through
National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID's). Ad-
dressed to the entire intelligence community, they often assign re-
sponsibilities to the CIA in addition to those assigned explicitly by
the 1947 National Security Act. Each is issued under authority of that
Act.
In general, these directives are broad delegations of responsibility;
they do not focus on particular methods for meeting the assignments.
To some extent, NSCID's may also limit the activities of the CIA by
assigning tasks to other agencies.
NSC authority over the CIA is also exercised through two com-
mittees : The NSC Intelligence Committee and the 40 Committee.
The NSC Intelligence Committee, created in 1971 following the
recommendation of a report on the intelligence community by James
R. Schlesinger (then of the Office of Management and Budget),
represents the viewpoint of users of intelligence estimates and evalu-
ations. Its members are subcabinet officials, including the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs and the Director of Central
Intelligence. It meets infrequently.
The other NSC subcommittee, now named the 40 Committee,'
reviews foreign covert operations and collection activities involving
high risk and sensitivity. It has existed in some form since 1948,
shortly after the NSC first authorized the CIA to engage in such
activities. It is now chaired by the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs; it includes the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence as members,
and has representatives from the State and Defense Departments as
well. The investigation disclosed no cases in which domestic activi-
ties-even those recognized by the Agency as highly sensitive-were
submitted to the 40 Committee for approval.
In addition to the subordinate committees of the NSC, the Presi-
dent has, by Executive Order, established a Foreign Intelligence Advis-
ory Board of private citizens to advise him on the objectives and man-
agement of the nation's intelligence effort and to conduct studies on
specific topics of interest to him.
President Eisenhower first established the Board in 1956. President
Kennedy reorganized it in 1961, and gave it the assignment. of review-
ing the events at the Bay of Pigs.
The Board has a staff of two but employs consultants and receives
personnel on loan from intelligence agencies.
It meets for twelve days each year (two days each two months).
Meetings frequently consist of briefings by intelligence services and
policymakers.
i So called because its charter is contained in National Security Decision Memorandum
40-it does not have 40 members.
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The Advisory Board does not exert control over the CIA. In fact,
the CIA is the Board's only source of information about CIA activi-
ties. It has not considered domestic intelligence activities, except that
in the early 1970's it explored the relationship between the CIA and
the FBI in connection with foreign intelligence activities which could
successfully be accomplished within the United States.
Thus .in June 1972, the Board recommended to the President that
the jurisdictional lines be clarified, either legislatively or administra-
tively, so that some government agency might undertake certain spe-
cific intelligence activities within the United States.
2. Other Intelligence Committees
As one component of the federal government's foreign intelligence
services-albeit the one with the widest authority-the CIA receives
at least nominal direction and control from coordinating commit-
tees established by the NSC.
The independence of these committees as a means of external con-
trol is limited, however, by the fact that they are chaired by the
Director of Central Intelligence in his role as coordinator of the
intelligence community.
In this supervisory role over the entire intelligence community, the
Director has issued directives (DCID's) addressed to all intelligence
agencies including the CIA. These are similar to their NSC counter-
parts (NSCID's), but are more detailed. Their primary purpose is
to allocate responsibility for intelligence-related activities among the
several intelligence services. For example, one DCID spells out the
procedures for treatment of foreign defectors within the United
States and divides responsibilities in this area between the CIA and
the FBI.
In performing this oversight function, the Director is assisted by
a staff of about 50 professionals assigned to him from the various
intelligence agencies (including the CIA), normally headed by a flag-
rank military officer. This Intelligence Community Staff provides the
Director with support to coordinate the various intelligence services.
In this role, the Director is also advised by two other organiza-
tions, the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee and the United
States Intelligence Board.
The Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, formed at the
recommendation of the 1971 Schlesinger Report, advises the Director
on the preparation of a consolidated intelligence program budget.
The United States Intelligence Board, in existence since 1948, is
composed of the heads of the principal foreign intelligence agencies.
It advises the Director on the intelligence community's operating
responsibilities. These include establishing intelligence needs and
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priorities, producing intelligence evaluations and estimates, and super-
vising the distribution of intelligence material. Of the Intelligence
Board's eleven standing committees, the Security Committee has the
greatest relevance to this report. It advises the Director on the pro-
tection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized dis-
closure. For example, it has proposed uniform standards of physical
and personnel security and recommended investigations of some se-
curity leaks.
3. Office of Management and Budget
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), an agency in the
Executive Branch, supervises the budget of the federal government.
In this connection, it controls the CIA's budget and, therefore, its
resources, in much the same manner as it does for other government
agencies. The CIA's proposed budget and support materials are re-
viewed by one budget examiner and his supervisor (who is also respon-
sible for all, other intelligence agencies) of the Office of Management
and Budget.
The impact of the OMB budgetary process on some CIA activities
is limited by the information supplied to OMB by the CIA. For ex-
ample, the proposed budget for the divisions of the 'Directorate of
Operations lumps all personnel costs under a "Management Support"
category rather than allocating them to functional areas within each
division. Yet, personnel costs represent a large percentage of the
directorate's budget. Budgets of other directorates reveal more de-
tailed information.
OMB prepares a final CIA budget, with the 'President's approval,
for submission to Congress. If the CIA. disagrees with an OMB recom-
mendation, it may, and frequently does, appeal to the President. In
accordance with the 1949 Act, the CIA budget is not identified in the
budget submitted to Congress, but is included in other appropriation
accounts. Congressional oversight committees are informed which
portions of the budget are intended for the CIA.
After Congress appropriates the funds, OMB transfers them to the
CIA under the - authority ? of the 1949 Act. Other transfers of funds
to the CIA may take place without OMB approval under the Economy
Act of 1932 (31 U.S.C. 686). Funds so transferred constitute signifi-
cant portions of CIA expenditures. These funds are subject to
OMB. oversight, however, since it -reviews them when they are first
proposed for inclusion in the budget of the transferring agency.
OMB also reviews CIA requests to make expenditures from its
contingency reserve fund. This fund, replenished by annual appropria-
tions as well as unobligated funds from previous CIA appropriations,
is available for unanticipated needs.. Although the Director has statu-
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tory authority to spend reserve funds without consulting OMB, ad-
ministrative practice requires that he first obtain the approval of
OMB and the chairmen of the appropriations subcommittees of the
Congress.
OMB exercises control over resources allocated to the CIA. It does
not control the CIA's operational activities, it is not an audit agency,
and the budget process is not designed to establish intelligence policy
or to perform an oversight function. OMB is generally aware of the
large-scale CIA activities, but their approval or disapproval is con-
trolled by the National Security Council and its subordinate
committees.
4. The Department of Justice
The Department of Justice is charged by statute with the responsi-
bility of investigating and prosecuting criminal cases on behalf of the
united States. In so doing, it exercises the President's Constitutional
responsibility to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.
Criminal prosecution is the most drastic form of external control of
misconduct in official positions.
In most federal agencies, a report of possible criminal conduct is
investigated on a preliminary basis to determine whether there is any
basis for it. If it appears to have some substance, it is referred to the
Department of Justice for investigation and for a decision on whether
there will be prosecution.
In 1954, the CIA pointed out to the Department of Justice that,
in many cases involving CIA, prosecution would require public dis-
closure of sensitive Agency operations and procedures.
Even investigation and prosecutive consideration by outsiders would
disseminate this information more widely than the Agency believed
appropriate.
The Department of Justice responded that the Agency should in-
vestigate such allegations affecting its operations. If, after investiga-
tion, it appeared that prosecution would be precluded by the need to
reveal sensitive information, then the Agency should so indicate in'its
files and not refer the case to the Department of Justice.
In doing this, the Department of justice abdicated its statutory
duties and-placed on the Director of Central Intelligence the responsi-
bility for investigating criminal conduct and making the prosecutorial
decision-clearly law enforcement powers. (There is, however, no evi-
dence that these powers were ever abused by the Agency.)
This state of affairs continued until January 1975, when the De-
partment of Justice directed that cases with a potential for criminal
prosecution be referred to it for consideration.
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B. Control by the Congress
1. Congressional Committee Oversight
The armed services committees of Congress have exclusive legis-
lative jurisdiction over any bill, other than for appropriations, whose
primary focus is on the CIA. These committees, therefore, exercise
primary congressional policymaking control over the CIA. Each has
delegated this authority over CIA matters to an intelligence subcom-
mittee. The House subcommittee has seven members (and the ap-
proximate equivalent of one and one-half full-time professional staff
members). The Senate subcommittee has five members (with a staff of
similar size).
Although not involved in the appropriation process, these subcom-
mittees also receive CIA budget information supplied to the appro-
priations subcommittees.
Since there has been no substantive CIA legislation since 1947, the
role of these intelligence subcommittees has generally been to exert
policy-making influence informally through personal discussions with
the Director of Central Intelligence.
The appropriations committees also examine CIA activities in re-
viewing CIA budget requests. Both appropriations committees rely
on subcommittees to perform this task. The information submitted
to congressional oversight subcommittees on the CIA budget is identi-
cal to that submitted to OMB. It is considered in secret sessions of
the subcommittees (whose chairmen are also chairmen of the' parent
committees) but is not revealed to the full committee membership or
the Congress as a whole.
There has been little further discussion in Congress (outside of the
oversight committees) of the CIA's budget or activities except when
they otherwise become matters of public discussion. After the CIA
appropriation is passed, the chairmen of the appropriations sub-
committees retain limited de facto fiscal control over the CIA. Before
any of its contingency reserve fund is spent, they are consulted. On the
other hand, the CIA is not required to notify Congress before shifting
appropriated funds from one program to another.
Neither the members of the oversight committees nor other members
of Congress have generally received detailed information on CIA
operations. Public hearings are not held. Although secret hearings
are held, they are confined by the scope of the information made
available. While it appears that the subcommittees or at least their
leaders and the leaders of Congress have been informed of major
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CIA activities,2 the amount of information provided does not always
correspond with that available to Congress in other sensitive areas.
In sum, congressional oversight of the CIA has been curtailed by
the secrecy shrouding its activities and budget. At least until quite
recently, Congress has not sought substantial amounts of information
of a sensitive nature. Correspondingly, the CIA has not generally
volunteered additional information.
There have been occasional efforts to extend congressional oversight
of CIA activities. Since 1967, three members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee have been invited to attend intelligence briefings
given to the Senate oversight subcommittees, but these briefings do
not identify specific CIA operations.
In addition, certain members of Congress have proposed more in-
tensive congressional oversight over the CIA. These proposals have
usually been defeated.
In January 1955, Senator Mansfield (Democrat-Montana) intro-
duced a resolution to establish a Joint Committee on Central Intelli-
gence; it was defeated 50 to 27. In 1966, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee proposed a Senate Committee on Intelligence Operations;
the proposal was defeated 61 to 28. However, the Hughes Amendment
to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 prohibits CIA expenditure
of funds "for operations in foreign countries, other than intelligence
activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence" unless
the President determines that it is "important to the national security"
and reports the operation to the "appropriate committees of the Con-
gress, including the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United
States Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United
States House of Representatives." Both the Senate and House re-
cently formed select committees with temporary charters to investi-
gate the activities of all intelligence agencies.
2. General Accounting Office
The General Accounting Office (GAO) is responsible for making
accounting and auditing reports to the Congress. It studies the effi-
ciency, propriety, and legality of executive agency operations and
conducts financial audits on its own initiative or at the request of a
member or committee of Congress.
The CIA Act of 1949 authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence
to make confidential (unvouchered) payments; these payments, con-
stituting approximately one half of total CIA spending, are beyond
2 A compilation from CIA files of its contacts with Congress shows that over a five-year
period (1967-1972) the CIA averaged 26 briefings of congressional committees or subcom-
mittees per year and 81 briefings of individual members of Congress per year.
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the GAO's audit authority. The 1949 Act further protects CIA spend-
ing from GAO challenge by providing that :
The sums made payable to the Agency may be expended without regard to
the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government
funds .. .
For a time, GAO audited the nonconfidential expenditures of the
CIA; however, after adoption of the 1949 Act, no challenges to the
legality of any payments were made. Any questions about the lawful-
ness of CIA expenditures were instead referred to the CIA's
Comptroller.
When GAO broadened its activities in 1959 to include studies of
agency efficiency, it included the CIA on a "trial basis." After two
years, the Comptroller General (who heads GAO) decided that be-
cause of statutory and security restrictions on GAO audits of CIA
activities, GAO "did not have sufficient access to make comprehensive
reviews on a continuing basis which would produce evaluations help-
ful to the Congress."
GAO also concluded that it would not be worthwhile to continue
its limited financial audits of the CIA. This decision to eliminate
GAO audits of CIA activities was related to a CIA internal reorga-
nization which increased the scope of its internal comptroller and
audit operations. Since 1962, the GAO has not conducted any reviews
at the CIA nor any reviews which focus specifically on CIA activities.
C. Control by the Courts
The CIA has only rarely been involved in litigation. In the CIA's
history, there have been only seven judicial decisions relating to it.
None operated as a substantial check on the CIA's activities.
The CIA's actions are not readily challenged in the courts. Most
CIA activities relate to foreign intelligence and as a consequence are
not reviewed by the courts. Moreover, since practically all of the CIA's
operations are covered by secrecy, few potential challengers are even
aware of activities that might otherwise be contested; nor can such
activities be easily discovered.
The CIA is also, specifically freed from statutory requirements
which often constrain government activities and are enforced by
courts. For instance, the 1947 Act authorizes the Director to discharge
employees whenever he deems "such termination necessary or advisable
in the interests of the United States." This discharge power has been
held to be unreviewable. Accordingly, employees have rarely initiated
suits against the Agency for wrongful termination and have never
successfully done so.
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D. The Effects of Publicity
Reports of CIA activities in newspapers and magazines and on tele-
vision are another form of external control on its activities.
Until recently, the secrecy which protected the CIA's activities ef-
fectively limited the impact of this control. Recent events indicate that
the CIA will be subject to more intensive scrutiny in the press, but as
a practical matter the news media cannot effectively "police" CIA
activities.
Publicity about the CIA tends to be an unrefined control mechanism.
The press can examine only what is leaked; it cannot consider all
relevant details; it may be inaccurate and incomplete; and it may
have unintended results on CIA operations.
E. Control by Special Commissions and Panels
Since the creation of the CIA in 1947, it has been reviewed by a
number of special panels, commissions and committees. Some were
created in response to particular issues, most notably in 1961 after the
Bay of Pigs and in 1967 after disclosure that nonprofit institutions
had been used to assist the CIA. The primary studies were :
1. Dulles, Jackson, Correa Report to the NSC on the CIA and
National Organization for Intelligence (January 1949) : A study
of the structure and organization of the CIA, existing CIA activ-
ities, and the relationship of those activities to those of other
departments and agencies.
2. Jackson Report (President's Committee on International In-
formation Activities) (June 1953) : A survey and evaluation of
the international policies and activities of the executive branch.
3. Doolittle Report (September 1954) : A report on covert oper-
ations of the CIA.
4. Clark Report (Task Force on Government Intelligence Ac-
tivities) (May 1955) : A survey of the CIA and intelligence
activities of the State and Defense Departments and the National
Security Council.
5. Sprague Report (President's Committee on Information
Activities Abroad) (December 1960) : A review of the impact
of international actions of the United States government on world
public opinion and on other governments, with particular refer-
ence to the CIA.
6. Kirkpatrick Report (Joint Study Group Report on Foreign
Intelligence Activities of the U.S. Government) (December
1960) : A series of recommendations to assist the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence in coordinating foreign intelligence activities.
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7. Kirkpatrick, Schuyler, Coyne Report (April 1962) : A study
of the organization and activities of the CIA and its relationship
with other agencies in the intelligence community.
8. Katzenbach Report (March 1967) : A review of the relation-
ships between government agencies and educational and volun-
tary organizations which operate abroad.
9. Lindsay Report.on Covert Operations of the U.S. Govern-
ment (December 1968) : A study of supervision by Congress and
within the CIA of covert operations.
10. OMB Report (Schlesinger Study of the Intelligence Com-
munity) (March 1971) : A study of the organization of the intel-
ligence community and its cost-effectiveness.
Most recommendations have focused on the organization of the intel-
ligence community and were preludes to a reorganization. The Katz-
enbach Report ended CIA funding of educational and voluntary or-
ganizations. The issue of CIA activities within the United States was
not given major attention by any other of these review panels.
Conclusions
Some improvement in the congressional, oversight system would be
helpful. The problem of providing adequate oversight and control
while maintaining essential security is not easily resolved. Several
knowledgeable witnesses pointed to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy as an appropriate model for congressional oversight of the
Agency. That Committee has had an excellent record of providing
effective oversight while avoiding security leaks in a highly sensitive
area.
One of the underlying causes of the problems confronting the CIA
arises out of the pervading atmosphere of secrecy in which its activi-
ties have been conducted in the past. One aspect of this has been the
secrecy of the budget.
A new body is needed to provide oversight of CIA within the
Executive Branch. Because of the need to preserve security, the CIA
is not subject to the usual constraints of audit, judicial review, un-
limited publicity, or open congressional budget review and oversight.
Consequently, its operations require additional external control. The
authority assigned the job of supervising the CIA must be given
sufficient power and significance to assure the public of effective
supervision.
The situation whereby the Agency determined whether its own em-
ployees would be prosecuted must not be permitted to recur.
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81
currently played by the Armed Services Committees.3
The President should recommend to Congress the establishment
of a Joint Committee on Intelligence to assume the oversight role
Recommendation (3)
Recommendation (4)
Congress should give careful consideration to the question
whether the budget of the CIA should not, at least to some extent,
be made public, particularly in view of the provisions of Article I,
Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution:
Recommendation (5)
a. The functions of the President's Foreign Intelligence Ad-
visory Board should be expanded to include oversight of the CIA.
This expanded oversight board should be- composed of distin-
guished citizens with varying backgrounds and experience. It
should be headed by a full-time chairman and should have a full-
time staff appropriate to its role. Its functions related to the CIA
should include:
1. Assessing compliance by the CIA with its statutory au-
thority.
2. Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence collection.
3. Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence estimates.
4. Assessing the quality of the organization of the CIA.
5. Assessing the quality of the management of the CIA.
6. Making recommendations with respect to the above sub-
jects to the President and the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, and, where appropriate, the Attorney General.
3 Commissioner Griswold adds the following statement:
"The assignment given to the Commission relates only to the domestic activities of the
C.I.A. But the problems which have arisen in the domestic field cannot be fully understood
and evaluated unless they are viewed against the role which the CIA has undertaken to
play outside the United States. Because of the secret nature of its operations, legal and
moral limitations may not always be kept in mind. In this situation, it should not be sur-
prising that personnel, when working in the United States, should not always feel that they
are subject to ordinary restraints.
"Congress should, in my opinion, decide by law whether and to what extent the CIA
should be an action organization, carrying out operations as distinguished from the gather-
ing and evaluation of intelligence. If action operations were limited, there would be a less-
ened need for secrecy, and the adverse effect which the activities of the CIA sometimes have
on the credibility of the United States would be modified.
"One of the great strengths of this country is a deep and wide-flung capacity for goodwill.
Those who represent us, both at home and abroad, should recognize the potentiality of that
goodwill and take extreme care not to undermine it, lest their efforts be in fact counter-
productive to the long-range security interests of the United States."
4 "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made
by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public
Money shall be published from time to time."
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b. The Board should have access to all information in the CIA.
It should be authorized to audit and investigate CIA expenditures
and activities on its own initiative.
c. The Inspector General of the CIA should be authorized to
report directly to the Board, after having notified the Director
of Central Intelligence, in cases he deems appropriate.
Recommendation (6)
The Department of Justice and the CIA should.establish written
guidelines for the'handling of reports of criminal violations by
employees of the Agency or relating to its affairs. These guide-
lines should require that the criminal investigation and the deci-
sion whether to prosecute be made by the Department of Justice,
after consideration of Agency views regarding the impact of pros-
ecution on the national security. The Agency should be-permitted
to conduct such investigations as it requires to. determine whether
its operations have been jeopardized. The Agency should scrupu-
lously avoid exercise?of the prosecutorial function.
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Chapter 8
Internal Controls
The CIA relies on internal controls to ensure that policy commands
are followed, that resources are used properly and efficiently and that
activities are consistent with statutory authority.
Seven major mechanisms, none of them peculiar to. this intelligence
agency, play a role : (1) The chain of authority ; (2) requirements
for coordination among various offices within the agency; (3) written
internal regulations; (4) internal "watchdogs", including the legal
counsel, inspector general, and auditors ; (5) resource controllers of
money, property, and personnel; (6) training courses; and (7) in-
formal methods of communication.
A central feature of the CIA's organization is its "compartmenta-
tion." For reasons of security, persons in one office are not informed
of activities in other offices unless they have a "need to know." As a
consequence, the number of persons who are in a position to comment
on activities within the CIA is small.
Even persons whose function it is to oversee or inspect CIA activities
are sometimes denied complete access to operational details.
On the other hand, compartmentation results in high-level, detailed
approval of many activities-more so than in most government
agencies.
In addition, the secrecy of CIA activities creates additional prob-
lems for internal control. Individuals trained and accustomed to be
secretive and to use unorthodox methods to perform their tasks may
be tempted to employ this knowledge and experience to avoid close
scrutiny.
The sensitive and sometimes dangerous nature of the work of the
CIA demands high standards of personal discipline, dedication, and
patriotism. The investigation indicates that virtually all of the Agency
activities criticized in this Report were known to top management,
sometimes as a result of complaints of impropriety from lower-ranking
employees. This shows, among other things, that the Agency's system
of internal communication can operate.
(83)
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A. Management and Administration
1. Chain of Authority
The Director of Central Intelligence is the head of the CIA and at
the top of its chain of authority. He is also the principal foreign intel-
ligence officer of the government and has duties extending beyond the
CIA.
The Director's duties in administering the intelligence community,
handling relations with other components of the government, and
passing on broad questions of policy leave him little time for day-to-
day supervision of the Agency.
His chief assistant (since 1953, by statute) is the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence (DDCI). In recent years, this position has been
occupied by a high-ranking military officer, with responsibilities for
maintaining liaison with the Department of Defense, fostering the
Agency's relationship with the military services, and providing top
CIA management with necessary experience and skill in understand-
ing particular intelligence requirements of the military. Generally
speaking, the Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence have not been
heavily involved in administration of the CIA.
Each of the four major directorates within the CIA-Intelligence,
Operations, Administration, and Science and Technology-is headed
by a deputy director. They report directly to the Director of Central
Intelligence.
The Directorate of Intelligence evaluates, correlates, and dissemi-
nates foreign intelligence. It also collects information by monitoring
foreign radio broadcasts.
The Directorate of Operations (formerly called the Directorate for
Plans) conducts the CIA's clandestine collection, covert operation, and
counterintelligence activities. Many of its employees work overseas,
but it also operates an office that collects foreign intelligence from
Americans who volunteer information.
The Directorate of Science and Technology conducts research and
development projects related to devices used in intelligence collection
and in counterintelligence. It also provides technical services and sup-
plies for operating portions of the CIA.
The Directorate of Administration (formerly called the Directorate
of Support) handles housekeeping chores for the CIA such as con-
tracting, communications, medical services, personnel management,
security, finance and computer support.
In addition to these operating branches, the CIA has a number of
staff offices, including a General Counsel, an Inspector General and a
Comptroller, who report directly to the Director of Central
Intelligence.
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The compartmented nature of CIA operations and the adherence to
"need-to-know" principles has restricted communication to lines of
authority within each directorate. One directorate generally does not
share information with another. The Director of Central Intelligence
is, as a consequence, the only person in a position to be familiar with
all activities. Therefore he is the focal point for formal internal con-
trol of the CIA.
The impact of compartmentation is sharpened by the occasional
practice of having lower echelon officers report directly to the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence. Such special reporting authority outside
the normal chain of command existed both for the Office of Security
and the Special Operations Group of the Counterintelligence Staff.
This special reporting authority arose both from the need for tight
security and the Director's interest in maintaining and continuing close
contact with these sensitive activities.
Informal practices have the effect of expanding the information
flow within the CIA. Daily morning meetings are held by the Director
with the deputy directors. Also present are the Inspector General,
Comptroller, legal and legislative counsels and other top officials.
These weekday meetings include discussion of issues that otherwise
would be handled only through the chain of authority. In addition,
top CIA officials now meet regularly without the Director in the
Agency Management Committee.
A distinctive feature of the CIA is the absence of "outsiders" in top-
level management. Unlike the typical executive agency, where not only
the chief officer but also a group of top-level assistants are appointed
from the outside, no such infusion occurs in the CIA. Almost all the
top leadership for the past 28 years has been chosen from within the
organization.
2. Coordination Requirements
The need for coordination has caused the CIA to supplement the
chain of authority with requirements for consultation between offices.
Basic CIA policies and certain types of operational activities are ap-
proved only after consultation among staff offices and sometimes sev-
eral directorates. The coordination required varies with the activity.
All regulations applicable to the entire agency must be reviewed by
the directorates, the Inspector General and General Counsel before
being approved by the Director of Central Intelligence. Whenever
an activity requires use of a new proprietary company, an adminis-
trative plan must be prepared by the operating component and ap-
proved both within the direct chain of authority and by the Offices
of General Counsel, Finance, Comptroller, and Security, among others.
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To the extent that CIA activities involve agency-wide regulations
or proprietaries, the compartmented nature of the Agency is somewhat
lessened by such coordination requirements.
Nonetheless, field operational details, although they often are ap-
proved through the chain of authority, are not normally cleared at
headquarters for logistic and financial support or legal authority.
Decentralized control is designed to allow the CIA to operate secure-
ly, effectively, and rapidly, though it sacrifices the opportunity for
internal checks.
Current requirements for coordination would not provide significant
control over most of the CIA activities which are the subject of this
Report.
3. Written Directives
Written CIA regulations serve as an internal standard. The CIA
is given its basic policy direction by the 1947 National Security and
1949 CIA acts. Directives of the National Security Council and of the
Director of Central Intelligence in his role as head of the intelligence
community elaborate upon the basic guidance of Congress in setting
forth the CIA's duties and responsibilities. CIA regulations translate
these broad intelligence directives into specifics. In addition, CIA
regulations spell out the basic missions and functions of each office.
They are readily available to all employees; as assignments and
procedures change, amendments are made.
CIA regulations are supplemented by official notices, which deal
with policies of a transitory nature. Over 100 are issued each year.
Handbooks give further details on administrative practices, security,
salary and benefits, travel, accounting, procurement and other items of
general concern. In addition, each directorate and staff office pub-
lishes its own written guidance for employees. Some particular offices
have also supplied detailed written guidance setting limits on their
domestic activities.
Agency directives do not, in general, however, spell out in detail
which activities can or cannot be undertaken under the CIA's statute
or policies. Agency-wide regulations rarely go beyond quoting the
National Security Act of 1947 prohibitions in describing the limita-
tions on CIA activities within the United States. A handbook of re-
quired regulatory reading for all CIA employees similarly does not
discuss, beyond the barest outline, the 1947 Act's prohibitions on
the exercise of police powers or internal security functions.
Some changes have recently been made to improve guidance pro-
vided by written directives. A number of notices have been issued
specifically dealing with CIA activities within the United States and
requiring office chiefs to prevent activities not authorized by the CIA's
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charter. Notices have set strict limitations on certain testing programs,
surveillance of Americans at home and abroad, assistance to local law
enforcement agencies, detailing of personnel to other agencies, and
wiretaps, searches and seizures. Most are brief and relate to past incid-
ents that have been questioned. These notices have not yet been written
into permanent regulations.
B. Staff Offices
Three staff offices 1 are assigned responsibility to investigate activi-
ties throughout the CIA, respond to inquiries about their legality,
and report their findings to the Director : the General Counsel, the
Inspector General and the Audit Staff.
1. The Office of General Counsel
The CIA's legal counsel performs a dual role. On the one hand,
he supplies independent advice to the Director of Central Intelligence
on the propriety-under the Constitution, statutes, or regulations-
of CIA activities.
On the other hand, because the legal counsel is also part of the
CIA's management that is responsible for carrying out assigned tasks,
he is subject to pressures to find legal techniques to facilitate proposed
activities.
The absence of clear legal standards in the many unusual situations
which come to him complicates his problem in maintaining profes-
sional independence of judgment.
The General Counsel and his staff of 14 lawyers are responsible for
providing legal advice to the Director and all other officials of the
CIA. They also do miscellaneous legal tasks not involving legisla-
tive liaison.
Two features of this legal office are distinctive. First, one person
served as the General Counsel for 27 years, from the time the Agency
was created in 1947 until his retirement in 1974. Many particularly sen-
sitive matters were handled by him personally. His successor has also
served in the General Counsel's office for most of this period. Second,
with one exception, the staff has been recruited entirely from within
the CIA.
The General Counsel is involved in policy-making. He has been
an active participant in drafting the basic delegations of responsibility
to the CIA : the National Security Council Intelligence Directives
(NSCID's) and Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCID's).
He reviews all internal CIA regulations.
1 A fourth, the Office of Legislative Counsel, coordinates CIA relations with Congress and
therefore does not exercise a significant internal control function.
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The General Counsel also participates in implementing CIA policy.
His office has been active in establishing proprietaries and other cover
for operations. He is consulted on CIA immigration cases and reviews
procurement contracts, administrative and liquidation plans for pro-
prietary companies, and agreements between the CIA and non-govern-
mental organizations.
The General Counsel is sometimes asked by the Director and other
officials within the CIA for formal or informal legal opinions on the
legality of CIA activities. The office maintains a collection of its legal
opinions; they range over a wide assortment of topics from proper
use of the confidential appropriated funds of the CIA to the authority
for domestic activities in support of foreign intelligence.
The General Counsel does not review and comment on all activities
of the CIA. He does not have authority to initiate inquiries; rather
he responds to requests for legal advice. Most of the activities reviewed
in this Report do not appear to have been the subject of a legal opinion
from the General Counsel until quite recently.
Absence of written opinions alone does not necessarily indicate
that the General Counsel was not consulted ; consultation was at times
handled informally. The General Counsel and his staff have, however,
testified that they were unaware of most of the specific CIA activities
discussed in this Report.
2. The Inspector General
The Inspector General and his staff of five professionals report to
the Director. They review employee grievances, supervise equal em-
ployment practices, investigate reports of wrongdoing, and perform
special management reviews of CIA activities. Under Directors with
differing styles and management approaches, the Inspector General's
role has varied.
The size of the Inspector General's staff reflects the Director's view
of the scope of appropriate oversight of the operating divisions and
of the amount of reliance that management should place on the chain
of command.
Until quite recently, the Inspector General conducted component
reviews of all CIA activities. Teams from the Inspector General's office
visited each component and sought to determine the propriety and
efficiency with which it conducted its activities.
The teams were also concerned with morale, security and supervisor-
employee relationships.
The size of the Inspector General's staff has recently been reduced
from fourteen to five professionals. As a result, it no longer conducts
component reviews; instead, the Director relies on each deputy director
and his staff to ensure proper management in his directorate.
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Even when the Inspector General's office performed component re-
views, the ability of such reviews to discover information was re-
stricted. The office could review each component only once every three
to five years. In performing such reviews, the Inspector General's staff
was sometimes refused access to particularly sensitive CIA activities
for which the Director granted a waiver from inspection. Even with
complete access, not all aspects of an office's activities could be ex-
amined.
Despite these limitations, the Inspector General frequently was
aware of many of the CIA activities discussed in this Report, and
brought them to the attention of the Director or other top manage-
ment. The only program which was terminated as a result was one
in 1963-involving experiments with behavior-modifying drugs on
unknowing persons.
The focus of the Inspector, General component reviews was on oper-
ational effectiveness. Examination of the legality or propriety of CIA
activities was not normally a primary concern.
In the last two years, the Inspector General has become a focal point
for collection of information on questionable CIA activities. In April
1973, the Director of Central Intelligence asked the Inspector Genera]
to coordinate the CIA's internal investigation of possible involvement
with Watergate matters. A May 9, 1973, memorandum from the Direc-
tor to all CIA employees requested that they report to him any activi-
ties that may have been improper. Although most such reports were
through the chain of command, some came directly from employees of
lesser rank. The obligation to report such activities to the Director or
the Inspector General is now a standing order in the Agency.
3. The Audit Staff
While the Inspector General conducts general program reviews of
CIA activities, more particular financial reviews are conducted by the
Audit Staff. Although part of the Inspector General's office on the
CIA table of organization, the Audit Staff operates separately. Its
chief has direct reporting responsibility to the Director. With a staff
of 36, few of whom have previously served elsewhere in the CIA, the
Audit Staff conducts annual reviews of the financial records of all
CIA activities. Field offices are reviewed on a random rather than an
annual basis.
The purpose of the audit is to ensure compliance with proper
accounting procedures consistent with CIA financial regulations. To
the extent possible, CIA regulations are similar to financial regula-
tions relied on generally in the federal government. Auditors
apply the standards of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants.
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In conducting a financial audit, the Audit Staff has available com-
puterized information on all expenses of the office being audited. The
Audit Staff selects a few expenses of each office for particular exami-
nation. Activities using unusual accounting procedures or requiring
large sums of money other than payroll expenses will normally be
chosen.
Although an auditor often is necessarily aware of the activities of an
office during this financial compliance review, he does not usually learn
about the activities in great detail; his focus is on their financial
aspects.
Within the past year, at the urging of the General Account-
ing Office, the Audit Staff has begun to review programs in
addition to auditing for financial compliance. This is a limited project
of about four program reviews per year and focuses on costly activ-
ities. Program reviews concentrate on the success of activities in
achieving stated goals and on cost-effectiveness. They are not searches
for illegal or improper conduct.
C. Control of Resources
1. The Comptroller and the Budget Process
Preparation of the annual CIA budget is coordinated by the Comp-
troller, who reports to the Director. The Comptroller has a staff of
fewer than twenty professionals, eight of whom are specifically as-
signed to review the budgets of the four directorates. Because these
budget reviewers usually are assigned to the Comptroller from direc-
torates and have not had budget experience, they serve as advocates
for their directorates as well as comptrollers reviewing funding
requests.
Every division within the CIA prepares a budget which is reviewed
within each directorate or staff office before being forwarded and com-
piled by the Comptroller. Detailed scrutiny of budgets is done pri-
marily within the directorates. The Comptroller focuses only on major
issues, involving large sums of money, major new initiatives or activi-
ties of special concern to the Director.
In reviewing the budget, the Comptroller's staff generally examines
allocation of resources only if they exceed $30 million or employ over
200 persons. More limited activities would not be closely examined in
the budget process at the Comptroller level. His focus is on questions
of cost and effectiveness. Rarely, if ever, has the propriety of an
activity been an issue for the Comptroller, unless some unusual fund-
ing pattern is involved.
The Comptroller presents the budget to the Director of Central
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Intelligence for approval. It is then sent to the Office of Management
and Budget for review before submission to Congress. After Congress
appropriates funds, the Comptroller releases them to the directorates.
Lump sums are given to each directorate, with instructions that the
Comptroller is to be notified only of any internal apportionments of
funds that constitute substantial changes from the original budget.
The Comptroller also provides fiscal guidance to the directorates,
including instructions on when the Director is to be kept advised of
the progress of certain activities.
The principal detailed budgetary control of specific CIA pro-
grams-apportionment of funds, evaluation of activities, and plan-
ning for the future-is performed outside the Comptroller's office.
Within the past two years, staff officers in each directorate have been
using a "management-by-objectives" system that seeks to relate need
for funds to the Director's program goals. Periodic reports are made
to the deputy directors and to the Director of Central Intelligence.
2. The Office of Finance
While the Comptroller prepares the budget and apportions funds
to the directorates, the Office of Finance handles actual payment of
expenses. Within the Directorate of Administration, this chief finan-
cial officer does not report directly to the Director of Central Intelli-
gence. The Office of Finance's responsibilities include processing the
payroll, maintaining centralized financial records, auditing private
contractors, disbursing cash and purchasing foreign currencies. The
responsibility most closely related to internal control is the verification-
of all vouchers for expenditures.
Finance officers assigned to each office and station must approve
all vouchers. They are responsible for preventing expenditure of
funds in violation of CIA regulations. Financial regulations do not,
however, explicitly describe what activities are prohibited by the
CIA's charter. Finance officers therefore rarely questioned the activi-
ties described in this Report.
3. Property Controllers
A number of the activities described in this Report require use of
particular types of property; wiretaps, for instance, require special
electronic devices. This property is maintained in various offices with-
in the CIA. Operating components needing to use this property must
obtain it from the office that maintains an inventory. Inventory man-
agement controls exist in most offices, but they have not always been
oriented toward ensuring legitimate use of equipment.
New controls have been established (since 1972) over the loan of
disguise materials and alias documents. Their use must now be ap-
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proved by designated senior officials who can question the contem-
plated use; centralized, detailed records list their location and regula-
tions require their return when no longer needed.
4. Personnel Controllers
General personnel policies are formulated and personnel administra-
tion is conducted in the Office of Personnel in the Directorate of
Administration. The Office of Personnel has some contact with opera-
tional activities when it approves agreements with contract officers
and validates job ratings and salaries. In these capacities, although
the Office learns some operational details, it does not monitor the
activities.
Occasionally, activities whose propriety is questionable come to the
personnel office's attention. For example, the CIA's special Retirement
and Disability System is available only to certain employees who have
served overseas or in "qualified" domestic activities; the Office has
forwarded information from employee applications for this program
to the Inspector General's office for scrutiny when questionable domes-
tic activities were mentioned.
D. Other Information Channels
1. Training
The CIA's Office of Training, first established in 1951, has long
worked closely with the Directorate of Operations to train agents in
the special skills necessary for clandestine operations.
In recent years, the Office has expanded its curriculum and now
offers more than 60 courses on world affairs, management theories
and techniques, foreign languages and intelligence evaluation and
production. One course is required of all new professional CIA em-
ployees; the three-week introduction to International and World Af-
fairs deals with the nature of intelligence work and the organization
of the CIA. Although a brief introduction to the statutory framework
of the CIA is included in the course, detailed discussions of the
domestic limitations on the CIA is not.
2. Communication Outside the Chain of Authority
The Management Advisory Group.-In 1969, the Executive
Director-Comptroller (a position now vacant) established a Manage-
agement Advisory Group consisting of 14 mid-level officers (three from
each directorate and two from the Director's staff) to discuss CIA
policies and activities with the Director of Central Intelligence. The
Group meets monthly with the Director and conducts inquiries into
CIA practices. CIA employees are informed of the Group's existence
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through notices and are encouraged to submit suggestions for, areas
needing review.
The Group's focus has been on areas of improved personnel man-
agement. In 1970, however, it questioned the propriety of a number
of CIA activities within the United States, particularly Operation
CHAOS. The Group sought and received assurance that these domestic
activities had been properly approved.
Within the last two years, similar advisory groups have been created
in each directorate.
Conclusions
In the final analysis, the proper functioning of the Agency must
depend in large part on the character of the Director of Central
Intelligence.
The best assurance against misuse of the Agency lies in the appoint-
ment to that position of persons with the judgment, courage, and
independence to resist improper pressure and importuning, whether
from the White House, within the Agency or elsewhere.
Compartmentation within the Agency, although certainly appro-
priate for security reasons, has sometimes been carried to extremes
which prevent proper supervision and control.
The Agency must rely on the discipline and integrity of the men
and women it employs. Many of the activities we have found to be
improper or unlawful were in fact questioned by lower-level employees.
Bringing such situations to the attention of upper levels of manage-
ment is one of the purposes of a system of internal controls.
Recommendation (7)
a. Persons appointed to the position of Director of Central Intel-
ligence should be individuals of stature, independence, and in-
tegrity. In making this appointment, consideration should be
given to individuals from outside the career service of the CIA,
although promotion from within should not be barred. Experience
in intelligence service is not necessarily a prerequisite for the
position; management and administrative skills are at least as
important as the technical expertise which can always be found
in an able deputy.
b. Although the Director serves at the pleasure of the President,
no Director should serve in that position for more than 10 years.
Recommendation. (8)
a. The Office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence should
be reconstituted to provide for two such deputies, in addition to
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the four heads of the Agency's directorates. One deputy would
act as the administrative officer, freeing the Director from day-
to-day management duties. The other deputy should be a military
officer, serving the functions of fostering relations with the mili-
tary and providing the Agency with technical expertise on mili-
tary intelligence requirements.
b. The advice and consent of the Senate should be required for
the appointment of each Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
Recommendation (9)
a. The Inspector General should be upgraded to a status equiv-
alent to that of the deputy directors in charge of the four direc-
torates within the CIA.
b. The Office of Inspector General should be staffed by out-
standing, experienced officers from both inside and outside the
CIA, with ability to understand the various branches of the
Agency.
c. The Inspector General's duties with respect to domestic CIA
activities should include periodic reviews of all offices within the
United States. He should examine each office for compliance with
CIA authority and regulations as well as for the effectiveness of
their programs in implementing policy objectives.
d. The Inspector General should investigate all reports from
employees concerning possible violations of the CIA statute.
e. The Inspector General should be given complete access to all
information in the CIA relevant to his reviews.
f. An effective Inspector General's office will require a larger
staff, more frequent reviews, and highly qualified personnel.
g. Inspector General reports should be provided to the National
Security Council and the recommended executive oversight body.
The Inspector General should have the authority, when he deems
it appropriate, after notifying the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, to consult with the executive oversight body on any CIA
activity (see Recommendation 5).
Recommendation (10)
a. The Director should review the composition and operation of
the Office of General Counsel and the degree to which this office
is consulted to determine whether the Agency is receiving ade-
quate legal assistance and representation in view of current
requirements.
b. Consideration should be given to measures which would
strengthen the office's professional capabilities and resources
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95
including, among other things, (1) occasionally departing from
the existing practice of hiring lawyers from within the Agency
to bring in seasoned lawyers from private practice as well as to
hire law school graduates without prior CIA experience; (2) occa-
sionally assigning Agency lawyers to serve a tour of duty else-
where in the government to expand their experience; (3) encour-
aging lawyers to participate in outside professional activities.
Recommendation (11)
To a degree consistent with the need for security, the CIA
should be encouraged to provide for increased lateral movement
of personnel among the directorates and to bring persons with
outside experience into the Agency at all levels.
Recommendation (12)
a. The Agency should issue detailed guidelines for its employees
further specifying those activities within the United States which
are permitted and those which are prohibited by statute, Execu-
tive Orders, and NSC and DCI directives.
b. These guidelines should also set forth the standards which
govern CIA activities and the general types of activities which are
permitted and prohibited. They should, among other things,
specify that:
-Clandestine collection of intelligence directed against
United States citizens is prohibited except as specifically per-
mitted by law or published Executive Order.
-Unlawful methods or activities are prohibited.
-Prior approval of the DCI shall be required for any ac-
tivities which may raise questions of compliance with the law
or with Agency regulations.,
c. The guidelines should also provide that employees with in-
formation on possibly improper activities are to bring it promptly
to the attention of the Director of Central Intelligence or the
Inspector General.
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Part IV
Significant Areas of
Investigation
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Introduction
This Commission was charged with determining whether any activi-
ties of the CIA within- the United States exceeded its statutory au-
thority. We have, therefore, extensively inquired into the CIA's do-
mestic activities and related matters over the years.
The next 11 Chapters of this Report detail our findings and analyze
those activities that bear special scrutiny.
The Commission met weekly, beginning on January 13, 1975, to
hear testimony from witnesses familiar with CIA domestic activities.
The Commission heard 51 witnesses, including the four living former
Directors of Central Intelligence, the current Director, 28 other cur-
rent and former CIA employees, the Director of the FBI, Secretary
of State Henry A. Kissinger, former Secretary of State Dean Rusk :
three former Presidential Advisers for National Security Affairs,
McGeorge Bundy, Walt W. Rostow and Gordon Gray ; and five experts
on individual liberties and privacy. A transcript of all testimony by
these witnesses was made. More than 2,900 pages of sworn testimony
were collected.
In addition to testimony before the Commission, many additional
witnesses were questioned under oath by the Commission staff, or sign-
ed sworn affidavits.
The staff was divided into four teams for purposes of the investiga-
tion. Three two-man teams conducted the factual investigation. The
fourth team researched the legislative history and other Constitutional
and statutory limitations on the CIA and investigated its internal
and external controls.
These four teams presented the most important evidence through
witnesses who appeared before the Commission. They also made
available to the Commission summaries of all interviews and docu-
mentary evidence that they discovered.
The Commission's investigation attempted, within the limits of time
and personnel, to discover all pertinent witnesses and documents dis-
closing the nature of the CIA's domestic activities.
Members of the staff spent weeks at the CIA and elsewhere inter-
viewing personnel, and reviewing files, computer systems and written
memoranda on activities within the United States.
(98)
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The Commission was given access to all CIA files that the Commis-
sion ascertained could be pertinent to a full investigation. Some files
were reviewed in their entirety ; others were sampled at random. The
documentary holdings of the CIA were much too large for an investi-
gation or examination of all papers. Nevertheless, we believe that this
investigation covered all areas of the CIA likely to have been in-
volved in domestic activities, and examined closely those witnesses
and documents most likely to contain pertinent information on such
activities.
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Chapter 9
The CIA's Mail Intercepts
During the early 1950's, at the height of the so-called cold war,
the CIA initiated the first of a series of programs to examine the
mails between the United States and Communist countries for pur-
poses of gathering intelligence. During the years since that time,
interception and examination 1 of the mails for intelligence purposes
was carried out at various times by the CIA at four different locations
in the United States, until the last project was terminated in 1973.
An intercept project in New York City was the most extensive
of the CIA mail operations, and lasted for twenty years.
Three Postmasters General and one Attorney General were in-
formed of the project to varying degrees. The CIA, the record dis-
closes, was aware of the law making mail openings illegal, but appar-
ently considered the intelligence value of the mail operations to be
paramount.
The stated purpose of the New York mail intercept project was
best described in the report of the Chief of Counterintelligence
presented to Director James R. Schlesinger in 1973 when termination
of the project was being considered. The report stated:
The mail intercept project is a basic counterintelligence asset designed to
give United States intelligence agencies insight into Soviet intelligence activities
and interests.2
Three other mail projects carried out by the Agency during the same
period occurred in San Francisco, Hawaii and New Orleans. The
intercept in San Francisco took place during four separate periods
of a month or less in 1969, 1970 and 1971. The one in Hawaii occurred
in late 1954 and early 1955; and the New Orleans intercept lasted
only about three weeks, in 1957.
1 Mail intercepts or mail openings involve the opening and examination of the contents of
letters. Mail cover operations involve only exami'hation and copying information on the
outside or covers of letters.
2 Among these Soviet activities was mail censorship. Presumably all mail to and from the
USSR is censored by the Soviets.
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In addition, the Office of Security, acting alone over a 24-year
period, ran over 91 separate mail cover operations and conducted
about 12 mail openings relating to particular individuals within the
United States. Most of the cases involved CIA employees under
investigation, although some of the activity was directed against
foreign nationals and some against citizens who had no connection
with the CIA.
This chapter discusses and analyzes these projects, concludes that
the interceptions were illegal and improper, and recommends steps to
prevent their reinstitution.
A. East Coast Mail Intercept
1. Inception of the Project
During 1952, interception of mail was perceived by the CIA as a
potential source of intelligence. The Agency concluded that it was
willing to devote the technical personnel and resources that would
be required to carry such an operation into effect. Nevertheless, the
CIA recognized the necessity for caution in approaching the subject
with the postal authorities. The Chief of the Special Security Divi-
sion said in a planning memorandum dated July 1, 1952, "I believe
we should make contact in the Post Office Department at a very high
level, pleading relative ignorance of the situation and asking that we,
with their cooperation, make a thorough study of the volume of such
mail, the channels through which it passes and particularly the bottle-
necks within the United States in which we might place our survey
team."
The Post Office Department was initially to be approached with
a request that the CIA be allowed to examine only the outside or cov-
ers of the mail. The actual ultimate intent of the CIA was, however,
made clear in the last paragraph of the July 1, 1952, memorandum :
Once our unit was in position, its activities and influence could be extended
gradually, so as to secure from this source every drop of potential information
available. At the outset, however, as far as the Post Office is concerned, our
mail target could be the securing of names and addresses for investigation and
possible further contact.
The memorandum also outlined the possible benefits of such a pro-
gram. It would allow determination of the nature and point of origin
of communications from the Soviet Union. Technical analysis of the
mail might also reveal secret communication methods.
By September 30, 1952, the Office of Security of the CIA had deter-
mined, through its investigation of the mails in the United States,
the volume of mail flow from the Soviet Union. Security had also
determined from the FBI that the Bureau then maintained no records
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of correspondence between United States and Soviet citizens except
that which was uncovered incidentally in investigation of internal
security or espionage cases. The Security Office requested the Deputy
Director for Plans to inform the Director of Central Intelligence that
Security planned to undertake activities to accumulate information
on all letter envelopes, or covers, passing through New York City,
originating in the Soviet Union or destined for the Soviet Union.
Security noted that the Operation would require the cooperation of
the United States Post Office Department and the FBI. The sensitivity
of the operation was deemed "patently obvious."
On November 6, 1952, the CIA wrote to the Chief Postal Inspector
and asked that arrangements be made for one or two designated CIA
employees to work with a Postal Inspector in securing certain in-
formation from the mails. The expressed intention was to examine the
outside of envelopes only.
Arrangements were made on December 8, 1952, with the Chief
Postal Inspector to survey all mail to and from the Soviet Union
passing through New York City, and to provide for selective photo-
graphing of the envelopes or covers. The mail was removed in bulk
from the regular Post Office channels for purposes of examination,
and by December 18 the Office of Security had completed the survey
of how all mail passing to and from the Soviet Union was handled
through New York.
. By September 1953, the mail operation had been in progress for
about a year. Analysis by the Agency of the materials examined
showed that the CIA had gained both substantive and technical intelli-
gence. This was deemed sufficiently valuable to warrant expansion of
the project and the photographing of all the mail covers passing
through the New York Post Office to and from the Soviet Union.
On December 23, 1953, Security reported to the CIA's Director of
Operations that it was ready to install the photography equipment at
the Post Office and that the Post Office would cooperate by making the
mail available to the CIA agents. Both sides of all first class mail were
to be photographed. The December 23 memorandum closed by suggest-
ing that the support of Allen Dulles, then Director of Central Intelli-
gence, be solicited for securing Post Office approval of this second step
of the venture. Agency documents show that by this time (and prob-
ably as early as February 1953) selected items of the mail were already
being opened and the contents analyzed by the CIA.
2. Initial Contact with the Postmaster General
In a memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence dated
January 4, 1954, the Director of Security explained that the Postal
Inspectors were unwilling to go forward without higher authorization
from within the Post Office Department. Security suggested to the
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DCI that arrangements be made for a meeting between the DCI and
the Postmaster General, who had already been briefed generally on
the project by the Chief Postal Inspector and was waiting for the
Director's call. The Director of Security said that in his meeting with
the Postal Inspectors, no mention was made of informing the FBI.
In fact, the FBI apparently did not become aware of the mail project
until four years later, in February of 1958.
On May 17, 1954, Allen Dulles and Richard Helms, the latter then
Chief of Operations in the Plans Directorate, met with Postmaster
General Arthur Summerfield and three of Summerfield's assistants.
According to Helms' contemporaneous memorandum of the meeting,
Dulles described the importance of the mail program and asked that
it be allowed to continue. No mention appears to have been made of
covert mail opening. Summerfield made no specific comment but,
according to Helms' memorandum, it was clear that he was in favor
of giving the CIA any assistance he could. Helms' memorandum
pointed out that Director Dulles, during the conference, did not men-
tion the potential for passing material on internal security matters to
the FBI and thought it would be better to leave that until a later date.
3. Formal Counterintelligence Proposal
By late 1955, the Office of Security had eight full-time employees
and several others on a part-time basis engaged in opening the mail.
The.project was ready to be expanded. The Chief of Counterintelli-
gence asked Helms, by memorandum dated November 21, 1955, for
formal approval of a new counterintelligence program in conjunction
with the mail project.
The Counterintelligence Staff, which had previously not been in-
volved with the project, proposed that the CIA expand the operation
and "gain access to all mail traffic to and from the USSR which enters,
departs or transits the United States." Counterintelligence further
suggested that the "raw information acquired be recorded, indexed,
analyzed and that various components of the Agency be furnished
items of information." According to the November 21 memorandum,
the only added function that would be performed by the Office of
Security was that "more letters will be opened." "They are presently
able to open only a very limited number."
The project description which accompanied the November 21 memo-
randum noted that the mail opening did not have the express or tacit
approval of the postal authorities. It also recognized that "there is no
overt, authorized or legal censorship or monitoring of first-class mails
which enter, depart, or transit the United States at the present time."
It could be assumed, therefore, the proposal said, that foreign espio-
nage agents used the mail as a means of communication, relying upon
the policy of the government against any monitoring of mail. Because
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of this policy, however, it was conceded that any disclosure of the mail
project would probably cause "serious public reaction in the United
States, perhaps leading to a congressional inquiry." But, the project
description said, "it is believed that any problem arising could be
satisfactorily handled."
The proposed counterintelligence project was approved by the
Deputy Director for Plans and the Director of Security in January
1956, but difficulties in organization delayed commencement of opera-
tions until approximately November 1956.
4. FBI Liaison with the Mail Project
In January 1958, the FBI approached the Post Office Department
for the purpose of instituting similar coverage of mail to and from
the Soviet Union. The Post Office Department brought the Bureau's
request to the Agency's attention, and shortly thereafter CIA repre-
sentatives told the FBI of the Agency's ongoing mail project. Up to
that time, the CIA had avoided telling the FBI of the mail project-
and no materials derived from the project were disseminated to the
FBI.
Discussions between Agency and Bureau representatives in February
1958 resulted in an agreement that the CIA would send to the FBI
mail project items which were of internal security interest. The FBI,
in turn, would provide the Agency with watch lists of particular per-
sons or matters in which the Bureau was interested. The Bureau agreed
with the CIA's suggestion that the project should be handled by the
CIA alone. Eventually, the FBI would become, by far, the principal
recipient of mail project materials outside of the CIA's Counterintel-
ligence Staff.
5. The Mail Project in Full Operation
The mail opening project, which started in the early months of the
operation with only a few letters, had expanded by 1959 to include the
opening of over 13,000 letters a year. By 1961, the CIA had installed a
small laboratory for technical examination of letters to uncover for-
eign espionage techniques of communication.
The physical scanning of the mail was performed by CIA officers
in a facility located at the New York intercept. The envelopes of let-
ters selected during the scanning process were photographed, opened
and the contents photographed. The letters were then resealed. Tech-
nical testing of some of the letters and their contents was also accom-
plished at a CIA facility in the region. Copies of letters were analyzed
in CIA headquarters.
Individuals or organizations of particular intelligence interest were
specified in watch lists provided to the mail project by the Counter-
intelligence Staff, by other CIA components, and by the FBI. The total
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number of names on the watch list varied, from time to time, but on
the average, the list included approximately 300 names including
about 100 furnished by the FBI. The watch list included the names
of foreigners and of United States citizens. Operation CHAOS (see
Chapter 11), in an effort to focus the mail project upon communica-
tions of dissidents, provided the mail project with a watch list of 41
American citizens.
Dissemination of the information derived from the mail intercept
was made to those CIA departments which filed watch lists. The prin-
cipal user of the information within the CIA was the Counterintelli-
gence Staff. Information of an internal security nature derived from
the intercept was forwarded to the FBI.
6. Second Briefing of a Postmaster General
With the inauguration of the Kennedy Administration in 1961 and
the appointment of a new Postmaster General, consideration was again
given in the CIA to briefing high postal officials on the program. The
Deputy Chief of Counterintelligence pointed out in a January 27,
1961, memorandum that "there is no record in any conversation with
any official of the Post Office Department that we have admitted open-
ing mail." The memorandum continued that although "all conversa-
tions have involved examination of exteriors," it nevertheless seemed
"quite apparent that they must feel sure that we are opening mail."
No further explanation was given to support the last remark.
Counterintelligence suggested to Richard Helms, then the Deputy
Director for Plans, who was about to meet with J. Edward Day, the
new Postmaster General, that ". . . if the Postmaster General asks if
we open any mail, we confirm that some mail is opened. He should be
informed, however, that no other person in the Post Office has been
so informed."
Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, accompanied by
Helms and another CIA officer met with Postmaster General Day on
February 15, 1961. According to Helms' memorandum for the record
made the following day, the CIA representative told Day "the back-
ground, development and current status (of the mail project), with-
holding no relevant details." The Postmaster General, according to
Helms' memorandum, ended the February 15 meeting by "expressing
the opinion that the project should be allowed to continue and that
he did not want to be informed in any greater detail on its handling."
Whether the "relevant details" told to Day included the fact of
mail openings is not entirely clear.
Day testified on May 7, 1975, before the House Committee on the
Post Office and Civil Service that, when Dulles came to visit on Feb-
ruary 15, 1961, and said he had something "very secret" to talk about,
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Day responded that he would rather not know about the secret, and so
Dulles did not tell him about it.
Helms stressed in his testimony that, while he could not recall the
specific conversation, his memorandum of February 15, 1961, states
that no information was withheld. An August 1971 note on the sub-
ject, apparently written by the chief of the mail project, tends to
point the other way. In any event, the mail project continued.
7. Consideration of "Flap Potential" and Cover Stories
Concern over the "flap potential" of the mail project appears to
have been constant. Even the CIA's Inspector General, after a review
of the Office of Security in 1960, had recommended preparation of an
"emergency plan" and "cover story" if the mail project were some-
how revealed. Despite general realization in the Agency of the dan-
gers involved, the Inspector General in the 1960 review did not sug-
gest termination of the project or raise the issue of its legality .3
Detailed consideration of the "flap" problem was set forth in a
memorandum sent by the Deputy Chief of Counterintelligence to the
Director of Security on February 1, 1962. This memorandum warrants
attention. It conceded that everyone realized from the outset of the
mail project that ". . . a flap would put us [the project] out of busi-
ness immediately and give rise to grave charges of criminal misuse of
the mail by government agencies." It had been decided, however, that
"the effort was worth the risk." It was assumed that any compromise
of the project would "unavoidably be in the form of a charge of vio-
lations of the mails." The memorandum continued :
Since no good purpose can be served by an official admission of the violation,
and existing Federal Statutes preclude the concoction of any legal excuse for
the violation, it must be recognized that no cover story is available to any govern-
ment agency.
Unless the charge is supported by the presentation of interior items from the
project, it should be relatively easy to "hush up" the entire affair, or to explain
that it consists of legal mail cover activities conducted by the Post Office at the
request of authorized Federal Agencies. Under the most unfavorable circum-
stances, including the support of charges with interior items from the project
it might become necessary, after the matter has cooled off during an extended
period of investigation, to find a scapegoat to blame for unauthorized tampering
with the mails.
The response of the CIA to this Commission's inquiries on the mail
project was the opposite of that suggested in the memorandum. All
CIA files and personnel connected with the mail project appear to have
3 A July 1969 Inspector General review of the Counterintelligence Staff, however, did
recommend that the Deputy Director of Plans discuss with the Director of Central Intelli-
gence the transfer of the mail operation to the FBI or in the alternative that the project be
cancelled. The recommendation was not followed.
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been made available to the Commission staff, and a detailed, accurate
description of the project was provided to the Commission by the for-
mer Chief of Counterintelligence. The 1962 memorandum is, however,
significant because it shows the thought processes of those involved
and illustrates the need for a method of periodic review of CIA opera-
tions by objective persons.
A further indication that the CIA was aware of the possible crim-
inality of the mail project exists in a September 26,1963, memorandum
by the officer in charge of the mail project to an officer in the CIA's
Operations Division. That memorandum states "there is no legal basis
for monitoring postal communication in the United States except dur-
ing time of war or national emergency . . ." The Commission staff
found nothing in the CIA records indicating that the Agency's legal
counsel was asked to give an opinion on the mail intercept prior to its
inception. As previously noted, the Inspector General, in looking into
the project in 1960, simply proposed that an adequate "cover story"
be developed.
Substantial consideration was given again to the possible efforts of
exposure of the operation, after testimony before a Senate subcom-
mittee in April 1965 had apparently indicated that governmental
agencies were "snooping into the mail." According to a contempo-
raneous memorandum of an April 25, 1965, conference which included
the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, Thomas Karamessines, con-
sideration was given to suspending the mail project pending the con-
clusion of the Senate hearings. The idea was rejected because the
project was deemed sufficiently secure and the project's facilities at
the post office could be dismantled and removed on an hour's notice.
Consideration was given during the April 25 meeting to briefing
Postmaster General Gronouski about the project because no officials
then in the Post Office Department had been briefed. This was rejected
because of testimony which Mr. Gronouski had given before the Sen-
ate subcommittee. The Assistant Deputy Director for Plans instead
gave instructions that "steps be taken to arrange to pass this informa-
tion through McGeorge Bundy to the President" after the subcom-
mittee investigation was completed. No evidence could be found to
confirm that President Johnson was ever advised of the project.
8. The Appointment of William Cotter, a Former CIA Officer, as
Chief Postal Inspector
On April 7, 1969, William J. Cotter, previously a security officer in
the Plans Directorate, was sworn in as Chief Postal Inspector of the
United States Post Office Department. Cotter was recommended for
the position by Richard Helms, who, along with the heads of other
governmental components, had been asked by Postmaster General
Blount for suggestions as to persons who might fill the Chief Inspec-
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toy's job. Cotter was considered thebest qualified among three or four
persons suggested to Helms by the CIA's Director of Security.
Cotter had been with the Agency since 1951, and from 1952 through
1955 he had served as deputy head of the CIA field office which coordi-
nated the East Coast mail intercept. Cotter knew of the project from
its outset and he was aware that letters were opened surreptitiously.
Although Cotter had no direct contact with the mail intercept project
from 1956 to 1969, when he was appointed Chicf Postal Inspector, he
knew that it was still in operation.
As Cotter left the CIA headquarters on April 8, 1969, to be sworn
in as Chief Postal Inspector, he coincidentally met an officer in the
Counterintelligence Staff. A CIA memorandum for the record of the
same date sets forth the substance of the conversation which ensued.
According to that memorandum, Cotter was concerned that circum-
stances in his new position might compel him to reveal the existence
of the mail project. If he were asked about mail intercepts under
oath, Cotter-unlike his predecessor-could not truthfully state he
thought the project involved only mail "covers." Further, because of
his CIA background, he would be in a particularly precarious position
if the project were compromised.
According to the April 8 memorandum, Cotter said he planned to
enter his new job without making inquiries about the project, and he
planned to do nothing about the project unless it was mentioned to
him. Cotter said that eventually he would probably inspect the mail
intercept facility and might find it necessary to brief Postmaster
General Blount. But, according to the memorandum, Cotter assured
the counterintelligence officer that he would not take any action with-
out consulting first with the CIA.
9. Cotter's Dilemma About the Mail Project
In January 1971, Cotter, as Chief Postal Inspector, received a letter
from an association of American scientists inquiring about possible
Post Office acquiescence in opening first-class mail. Cotter apparently
forwarded a copy of the letter to the CIA. A CIA memorandum in
March 1971 indicates that Cotter also was concerned that the impend-
ing alteration of the Post Office. Department from a governmental
agency to a corporation in mid-1971 might cause organizational
changes which would result in revelation of the mail project. Before
this Commission, Cotter testified that the reorganization was not of
major concern to him in this respect.
In any event, Director Helms convened a meeting of his associates
on May 19, 1971, to discuss the mail project. The May 19 meeting was
attended by the Deputy Director for Plans, the Director of Security,
the Chief and the Deputy Chief of Counterintelligence, and the offi-
cer in charge of the mail project. According to a memorandum made
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after the meeting, the discussion in part concerned the extent of
knowledge of the project outside the CIA and the likelihood of ex-
posure. Thomas Karamessines, now Deputy Director for Plans, was
particularly concerned about compromise of the project because it
would cause the CIA "the worst possible publicity and embarrass-
ment." Cotter's "dilemma" was evident. While he was presumably
loyal to the CIA, he could not deny knowledge of the project under
oath and, furthermore, in his new job his loalty belonged to the Post-
master General.
Karamessines suggested during the meeting that the mail project be
handled by the FBI. As he said, "they could better withstand such
publicity, inasmuch as it is a type of domestic surveillance."
The Counterintelligence Chief responded that his staff regarded the
operation as foreign surveillance-and that the FBI did not have the
facilities or trained personnel to take care of the operation. The Chief
of Counterintelligence also contended that the CIA could live with the
known risks and should continue the project.
Director Helms decided to discuss the matter with Cotter and deter-
mine whether Postmaster General Blount should be informed. Helms
then met with Cotter, and it was agreed that higher level approval in
the Post Office Department for the mail project was necessary. Helms
said he would first talk with the Attorney General.
10. Helms Briefs the Attorney General and the Postmaster Gen-
eral on the Mail Project
The Director met with Attorney General Mitchell on June 1 and with
Postmaster General Blount on June 2, 1971, to discuss the mail project.
Helms reported on June 3, 1971, to the Deputy Director for Plans, the
Director of Security, and the Counterintelligence Chief that Attorney
General Mitchell had fully concurred in the value of the operation and
had no "hang-ups" concerning it. Mitchell also reportedly encouraged
Helms to'brief the Postmaster General.
Helms said he met with Postmaster General Blount and showed him
selected items derived ,from the project and explained Cotter's situa-
tion. Blount, according to Helms, was "entirely positive regarding the
operation and its continuation." Further, Blount felt "nothing needed
to be done" and rejected a "momentarily held thought" to have some-
one review the legality of the project because to do so would widen
the circle of knowledgeable persons. The project was therefore con-
tinued with Director Helm's admonition that if there were even a sus-
picion of a leak, the project was to be stopped; investigation could be
made later.4
* In a telephone interview with the Commission staff, Mr. Blount said he could not
recall the specifics of his conversation with Helms. Mr. Mitchell's attorney, in response
to a staff inquiry, said that Mitchell could recall the conversation with Helms but thought
they had only discussed mail covers.
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11. Termination of the East Coast Mail Project
Postmaster General Blount resigned his cabinet post later in 1971
and Attorney General Mitchell resigned at the end of February 1972,
leaving Cotter as once again the senior governmental official outside the
CIA with knowledge of the mail project. Cotter expressed his mis-
givings about the propriety of the project and his continuing concern
about the conflict in his loyalties in a conversation with Mr. Karames-
sines and the Chief of the Office of Security. Finally, in early 1973,
Cotter said that unless the CIA obtained higher level approval for the
project by February 15, 1973, it would have to be terminated.
This ultimatum was brought to the attention of James R. Schles-
inger, who was then Director of Central Intelligence. The Counter-
intelligence Staff forwarded a memorandum to the Director arguing
the importance to both the CIA and the FBI of continuing the project.
The correspondence was reviewed -at a meeting on February 15, 1973,
between Schlesinger and William Colby, who was the CIA Executive
Director-Comptroller. Schlesinger determined at the meeting that the
project should be turned over to the FBI and that he was not convinced
that "the product to the CIA [from the mail project] was worth the
risk of CIA involvement."
As a result of another meeting shortly thereafter, with both Colby
and the Counterintelligence Chief, Schlesinger decided that Cotter
should be asked to defer termination of the project while the CIA took
it to a "very high level." But Cotter refused the request for delay,
stating that the project should be shut down now and could be renewed
once appropriate authority was obtained. The New York mail project
was therefore terminated by the Agency on February 15, 1973.
There is no record to indicate that the CIA attempted to obtain
President Nixon's approval of the project in 1973. Indeed, although
CIA files reflect suggestions made in January 1954 (Eisenhower Ad-
ministration) and in April 1965 (Johnson Administration) that the
President be advised of the mail project, no evidence could be found
that any briefing of any President occurred.
12. Evaluating the Mail Project
Statistics gathered by the CIA show that in the last full year of
its operation, the New York mail intercept handled approximately
4,350,000 items of mail and examined the outside of over 2,300,000 of
those items. Photographs were taken of the exteriors of approximately
33,000 items. Some 8,700 items were opened and the contents analyzed.
Selections for opening were made on the basis of a watch list given
to the crew and upon various other intelligence factors. During the
last year, approximately 5,000 of the selections were made on the basis
of the watch list.
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In the last year, the program made over 3,800 separate dissemina-
tions of information derived from the project within the Agency and
sent some 1,400 separate items of information to the FBI. At the end
of 1972, the active watch list of names totaled approximately 600.
The number of names watch-listed varied from month to month as
they were supplied by CIA components and the FBI.
Although only mail coming into the United States was intercepted
in the early years of the project, both outgoing and incoming mail
were involved during most of the project's operation. CIA personnel
estimate that, overall, approximately 30 percent of the mail inter-
cepted was outgoing.
The project not only disseminated current information but provided
file data back to 1955 in a compartmented, computerized machine
record system containing almost 2,000,000 entries. Institutional and
organizational files were also maintained for reference and analytical
purposes.
The intelligence value of the mail project is not easy to assess. While
the Commission staff examined materials derived from the mail
intercept, it is difficult to judge their significance without knowing a
great deal about the cases to which the materials may relate.
All components of the Agency seemed to agree that the project was
useful as a source of technical communications intelligence on such
matters as secret writing, censorship techniques and the like.
There are also indications that the FBI found the mail project
valuable in internal security matters.
The Counterintelligence Staff regarded the mail project as a unique
source of intelligence of strategic importance. It was, they said, a
source of counterintelligence leads and of confirmation of otherwise
questionable information.
During his 1973 review of the project, however, Director Schlesinger
was not convinced that the intelligence derived from the mail inter-
cept was worth the risk of continued CIA involvement.
B. West Coast Mail Intercept
An August 26, 1969, two CIA officers from the technical division
of the Plans Directorate spoke with the Deputy Chief Postal Inspector
for the United States about commencing a CIA mail cover operation
on the West Coast. The proposed operation was to encompass inter-
national mail from the Far East. According to a contemporaneous
CIA memorandum, the Agency officers said during the August 26
meeting that the proposed activity would not involve opening the
mail; rather, the Agency wanted only to analyze the exteriors of
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relevant envelopes. The postal official stated that he wanted to look
further into the matter.
The same CIA officers met with the Deputy Chief Postal Inspector
on September 12, 1969, to make arrangements for a survey on the
West Coast of the mail flow from the designated communist-con-
trolled areas overseas. The postal official agreed to the proposed survey.
A CIA memorandum made shortly after the September 12 meeting
indicates that "the key factor" in the official's decision to permit the
survey was "the fact that no envelopes would be opened."
Several days after the meeting on September 12, the two CIA
officials visited a postal facility in the San Francisco area. They con-
ducted a week-long survey of the incoming mail from the Far East.
In all, over 1500 envelopes were reviewed. No indication could be found
that any mail was opened during this survey.
CIA records do not show that any high level approval was re-
quested or obtained within the Agency for the September 1969 mail
survey. The CIA officers who undertook the survey apparently did
so in order to determine the feasibility of the mail project before
they sought approval for it.
On October 6, 1969, the two officers who had conducted the survey
convinced the chief of their division in the Plans Directorate that
the project was feasible and that approval should be sought for it.
The proposal was also discussed on October 23, 1969, with the Direc-
tor of Security, who agreed with it but said that the approval of
Director Helms had to be obtained. The Director of Security also
suggested during this meeting that, in view of the obvious sensitivity
of the proposal, all CIA personnel should "avoid preparing or ex-
changing any formal communications on the project." (No such com-
munications were located, but hand-written notes made by one CIA
officer detailed the events occuring throughout the formative stages of
the project.)
Thomas Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans, orally
approved the project on November 4, 1969. He had secured Director
Helms' approval for the project the prior week. Karamessines testi-
fied that he approved of the project because it was the only way to
obtain intelligence vital to the safety of agents involved in certain
ongoing operations.
Later in November 1969, the CIA Director of Security explained
the project to Chief Postal Inspector Cotter, who gave his approval.
Cotter, of course, was familiar with the New York mail intercept
project. He said he wanted the West Coast project "to go slow and
develop gradually."
Neither Cotter nor any other postal official appears to have been told
that the West Coast project would involve opening mail. CIA
records indicate that the Agency representatives ostensibly agreed
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114
with the Post Office instructions that no mail was to be removed
from Post Office premises or opened. Nevertheless, the CIA's plan from
the outset was to open the mail, if possible, without informing postal
authorities.
The CIA officers involved in the West Coast project were aware
that questions might be raised as to its propriety under United States
laws, but they believed the likely intelligence potential from the proj -
ect was worth the risk. The successful operation of the mail project
in New York over the prior 16 years also played a part in the decision
to proceed with the West Coast project.
The first formal operation of the San Francisco project occurred in
early 1970, and another operation was run later that year. A third
effort was made in 1971. Each of the operations lasted for approxi-
mately two or three weeks and followed the same pattern: Late in the
evening, CIA personnel went to the postal facility, where a special
official met them and opened the relevant bags of mail. The postal offi-
cial remained present while the CIA representatives performed tests
on the outside of envelopes. During virtually every session, the CIA
officers, apparently without the knowledge of the postal official, con-
cealed selected pieces of mail in an equipment case or a handbag. The
selected items were then taken surreptitiously from the post office fa-
cility, opened, photographed, analyzed, resealed and returned to the
mail flow during the next visit to the facility.
CIA records indicate that a great majority of the mail examined
had originated outside the United States, although, on at least one
occasion, a bag of outgoing mail was opened for the CIA officers. The
primary objective of the San Francisco mail intercept, unlike the East
Coast mail project, was to obtain technical intelligence concerning for-
eign censorship, secret writing and the like. Agency records indicate
the San Francisco project was highly successful in meeting this
objective.
C. Hawaiian Mail Intercept
An intercept of mail from the Far East was carried out in the
territory of Hawaii from late 1954 until the end of 1955, when the
intercept was terminated. The project was initiated by a single CIA
officer, who photographed, opened and analyzed selected items of
mail.
CIA Headquarters was not informed of the one-man Hawaiian oper-
ation prior to its beginning, nor was express approval ever granted
for it. Tacit approval of the project may nevertheless be implied from
the favorable response given to the operation report submitted by the
officer in charge of the project. The Hawaiian intercept appears to
have been successful in producing technical postal intelligence.
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D. New Orleans Mail Intercept
A fourth mail intercept was conducted in New Orleans for approxi-
mately three weeks in August 1957 as a counterintelligence operation.
Approximately 25 sacks of international surface mail were examined
each day. The mail examined did not originate in the United States,
nor was it destined for delivery in the United States; it was simply
in transit. Approximately 200 items were opened and photographed,
but no substantive intelligence was gained and the project was ter-
minated.
Conclusions
While in operation, the CIA's domestic mail opening programs
were unlawful. United States statutes specifically forbid opening the
mail.
The mail openings also raise Constitutional questions under the
Fourth Amendment guarantees against unreasonable search, and the
scope of the New York project poses possible difficulties with the First
Amendment rights of free speech and press.
Mail cover operations (examining and copying of envelopes only)
are legal when carried out in compliance with postal regulations on a
limited and selective basis involving matters of national security. The
New York mail intercept did not meet these criteria.
The nature and degree of assistance given by the CIA to the FBI
in the New York mail project indicate that the primary purpose event-
ually became participation with the FBI in internal security func-
tions. Accordingly, the CIA's participation was prohibited under the
National Security Act.
Recommendation (13)
a. The President should instruct the Director of Central Intelli-
gence that the CIA is not to engage again in domestic mail open-
ings except with express statutory authority in time of war. (See
also Recommendation 23.)
b. The President should instruct the Director of Central In-
telligence that mail cover examinations are to be in compliance
with postal regulations; they are to be undertaken only in fur-
therance of the CIA's legitimate activities and then only on a
limited and selected basis clearly involving matters of national
security.
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Chapter 10
Intelligence Community Coordination
Introduction
In the late 1960's and continuing into the early 1970's, widespread
violence and civil disorder arose in many cities and on many campuses
across the country.
President Johnson and later President Nixon acted on a number
of fronts to organize the resources of the Federal government to
determine the facts about those responsible for the turmoil. Both
Presidents persistently demanded to know whether this violence and
disorder was in any way supported or directed by foreign elements.
Inevitably, the CIA became a major factor in these undertakings,
with action including :
(1) Participation in coordinated intelligence community ef-
forts to deal with the disturbances;
(2) Creation of a Special Operations Group ("Operation
CHAOS") to investigate and analyze any foreign connections of
domestic dissident groups (Chapter 11) ; and,
(3) Efforts of CIA's Office of Security to protect CIA's in-
stallations and campus recruiters from potentially violent dissent
activity. (Chapter 12).
A. Summary
In 1967, the Justice Department under Attorney General Ramsey
Clark established the first in a series of secret units designed to col-
late and evaluate information concerning the growing domestic dis-
order and violence.
The Justice Department's initial effort failed to produce the desired
intelligence results.
The CIA was consulted for advice on intelligence evaluation, and
the Department of Justice under Attorney General John Mitchell
(116)
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created another unit in 1969. This effort, too, failed to produce re-
sults satisfactory to the Administration.
Therefore, in June of 1970, President Nixon instructed the direc-
tors of four principal intelligence agencies to develop a plan for
increased coordination and evaluation of domestic intelligence. This
led the Nixon Administration in December of 1970 to create an inter-
agency committee and staff, including representatives from the CIA
the FBI, and other principal intelligence agencies, for coordination
and evaluation of intelligence related to domestic dissidence. This
joint committee produced reports for President Nixon and certain
other top governmental officials from February 1971 through May
1973.
All these efforts resulted from a realization in both the Johnson
and the Nixon administrations that the Government of the United
States had no effective capacity for evaluating intelligence concerning
domestic events. The FBI, as an investigative agency, produced raw
data but did not produce evaluated intelligence. The CIA produced
intelligence evaluations, but its jurisdiction was limited to foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence. The problem was further compli-
cated by the FBI's refusal during one period to cooperate fully with
other components of the intelligence community.
This realization appears to have caused the White House to pressure
the CIA into expanding the Agency's own activities related to domestic
dissidence (see Chapter 11). The White House evidently also concluded
that without some formal interagency coordination, it would not have
an adequate source of domestic intelligence evaluations or estimates
upon which to rely in attempting to deal with domestic disturbances.
The CIA's participation in these joint efforts warrants particular
attention. Any involvement of the Agency in activities of the Depart-
ment of Justice or in a domestic intelligence evaluation group could,
at least on the surface, raise a question of impropriety, under 50 USC
sec. 403(d), which prohibits the CIA from having "... law enforce-
ment powers or internal security functions."
B. The "Interdivision Information Unit"
In early fall, 1967, Attorney General Clark asked John Doar, Assist-
ant Attorney General for Civil Rights, to report on the Department's
facilities for organizing information on individuals involved in civil
disorders. On September 27, 1967, Doar recommended establishment
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of a "single intelligence unit to analyze the FBI information we receive
about certain persons and groups who make the urban ghetto their
base of operation."
The FBI was to constitute only one source of information for the
proposed unit. As additional sources, Doar suggested federal poverty
programs, Labor Department programs, and neighborhood legal serv-
ices. Doar recognized the "sensitivity" of using such additional sources,
but he nevertheless thought these sources would have access to relevant
facts. Other sources of dissident information suggested by Doar in-
cluded the intelligence unit of the Internal Revenue Service and per-
haps the Post Office Department. The CIA was not among the proposed
sources.
Attorney General Clark, by memorandum dated November 9, 1967,
approved Doar's recommendation. Clark found it "imperative" that
the Justice Department obtain "the most comprehensive intelligence
possible regarding organized or other purposeful stimulation of domes-
tic dissension, civil disorders and riots." He appointed a committee of
four Assistant Attorneys General to make recommendations concerning
the organization and functioning of the proposed unit. "Planning and
creation of the unit must be kept in strictest confidence," Clark's
memorandum stated.
On December 6, 1967, the committee recommended in part that
the new unit, in addition to analyzing FBI information, should de-
v-elop contacts with other intelligence agencies, including the CIA,
as possible sources of information. Following his committee's rec-
ommendation, Attorney General Clark on December 18, 1967, directed
the organization of the Interdivision Information Unit ("IDIU").
Objectives of the new Unit were :
. . . reviewing and reducing to quickly retrievable form all information that
may come to this Department relating to organizations and individuals through-
out the country who may play a role, whether purposefully or not, either in
instigating or spreading civil disorders or in preventing or checking them.
After its establishment, the IDIU commenced collecting, collating,
and computerizing information on antiwar activists and other dissi-
dents. The IDIU produced daily and weekly reports on dissident
occurrences and attempted to predict significant future dissident
activities.
C. Development of Justice Department-CIA Liaison
Problems of domestic dissidence were of immediate concern to the
Nixon Administration when it took office.
Attorney General John Mitchell met with Director Helms of the
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CIA on May 14, 1969, to discuss problems arising from domestic un-
rest and, more specifically, to discuss where within the government
the entire question of domestic dissident intelligence could be handled.
The Attorney General explained that he felt the FBI was not ac-
quiring the necessary intelligence concerning domestic unrest, although
Mitchell also was of the opinion that the IDIU was improving in that
regard. Helms offered to have a CIA liaison established with the
Department of Justice to provide advice on the Department's intelli-
gence efforts; but, because of the "political implications" involved,
Helms rejected the Attorney General's suggestion that CIA person-
nel be assigned to the Justice Department unit.
Helms then asked the Chief of CIA's Special Operations Group,
which ran Operation CHAOS,1 to establish the liaison with the Jus-
tice Department. He was to make contact with Jerris Leonard, the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division, and
James Devine, another member of the Justice Department. Leonard
coordinated the Department's efforts concerning civil disorders, and
Devine, under Leonard, headed the IDIU.
The Chief of the CIA Special Operations Group met with Leonard
on May 19 and with Leonard and Devine on May 27, 1969. According
to notes taken at those meetings by the CIA officer, the Justice De-
partment representatives explained that they and their units were re-
sponsible for receiving and evaluating information used to advise the
Attorney General and the President as to when federal aid would be
needed in civil disorders. The IDIU was the unit which received and
indexed the information. Coordination and evaluation of that infor-
mation was supposed to be the responsibility of a relatively inactive
entity known as the Intelligence Evaluation Committee ("IEC"),
which was composed of representatives from the Department of Jus-
tice, the Department of Defense and the Secret Service.
Conceding their ignorance of matters relating to intelligence evalua-
tion, Leonard and Devine requested the CIA's assistance and advice in
processing intelligence on civil disorders. Leonard also pressed the
CIA officer to sit as a member of the IEC which, Leonard explained,
was an informal group and would therefore permit any CIA role in
it to remain hidden. The officer declined, saying that the CIA had no
domestic jurisdiction and that Helms was reluctant to "have the
Agency appear to be too deeply involved in domestic matters." How-
ever, the officer suggested that the CIA could probably be of assistance
in supplying information on the foreign travel and contacts of indi-
viduals of interest, as well as in providing advice relating to the orga-
nization and evaluation of intelligence information.
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When the CIA officer reported to Helms on these meetings, the Di-
rector agreed with his position on the nature of the liaison and con-
firmed that there should be no formal participation by the CIA on
the Intelligence Evaluation Committee. Helms also instructed the offi-
cer not to inform anyone else in the CIA of the newly established
liaison. The Director suggested that, perhaps, the Chief of Counter-
intelligence, the liaison officer's immediate supervisor, might be told
at a later date-depending on developments. As a matter of fact, no
one in the CIA other than Helms, his Executive Assistant and the
liaison officer himself knew of the CIA's liaison with the Justice De-
partment during the following year.
D. Eichange of the IDIU Computer Listing
On June 18, 1969, Devine briefed the CIA liaison officer on the IDIU
machine records system. Devine explained that the IDIU had often
been unsuccessful in providing advance warning of incipient civil dis-
orders because information concerning the disorders was not avail-
able far enough in advance. It was agreed that Devine would furnish
the IDIU computer listing to the CIA for checking against the for-
eign travel records of dissidents, as held by Operation CHAOS, and
to allow the CIA's analysts the opportunity to suggest how the Justice
Department might use its list more effectively.
The IDIU listing apparently contained the names of approximately
10,000 to 12,000 individuals, as well as brief narratives about their
dissident activities.2 The head of Operation CHAOS found that the
IDIU listing consisted principally of information derived from FBI
reports. He concluded that any meaningful comparison with Opera-
tion CHAOS records was not reasonably feasible.
In September of 1969, the officer asked Devine for a duplicate of
the actual IDIU computer tape and program. The idea was that, by
matching the duplicate IDIU tape with the computer tape maintained
by Operation CHAOS, it could possibly be determined whether the
CIA had indexed information which the FBI had not already pro-
vided to the IDIU.
The duplicate IDIU computer tape and program were delivered to
the Chief of Operations CHAOS and held by him personally in his
private safe. Only the Chief, Director Helms, and a CHAOS
computer programmer knew of the CIA's possession of the Justice
2 The evidence reviewed by the Commission indicates that the listing of 10,000-12,000
names held by the IDIU and the compilation of 7,200 personality files held by Operation
CHAOS (see Chapter 11) were developed independently of one another.
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Department materials. Subsequently, the Chief and the computer
programmer attempted to match the Department of Justice tape with
the Operation CHAOS computer system, but concluded that the
matching would require too much time and effort. None of the informa-
tion contained in the IDIU tapes was used by Operation CHAOS or
incorporated into the CIA records. The IDIU materials were finally
destroyed when Operation CHAOS was terminated in March 1974.
E. The "Civil Disturbance Group"
In a further attempt to coordinate the efforts of the Department of
Justice to control civil disorders, Attorney General Mitchell, on
.July 22, 1969, established the "Civil Disturbance Group" (CDG).
Both the IDIU and the IEC were placed under the jurisdiction of the
Civil Disturbance Group, which was instructed to coordinate intelli-
gence, policy, and action within the Department of Justice concerning
domestic civil disturbances.
Although the plan establishing the CDG made no mention of the
CIA, Helms was told of the plan almost immediately. On July 25,
1969, three days after the plan had been put into effect, the Attorney
General met with Helms. According to handwritten notes made by
Helms during that meeting, Attorney General Mitchell explained that
the CDG had been created because the FBI could not provide the
needed analysis of intelligence on civil disturbances. The FBI, the At-
torney General noted, was an "investigative not [an] intelligence
outfit." Mitchell asked Helms to have the CIA investigate the ade-
quacy of the FBI's collection efforts in dissident matters and to per-
suade the FBI to turn over its material to the CDG. Apparently the
Attorney General was experiencing some difficulty in obtaining coop-
eration within his own Department.
The CIA connection with the Civil Disturbance Group appears to
have been minimal: Shortly after the CDG was established in July
1969, the Chief of Operation CHAOS, acting as the CIA liaison,
assisted Jerris Leonard, as Chief of Staff for the CDG, and other
Justice Department officials in establishing relationships with the
military intelligence departments. In November 1969, the CIA liaison
officer took part in a series of meetings with Leonard concerning prep-
arations for handling an antiwar rally scheduled to take place in
Washington, D.C. Intermittent contacts between the liaison officer and
other Justice Department officers also occurred over the following two
or three months.
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F. The "Interagency Committee on Intelligence
(Ad Hoc)"
The CDG did not satisfy the government's requirements for coordi-
nated and evaluated intelligence on domestic upheaval. Both the At-
torney General and the White House continued to receive only raw,
unevaluated data from the FBI. In addition, cooperation within the
intelligence community upon intelligence matters deteriorated sub-
stantially during late 1969 and early 1970. In late February 1970, J.
Edgar Hoover forbade the Bureau to engage in anything but formal,
written liaison with the CIA, because Helms had refused to compel a
CIA officer to disclose to Hoover the name of an FBI agent who had
given the officer certain FBI information late in 1969.
President Richard M. Nixon called a meeting at the White House
on June 5, 1970, of the directors and officers from four of the major
components of the intelligence community. Those attending included
J. Edgar Hoover for the FBI, Richard Helms for the CIA, Vice
Admiral Gayler for the National Security Agency and Lt. General
Bennett for the Defense Intelligence Agency. The purpose of the
meeting was to discuss problems relating to domestic disorders.
The President directed those present to make greater efforts to
cover the activities of dissidents in the United States. He made it
plain that he was dissatisfied with the quality of intelligence concern-
ing the extent of any foreign connections with domestic dissidence.
The possible relationship of Black radicalism in the Caribbean to
Black militancy in the United States was discussed, and the President
directed that a study on the subject be prepared.3 Finally, the Presi-
dent said that Mr. Hoover was to organize the group to draft a plan
for coordination of domestic intelligence.
Four days later, on June 9, 1970, the "Interagency Committee on
Intelligence (Ad Hoc)" ("ICI") held its first meeting. The com-
mittee was composed of the directors of the FBI, CIA, NSA, and
DIA. Simultaneously, a subcommittee of representatives from the
same agencies was established to accomplish the drafting of the ICI
report. The CIA Counterintelligence Chief was designated as the
CIA's representative on the subcommittee, and the Chief of Operation
CHAOS served as an "observer" in the group. The subcommittee was
officially constituted within the United States Intelligence Board, but
this appears to have been done simply to provide an organizational
cover for the activities of the subcommittee. Minutes of the subcom-
mittee's meetings show that, in fact, the subcommittee was "an inde-
3 Operation CHAOS eventually did prepare such a study. It was delivered over the signa-
ture of Director Richard Helms to Tom Huston on July 6, 1970, for handing to
the President.
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pendent, ad hoc, inter-agency group with a specific mandate," and
that the "scope and direction of the review [conducted by the sub-
committee] will be determined by the White House."
Two of the stated objectives for the ICI were : (1) to assure a
"higher priority by all intelligence. agencies on internal security col-
lection efforts" and (2) to assure "maximum use of all special investi-
gative techniques, including increased agent and informant penetra-
tion by both the FBI and CIA." An unstated objective was to effect
greater cooperation and evaluation of data by the FBI. Charles
Huston, the White House liaison on the ICI, stated the problem dur-
ing the first meeting of the Committee : "The President receives un-
coordinated information which he has to put together," or, as Helms
told the CIA's observer later in June 1970, "the heart of the matter"
was to "get the FBI to do what it was not doing."
Huston made it clear at the initial ICI meeting that President Nixon
wanted the Committee to assume that all methods of gathering intelli-
gence were valid. The President, Huston said, wanted the Committee,
in reviewing matters which "obstructed" intelligence gathering, to
consider that "everything is valid, everything is possible." All re-
strictions on methods were to be listed, according to Huston, so that
the President could make a final decision on which methods would
be employed.
A forty-three page "Special Report" was issued by the ICI on
June 25, 1970. The Report assessed the internal security threat posed
by the major domestic dissident groups as well as by foreign organiza-
tions. The CIA's contribution to this section of the Report was entitled,
"Definition of Internal Security Threat-Foreign," and encompassed
only the foreign aspects of the problem.
The ICI's Report also considered the effect of legal restraints and
constitutional safeguards limiting the methods which the government
could employ in the collection of 'domestic intelligence. The enumer-
ated -methods which were subject to "restraints" included electronic
surveillance, mail coverage, surreptitious entry and development of
campus sources. Covert mail coverage and surreptitious entry were
specifically described as illegal. The Special Report listed the benefits
or detriments to be derived from employing such methods but did
not expressly recommend their use; instead, it specified possible alter-
natives -concerning each of them. The FBI expressed opposition to any
change in existing procedures.
Finally, the ICI's Report concluded that :
There is currently no operational body or mechanism specifically charged with
the overall analysis, coordination and continuing evaluation of practices and
policies governing the acquisition and dissemination of intelligence, the pooling
of resources and the correlation of operational activities in the domestic field.
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The ICI recommended establishment of an interagency group for
evaluation and coordination of domestic intelligence, a proposal which
the CIA representatives had supported throughout the Committee's
meetings. Director Hoover opposed the recommendation.
On July 9, 1970, Huston advised Director Helms that all com-
munications to the White House on domestic intelligence or internal
security matters were thereafter to be addressed to Huston's exclusive
attention. At approximately the same time, Huston recommended to
the President, through H. R. Haldeman, that almost all the restraints
on methods of intelligence collection discussed in the ICI's Special
Report should be relaxed. Haldeman advised Huston on July 14, 1970,
that the President had approved Huston's recommendations.
By memorandum dated July 23, 1970, Huston informed Helms and
the other members of the ICI of the President's decision. Under the
"Huston Plan," prohibitions against covert mail coverage, surrepti-
tious entry and electronic surveillance were to be relaxed or removed.
Huston further advised the ICI members that a committee composed
of representatives from the FBI, the CIA, the NSA and the DIA
was to be constituted effective August 1, 1970, to provide domestic
intelligence evaluations.
Apparently Attorney General Mitchell was not aware of the June 5,
1970, meeting between the President and the heads of the intelli-
gence community or of the course of meetings and events leading up
to the President's decision and direction on the Huston Plan. Attorney
General Mitchell told Helms on July 27, 1970, that he had not heard
of the Huston Plan until earlier that same day, when Hoover had
complained to him about Huston's July 23 memorandum. In a memo-
randum he made of their meeting, Helms said Mitchell had been
"frank" in stating that no action should be taken on Huston's directive
until Mitchell had spoken with the President. Subsequently, Mitchell
expressed his opposition to the Huston Plan, apparently with success.
The next day, July 28, the White House asked Helms to return his copy
of Huston's July 23 memorandum. Soon thereafter, in late August or
early September, John Dean was assigned White House responsibility
for domestic intelligence on internal security matters.
Sometime during this same period, the Attorney General discussed
with Director Helms the continuing lack of evaluated domestic intel-
ligence and the absence of coordination on that matter within the in-
telligence community. Mitchell said that he was considering the pos-
sibility of a small unit within the Department of Justice for the
assembling and evaluation of domestic intelligence. A luncheon for the
Attorney General was arranged at the CIA Headquarters on Septem-
ber 17, 1970, to discuss this possibility.
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In addition to Mitchell and Helms, the Deputy Director for Plans,
the Chief of Counterintelligence, and the Chief of Operation CHAOS
were present for the discussion on September 17. According to notes
made at the luncheon meeting, the group discussed problems of the
existing domestic intelligence procedures. Specificallly, it was again
emphasized that the FBI did not have any "organization for evalua-
tion of domestic intelligence." Further, the Justice Department's
IDIU was characterized as "useless" for evaluation purposes because
the unit often did not receive information until after the events hap-
pened. The luncheon group proposed that a unit be established within
the Justice Department to "provide evaluated intelligence from all
sources" and "allow preventive action" to be taken in time.
One of the options discussed was the revival within the Justice De-
partment of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee. The revived IEC
would include the CIA and perhaps a White House representative, and
it would be charged with the responsibility of coordination and evalu-
ation. To avoid duplication of effort, the new IEC would draw upon
the files and indices maintained by the participating agencies, rather
than setting up its own files.
Shortly after the September 17, 1970, luncheon, Attorney General
Mitchell met with John Dean to discuss the prompt organization of
the new domestic intelligence unit. It was Dean's suggestion that an
interagency domestic intelligence unit be used for both operational
and evaluation purposes. Dean further suggested that, while initially
there would be no blanket removal of the restrictions on the methods
of intelligence collection, eventually restraints could be removed as far
as necessary to obtain intelligence on a particular subject. Dean also
thought that the existing but inactive IDIU would provide an "ap-
propriate Justice Department cover" and eliminate the chance of
public discovery of a new intelligence operation within the Depart-
ment of Justice.
G. The "Intelligence Evaluation Committee"
The Administration thus decided to revise and reactivate the mori-
bund Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC) of the Department
of Justice. The initial meeting of the reconstituted IEC occurred on
December 3, 1970, in John Dean's office in the Old Executive Office
Building. Several other meetings of an organizational nature were
held from time to time through February 1971.
The Committee was composed of representatives from the Depart-
ment of Justice, the FBI, the CIA, the Department of Defense, the
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Secret Service and the National Security Agency. A representative of
the Treasury Department was invited to participate in the last two
IEC meetings. The Chief of Counterintelligence was the CIA repre-
sentative on the IEC, and the Chief of Operation CHAOS was his
alternate.
Robert C. Mardian, Assistant Attorney General for the Internal
Security Division, was technically Chairman of the IEC, while John
Dean served as the White House representative. The ultimate author-
ity over the Committee was somewhat fuzzy; both Mardian and Dean
stated requirements and made assignments to the Committee.
The IEC was not established by Executive Order. In fact, according
to minutes of the IEC meeting on February 1, 1971, Dean said he
favored avoiding any written directive concerning the IEC because
a directive "might create problems of Congressional oversight and dis-
closure." Several attempts were nevertheless made to draft a charter
for the Committee, although none appears to have been accepted by all
of the IEC members. The last draft which could be located, dated
February 10, 1971, specified the "authority" for the IEC as "the Inter-
departmental Actional Plan for Civil Disturbances," something which
had been issued in April 1969 as the result of an agreement between
the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense. Dean thought it
was sufficient just to say that the IEC existed "by authority of the
President."
Revitalization of the TEC in December 1970 appears clearly to have
sprung from the suggestions of the ICI's Special Report. Helms testi-
fied that he understood that the IEC had been organized to focus and
coordinate intelligence on domestic dissidence. Handwritten notes
made by the CIA Counterintelligence Chief during an TEC meeting
on January 25, 1971, indicate that the IEC was in part an "imple-
mentation of the ad hoc committee report." But, because Hoover had
objected so strongly to the ICI's report, no reference was to be made
to it during the IEC meetings.
The Counterintelligence Chief's notes also reflect that the operation
of the IEC was to be "done with the tools we now have." This Commis-
sion's staff did not find any indication that the TEC attempted to
adopt the suggestions in the Huston Plan for ignoring legal restric-
tions on intelligence gathering in the United States.
The January 25, 1971, meeting of the IEC also concerned recruit-
ing a staff for the Committee. Mardian suggested that each of the par-
ticipating agencies should contribute an individual to work on the
staff, although Hoover had already made it clear the FBI would
refuse either to contribute to the IEC budget or to provide personnel
for the staff.
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H. The "Intelligence Evaluation Staff"
A staff for the IEC was organized by the end of January 1971.
That group, called the Intelligence Evaluation Staff ("IES"), held
its first meeting on January 29, 1971. Unlike the Committee, which
was intended to function as a "think tank," the Staff was to do the
work of coordination, evaluation and preparation of estimates for is-
suance by the Committee.
The Chief of Operation CHAOS was the CIA representative on
the IES. He attended such IES meetings as were called, and he
coordinated the CIA's contributions to the IES evaluations and esti-
mates. The Operation Chief was not assigned to the IES on a full-time
basis. Representatives of the NSA, the Secret Service and the military
intelligence services also served on the IES. Finally, in May 1971,
the FBI also assigned a representative to aid the staff.
Although the Department of Justice's IDIU was not actually in-
volved in the work of the IES, the IES was "attached to [the IDIU]
for cover purposes."
The Intelligence Evaluation Committee met on only seven occasions;
the last occasion was in July 1971. The Intelligence Evaluation Staff,
on the other hand, met a total of one hundred and seventeen times be-
tween January 29, 1971, and May 4, 1973.
The IES prepared an aggregate of approximately thirty studies
or evaluations for dissemination. It also published a total of fifty-five
summaries called intelligence calendars of significant events. The
preparation of these studies, estimates or calendars was directed by
John Dean from the White House or by Robert Mardian as Chair-
man of the IEC.
The initial studies related to the "May Day" demonstrations held
in 1971, and later reports concerned other proposed antiwar demon-
strations, racial protests or planned violence. From January to
August 1972, the IEC/IES issued, and regularly revised, reports cov-
ering the potential for disruptions at both the 1972 Republican and
Democratic National Conventions.
Many of the IEC reports contained information having both domes-
tic and international aspects. The CIA made a number of contribu-
tions to the IEC/IES publications. Those contributions were prepared
by Operation CHAOS personnel (see Chapter 11). However, the con-
tributions appear to have been a by-product of ongoing activities
abroad. Review of all the contributions reveals that the CIA re-
ported, with only minor exceptions, on matters relating strictly to
foreign or international events or organizations.
It appears the only participation by the CHAOS Chief in the IES,
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aside from serving as the CIA liaison in preparing the Agency's con-
tributions, was to edit drafts of the Staff's reports. Mardian himself
did ask the Chief to use the CIA's computer index for name traces in
connection with the March 1971 Capitol bombing incident, the
"Pentagon Papers" case and the Berrigan Brothers case.' But no
evidence was found that the CIA was asked by either the IEC or
the IES to collect domestic intelligence.
The agents run by the CIA's Operation CHAOS appear on only one
occasion to have been directed to collect information domestically
which was used for IEC/IES purposes. That was the use of one
agent during the 1971 May Day demonstrations in Washington, D.C.,
which is described more fully in Chapter 11. CHAOS forwarded the
information supplied by that agent to the FBI, and some of the in-
formation ultimately may have been incorporated in IEC publications
concerning the May Day demonstrations.
Director Helms told the CIA liaison officer during a meeting on
December 5, 1972, that the Agency "should minimize its contribu-
tions to the IEC, with the expectation that eventually the or-
ganization may disappear." Helms in his testimony was unable to
recall the basis for this instruction. By then, however, the fact that
Attorney General Mitchell and Robert Mardian had long since re-
signed to work on President Nixon's reelection campaign, plus the
substantial decline in the incidence of civil disorder, all contributed
to the lapse in IEC/IES activity.
The IEC and IES were terminated in July 1973 by Assistant
Attorney General Henry Petersen.
Conclusions
The CIA's liaison with the Department of Justice and the Agency's
participation in interagency intelligence groups resulted from at-
tempts to utilize the CIA's expertise in intelligence evaluation and
its collection of intelligence abroad having a bearing upon domestic
dissidence.
This attempted use occurred because two Administrations 'believed
the government of the United States lacked an effective capacity
to coordinate and evaluate intelligence on matters affecting internal
security.
The available evidence indicates that the CIA's participation in
meetings of the TES was limited to providing advice on foreign in-
telligence and evaluation techniques and to editing reports. The
3 This appears to have been a short cut of the general procedure in the Justice Department
to make requests for name checks by the CIA through the FBI.
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Agency's substantive contributions to the IES were restricted to for-
eign aspects, if any, of the relevant problems.
The statutory prohibition on internal security functions does not
preclude the CIA from providing foreign intelligence or advice on
evaluation techniques to interdepartmental intelligence evaluation
organizations having some domestic aspects.
The attendance of the CIA liaison officer at over 100 meetings of
the Intelligence Evaluation Staff, some of them concerned wholly
with domestic matters, nevertheless created at least the appearance
of impropriety. The Director of Central Intelligence was well advised
to approach such participation reluctantly.
The liaison officer acted improperly in the one instance in which
he directed an agent to gather domestic information within the United
States which was reported to the Intelligence Evaluation Staff.
Recommendation (14)
a. A capability should be developed within the FBI, or else-
where in the Department of Justice, to evaluate, analyze, and
coordinate intelligence and counterintelligence collected by the
FBI concerning espionage, terrorism, and other related matters
of. internal security.
b. The CIA should restrict its participation in any joint intelli-
gence committees to foreign intelligence matters.
c. The FBI should be encouraged to continue to look to the CIA
for such foreign intelligence and counterintelligence as is relevant
to FBI needs.
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Chapter 11
Special Operations Group
"Operation CHAOS"
Responding to Presidential requests to determine the extent of for-
eign influence on domestic dissidence, the CIA, upon the instruction
of the Director of Central Intelligence, established within the Counter-
intelligence Staff a Special Operations Group in August 1967, to
collect, coordinate, evaluate and report on foreign contacts with
American dissidents.
The Group's activities, which later came to be known as Operation
CHAOS, led the -CIA to collect information on dissident Americans
from its overseas stations and from the FBI.
Although the stated purpose of the Operation was to determine
whether there were any foreign contacts with American dissident
groups, it resulted in the accumulation of considerable material on
domestic dissidents and their activities.
During six years, the Operation compiled some 13,000 different files,
including files on 7,200 American citizens. The documents in these
files and related materials included the names of more than 300,000
persons and organizations, which were entered into a computerized
index.
This information was kept closely guarded within the CIA to pre-
vent its use by anyone other than the personnel of the Special Opera-
tions Group. Utilizing this information, personnel of the Group pre-
pared 3,500 memoranda for internal use; 3,000 memoranda for dis-
semination to the FBI; and 37 memoranda for distribution to 'high
officials.
The Operation ultimately had a staff of 52, who were isolated from
any substantial review even by the Counterintelligence Staff of which
they were technically a part.
Beginning in late 1969, Operation CHAOS used a number of agents
(130)
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to collect intelligence abroad on any foreign connections with Ameri-
can dissident groups. In order to have sufficient "cover" for these
agents, the Operation recruited persons from domestic dissident
groups or recruited others and instructed them to associate with such
groups in this country.
Most of these recruits were not directed to collect information
domestically on American dissidents. On a number of occasions, how-
ever, such information was reported by the recruits while they were
developing dissident credentials in the United States, and the infor-
mation was retained in the files of the Operation. On three occasions,
agents of the Operation were specifically used to collect domestic
intelligence.
Part of the reason for these transgressions was inherent in the
nature of the task assigned to the Group : to determine the extent of
any foreign influence on domestic dissident activities. That task neces-
sarily partook of both domestic and foreign aspects. The question
could not be answered adequately without gathering information on
the identities and relationships of the American citizens involved in
the activities. Accordingly, any effort by the CIA in this area was
bound, from the outset, to raise problems as to whether the Agency
was looking into internal security matters and therefore exceeding its
legislative authority.
The Presidential demands upon the CIA appear to have caused the
Agency to forego, .to some extent, the caution with which it might
otherwise have approached the subject.
Two Presidents and their staffs made continuing and insistent re-
quests of the CIA for detailed evaluation of possible foreign involve-
ment in the domestic dissident scene. The Agency's repeated conclu-
sion in its reports-that it could find no significant foreign connec-
tion with domestic disorder-led to further White House demands
that the CIA account for any gaps in the Agency's investigation and
that it remedy any lack of resources for gathering information.
The cumulative effect of these repeated demands was the addition
of more and more resources, including agents, to Operation CHAOS-
as the Agency attempted to support and to confirm the validity of its
conclusion. These White House demands also seem to have encouraged
top CIA management to stretch and, on some occasions, to exceed the
legislative restrictions.
The excessive secrecy surrounding Operation CHAOS, its isola-
tion within the CIA, and its removal from the normal chain of
command prevented any effective supervision and review of its activ-
ities by officers not directly involved in the project.
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A. Origins of Operation CHAOS-August 1967
In the wake of racial violence and civil disturbances, President
Johnson on July 2, 1967, formed the National Commission on Civil
Disorders (the Kerner Commission) and directed it to investigate
and make recommendations with respect to the origins of the dis-
orders. At the same time, the President instructed all other depart-
ments and agencies of government to assist the Kerner Commission
by supplying information to it.
On August 15, 1967, Thomas Karamessines, Deputy Director for
Plans, issued a directive to the Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff
instructing him to establish an operation for overseas coverage of
subversive student activities and related matters. This memorandum
relayed instructions from Director Richard Helms, who, according to
Helms' testimony, acted in response to continuing, substantial pressure
from the President to determine the extent of any foreign connections
with domestic dissident events. Helms' testimony is corroborated by
a contemporaneous FBI memorandum which states :
The White House recently informed Richard Helms, Director, CIA, that the
Agency should exert every possible effort to collect information concerning U.S.
racial agitators who might travel abroad * * * because of the pressure placed
upon Helms, a new desk has been created at the Agency for the explicit purpose
of collecting information coming into the Agency and having any significant
bearing on possible racial disturbances in the U.S.
The question of foreign involvement in domestic dissidence com-
bined matters over which the FBI had jurisdiction (domestic dis-
order) and matters which were the concern of the CIA (possible for-
eign connection). The FBI, unlike the CIA, generally did not pro-
duce finished, evaluated intelligence. Apparently for these reasons, the
President looked to the Director of Central Intelligence to produce a
coordinated evaluation of intelligence bearing upon the question of
dissidence.
When the Kerner Commission's Executive Director wrote to Helms
on August 29, 1967, requesting CIA information on civil disorders,
Helms offered to supply only information on foreign connections with
domestic disorder. Ultimately, the CIA furnished 26 reports to the
Kerner Commission, some of which related largely to domestic
dissident activities.
B. Evolution of Operation CHAOS-The November 1967
Study
The officer selected to head what became the Special Operations
Group was a person already involved in a counterintelligence effort
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in connection with an article in Ramparts magazine on CIA associ-
ations with American youth overseas. In connection with his research
and analysis, the officer had organized the beginnings of a computer
system for storage and retrieval of information on persons involved
in the "New Left."
By October 1967, this officer had begun to establish his operation
concerning foreign connections with the domestic dissident scene.
In a memorandum for the record on October 31, 1967, he indicated
that the CIA was to prepare a study on the "International Connec-
tions of the United States Peace Movement."
The CIA immediately set about collecting all the available govern-
inent information on dissident groups. All field stations of the CIA
clandestine service were polled for any information they 'had on the
subject of the study. Every branch of the intelligence community
was called upon to submit whatever information it had on the peace
movement to the Special Operations Group for cataloging and storage.
Most of the information was supplied by the FBI.
All information collected by the Special Operations Group was
forwarded to the CIA Office of Current Intelligence, which com-
pleted the study by mid-November. Director Helms personally de-
livered the study to President Johnson on November 15, 1967, with
a covering note stating that "this is the study on the United States
Peace Movement you requested."
The study showed that there was little evidence of foreign involve-
ment and no evidence of any significant foreign financial support
of the peace activities within the United States. As a result of the
information gathered for the study, however, the Special Operations
Group gained an extensive amount of data for its later operations.
On November 20, 1967, a new study was launched by the CIA at
the request of the Director of Central Intelligence. This study was
titled "Demonstration Techniques." The scope of the study was
world-wide, and it concentrated on antiwar demonstrations in the
United States and abroad. The procedure used on the earlier study
was also employed to gather information for this new project.
The CIA sent an updated version of the Peace Movement Study
to the President on December 22, 1967, and on January 5, 1968, Direc-
tor Helms delivered to the White House a paper entitled "Student
Dissent and Its Techniques in the United States." Helms' covering
letter to the President described the January 5 study as "part of our
continuing examination of this general matter."
Again, the information bank of the Special Operations Group was
increased by the intelligence gathered for these studies.
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C. Evolution of Operation CHAOS-Domestic Unrest in
1968
Continuing antiwar demonstrations in 1968 led to growing White
House demands for greater coverage of such groups' activities abroad.
As disorders occurred in Europe in the summer of 1968, the CIA,
with concurrence from the FBI, sought to engage European liaison
services in monitoring United States citizens overseas in order to
produce evidence of foreign guidance, control or financial support.
In mid-1968, the CIA moved to consolidate its efforts concerning
foreign connections with domestic dissidence and to restrict further
the dissemination of the information used by the Special Operations
Group. The Group was given a cryptonym, "CHAOS." The CIA
sent cables to all its field stations in July 1968, directing that all
information concerning dissident groups be sent through a single
restricted channel on an "Eyes Only" basis to the Chief of Opera-
tion CHAOS. No other dissemination of the information was to
occur.
Some time in 1968, Director Helms, in response to the President's
continued concern about student revolutionary movements around
the world, commissioned the preparation of a new analytic paper
which was eventually entitled "Restless Youth." Like its predecessor,
"Restless Youth" concluded that the motivations underlying student
radicalism arose from social and political alienation at home and not
from conspiratorial activity masterminded from abroad.
"Restless Youth" was produced in two versions. The first version
contained a section on domestic involvements, again raising a question
as to the propriety of the CIA's having prepared it. This version was
delivered initially only to President Johnson and to Walt W. Rostow,
the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.
Helms' covering memorandum, dated September 4, 1968, stated, "You
will, of course, be aware of the peculiar sensitivity which attaches
to the fact that CIA has prepared a report on student activities both
here and abroad."
Another copy of the first version of "Restless Youth" was delivered
on February 18, 1969, after the change in Administrations, to Henry
A. Kissinger, then Assistant to President Nixon for National Security
Affairs. Director Helms' covering memorandum of February 18
specifically pointed out the impropriety of the CIA's involvement
in the study. It stated :
In an effort to round-out our discussion of this subject, we have included
a section on American students. This is an area not within the charter of this
Agency, so I need not emphasize how extremely sensitive this makes the paper.
Should anyone learn of its existence it would prove most embarrassing for
all concerned.
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A second version of "Restless Youth" with the section on domestic
activities deleted was later given a somewhat wider distribution in
the intelligence community.
The CHAOS group did not participate in the initial drafting of
the "Restless Youth" paper, although it did review the paper at some
point before any of its versions were disseminated. Intelligence
derived from the paper was, of course, available to the group.
E. The June 1969 White House Demands
On June 20, 1969, Tom Charles Huston, Staff Assistant to Presi-
dent Nixon, wrote to the CIA that the President had directed prepara-
tion of a report on foreign communist support of revolutionary pro-
test movements in this country.
Huston suggested that previous reports indicated inadequacy of
intelligence collection capabilities within the protest movement area.
(Helms testified that this accurately reflected the President's attitude.)
According to Huston's letter, the President wanted to know :
-What resources were presently targeted toward monitoring
foreign communist support of revolutionary youth activities in
this country;
-How effective the resources were ;
-What gaps existed because of inadequate resources or low
priority of attention ; and,
-What steps could be taken to provide maximum possible
coverage of the activities.
Huston said that he was particularly interested in the CIA's
ability to collect information of this type. A ten-day deadline was
set for the CIA's reply.
The Agency responded on June 30, 1969, with a report entitled,
"Foreign Communist Support to Revolutionary Protest Movements in
the United States." The report concluded that while the communists en-
couraged such movements through propaganda and exploitation of
international conferences, there was very little evidence of communist
funding and training of such movements and no evidence of communist
direction and control.
The CIA's covering memorandum, which accompanied the June 30
report, pointed out that since the summer of 1967, the Agency had
attempted to determine through its sources abroad what significant
communist assistance or control was given to domestic revolutionary
protests. It stated that close cooperation also existed with the FBI
and that "new sources were being sought through independent means."
The memorandum also said that the "Katzenbach guidelines" of 1967
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had inhibited access to persons who might have information on efforts
by communist intelligence services to exploit revolutionary groups in
the United States.'
E. CHAOS in Full-Scale Operation-Mid-1969
By mid-1969, Operation CHAOS took on the organizational form
which would continue for the following three years. Its staff had in-
creased to 36. (Eventually it totaled 52.) In June 1969, a Deputy Chief
was assigned to the Operation to assist in administrative matters and to
assume some of the responsibilities of handling the tightly-held com-
munications. There was a further delegation of responsibility with
the appointment of three branch chiefs in the operation.
The increase in size and activity of the Operation was accompanied
by further isolation and protective measures. The group had already
been physically located in a vaulted basement area, and tighter security
measures were adopted in connection with communications of the
Operation. These measures were extreme, even by normally strict CIA
standards. An exclusive channel for communication with the FBI
was also established which severely restricted dissemination both to
and from the Bureau of CHAOS-related matters.
On September 6, 1969, Director Helms distributed an internal
memorandum to the head of each of the directorates within CIA, in-
structing that support was to be given to the activities of Operation
CHAOS. Both the distribution of the memorandum and the nature
of the directives contained in it were most unusual. These served to
underscore the importance of its substance.
Helms confirmed in the September 6 memorandum that the CHAOS
group had the principal operational responsibilities for conducting
the Agency's activities in the "radical milieu." Helms expected that
each division of the Agency would cooperate "both in exploiting
existing sources and in developing new ones, and that [the Special
Operations Group] will have the necessary access to such sources and
operational assets."
Helms further stated in the memorandum that he believed the
CIA had "the proper approach in discharging this sensitive respon-
sibility while strictly observing the statutory and de facto proscrip-
tion on Agency domestic involvements."
The September 6 memorandum, prepared after discussions with
1 In 1967 President Johnson appointed a committee including Nicholas Katzenbach, John
Gardner, and Richard Helms to investigate charges that the CIA was funding the National
Student Association. The charges were substantiated, and the Katzenbach Committee's
recommendation that the government refrain from cover* financial support of private
educational organizations was adopted as government policy.
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the Chief of the Operation, among others, served at least three impor-
tant functions : First, it confirmed, beyond question, the importance
which Operation CHAOS had attained in terms of Agency objectives.
Second, it replied to dissent which had been voiced within the CIA
concerning the Operation. Third, it ensured that CHAOS would re-
ceive whatever support it needed, including personnel.
F. Agent Operations Relating to Operation CHAOS
Within a month after Helms' memorandum of September 6, an
operations or "case" officer was assigned from another division to
Operation CHAOS. The Operation thus gained the capacity to man-
age its own agents. A full understanding of the Operation's use of
agents, however, requires some appreciation of similar proposals
previously developed by other components of the CIA.
1. "Project 1"
In February 1968, the CIA's Office of Security and a division in
its Plans Directorate jointly drafted a proposal for "Project 1," which
was initially entitled "An Effort . . . in Acquiring Assets in the
`Peace' and `Black Power' Movements in the United States." The
project was to involve recruitment of agents who would penetrate
some of the prominent dissident groups in the United States and re-
port information on the communications, contacts, travel and plans of
individuals or groups having a connection with a certain foreign
area. The proposal was rejected by Director Helms in March 1968
on the ground that it "would appear to be" beyond the Agency's juris-
diction and would cause widespread criticism when it became public
knowledge, as he believed it eventually would.
Shortly thereafter, the proposed Project was modified to include
a prohibition against domestic penetration of dissident groups by
agents recruited by CIA. Any contact with domestic groups would be
incidental to the overall objective of gaining access overseas to informa-
tion on foreign contacts and control.
This modification was consistent with Helms' instruction that the
Agency was not to engage in domestic operational activity directed
against dissident groups. The modified plan was approved by the
Deputy Director of Plans, subject to conditions to ensure his tight
supervision and control over its activities, but no evidence could be
found that the project ever became operational.
The history of Project 1 clearly reflected the CIA's awareness
that statutory limitations applied to the use of agents on the domestic
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dissident scene. "Penetration" of dissident groups in the United States
to gain information on their domestic activities was prohibited.
2. "Project 2"
A second program, "Project 2," was initiated in late 1969 by the
same office in the CIA's Plans Directorate which had developed Proj-
ect 1. Under Project 2, individuals without existing dissident affilia-
tion would be recruited and, after recruitment, would acquire the
theory and jargon and make acquaintances in the "New Left" while
attending school in the United States. Following this "reddening"
or "sheepdipping" process (as one CIA officer described it), the agent
would be sent to a foreign country on a specific intelligence mission.
Project 2 was approved on April 14, 1970, by the Assistant Deputy
Director for Plans, who stated that no Project 2 agent was to be
directed to acquire information concerning domestic dissident activi-
ties..Only if such information was acquired incidentally by the
agents during the domestic "coloration" process would it be passed
to Operation CHAOS for forwarding to the FBI.2
Renewals of Project 2 were approved annually during 1971-1973
by the Deputy Director for Plans. The Project was also reviewed and
approved in the fall of 1973 by William E. Colby, by then Director of
Central Intelligence. In granting his approval on September 5, 1973,
Director Colby, in language which paraphrased the original Project
1 guidelines, stated that :
Care will be taken that, during the training period of [Project 2] agents
within the United States, they will not be operated by CIA against domestic
targets.
During the period 1970-1974 a total of 23 agents were recruited
for the project, of which 11 completed the prescribed development
process in the United States. Each agent was met and debriefed on
a regular schedule in this country by Project 2 case officers. The agents
were told repeatedly of the limitations on their activities in the United
States.
The Project 2 case officers used debriefing sessions as one method
of assessing an agent's effectiveness in reporting facts precisely and
accurately, obviously an essential skill to any intelligence agent.
"Contact reports" were prepared after the sessions. Although the re-
ports contained a substantial amount of information on agents' obser-
vations of domestic activities, no evidence was found that Project 2
itself opened any files based upon any of the information.
2 Prior to the April 14 approval of Project 2, Operation CHAOS personnel had requested
that a proviso be added to the Project that Operation CHAOS would coordinate Project 2
recruits during the "coloration" process in the United States. The proviso was rejected.
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Copies of all contact reports with Project 2 agents, however, were
provided to Operation CHAOS, and that Operation made a detailed
review of the information contained in the reports. Information on
both individuals and activities which was contained in the reports and
which was deemed significant by CHAOS was incorporated into the
raw data files of the operation and indexed into its computer sys-
tem. Depending upon the nature of the information, it might even-
tually be furnished by Operation CHAOS to the FBI.
Thus, while Project 2 agents were not assigned collection missions
in the United States, the tandem operation of CHAOS with Project
2 nevertheless did result in collection and dissemination by the CIA
of a limited quantity of intelligence on domestic dissident activities.
Director Helms testified that he was not aware of this collection and
dissemination.
Furthermore, despite efforts by Project 2 case officers to have their
agent trainees avoid taking an activist role in domestic dissident
groups, that did occur upon occasion. One of the agents became an
officer in such a group, and on at least one occasion the agent pro-
vided Project 2 with copies of minutes of the group's meetings.
A Project 2 agent also became involved as an adviser in a United
States congressional campaign and, for a limited period, furnished
reports to CHAOS of behind-the-scenes activities in the campaign.
3. CHAOS Agents
During the first two years of its existence, Operation CHAOS
gathered the bulk of its information from reports issued by other
governmental agencies or received from CIA field stations abroad.
By October 1969, this approach had changed almost completely.
Operation CHAOS' new case officer was beginning to contact, recruit,
and run agents directly for the operation. This reversal of approach
appears to be attributable primarily to three factors :
-First, and most important, an increasing amount of White
House pressure (for example, the June 20, 1969, letter from Tom
Charles Huston, Staff Assistant to the President) was brought
to bear on the CIA to provide more extensive and detailed re-
porting on the role of foreign connections with American dis-
sident activities;
-Second, Operation CHAOS had been relatively unsuccessful
in obtaining meaningful information through agents associated
with other agencies;
-Third, the tempo of dissident activities had increased sub-
stantially in the United States.
The extent of CHAOS agent operations was limited to fewer than
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30 agents. Although records of the Operation indicate that reporting
was received from over 100 other agent sources, those sources appear
to have been directed abroad either by other governmental agencies
or by other components of the CIA. The information which these
sources reported to Operation CHAOS was simply a by-product of
other missions.
Operation CHAOS personnel contacted a total of approximately 40
potential agents from October 1969 to July 1972, after which no new
agent recruitments were made. (The case officer left the Operation
on July 12, 1972.) Approximately one-half of these individuals were
referred to the Operation by the FBI, and the remainder were devel-
oped through various CIA components.
All contact, briefing and debriefing reports prepared by the case
officer concerning all potential and actual agents, from whatever
source, became part of the records of the Operation. These reports,
often highly detailed, were carefully reviewed by CHAOS personnel;
all names, organizations and significant events were then indexed in
the Operation's computer. Upon occasion, the information would be
passed to the FBI.
The individuals referred to Operation CHAOS by the FBI were
past or present FBI informants who either were interested in a foreign
assignment or had planned a trip abroad. Eighteen of the referrals
were recruited. Only one was used on more than one assignment. In
each instance the Operation's case officer briefed the individual on
the CHAOS "requirements" before his trip and debriefed him upon
his return. After debriefing, the agents once again became the respon-
sibility of the FBI.
In one instance, the FBI turned an individual over to Operation
CHAOS for its continued use abroad. Before going overseas, that
agent was met by the Operation's case officer on a number of occasions
in the United States and did, report for several months upon certain
domestic contacts.
Seventeen agents were referred to Operation CHAOS by other CIA
components. Ten were dropped by the Operation for various reasons
after an initial assessment. Four were used for brief trips abroad, with
reporting procedures which essentially paralleled those used for the
FBI referrals.
The remaining three individuals had an entree into anti-war, radical
left, or black militant groups before they were recruited by the Oper-
ation. They were used over an extended period abroad, and they
were met and debriefed on numerous occasions in the United States.
One of the three agents travelled a substantial distance in late
1969 to participate in and report on major demonstrations then
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occurring in one area of the country. The CHAOS case officer met
and questioned the agent at length concerning individuals and organ-
izations involved in the demonstrations. Detailed contact reports were
prepared after each debriefing session. The contact reports, in turn,
provided the basis for 47 separate disseminations to the FBI, the bulk
of which related solely to domestic matters and were disseminated
under titles such as : "Plans for Future Anti-War Activities on the
West Coast."
The second of these agents regularly provided detailed information
on the activities and views of high-level leadership in another of the
dissident groups within the United States. Although a substantial
amount of this agent's reporting concerned the relationship of the dis-
sident group with individuals and organizations abroad, information
was also obtained and disseminated on the organization's purely domes-
tic activities.
The third agent was formally recruited in April 1971, having
been initially contacted by Operation CHAOS in October 1970. Dur-
ing the intervening months the CIA had asked the agent questions
posed by the FBI concerning domestic dissident matters and fur-
nished the responses to the Bureau.
Two days after the official recruitment, the agent was asked to travel
to Washington, D.C. to work on an interim basis; the mission was to
"get as close as possible" and perhaps become an assistant to certain
prominent radical leaders who were coordinators of the imminent
"May Day" demonstrations. The agent was to infiltrate any secret
groups operating behind the scenes and report on their plans. The
agent was also asked to report any information on planned violence
toward government officials or buildings or foreign embassies.
This third agent travelled to Washington as requested, and was met
two or three times a week by the CHAOS case officer. After each of
these meetings, the case officer, in accordance with the standard pro-
cedure, prepared contact reports including all information obtained
from the agent. These reports, many of which were typed late at night
or over weekends, were passed immediately to the Chief of Operation
CHAOS. And when the information obtained from the agent was sig-
nificant, it was immediately passed by the Chief to an FBI repre-
sentative, generally orally.
The Operation's use of these three agents was contrary to guide-
lines established after Director Helms rejected the initial proposal
for Project 1 in March 1968. Helms testified that he was not aware of
the domestic use of these agents.
The Commission found no evidence that any of the agents or
CIA officers involved with any of the dissident operations em-
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ployed or directed the domestic use of any personal or electronic
surveillance, wiretaps or unauthorized entries against any dissident
group or individual. Any reporting by CHAOS agents in the United
States was based upon information gained as a result of their personal
observations and acquaintances.
G. Collection, Indexing, and Filing of Information by
Operation CHAOS
The volume of information passing through the CHAOS group
by mid-1969 was great. As Director Helms pointed out in his Sep-
tember 6, 1969, memorandum to the Directorates, the Operation's
main problem was a backlog of undigested raw information which
required analysis and indexing.
Not only was the Agency receiving FBI reports on antiwar activi-
ties, but with the rise of international conferences against the war,
and student and radical travel abroad, information flowed in from
the Agency's overseas stations as well.
The Operation had gathered all the information it could from the
Agency's central registry. According to the Chief of the Operation,
that information for the most part consisted of raw data gathered
on individuals by the FBI which had not been analyzed by the Agen-
cy because the information contained nothing of foreign intelligence
value.
CHAOS also availed itself of the information gained through the
CIA's New York mail intercept. The Operation supplied a watch
list of United States citizens to be monitored by the staff of the mail
intercept. The number of mail items intercepted and sent to CHAOS
during its operation were sufficient in number to have filled two draw-
ers in a filing cabinet. All of these items were letters or similar mate-
rial between the United States and the Soviet Union.
In addition, Operation CHAOS received materials from an in-
ternational communications activity of another agency of the gov-
ernment. The Operation furnished a watch list of names to the other
agency and received a total of approximately 1100 pages of materials
overall. The program to furnish the Operation with these materials
was not terminated until CHAOS went out of existence. All such mate-
rials were returned to the originating agency by the CIA in Novem-
ber 1974 because a review of the materials had apparently raised a
question as to the legality of their being held by CIA. The materials
concerned for the most part anti-war activities, travel to international
peace conferences and movements of members of various dissident
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groups. The communications passed between the United States and
foreign countries. None was purely domestic.
During one period, Operation CHAOS also appears to have re-
ceived copies of booking slips for calls made between points in the
United States and abroad. The slips did not record the substance
of the calls, but rather showed the identities of the caller and the
receiver, and the date and time of the call. The slips also indicated
whether the call went through.
Most of the officers assigned to the Operation were analysts who
read the materials received by it and extracted names and other in-
formation for indexing in the computer system used by the Operation
and for inclusion in the Operation's many files. It appears that, because
of the great volume of materials received by Operation CHAOS and
the time pressures on the Operation, little judgment could be, or was,
exercised in this process. The absense of such judgment led, in turn,
to the inclusion of a substantial amount of data in the records of
the Operation having little, if anything, bearing upon its foreign in-
telligence objective.
The names of all persons mentioned in intelligence source reports
received by Operation CHAOS were computer-indexed. The computer
printout on a person or organization or subject would contain refer-
ences to all documents, files or communications traffic where the name
appeared. Eventually, approximately 300,000 names of American citi-
zens and organizations were thus stored in the CHAOS computer
system.
The computerized information was streamed or categorized on a
"need to know" basis, progressing from the least sensitive to the most
sensitive. A special computer "password" was required in order to
gain access to each stream. (This multistream characteristic of the
computer index caused it to be dubbed the "Hydra" system.) The
computer system was used much like a library card index to locate in-
telligence reports stored in the CHAOS library of files,
The files, like the computer index, were also divided into different
levels of security. A "201," or personality, file would be opened on an
individual when enough information had been collected to warrant a
file or when the individual was of interest to another government
agency that looked to the CIA for information. The regular 201 file
generally contained information such as place of birth, family, occupa-
tion and organizational affiliation. In addition, a "sensitive" file might
also be maintained on that same person. The sensitive file generally
encompassed matters which were potentially embarrassing to the
Agency or matters obtained from sources or by methods which the
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Agency sought to protect. Operation CHAOS also maintained nearly
1000 "subject" files on numerous organizations.3
Random samplings of the Operation's files show that in great part,
the files consisted of undigested FBI reports or overt materials such
as new clippings on the particular subject.
An extreme example of the extent to which collection could go once
a file was opened is contained in the Grove Press, Inc., file. The file
apparently was opened because the company had published a book by
Kim Philby, the British intelligence officer who turned out to be a
Soviet agent. The name Grove Press was thus listed as having in-
telligence interest, and the CHAOS analysts collected all available
information on the company. Grove Press, in its business endeavors,
had also produced the sex-oriented motion picture, "I Am Curious
Yellow" and so the Operation's analysts dutifully clipped and filmed
cinema critics' commentaries upon the film.
From among the 300,000 names in the CHAOS computer index, a
total of approximately 7,200 separate personality files were developed
on citizens of the United States.
In addition, information of on-going intelligence value was digested
in summary memoranda for the internal use of the Operation. Nearly
3,500 such memoranda were developed during the history of CHAOS.
Over 3,000 memoranda on digested information were disseminated,
where appropriate, to the FBI. A total of 37 highly sensitive memo-
randa originated by Operation CHAOS were sent over the signature
of the Director of Central Intelligence to the White House, to the
Secretary of State, to the Director of the FBI or to the Secret Service.
H. Preparation of Reports for Interagency Groups
Commencing in mid-1970, Operation CHAOS produced reports
for the interagency groups discussed in the previous chapter. One such
3 The organizations, to name a few, included :
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)
Young Communist Workers Liberation League (YCWLL)
National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam ;
Women's Strike for Peace ;
Freedomways Magazine and Freedomways Associated, Inc. ;
American Indian Movement (AIM) ;
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)
Draft Resistance Groups (U.S.) ;
Cross World Books and Periodicals, Inc. ;
U.S. Committee to Aid the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam ;
Grove Press, Inc.
Nation of Islam ;
Youth International Party (YIP)
Women's Liberation Movement ;
Black Panther Party (BPP)
Venceremos Brigade;
Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam.
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report was prepared by the Operation in June 1970. Unlike the June
1969 study, which was limited to CIA sources, the 1970 study took into
account all available intelligence sources. In the 1970 analysis, entitled,
"Definition of Existing Internal Security Threat-Foreign," the
Agency concluded that there was no evidence, based on available in-
formation and sources, that foreign governments and intelligence
services controlled domestic dissident movements or were then capable
of directing the groups. The June 1970 Report was expanded and re-
published in January 1971. It reached the same conclusions.
1. Relationship of Operation CHAOS to
Other CIA Components
Substantial measures were .taken from the inception of Operation
CHAOS to ensure that it was highly compartmented. Knowledge of
its activities was restricted to those individuals who had a definite
"need to know" of it.
The two or three week formal training period for the operation's
agents was subject to heavy insulation. According to a memorandum in
July 1971, such training was to be carried out with "extreme caution"
and the number of people who knew of the training was to be kept to
"an absolute minimum." The Office of Training was instructed. to re-
turn all communications relating to training of CHAOS agents to the
Operation.
The Operation was isolated or compartmented even within the
Counterintelligence Staff which, itself, was already a highly com-
partmented component of the CIA. The Operation was physically re-
moved from the Counterintelligence Staff. Knowledge within the
Counterintelligence Staff of proposed CHAOS operations was re-
stricted to the Chief of the Staff and his immediate assistants.
The Counterintelligence Chief was technically responsible in the
chain of command for Operation CHAOS, and requests "for budget-
ing and agent recruitment had to be approved through his office. But
the available evidence indicates that the Chief of Counterintelligence
had little connection with the actual operations of CHAOS. Accord-
ing to a CIA memorandum in May 1969, Director Helms specifically
instructed the Chief of the Operation to refrain from disclosing part
of his activities to the Counterintelligence Chief.
The Counterintelligence and the CHAOS Chiefs both agree that,
because of the compartmentation and secrecy of CHAOS, the actual
supervisory responsibility for the Operation was vested in the Director
of Central Intelligence. This was particularly so beginning in mid-
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1969. In fact, the Chief of CHAOS, later in history of his Opera-
tion, sought unsuccessfully to have his office attached directly to that
of the Director.
Director Helms testified that he could recall no specific directions he
gave to the CHAOS Group Chief to report directly to him. To the
contrary, Helms said, he expected the Chief to report to the Chief of
Counterintelligence, who in turn would report to the Deputy Director
for Plans and then to the Director.
The sensitivity of the Operation was deemed so great that, during
one field survey in November 1972 even the staff of the CIA's
Inspector General was precluded from reviewing CHAOS files or
discussing its specific operations. (This incident, however, led to a
review of the Operation by the CIA Executive Director-Comptroller
in December 1972.)
On another occasion, an inspection team from the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget was intentionally not informed of the Operation's
activity during an OMB survey of CIA field operations.
There is no indication that the CIA's General Counsel was ever
consulted about the propriety of Operation CHAOS activities.
It further appears that, unlike most programs within the CIA
clandestine service, Operation CHAOS was not subjected to an
annual review and approval procedure. Nor does there appear to have
been any formal review of the Operation's annual budget. Such review
as occurred seems to have been limited to requests for authority to
assess or recruit an American citizen as an agent.
The result of the compartmentation, secrecy and isolation which
did occur seems clear now. The Operation was not effectively super-
vised and reviewed by anyone in the CIA who was not operationally
involved in it.
Witnesses testified consistently that the extreme secrecy and se-
curity measures of Operation CHAOS derived from two considera-
tions : First, the Operation sought to protect the privacy of the Ameri-
can citizens whose names appeared in its files by restricting access to
those names as severely as possible. Second, CHAOS personnel were
concerned that the operation would be misunderstood by others within
the CIA if they learned only bits of information concerning it with-
out being briefed on the entire project.
It is safe to say that the CIA's top leadership wished to avoid even
the appearance of participation in internal security matters and were
cognizant that the Operation, at least in part, was close to being
a proscribed activity and would generate adverse public reaction if
revealed.
Despite the substantial efforts to maintain the secrecy of Operation
CHAOS, over six hundred persons within the CIA were formally
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briefed on the Operation. A considerable number of CIA officers had
to know of the Operation in order to handle its cable traffic abroad.
Enough information concerning CHAOS was known within the
CIA so that a middle level management group of 14 officers (organized
to discuss and develop possible solutions to various CIA problems)
was in a position to write two memoranda in 1971 raising questions
as to the propriety of the project. Although only one of the authors
had been briefed on CHAOS activities, several others in the group
apparently had enough knowledge of it to concur in the preparation of
the memoranda.
Opposition to, or at least skepticism about, the CHAOS activities
was also expressed by senior officers in the field and at headquarters.
Some area division chiefs were unwilling to share the authority for
collection of intelligence from their areas with the Operation and
were reluctant to turn over the information for exclusive handling
and processing by the Operation. When CHAOS undertook the place-
ment of agents in the field, some operations people resented this in-
trusion by a staff organization into their jurisdiction.
In addition, some of the negativism toward CHAOS was expressed
on philosophic grounds. One witness, for example, described the atti-
tude of his division toward the Operation as "total negativeness."
A May 1971 memorandum confirms that this division wanted "nothing
to do" with CHAOS. This was principally because the division per-
sonnel thought that the domestic activities of the Operation were
more properly the function of the FBI. As a result, this division sup-
plied the Operation with only a single lead to a potential agent, and
its personnel has little to do with the on-going CHAOS activities.
Apparently the feelings against Operation CHAOS were strong
enough that Director Helms' September 6, 1969 memorandum was
required to support the Operation. That memorandum, sent to all
deputy directors in the CIA, assured them that the Operation was
within the statutory authority of the Agency, and directed their
support.
Director Helms' attitude toward the views of some CIA officers
toward Operation CHAOS was further summarized in a memorandum
for the record on December 5,1972, which stated :
CHAOS is a legitimate counterintelligence function of the Agency and can-
not be stopped simply because some members of the organization do not like
this activity.
J. Winding Down Operation CHAOS
By 1972, with the ending of the American involvement in the
Vietnam War and the subsequent lower level of protest activities at
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home, the activities of Operation CHAOS began to lag. The com-
munications traffic decreased, and official apprehension about foreign
influence also abated. By mid-1972, the Special Operations Group
began to shift its attention to other foreign intelligence matters.
At the end of August 1973, William E. Colby, the new CIA Di-
rector, in memoranda dealing with various "questionable" activi-
ties by the Agency, ordered all its directorates to take specific ac-
tion to ensure that CIA activities remained within the Agency's leg-
islative authority. In one such memorandum, the Director stated that
Operation CHAOS was to be "restricted to the collection abroad of
information on foreign activities related to domestic matters.
Further, the CIA will focus clearly on the foreign organizations
and individuals involved and only incidentally on their American
contacts."
The Colby memorandum also specified that the CIA was not to be
directly engaged in surveillance or other action against an Amer-
ican abroad and could act only as a communications channel between
the FBI and foreign services, thus altering the policy in this regard
set in 1968 and reaffirmed in 1969 by Director Helms.
By August 1973, when the foregoing Colby memorandum was writ-
ten, the paper trail left by Operation CHAOS included somewhere
in the area of 13,000 files on subjects and individuals (including ap-
proximately 7,200 personality or "201" files) ; 4 over 11,000 memo-
randa, reports and letters from the FBI; over 3,000 disseminations
to the FBI; and almost 3,500 memoranda for internal use by the
Operation. In addition, the CHAOS group had generated, or caused
the generation of, over 12,000 cables of various types, as well as a
handful of memoranda to high-level government officials.
On top of this veritable mountain of material was a computer sys-
tem containing an index of over 300,000 names and organizations
which, with few exceptions, were of United States citizens and orga-
nizations apparently unconnected with espionage.
K. Operation CHAOS Terminated
On March 15, 1974, the Agency terminated Operation CHAOS.
Directions were issued to all CIA field stations that, as a matter of
future policy, when information was uncovered as a byproduct of a
foreign intelligence activity indicating that a United States citizen
abroad was suspect for security or counterintelligence reasons, the in-
formation was to be reported to the FBI.
4 A CIA statistical evaluation of the files indicates that nearly 65 percent of them were
opened to handle FBI Information or FBI requests.
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According to the CHAOS termination cable, no unilateral action
against the suspect was to be taken by the CIA without the specific
direction of the Deputy Director for Operations and only after re-
ceipt of a written request from the FBI and with the knowledge of
the Director of Central Intelligence.
The files and computerized index are still intact and are being held
by the Agency pending completion of the current investigations. Ac-
cording to the group chief who is custodian of the files, many of the
files have little, if any, value to ongoing intelligence operations. The
CIA has made an examination of each of the CHAOS personality
files and has categorized those portions which should be eliminated.
Final disposition of those files, as noted, awaits the completion of the
current investigations.
Conclusions
Some domestic activities of Operation CHAOS unlawfully ex-
ceeded the CIA's statutory authority, even though the declared mis-
sion of gathering intelligence abroad as to foreign influence on domes-
tic dissident activities was proper.
Most significantly, the Operation became a repository for large
quantities of information on the domestic activities of American citi-
zens. This information was derived principally from FBI reports or
from overt sources and not from clandestine collection by the CIA.
Much of the information was not directly related to the question of
the existence of foreign connections with domestic dissidence.
It was probably necessary for the CIA to accumulate an informa-
tion base on domestic dissident activities in order to assess fairly
whether the activities had foreign connections. The FBI would collect
information but would not evaluate it. But the accumulation of domes-
tic data in the Operation exceeded what was reasonably required to
make such an assessment and was thus improper.
The use of agents of the Operation on three occasions to gather
information within the United States on strictly domestic matters
was beyond the CIA's authority. In addition the intelligence dissemi-
nations and those portions of a major study prepared by the Agency
which dealt with purely domestic matters were improper.
The isolation of Operation CHAOS within the CIA and its inde-
pendence from supervision by the regular chain of command within
the clandestine service made it possible for the activities of the Opera-
tion to stray over the bounds of the Agency's authority without the
knowledge of senior officials. The absence of any regular review of
these activities prevented timely correction of such missteps as did
occur.
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Recommendation (5)
a. Presidents should refrain from directing the CIA to perform
what are essentially internal security tasks.
b. The CIA should resist any efforts, whatever their origin, to
involve it again in such improper activities.
c. The Agency should guard against allowing any component
(like the Special Operations Group) to become so self-contained
and isolated from top leadership that regular supervision and
review are lost.
d. The files of the CHAOS project which have no foreign intel-
ligence value should be destroyed by the Agency at the conclusion
of the current congressional investigations, or as soon thereafter
as permitted by law.
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Chapter 12
Protection of the Agency Against.
Threats of Violence-Office
of Security
During the period of widespread domestic disorder from 1965 to
1972, the CIA, along with other government departments, was subject
to threats of violence and disruption by demonstrators and self-styled
revolutionary groups.
In the fall of 1968, a bomb destroyed a CIA recruiting office in Ann
Arbor, Michigan. Bomb threats required the evacuation of other
Agency buildings on several occasions. Agency recruiters on college
campuses were harassed and occasionally endangered. Protesters held
massive demonstrations, sometimes with the announced purpose of
preventing operation of the government.
Throughout this period, the government was determined not to per-
mit such activities to disrupt its functioning. The Office of Security of
the CIA was charged with the responsibility of ensuring the safety
of CIA buildings, employees, and activities and their continued
functioning.
Three programs to accomplish this mission are of particular concern
to our inquiry :
-Assistance to recruiters on college campuses.
-Infiltration of dissident groups in the Washington, D.C., area.
-Research and analysis of dissident activity.
A. Assistance to Recruiters
In light of the increasingly hostile atmosphere on many college
campuses, the CIA's Deputy Director for Support (now Administra-
tion) directed the Office of Security in February of 1967 to institute
a program of rendering assistance to Agency recruiters.
CIA field offices made contacts with college and university officials
to determine the general level of dissident activity on each campus-
and the nature and extent of activity directed against the CIA in par-
(151)
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ti.cular. The Office of Security then advised the recruiter scheduled to
visit a particular campus of its findings and recommendations.
We found nothing to indicate that the CIA collected this informa-
tion by any means other than openly published materials and conver-
sations with law enforcement and other authorities.
If a recruiter elected to visit a campus where there were indications
of trouble, the Office of Security would provide him with monitoring
and communications support.
If trouble arose while the recruiting interviews were in process,
appropriate warnings were communicated to the recruiter, law en-
forcement agencies in the vicinity were alerted, and arrangements were
made for terminating the interviews and leaving the campus. The
Agency had a clearly-expressed policy of avoiding confrontations.
If the recruiter elected not to conduct interviews on a college or
university campus, the Office of Security would arrange for alternative
interviewing space in off-campus facilities, if possible. Where nec-
essary, similar monitoring and communications support was provided
at the off-campus site. In some instances, the campus atmosphere was
so hostile that scheduled recruitment visits were simply cancelled.
The program of assistance to recruiters was discontinued in 1970.
By that time, revisions in the Agency's recruitment program
eliminated the need for such security precautions.
B. Infiltration of Dissident Groups in the Washington,
D.C., Area
A second program conducted by the Office of Security involving
dissident activity was aimed at providing timely advance notice of
impending demonstrations in the Washington, D.C., area in order to
protect the facilities, employees and operations of the Agency. The
Director of Central Intelligence knew of this program and approved
its initial scope and purpose.
This project began in February 1967.E It was initially aimed at
monitoring 2 public demonstrations which might develop into picket-
ing of Agency buildings. Almost from the outset, however, it became
a project for placing "assets" in suitable organizations in order to
obtain information concerning intended demonstrations directed at
I There was testimony from one Agency employee that he had been asked as early as 1964
to monitor certain groups. If such monitoring did occur, it appears to have been confined to
one or two men operating on their off-duty hours.
2 According to Director Helms, to "monitor" a group is merely to attend its public meet-
ings and hear what any citizen present would hear ; to "infiltrate" a group is to join it as
a member and appear to support its purposes in general ; to "penetrate" a group is to gain
a position of leadership and influence or direct its policies and actions.
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CIA properties. ("Asset" is a term used by the CIA to refer to agents
and informants other than employees.)
A small number of persons employed by the CIA, either directly or
through an Office of Security proprietary, and several of their rela-
tives were recruited to work on this project on a part-time basis. In
the early phase of the project, only four or five such part-time "assets"
were involved. They were instructed to mingle with others at demon-
strations and meetings open to the public, to listen for information
and pick up literature, and to report promptly on any indications of
activities directed against Government installations, particularly CIA
installations.
By April 1967, four specific organizations in the Washington
metropolitan area had been designated for infiltration-the Women's
Strike for Peace, the Washington Peace Center, the Student Non-
Violent Coordinating Committee and the Congress of Racial Equality.
The part-time agents were instructed to attend meetings of these
organizations, to show an interest in their purposes, and to make
modest financial contributions, but not to exercise any leadership,
initiative or direction. The Agency provided funds for their suggested
financial contributions.
They were also directed to report how many persons attended the
meetings or demonstrations, who the speakers and leaders were, what
they said and what activities were conducted and planned.
These "assets" reported regularly, usually in longhand. The reports
were not confined to matters relating to intended demonstrations at
Government installations. They included details of the size and make-
up of the groups and the names and attitudes of their leaders and
speakers.
By late June 1967, the Agency sought to obtain whatever informa-
tion it could regarding the sources and amounts of income of each of
the infiltrated organizations.
One infiltrator was sent to dissident rallies in New York, Philadel-
phia and Baltimore. One was called upon to maintain a contimi-
ous check on the movements and activities of certain prominent dis-
sident leaders whenever they arrived in Washington, D.C. Infiltrators
were charged from time to time with obtaining specific information on
individuals, groups or planned demonstrations.
In some instances, the Agency identified leaders or speakers at a
meeting by photographing their automobiles and checking registra-
tion records. In other cases, it followed them home in order to identify
them through the city directory. Photographs were also taken at sev-
eral major demonstrations in the Washington area and at protest
activities in the vicinity of the White House.
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In September 1967, the National Mobilization Committee to End
the War was added to the list of monitored organizations in anticipa-
tion of large demonstrations planned for the Washington, D.C., area in
the following month. The assets were instructed to gather biographical
data on its leaders and participants, and information regarding the
location of the organization's office, the source of its funds, and the
identity of other organizations which would participate in that
demonstration.
In mid-August 1968, additional organizations were added to the
list for monitoring : the Southern Christian Leadership Conference,
School of Afro-American Thought, Washington Ethical Society,
American Humanist Association, Black Panthers, War Resisters'
League, Black United Front, Washington Mobilization for Peace,
Washington Urban League, Black Muslims and Niggers, Inc.
Assets were instructed to include within their reports the details of
meetings attended, including the names of the speakers and the gist
of their speeches, any threatening remarks against United States gov-
ernment leaders, and an evaluation of attitudes, trends, and possible
developments within the organization.
Funds and personnel adequate to carry out the program in full were
never made available. There are strong indications in the CIA's files,
and there was testimony before the Commission, that some of the
named organizations were never monitored at all. On the other hand,
some of them had already been infiltrated before August 1968.
On one occasion, in the course of infiltrating one of the dissident
organizations, an asset learned that the organization was receiving
financial support from a foreign source. The Director of Central In-
telligence and the President were informed of this development. Con-
cerned that further investigation of this matter might involve the
Agency in forbidden domestic activity, the Director made immediate
arrangements to turn the information and the asset over to the FBI.
From that point forward, the asset engaged in no further activity on
behalf of the CIA.
Information gathered in the course of this program was regularly
supplied to Operation CHAOS. Indeed, both testimony and circum-
stantial evidence indicate that the broad sweep of the information
collected was in part a result of requests levied on the Office of Secu-
rity by that Operation.
By the latter part of 1968, the Washington Metropolitan Police De-
partment had developed its own capability to collect information on
dissident groups in the area, and the Office of Security phased out its
project. In his testimony, Director Helms confirmed that these two
events were related. The Office of Security has continued to maintain
liaison with police departments in the Washington area.
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During the period of the operation of this program (February 1967
to December 1968), the maximum number of agents employed at any
one time appears to have been twelve. None of them was a professional-
ly-trained intelligence gatherer. All were residents of the Washington
metropolitan area. Most of them were manual laborers. They were paid
nominal salaries by the CIA, in most cases $100 per month or less. Ex-
cept for several housewives who were otherwise unemployed, all of
these assets had full-time jobs unconnected with dissident groups or
activities. During major demonstrations in the Washington metro-
politan area, some of them were called upon to put in long hours on
evenings and weekends, and for this extra service they received com-
pensation on a modest hourly basis. The primary motive of these assets
appears to have been patriotism rather than pay.
C. Research and Analysis on Dissident Activity
In 1966 and 1967, the Deputy Director for Support ordered the
Office of Security to prepare several studies relating to dissidents and
dissident groups. One of the studies centered on the individuals and
groups who were charging the CIA with involvement in the assassina-
tion of Malcolm X, the Black Muslim leader. The study provided
background information relating to those accusing the CIA.3
Shortly thereafter, the Deputy Director for Support ordered a
further study on dissidents in general. Such a study was prepared,
relying primarily upon public news sources.
In December 1967, the Office of Security launched a program under
which it was to maintain for several years a continuing study of dis-
sident activity throughout the United States. The stated purposes of
this project were to identify threats to CIA personnel, projects and
installations, and to determine whether there was foreign sponsorship
or ties to any such groups.
All field offices were directed to forward to headquarters whatever
relevant information they might find in their respective geographic
areas. Such information was to be obtained from willing sources and
from newspapers and similar publications. No penetrations, infiltra-
tions or monitoring of dissident groups was ordered or expected.
A substantial flow of material, primarily newspaper clippings, began
arriving at headquarters in early 1968. At that point, there was only
one employee in the Office of Security charged with the responsibility
of studying and evaluating such incoming material. In short order,
the arriving material inundated him.
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The Office soon created a special branch to handle the task. The
branch began operation in May 1968. Its staff varied slightly in size
from time to time, normally consisting of four or five persons.
One of the jobs of this branch was to organize and study the material
from the field offices. It also gathered relevant information from a
variety of other sources, including :
-Newspapers of general circulation in Washington, D.C., New
York and Chicago;
-Underground newspapers such as the Los Angeles Free Press
and the Berkeley Barb;
-The communist press, such as The Worker and People's
World;
-Organizational publications, such as the Black Panther;
-All college papers the branch could get and had time to read;
-Any relevant newspaper clippings it found;
-News magazines ; and
-Books and articles in general.
These materials dealt with activities and plans of dissident groups,
the names and travels of their leaders and speakers, and the attitudes
and intentions of such figures.
The branch had little or no input from the separate element within
the Office of Security engaged in monitoring dissident groups in the
Washington metropolitan area during 1967 and 1968. It used no infil-
trators, penetrators, or monitors.
Occasionally, the branch asked local police department intelligence
officers for information on dissident. activities, and it always received
cooperation. It also received the minutes of meetings of police depart-
ment intelligence officers from the Washington metropolitan area held
from time to time to plan for the handling of demonstrations and po-
tential riots. Finally, it received continuing reports from the FBI
relating to activities of dissidents and dissident groups.
The end products of this branch were weekly and special reports
called "Situation Information Reports" (SIR). These SIR's usually
consisted of two sections: one an analytical approach to events which
had been occurring; the other a calendar of forthcoming events. For
the most part, the SIR's were published weekly. The only regular
recipient of the full SIR's outside the Office of Security was the Chief
of Operation CHAOS. A United States Secret Service agent regularly
came to the Agency to pick up a copy of the calendar of forthcoming
events. Branch personnel and the Secret Service agent also conferred
whenever their information conflicted on the times and dates of forth-
coming events.
The SIR's were not furnished to the FBI. Neither were copies fur-
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nished to local police departments. They were never released to the
press or otherwise made public.
In addition to providing information from which to prepare the
SIR's, the materials received from the field and studied by the special
branch were used for several other related purposes :
(1) The Office of Security developed some insight into dissidents
and dissident groups. It could identify certain individuals whose par-
ticipation in an event would suggest the possibility of violence. It ana-
lyzed the relationships between some of the individuals and groups
and noted the frequent alterations and reorganizations of some of the
groups.
(2) It developed files on dissident groups and their leaders for ref-
erence purposes. These files were intended, in part, for use in making
security clearance determinations on applicants for employment by the
Agency. (According to those in charge of security clearance evalua-
tions, participation in the activities of a dissident organization, even
one that was prone to violence, did not necessarily disqualify an ap-
plicant for employment with the Agency, although it was considered
relevant to his objectivity and willingness to accept Agency security
discipline.)
(3) The Office of Security obtained information which helped it
assess risks posed to CIA offices, recruiters, agents and contractors by
upcoming demonstrations and other dissident activity.
Although estimates varied somewhat, approximately 500 to 800 files
were created on dissenting organizations and on individuals related in
various ways to dissident activity. The chief of the special branch
"guessed," that somewhere between 12,000 and 16,000 names were in-
dexed to these files.
The great majority of individuals and organizations indexed, or on
whom files were opened, were dissidents and dissident groups. This
was not true in all cases. Exceptions included Dr. S. I. Hayakawa of
San Francisco State College and Father Theodore Al. Hesburgh of
Notre Dame University, because they were publicly involved in cop-
ing with dissident activities.
Few if any of the files opened during this project were destroyed
before the commencement of the Commission's work. The Agency
intends to retain these files until the current investigations are con-
cluded, when it will destroy them as permitted by law.
In January 1971 the field offices were directed to limit their activi-
ties in support of this project to sending in newspaper clippings and
the literature of dissident organizations. In late 1972, publication of
the Situation Information Reports was discontinued because dissi-
dent activity had tapered off markedly. In June 1973, the entire proj-
ect relating to dissident individuals and groups was discontinued.
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During the lifetime of this project (late 1967 to mid-1973), several
incidental uses were made of it by the Office of Security :
(1) Branch personnel prepared a special report evaluating risks
that dissidents would interfere with CIA contract projects at about
twenty universities.
(2) On at least one occasion, a branch officer briefed the police
departments of Arlington and Fairfax Counties, Virginia, on what
to expect from large demonstrations planned for the Washington
metropolitan area.
(3) A branch officer delivered a briefing to security officers of the
Atomic Energy Commission on the subject of dissident groups in
connection with a training program on home-made bombs.
(4) Branch personnel served at the Command Center operated by
the Office of Security during several large demonstrations in order to
provide continuing analyses of developments and an assessment of
risks to Agency personnel and installations.
During the same period of time, the FBI maintained its own pro-
gram of reporting on dissident activity. CIA officials testified, how-
ever, that the FBI reports concentrated primarily on whether the
person or organization was subversive, whereas the needs of the Office
of Security extended beyond loyalty or subversion. This was so in
connection with screening employment applications and in assessing
the degree of risk to Agency facilities and operations by any particular
organization or combination of organizations. Knowledgeable FBI
officials did not dispute these observations, which were offered to ex-
plain why CIA mounted its own effort rather than using FBI
reports.
Conclusions
The program under which the Office of Security rendered assistance
to Agency recruiters on college campuses was justified as an exer-
cise of the Agency's responsibility to protect its own personnel and
operations. Such support activities were not undertaken for the pur-
pose of protecting the facilities or operations of other governmental
agencies, or to maintain public order or enforce laws.
The Agency should not infiltrate a dissident group for security
purposes unless there is a clear danger to Agency installations, opera-
tions or personnel, and investigative coverage of the threat by the
FBI and local law enforcement authorities is inadequate. The Agency's
infiltration of dissident groups in the Washington area went far be-
yond steps necessary to protect the Agency's own facilities, personnel
and operations, and therefore exceeded the CIA's statutory authority.
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In addition, the Agency undertook to protect other Government de-
partments and agencies-a police function prohibited to it by statute.
Intelligence activity directed toward learning from what sources a
domestic dissident group receives its -financial support within the
United States, and how much income it has, is no part of the authorized
security operations of the Agency. Neither is it the function of the
Agency to compile records on who attends peaceful meetings of such
dissident groups, or what each speaker has to say (unless it relates to
disruptive or violent activity which may be directed against the
Agency).
The Agency's actions in contributing funds, photographing people,
activities and cars, and following people home were unreasonable
under the circumstances and therefore exceeded the CIA's authority.
With certain exceptions, the program under which the Office of
Security (without infiltration) gathered, organized and analyzed
information about dissident groups for purposes of security was
-within the CIA's authority.
The accumulation of reference files on dissident organizations and
their leaders was appropriate both to evaluate the risks posed to the
Agency and to develop an understanding of dissident groups and
their differences for security clearance purposes. But the accumula-
tion of information on domestic activities went beyond what was
required by the Agency's legitimate security needs and therefore
exceeded the CIA's authority.
Recommendation (16)
The CIA should not infiltrate dissident groups or other organi-
zations of Americans in the absence of a written determination
by the Director of Central Intelligence that such action is neces-
.sary to meet a clear danger to Agency facilities, operations, or
personnel and that adequate coverage by law enforcement agen-
cies is unavailable.
Recommendation (17)
All files on individuals accumulated by the Office of Security in
the program relating to dissidents should be identified, and, ex-
cept where necessary for a legitimate foreign intelligence activity,
be destroyed at the conclusion of the current congressional in-
vestigations, or as soon thereafter as permitted by law.
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Chapter 13
Other Investigations by the Office of
Security
The Office of Security is responsible, on a world-wide basis, for en-
suring proper security of CIA facilities, operations and personnel.
The protection of classified material from unauthorized disclosure
is prominent among the responsibilities of the Office.
The Office also administers the Agency's security clearance pro-
gram and investigates breaches or suspected breaches of security by
persons affiliated with the Agency. Occasionally it has investigated
persons with no connection with the Agency, for various reasons re-
lated to the protection of classified material.
The Office is also responsible for providing proper security for per-
sons who have defected to the United States from other nations.
In the course of conducting investigations, the Office has, on in-
frequent occasions, engaged in wiretaps, buggings, surreptitious en-
tries and other improper conduct. Some of these activities were clearly
illegal at the time they were conducted. Others might have been
lawful at the time, but would be prohibited under current legal stand-
ards.
A. Security Clearance Investigations of Prospective
Employees and Operatives
The Office of Security conducts security investigations of all pro-
spective Agency employees and operatives, and of the employees of
private contractors doing business with the Agency on classified proj-
ects. Employees are subject to reinvestigation at five-year intervals.
Such investigations are undertaken to ensure that persons likely
to be security risks are not hired or retained by the Agency and are
not used by private companies on sensitive jobs for the Agency. Proper
security investigations of prospective Agency employees and opera-
atives are essential. All such investigations begin with routine name
(160)
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checks with other agencies to determine if there are any recent investi-
gations of the subject on file. If no satisfactory recent investigation
has been conducted, the Office of Security conducts its own investi-
gation, which includes making contact with friends, neighbors and
business associates of the prospective employee or operative.
Although the Commission has not attempted to review the thou-
sands of files compiled during the course of security investigations,
testimony before it has not given any reason to suspect that the
Office of Security has abused its authority in this regard or made
improper use of information so gathered.
Charges have been made implying that, on one occasion in 1968,
the Johnson Administration improperly used the Agency to investi-
gate a member of the Nixon campaign staff. The individual involved
had received some unclassified materials from the Agency, and the
Agency contemplated furnishing him with classified materials as well.
A routine security investigation was begun.
When the Agency learned that this individual had been asked by
Mr. Nixon to work on his campaign, it immediately curtailed its
investigation, restricting further inquiry to name checks from other
agencies. The Commission finds no basis for criticizing the Agency's
actions in this instance.
Conclusions
The CIA has properly performed the necessary function of screening
persons to whom it will make available classified information. The
Office of Security's activities in this regard help fulfill the Director of
Central Intelligence's statutory duty to protect sources and methods of
intelligence from unauthorized disclosure.
B. Investigations of Possible Breaches of Security
Aside from routine security clearance investigations and reinvesti-
gations, the Office of Security has conducted other investigations with-
in the United States in response to specific allegations of jeopardy to
intelligence sources and methods. Most of these allegations have been
resolved through routine investigative techniques such as name checks
or interviews.
In a relatively small number of cases, more intrusive methods
(physical and electronic surveillance, unauthorized entry, mail covers
and intercepts, and reviews of individuals' tax returns)-euphemistic-
ally known in the Office of Security as "special coverage"-were used.
While the Commission cannot be certain that it has found every
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instance of "special coverage" within the United States during the
last 28 years, it believes most of the significant operations have been
discovered.
Two questions are involved in the analysis of these investigations:
1. Was it proper for the CIA to conduct the investigation of the
particular subject by any means?
2. Were lawful investigative techniques employed?
1. Persons Investigated
a. Persons Affiliated with the CIA:'
By far the largest category of investigations involved the Agency's
own employees or former employees. We found a total of 76
investigations, involving 90 persons, in which some form of
"special coverage" was used. Almost all of the persons involved were
United States citizens.
Approximately one-fourth of the investigations of Agency employees
and former employees resulted from information obtained from de-
fectors to the United States that several employees of the Agency
might be working for foreign intelligence services.
Almost all of the remaining investigations were the result of the
discovery of suspicious activities on the part of employees with access
to sensitive classified information.
For example, investigations were undertaken concerning employees
associating with known or suspected foreign intelligence agents;
employees spending beyond their means; and employees suspected of
engaging in conduct which might subject them to blackmail or
compromise.
A few investigations directed against valued employees with many
years of service to the Agency were initiated as much to clear up
suspicions concerning the employee as to ensure the Agency that the
employee was not a security risk.2
All Agency employees are fully informed by the Office of Security,
when they first seek employment, of the possibility that their activities
might be closely scrutinized if they should be suspected of being a
security risk.
The next largest category of cases involved the investigation of
'If a person affiliated with the Agency who was investigated also falls into another
category of subjects investigated, he has been included in the category with persons affi-
liated for purposes of the Commission's analysis. Significantly different issues, however, are
raised by investigations falling within the various groups.
2 Under the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence has the
absolute right to discharge any employee without explanation where an employee is sus-
pected of being a security risk. The Director would thus be justified in requesting and
receiving that employee's resignation. One of the stated purposes for having undertaken an
investigation of suspected employees was to permit innocent employees to continue their
work with the Agency without knowing that they were suspected of having been disloyal.
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49 foreign nationals living in this country. Of these, 38 were Agency
operatives and 11 were defectors. In almost all of these cases, the Office
of Security investigated the foreign national at the request of one of
the operational arms of the Agency. The reasons varied from case to
case. Examples include :
-Determining whether the subject was controlled by a foreign
intelligence service;
-Verifying the subject's sources of information;
-Ascertaining the bona fides of a defector;'
-Determining the propriety of using the subject for opera-
tional purposes in the future.
In a few cases, special coverage was initiated in order to protect
a CIA case officer if trouble arose, or to provide a record of conversa-
tions for later evaluation.
In many instances, the employee or operative under investigation
was surveilled for only one or two days, or his telephone.was tapped
so as to overhear only one or two specific telephone conversations. In
some other instances, the investigations were more extensive.
One investigation by the Office of Security spanned approximately
eight years in the late 1940's and early 1950's. The employee involved
was alleged to have engaged in Communist Party activities in the
1930's and was suspected of still being in contact with Communist
sympathizers. A combination of physical surveillance, wiretaps and
bugging were used from time to time. The apartment occupied by the
subject was entered surreptitiously on two separate occasions. The
Director of Central Intelligence closely followed this particular in-
vestigation. The investigation led eventually to termination of the
subject's employment.
An extreme example of how far an investigation can go occurred in
the late 1960's. A CIA employee who attended meetings of a group
which the Agency suspected of foreign left-wing support, had been
privy to extremely sensitive classified information. Physical surveil-
lance of the employee was conducted for almost one year. A surrepti-
tious entry was made into the employee's apartment by cutting through
the walls from an adjacent apartment so that microphones could be
installed. Seven microphones were placed so that conversations could
be overheard in every room of the apartment. A cover was placed on
the employee's mail for two months during one period and five months
during another. Several of the subject's tax returns were also reviewed.
This investigation yielded no evidence of disloyalty.
The investigations of Agency employees and operatives were con-
ducted pursuant to a general understanding with the FBI. The Bureau
3 Several American citizens working with, but not employees of, the Agency have been
surveilled to determine their bona fides or the validity of their sources of information, in
the same manner as foreign nationals in similar positions.
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was unwilling (partly due to a lack of sufficient manpower) to under-
take every investigation of a breach of security involving employees
or operatives of the CIA or other intelligence departments and agen-
cies. It expected those departments and agencies to conduct any neces-
sary preliminary investigation and would enter the case itself only
when hard evidence of espionage was discovered.
Further, each member agency of the United States intelligence
community had been given primary responsibility by the National
Security Council for protecting intelligence sources and methods
within its own organization.
b. Newsmen
The Commission found two cases in which telephones of three news-
men were tapped in an effort to identify their sources of sensitive
intelligence information. The first such instance took place in 1959.
The other occurred in 1962, apparently with the knowledge and con-
sent of Attorney General Kennedy.
Three additional investigations were found in which reporters were
followed in an effort to identify their sources. These activities took
place in 1967,1971 and 1972.
Presidential concern was continually voiced, during every admin-
istration since the establishment of the CIA, that the sources of news
leaks be determined and the leaks themselves stopped-by whatever
means. In addition, the committee of the United States Intelligence
Board charged with investigating news leaks has historically taken
no detiuit ive action to solve the problem.4
The attitude of the FBI during the 1960's and early 1970's also
remained unwavering. The Bureau would not handle leak cases unless
directed to (10 so by the Attorney General. The Bureau's procedure in
such cases ',V-as to submit a request for investigation to the Attorney
General. for a prosecutive opinion and not to proceed unless the
Attorney General issued a favorable opinion and a directive to
investigate.
I+ aced with t this set of circumstances, the CIA chose to conduct its
own investigations of "leak" cases by physically and electronically
surveilliug newsmen to learn their sources of information.
c. Other Persons Not Affiliated With the CIA
On several occasions, the Office of Security placed "special cover-
age" on other persons with no relationship to the Agency. In 1971,
six United States citizens and one alien were followed for a period
of some three months as the result of a report that they intended to
'The Chairman of the USIB Security Committee during the early 1970's, when several
surveillances were initiated against newsmen by the Office of. Security, was also the CIA's
Director of Security. At several Security Committee meetings he stated that surveillance of
newsmen (which had been suggested at the meetings) was improper. At the same time, he
carried out such surveillance at the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence.
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assassinate the Director of Central Intelligence and kidnap the Vice
President. This investigation was conducted in close cooperation with
the FBI and the Secret Service.
On two occasions, investigations were directed against employees
of other government agencies with access to sensitive intelligence
materia1.5 Significant breaches of security were suspected in both
cases.
On at least one occasion, physical surveillance was placed on a citizen
who had approached an Agency employee under circumstances sug-
gesting that he might be attempting to penetrate the Agency. Several
investigations of Americans have been initiated for other reasons
directly associated with suspected security violations at the CIA.
In addition, on approximately eleven occasions, investigations of
employees or former employees of the CIA have resulted in some type
of coverage of other United States citizens with whom those employees
had contacts.
The Commission discovered no evidence suggesting that any of these
investigations were directed at any congressman, judge, or other pub-
lic official.
Conclusions
Investigations of allegations against Agency employees and oper-
atives are a reasonable exercise of the Director's statutory duty to
protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure,
provided they are lawfully conducted. Such investigations also assist
the Director in the exercise of his unreviewable authority to terminate
the employment of ally Agency employee.
Although such investigations may take on aspects of domestic coun-
terintelligence or enforcement of domestic laws, they are proper unless
their principal purpose becomes law-enforcement or the maintenance
of internal security. Whenever an .investigation develops substantial
c Vidence of espionage or other criminal activity, it should be coordi-
nated with the FRI.
Investigation of the bona fides of alleged defectors is an important
function, lawfully assigned to the CIA by the National Security
Council.
The Director's responsibility to protect intelligence sources and
methods, however, cannot be read so broadly as to permit investiga-
c Two additional cases involved investigations of military officers temporarily assigned
to the Agency. These have been included in the figures for investigations of persons affiliated
with the Agency.
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tions of persons having no relationship whatever with the Agency.
The CIA has no authority to investigate newsmen simply because
they have published leaked classified information. Investigations by
the CIA should be limited to persons presently or formerly affiliated
with the Agency, directly or indirectly.
Where an employee or other person under investigation has suspi-
cious contacts with an unknown individual, sufficient investigation
may be conducted to identify that person. Further investigation of
the contacts of persons properly under investigation should be left to
the FBI or other appropriate law enforcement agencies.
The investigation directed against several persons allegedly threat-
ening to assassinate the Director of Central Intelligence and kidnap
the Vice President was probably an exception to the general rule
restricting CIA investigations to persons with some relationship to
the Agency. The circumstances were obviously extreme, the threats
involved the Agency's director, and the investigation was undertaken
with the full knowledge and consent of both the FBI and the Secret
Service.
Recommendation (18)
a. The Director of Central Intelligence should issue clear guide-
lines setting forth the situations in which the CIA is justified in
conducting its own investigation of individuals presently or for-
merly affiliated with it.
b. The guidelines should permit the CIA to conduct investiga-
tions of such persons only when the Director of Central Intel-
ligence first determines that the investigation is necessary to
protect intelligence sources and methods the disclosure of which
might endanger the national security.
c. Such investigations must be coordinated with the FBI when-
ever substantial evidence suggesting espionage or violation of a
federal criminal statute is discovered.
Recommendation (19)
a. In cases involving serious or continuing security violations,
as determined by the Security Committee of the United States
Intelligence Board, the Committee should be authorized to recom-
mend in writing to the Director of Central Intelligence (with a
copy to the National Security Council) that the case be referred
to the FBI for further investigation, under procedures to be
developed by the Attorney General.
b. These procedures should include a requirement that the FBI
accept such referrals without regard to whether a favorable
prosecutive opinion is issued by the Justice Department. The CIA
should not engage in such further investigations.
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Recommendation (20)
The CIA and other components and agencies of the intelligence
community should conduct periodic reviews of all classified mate-
rial originating within that department or agency, with a view to
declassifying as much of that material as possible. The purpose
of such a review would be to assure the public that it has access to
all information that should properly be disclosed.
Recommendation (21)
The Commission endorses legislation, drafted with appropriate
safeguards of the constitutional rights of all affected individuals,
which would make it a criminal offense for employees or former
employees of the CIA willfully to divulge to any unauthorized
person classified information pertaining to foreign intelligence
or the collection thereof obtained during the course of their
employment.
2. Investigative Techniques Used
Direction of some investigations at proper subjects does not mean
that all the investigative techniques used were proper.
A great many of the cases (directed at 96 persons) involved physi-
cal surveillance-that is, observation of the public comings and goings
of an individual. Some of the cases were trivial. In one case, an Agency
employee was suspected of working at his private business establish-
ment when he, should have been working for the Agency. Employees
of the Office of Security went to his place of private business and
established that he was in fact there when he should have been at the
CIA.
Other cases of physical surveillance were more extensive, involving
(lawn-to-dusk coverage for a period of months. The last case of physical
surveillance by the Agency was in 1973. Current directives prohibit
surveillance off Agency property.
Our investigation also disclosed thirty-two wiretaps, thirty-two in-
stances of bugging,6 and twelve unauthorized entries. The last wiretap
used by the CIA was in 1965; the last bug in 1968; and the last unau-
thorized entry was in 1971.
6 These figures do not include cases in which the eavesdropping was done with the con-
sent of one or both parties. Such instances were done for convenience in making a record
of a conversation, such as the debriefing of a defector or a recruitment interview. Approx-
imately thirty-four such instances were discovered. In addition, a technical log (for
recording Office of Security wiretaps and buggings) for the period from December 1961
until March 1967, showing eleven telephone taps and sixty-five "mike and wire" operations
conducted during that period, suggests that there may actually have been more "mike and
wire" operations than the Commission has otherwise been able to document. Witnesses
before the Commission testified that most of those installations were used where one or
both parties were aware that their conversation was being recorded. In all cases where
doubt existed as to whether the CIA had subjected an individual to any questionable inves-
tigation, the benefit of that doubt was not given to the Agency, and the investigation has
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None of these activities was conducted pursuant to a search warrant,
and only in connection with the 1965 wiretap did the Agency obtain
the prior written approval of the Attorney General.
In at least fourteen instances, involving sixteen people, the CIA
obtained access to information on individual Federal income tax re-
turns. The Agency was apparently seeking information which would
indicate possible connections between the subject and foreign groups.
Ninety-one mail covers were used in 63 investigations. Only 12 occa-
sions, mail was actually opened and photographs were taken of the
contents.
Conclusions
Physical surveillance, while not itself unlawful, may become so if it
reaches the point of harassment. The possible invasions of privacy by
physical surveillance and the proximity of that activity to proscribed
law enforcement functions indicate that it should be undertaken only
after high level authorization within the Agency. Such authoriza-
tion would include a finding that the proposed surveillance is neces-
sary to protect intelligence sources and methods. When a legitimate
CIA investigation reaches the point that a search or some form of
electronic eavesdropping is appropriate, the case should be turned
over to the FBI or other law enforcement agencies.
The unauthorized entries into the homes and offices of American
citizens were illegal when they were conducted and would be illegal
if done today.
Because the law as to electronic eavesdropping has been evolving,
the Commission has not attempted to delineate specifically which of
the CIA's investigations over the years utilizing eavesdropping were
unconstitutional under then-announced standards. Some of those in-
vestigations within the United States were proper under the constitu-
tional standards of the time, but many others were not. Under con-
stitutional standards applied today, it is doubtful whether any of
those investigations would have been proper, with the possible excep-
tion of the one wiretap installed in 1965 where prior written approval
of the Attorney General was sought and obtained.
Today, eavesdropping would at a minimum require the prior writ-
ten approval of the Attorney General, based on a showing that the
national security was involved and that the circumstances included a
significant connection with a foreign power. The Supreme Court has
left open the question whether such approval would be sufficient or
whether a judicial search warrant would be required.
The execution of a search warrant involves the exercise of a law-
enforcement power of a type expressly forbidden to the CIA. If the
approval of the Attorney General is an adequate substitute for a war-
rant in some cases, similar problems may arise in conducting searches
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Under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, no person has
access, without special authorization, to any information supplied by
a taxpayer pursuant to a requirement of the tax law relating to income
and other taxes.7
Formal procedures for obtaining the necessary authorization have
been in effect for some time. They require the applicant (here the
Director of Central Intelligence) to make written application to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue for each tax return desired, setting
forth the reason why the return is needed .8
The Commission has found no evidence that this procedure was ever
followed by CIA personnel.
Mail covers are not unlawful if they are conducted in compliance
with postal regulations and do not reasonably delay the mail. The
opening of mail, however, violated specific statutes prohibiting such
conduct and was unlawful (see chapter 9).
In many instances the Agency's files do not clearly indicate the
nature of an investigation, the specific evidence suggesting that the
person investigated was a security risk and thus a proper subject of
investigation, the authority giving approval for special coverage, the
reasons underlying the decision to investigate, or the results of the
investigation.
Several past Directors of Central Intelligence testified that they be-
lieve they authorized all investigations in which wiretaps, bugs or
unauthorized entries were utilized. Yet, in over half of the investi-
gative records, a clear showing of the authorizing official is missing.
Investigative files should contain documentation showing the basis
and authority for undertaking each investigation. This will assure that
such investigations are authorized and have a lawful basis.
The CIA should not undertake physical surveillance (defined as
systematic observation) of Agency employees, contractors or re-
lated personnel within the United States without first obtaining
written approval of the Director of Central Intelligence.
Recommendation (23)
In the United States and its possessions, the CIA should not in-
tercept wire or oral communications 9 or otherwise engage in ac-
tivities that would require a warrant if conducted by a law en-
forcement agency. Responsibility for such activities belongs with
the FBI.
7 25 U.S.C. sec. 610 (a) and (b).
8 26 C.F.R. sec. 301.6103(a).
6 As defined in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. sees. 2510-20.
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Recommendation (24)
The CIA should strictly adhere to established legal procedures
governing access to federal income tax information.
Recommendation (25)
CIA investigative records should show that the investigation
.was duly authorized, and by whom, and should clearly set forth
the factual basis for undertaking the investigation and the results
of the investigation.
C. Handling of Defectors
Investigation of defectors is the responsibility of the CIA under a
National Security Council Intelligence Directive, assigning this duty
to the Agency as a "service of common concern" to the intelligence
community as a whole.
Within the CIA, the Office of Security is charged with providing
proper security for the handling of persons who have defected to the
f United States from other nations. A careful procedure has been devel-
oped for such handling.
Generally a defector can be processed in a few months' time. In one
instance, however, a defector was involuntarily confined to a CIA in-
stallation for approximately three years. For much of this time, the
defector was held in solitary confinement under extremely spartan liv-
ing conditions. The defector was apparently not physically abused.
The justification given by the CIA for the lengthy confinement arose
out of a substantial concern regarding the defector's bona fides. When
the issue was finally resolved, the defector was given total freedom and
became a United States citizen.
The confinement of the defector was approved by the Director of
Central Intelligence on the written advice of the General Counsel. The
FBI, the Attorney General, the United States Intelligence Board, and
selected Members of Congress were all aware to some extent of the
continued confinement.
In one other case, a defector was physically abused, although not
seriously injured. The Director of Central Intelligence discharged the
employee involved.
Conclusions
Such treatment of individuals by an agency of the United States
is unlawful. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Inspector
General must be alert to prevent repetitions.
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D. Other Activities of the Office of Security
The Commission has examined other domestic activities of the Office
of Security, including its cover operations, its use of the polygraph as
an aid in security investigations, its use of informants among employees
or contractor employees to assist in preventing sabotage of its premises
or penetrations of its organization, its use of recording systems in
certain CIA offices, and its efforts to test the physical security sys-
tems of certain private corporations under contract to the Agency.
No violations of the CIA's charter have been found in connection
with such activities.
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Chapter 14
Involvement of the CIA in Improper
Activities for the White House
During 1971, the CIA, at the request of members of the White
House staff, provided alias documents and disguise materials, a tape
recorder, camera, film and film processing to E. Howard Hunt. It also
complied with a request to prepare a psychological profile of Daniel
Ellsberg.
This assistance was requested by various members of the White
House staff and some of the materials provided were later used in
connection with improper activities, including the break-in into the
office of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Ellsberg's psychiatrist.
President Nixon and his staff also insisted in this period that the
CIA turn over to the President highly classified files relating to the
Lebanon landings, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, and
the Vietnam war. The request was made on the stated ground that
these files were needed by the President in the performance of his
duties, but was in fact made to serve the President's personal political
ends.
The Commission's staff has investigated the facts and circumstances
surrounding these events.' On the basis of this investigation, the
1 Documentation supporting this chapter is contained in the statement of information in
Hearings before House Judiciary Committee on H.A. 803 (Impeachment of President
Nixon) Book VII (May-June 1974) ; transcript of trial testimony in United States V.
Ehrlichman et al., No. 74-116 (June 28-July 9, 1974) ; transcript of testimony before
House Special Subcommittee on Intelligence of the Armed Services Committee (May 1973-
July 1974) ; transcripts of Executive Session Testimony before the Senate Select Committee
on Presidential Campaign Activities (Watergate Hearings), principally between Decem-
ber 17, 1973, and March 8, 1974; the testimony and affidavits of witnesses examined by
the Commission and its staff ; and the files and records of the Central Intelligence Agency.
The Commission also requested permission to examine relevant papers of President
Nixon's administration which are currently in the custody of the General Services
Administration under the terms of an interim order of the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia. The provisions of that order permit counsel for the former
President to object to such requests and he in fact did so, threatening to seek sanctions
from the court to prevent such an examination. With the limited period of time available
to complete the Commission's work, it was not possible to obtain a determination by the
court of the validity of the request.
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Commission concludes that the CIA neither participated in nor knew
in advance of the Fielding or Watergate break-ins. The Agency pro-
vided certain assistance to the White House staff because the staff
(and, in the case of the production of certain sensitive files, the Presi-
dent) insisted that it do so, but it appears to have provided that
assistance without actual knowledge that the White House staff was
engaging in illegal activities.
The Agency knew, however, that some of the demands made on
it by the White House, such as the demand for a psychological profile
of Dr. Ellsberg, were of doubtful propriety, and it is subject to
criticism for having at times failed to make sufficient efforts to resist
those demands. Nevertheless, the principal responsibility for drawing
the Agency into these activities falls on the White House staff.
Once it became known, however, following the arrest of the Water-
gate burglars, that some of the activities under investigation involved
persons with past or present CIA connections, the Agency's leaders
should have undertaken a thorough inquiry and should have disclosed
all relevant information to investigating agencies. The Commission
considers the Agency's delay of nearly a year in instituting such an
investigation, the Agency's failure promptly to disclose relevant
information in its possession, and the Agency's destruction of some
materials which may have contained relevant information to reflect
poor judgment and to be subject to criticism.
The evidence bearing on these matters is discussed in this chapter.
A. Employment of E. Howard Hunt by Robert R. Mullen
and Company
In April 1970, E. Howard Hunt retired from the Central Intelligence
Agency after having served in it for over twenty years. With the
help of the Agency's External Employment Affairs Branch, he ob-
tained a job with Robert R. Mul len and Company, a Washington, D.C.,
public relations firm. The Mullen Company itself had for years co-
operated with the Agency by providing cover abroad for Agency of-
ficers, carrying them as ostensible employees of its offices overseas.
Hunt, while employed by Mullen, orchestrated and led the Fielding
and Watergate break-ins and participated in other questionable ac-
tivities. The Mullen Company had tangential associations with some
activities of the White House staff.
These circumstances have led to suspicions and allegations of CIA
involvement in or advance knowledge of some of Hunt's improper
activities. In this section we review the circumstances of Hunt's em-
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ployment and the nature of the Hunt-Mullen-CIA relationship in the
light of these allegations.
Hunt retired from the Agency in April 1970 after having held a
number of responsible positions in the Directorate for Plans (now the
Directorate of Operations). After initial service in Europe, Hunt
served in various Western Hemisphere stations. In the early 1960s he
supervised a group of Cubans forming a skeleton government-in-exile
in connection with the Bay of Pigs operation and subsequently was
responsible for certain foreign publishing activities conducted under
cover by the Agency. Hunt retired on his own volition and in good
standing with the Agency.
In the course of looking for post-retirement employment, Hunt con-
tacted the Agency's External Employment Assistance Branch, which
among other things helps retirees find positions. One of its officers,
Frank O'Malley, had known both Hunt and Mullen from his earlier
work on the Agency's cover staff. In view of Hunt's interest in the
public relations field, O'Malley, with the help of the CIA case officer
assigned to Mullen, contacted Mullen for help in placing Hunt. Mullen,
who had known Hunt at a time after World War II when both had
served in the European Cooperation Administration in Paris, arranged
several interviews for Hunt during March 1970, none of which pro-
duced results.
Meanwhile, Mullen decided to expand the operations of his com-
pany, and about April 10, 1970, offered Hunt a job which he accepted.
Although in early testimony Mullen had claimed that Director Helms
or others in the Agency had put pressure on him to hire Hunt, he
later acknowledged that this was not correct and that he had hired
Hunt on his own initiative. There does not appear to be support for
the position taken by Mullen in his early testimony. While Helms
had given Hunt permission to list Helms' name as a reference on
Hunt's resume, and had written a letter of recommendation to a
friend at another company (a copy of which Mullen might have seen),
there is no evidence that he either wrote or communicated with Mullen
about Hunt, or took part in Mullen's hiring of Hunt. Helms' testi-
mony is that he did not even know Mullen. Within the Agency,
Mullen's hiring of Hunt was in fact considered undesirable because
it could attract attention to the existing cover relationship between
Mullen and the Agency.
The Mullen Company was a legitimate public relations firm with
a number of clients having no known relationship to the CIA. Robert
Mullen had, however, for many years cooperated with the CIA by
making some of his overseas offices available at different times as a
cover for Agency employees operating abroad. The existence of
Mullens' relationship with the CIA was, of course, kept secret to
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protect the secrecy of the cover arrangements and this led to com-
plications when, after Watergate, the Mullen Company came under
investigation.
The existence of the cover arrangements did not involve the Mullen
Company in the collection or transmission of intelligence itself. Its
only involvement was in the administrative arrangements for operat-
ing the offices in which an Agency employee worked during various
periods of time, maintaining the appearance of public relations activ-
ity by the employee, and handling in secret the related administra-
tive details. The necessary transactions were generally handled be-
tween the CIA's case officer and Mullen's bookkeeper who was a
retired CIA accountant.
After Hunt came to work for Mullen he was told, with CIA's con-
sent, of the existing cover arrangement so that he could deal with
administrative matters when necessary during Mullen's frequent
absences from Washington. To this end his security clearance was
extended by the Agency in October 1970. The record, however, dis-
closes only two instances of Hunt's involvement in these cover
arrangements. On one occasion lie suggested a new arrangement
which the Agency declined; on another, he successfully urged the
Agency not to terminate an existing arrangement.
There is no evidence of other significant contacts between Hunt
and the Agency from the time of his joining Mullen until July 1971
when he became a White House consultant. The only documented
w
contacts were inconsequential in nature. Hunt corresponded with the
Agency's General Counsel in an unsuccessful effort to change his
election of survivorship benefits under the Agency's retirement pro-
gram. In the fall of 1970, lie was asked by the Agency to prepare
a citation for a Civil Service award. And some time during this
period, Hunt repaid a loan made to him by the employee's association
to pay medical expenses incurred on behalf of his children.
Eight months after Hunt was hired by the Mullen Company, Robert
Bennett joined the company. Bennett, the son of Senator Wallace
Bennett (R-ITtah), had been active in Republican Party affairs and
served as Congressional relations officer of the Department of Trans-
portation until January 1971 when he came to the Mullen firm. His
political connections led him to be involved in some of Hunt's later
activities, discussed below.
Mullen, who was planning to retire, had invited Bennett to become
president of the firm and purchase it. This was a disappointment to
Hunt who had himself expected to become president and owner of the
business. Attempts by Hunt to negotiate a joint ownership arrange-
ment with Bennett failed and IIunt began to think of leaving the firm.
There is no evidence of Bennett's having had prior CIA contacts. He
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stated that he learned of the Mullen-CIA arrangement in February
1971 when he was examining Mullen's books preliminary to negotiating
a purchase price for the company. At that time, he first met the CIA
case officer and was briefed; occasional meetings followed from time
to time to discuss the cover arrangements.
Bennett brought Hughes Tool Company (now Summa Corpora-
tion) as a client to Mullen. He had met Hughes representatives while
at the Department of Transportation. Later in 1971, he introduced
Hunt to representatives of Hughes and various contacts occurred
which are discussed further below.
Conclusions
The investigation disclosed no participation by Hunt after his
retirement in any operation of the CIA, other than as described. Nor
has this investigation disclosed evidence of participation by the
Mullen Company or its employees during the period following Hunt's
employment in any operations of the CIA other than those described.
There is evidence that various companies who were clients of the
Mullen firm may in turn have had relationships with the CIA, but no
evidence has been found that either the Mullen firm or any of its em-
ployees participated in those relationships.
Those activities of Hunt which culminated in the Fielding and
Watergate break-ins, for some of which he sought CIA support, were,
so far as the record shows, conducted independently of his Mullen em-
ployment. No evidence has been found that the Mullen Company or its
employees were either involved in those activities or that they served
as a vehicle for CIA involvement in them. These matters are discussed
in greater detail in later sections.
B. CIA Assistance to Hunt
In July 1971 the CIA, at the request of Hunt, who had been hired
as a White House consultant, provided him with personal disguise
materials and alias identification. Within the next month the CIA
provided Hunt with additional assistance, including a tape recorder
and concealed camera, and disguise materials and alias identification
for G. Gordon Liddy. Some of these materials were used by Hunt and
Liddy in preparing for and carrying out the entry into the office of
Dr. Fielding, Daniel Ellsaberg's psychiatrist. In particular, tho CIA
at Hunt's request developed pictures taken by him of that office in.
the course of his reconnaissance for the break-in.
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These circumstances have led to suspicions and allegations of CIA
involvement in or knowledge of Hunt's unlawful activities. In this
section we review the record concerning CIA's assistance to Hunt.
Early in July 1971, Charles W. Colson, Counselor to President
Nixon, invited Hunt to become a part-time consultant for the White
House. Colson and Hunt were acquainted and had occasionally met
for lunch. Hunt had expressed interest in Colson's White House
work. Colson was looking for someone to become familiar with the
Pentagon Papers and to coordinate White House efforts resulting
from their recent publication by the New York Times. Colson intro-
duced Hunt to John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President, either
immediately before or just after he was hired.
Shortly after Hunt started to work at the White House, Bennett
told him of an acquaintance, Clifford de Mott, who claimed to have
derogatory information about the Kennedy family. Bennett knew
and had approved of Hunt's White House job and thought de Mott
might be of interest to the White House. Hunt and Colson agreed
that de Mott should be interviewed. Hunt felt, however, that his
identity as a White House staff member should be concealed and pro-
posed to obtain a disguise from the CIA.
At Hunt's request, relayed by Colson, Ehrlichman called General
Robert E. Cushman, Jr., then Deputy Director of the CIA, on July 7,
1971. According to notes of the conversation taken by Cushman's
secretary, Ehrlichman alerted him that Hunt had been asked by
the President to do some special consulting work on security prob-
lems, that he may be contacting Cushman, and that Cushman should
consider "he has pretty much carte blanche." Ehrlichman has testi-
fied that he does not recall having called Cushman about Hunt and
that he does not believe he did.
Cushman routinely reported the news about Hunt's White House
employment at the Agency's July 8, 1971, Senior Staff meeting
attended by Helms. He also advised the Agency's Director of Security
of Hunt's assignment since it related to security, and the Director
in turn may have called Hunt's office to establish contact.
On July 22, 1971, Hunt met Cushman at the Agency by appoint-
ment. Hunt, who had known Cushman during his service as an Agency
employee, asked to speak to Cushman alone. Hidden equipment in
Cushman's office recorded the conversation. Such recordings were
made by Cushman on occasion, but he was not able to explain why
this particular conversation was recorded.
Hunt explained that he had been charged with a "highly sensitive
mission" by the White House and needed a physical disguise and
some identification cards for what he described as a "one time opera-
tion-in and out." Cushman has stated that he did not consider this
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request as something to be concerned about inasmuch as the request
was made by an experienced ex-CIA officer with the endorse-
ment of high-ranking White House staff. Cushman also stated that
he assumed that the Agency's technical staff would require an appro-
priate accounting of materials given to Hunt. Moreover, materials
of the sort requested by Hunt were considered by Agency personnel
as being useful for disguising one's identity, not as implements for
an unauthorized entry. And, indeed, Hunt's purpose when asking
for these materials was simply to conceal his White House's connec-
tion while interviewing de Mott.
Cushman has testified (and a contemporaneous memorandum by his
executive assistant confirms) that he reported this request to Helms
routinely a few days after he had given authority to proceed, and that
there was no discussion about it. Helms, however, did not recall having
learned of Hunt's requests for technical assistance until later in
August, either in connection with Hunt's subsequent request for secre-
tarial assistance or in-connection with the decision to terminate further
assistance to him.
It was during this same period of time that Helms, at the request of
David R. Young of the White House, authorized preparation of a
psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg, discussed in a later section of
this chapter. The Commission has found no evidence indicating that
Helms then knew that Hunt had a part in the profile project. Nor has
it found evidence indicating Cushman knew of the request for prepara-
tion of the profile.
In any event, Cushman directed that his executive assistant handle
Hunt's request for technical assistance. Since the.materials requested
would be provided by the. Technical Services Division (TSD) of the
Directorate for Plans, the executive assistant advised the office of the
Deputy Director for Plans of the request and then contacted the Acting
Chief of TSD. Hunt, at his request, was identified to TSD only as
"Mr. Edward", not by his true name, but TSD was told that the request
came from the White House. The materials were prepared and on the
following day, July 23, 1971, a TSD technician met Hunt at a Wash-
ington apartment maintained by the Agency for clandestine meetings
(where all subsequent meetings were also held) and supplied him with
a wig, a pair of glasses, a speech-altering device, a driver's license and
miscellaneous identification cards (not including credit cards). On his
return, the technician briefed the Acting Chief on the meeting with
Hunt. Hunt and the technician met again at Hunt's request about a
week later to adjust Hunt's glasses.
Hunt used the disguise to interview de Mott in Rhode Island. There
is no evidence that he disclosed to the Agency any information beyond
the fact that he needed assistance to conduct an interview in disguise.
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The Agency's regulations required the execution of authentication
forms by an authorized officer before the issuance- of technical assist-
ance. In this manner the pm-poses for -,which assistance was required
had to be disclosed and the material received had to be accounted for,
either by its subsequent destruction or return. In the case of the assist-
ance supplied to Hunt, the Acting Chief assumed, from the manner in
which the request was given to him, that normal accounting procedures
were to be dispensed with ; hw drew that conclusion from the fact that
Hunt was identified to him only by an alias and that the entire request
was treated as particularly sensitive. The Acting Chief and the tech-
nician did, however, continually request that Hunt promptly return
the materials. According to the Acting Chief, it was Hunt's continuing
evasion of these requests that eventually led him to express his concern
to the executive assistant later in August.
Additional requests by Hunt for assistance followed. On August 18,
1971, he called the executive assistant requesting that a particular
Agency secretary, then stationed in Paris, be detailed to him tempo-
rarily for a "highly sensitive assignment." After discussion with Cush-
man, the executive assistant turned Hunt down, offering him other
qualified secretarial assistance available at Headquarters which Hunt,
however, declined.
On August 20, 1971, Hunt again met with the technician and asked
him for alias business cards. He also requested a tape recorder to
record conversations in a noisy environment. TSD's Acting Chief
approved these requests as being within the scope of the initial request.
About this time, Hunt also requested a so-called backstopped New
York telephone number and a backstopped driver's license and credit
cards. Backstopping requires arrangements such as a telephone an-
swering service and cooperation with the issuing authority for pro-
viding independent vertification for the alias identification. The Act-
ing Chief advised the technician that this request would not be met
without the Director's approval. He did, however, ask one of his elec-
tronic technicians to find out what would be required to provide this
service, and the technician appears to have asked TSD what informa-
tion would be needed to provide a backstopped telephone number. A
typewritten note from another officer to the technician specified some
of the needed information that would have to be obtained from Hunt.
It is not known what was done with that note, but on August 26 or 27.
1971, Hunt's secretary telephoned certain of this information to the
technician who typed a memorandum recording it. There is no evi-
dence, however, that steps were taken within the Agency (beyond this
gathering of information) to provide backstopped service; in any
event, as discussed below, by August 27, 1971, instructions were issued
cutting off all further assistance to Hunt.
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Another meeting between the technician and Hunt had taken place
on August 25, 1971, at which time the business cards and tape recorder
were delivered to him. Hunt had brought Liddy-identified only as
George-to this meeting and requested disguise materials for him as
well as a concealed camera. These were provided by the technician
later that day after approval had been given by TSD's Acting Chief.
Hunt renewed his request for a backstopped telephone number. In
the course of the meeting the technician heard Hunt and Liddy speak
of being engaged in narcotics-related activities and of catching a
plane that evening. In fact, Hunt and Liddy were about to fly to
Beverly Hills,for a reconnaissance of the office of I)r. Fielding, Ells-
berg's psychiatrist, but the Commission has found no evidence that
anyone at the Agency had knowledge of this plan.
On the evening of the next day, August 26, 1971, Hunt called the
technician from Los Angeles and asked him to meet him at Dulles
Airport at 6:00 a.m. the next morning (August 27). Having first
cleared with his Acting Chief, the technician niet Hunt and received
the concealed camera and a cartridge of film to be developed. Hunt
asked that the pictures be delivered to him as soon as possible. The
technician took the film to the CIA laboratory and then returne(l
to his office.
Meanwhile, TSD's Acting Chief became concerned over Hunt's
failure to return the alias materials which had been issued with the
understanding that they would be for a "one time operation", coupled
with the introduction of an unknown person (Liddy) and his re-
quests for a concealed camera and backstopped alias materials. He
instructed the technician to tell Hunt that no additional support
would be given without further authorization from the Director. He
then called Cushman's executive assistant on August 26, 1971, to report
and express his concern. The executive assistant instructed that no
further assistance should be provided to Hunt and directed him to
get the camera and additional disguises back as soon as possible. The
executive assistant also wrote a memorandum to Cushman expressing
his concern over the assistance being requested by Hunt and noting
that "there was also the question of its use in domestic clandestine
activity." He recommended that all further requests be cleared in
advance with the Deputy Director's office and that assurance be ob-
tained from Ehrlichman that "Hunt's latest caper is OK." On the
morning of August 27, 1971, after receipt of this memorandum,
Cushman telephoned Ehrlichman and advised hint that the Agency
could not properly meet Hunt's requests and Ehrlichman agreed that
he "would call a halt to this." Cushman passed the memoranda re-
flecting these communications to Helms who saw them several days
later and noted his approval of the cutoff of assistance to Hunt.
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By this time, the films which Hunt had delivered to the technician
early on August 27, 1971, had been developed and printed. The labora-
tory made no extra copies of the prints, apparently because the matter
was regarded as sensitive. When they were finished, the technician,
prior to delivering them to Hunt, showed them to the Acting Chief
who directed that xerox copies be made and retained in a file. He and
the technician reviewed them briefly; their testimony is that they
could not identify the subject of the pictures but speculated that ' it
might be a California medical building having some connection with
a narcotics training exercise, Liddy having previously mentioned
narcotics. Through an enlarger they could make out the names "Dr.
Fielding" and "Dr. Rothenberg" on the side of the building and the
technician wrote the names on the xerox copies. The Acting Chief
placed the xerox copies, along with other notes and papers related to
the dealings with Hunt, in a folder labeled "Mr. Edward" (Hunt's
alias) and the pictures were delivered to Hunt by the technician who
advised hint of the cut off of assistance.
Later that clay the executive assistant, with Cushman also on the
phone, called the Acting Chief and confirmed that Hunt was to receive
no more assistance. They spoke briefly about the pictures. The Acting
Chief has testified that they speculated that the pictures showed a
medical building in Southern California, possibly involved in a nar-
cotics exercise, but made no attempt to ascertain what they showed.
On August 31, 1971, Hunt called the technician once again to renew
his request for a backstopped telephone number but was turned down.
The disguise materials were not returned to the Agency and were
eventum,lly found in the possession of some of the men arrested at the
Watergate in June 1972. Copies of the pictures taken with the CIA
camera were turned over by the Agency to the Justice Department dur-
ing the Watergate investigation in January 1973.
Conclusions
The providing of assistance to Hunt and Liddy was not within the
Agency's authorized foreign intelligence functions. The Commission
has found no evidence, however, indicating that the Agency was aware
that Hunt's request would involve it in unauthorized activities, at least
until request was made for a concealed camera and backstopped tele-
phone number at which time prompt action was taken to terminate
further support.
Nor has the investigation disclosed facts indicating that the CIA
knew or had reason to believe that the assistance it provided to Hunt
and Liddy would be used in connection with the planning of an illegal
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entry. Indeed, as will be discussed below, when Hunt made his first
request to Cushman, the plan for the Fielding break-in had not yet
been formulated.
The responsibility for involvement of the Agency in providing
support ultimately used for illegal activities must rest primarily on
the White House staff. It is to some extent understandable that the
Agency would want to accommodate high-level White House requests
which on their face do not appear to be improper. Nevertheless, the
Agency is subject to criticism for having used insufficient care in
controlling the use of the materials it supplied. Inasmuch as the as-
sistance provided in this case differed from the foreign intelligence
services normally provided by the CIA to the White House, the respon-
sible Agency officials would have been well advised to insist on com-
pliance with the normal procedures for control of materials of this
kind, notwithstanding (or perhaps particularly because of) the air
of mystery that surrounded Hunt's request. Those procedures would at
least have required disclosure of where and when the materials were
to be used and might have served to deter the request. The Agency
should also use particular care in accommodating requests by or on
behalf of former employees or contractors.
C. The Ellsberg Psychological Profile
In July 1971, at the request of David R. Young of the White House
staff, the CIA prepared a psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg,
then under indictment for theft of the Pentagon Papers. Various
materials, including FBI reports, were provided for this purpose
by the White House staff to the Agency's psychiatric staff. In Novem-
ber 1971, a second profile was prepared at the request of the White
House on the basis of additional materials supplied by it to the
Agency.
Daniel Ellsberg was a patient of Dr. Lewis Fielding, a Beverly
Hills psychiatrist. In September 1971, Hunt and Liddy, after having
received CIA support, engineered a break-in into his office in an
attempt to obtain material on Ellsberg for use in the preparation of
the second profile.
These circumstances have given rise to suspicions and allegations
of Agency involvement in or prior knowledge of the Ellsberg break-in.
In this section, we review the circumstances surrounding the prepara-
tion of the profile in the light of these allegations.
The publication of the Pentagon Papers, coming on top of a series
of unauthorized disclosures of classified materials, caused consterna-
tion in the White House. It led to the creation in July 1971, at the
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President's direction, of the Special Investigative Unit, headed by
David Young and Egil Krogh. This group, which later became popu-
larly known as the White House Plumbers, reported to Ehrlichman.
Its principal purposes were to induce action by various Executive
agencies to prevent unauthorized disclosures, to review classification
and security practices and procedures, and to ensure thorough investi-
gation of all aspects of the case against Daniel Ellsberg, who by then
had been indicted.
On July 28, 1971, Hunt submitted a written proposal to Colson
for a series of overt and covert operations to assemble a file on Daniel
Ellsberg that would help "to destroy his public image and credibility."
Among other things, he proposed that the CIA prepare a "covert
psychological assessment-evaluation" and that Ellsbelg's file be ob-
tained from his psychiatrist.
Colson passed the proposal to Young and Krogh and, with
Ehrlichman's approval, Young in July 1971 contacted the CIA's Di-
rector of Security with the request that such a profile be prepared.
Young had previously been in contact with Helms in connection with
White House projects to review classification and security procedures
and Helms had authorized him to deal directly with the Director
of Security.
Young told the Director of Security that the White House wanted a
personality assessment on Ellsberg similar to others previously done
by the Agency on foreign leaders to assist in determining the motiva-
tion for an implication of the theft of the papers, and that Ehrlichman
had a personal interest in this project. The Security Director expressed
his concern to Young and stated that he would have to take it up with
the Director. A few days later, he discussed the request with Helms.
The Director approved it, stating that he believed that since the request
dealt with a major security leak, providing assistance would fall
within his obligation to protect intelligence methods and sources. A
CIA study had found that release of the Pentagon Papers disclosed
the identity of certain CIA operations and connections. In addition,
shortly before the decision was made, the Director had received a
report that a full set of the Pentagon Papers had come into the
possession of a major foreign embassy, and this report may have
influenced his decision. Nevertheless, the approval had been given
reluctantly. As Young later put it in a memorandum to Ehrlichman
reporting on CIA's preparation of the profile :
CIA has been understandably reluctant to involve itself in the domestic area,
but, responsive to the President's wishes, has done so. (Memorandum of
August 20, 1971, p. 7)
'On July 29, 1971, the Director of Security directed the Agency's
Chief of Medical Services to prepare the profile, and he in turn as-
signed the task to the Chief of the Psychiatric Staff, who had had prior
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experience along these lines. The latter called in a staff psychiatrist to
prepare a first draft. All three doctors had reservations about the
project as being outside the Agency's charter since it involved an
American citiezn. They were also disturbed that the order came from
the Director of Security instead of their superior, the Deputy Director
for Support. Nevertheless, when copies of FBI reports, newspaper and
magazine clippings, and State Department security and evaluation re-
ports arrived from the White House in a few days, a draft profile was
prepared for the Director of Security, who sent it to Young on Au-
gust 11, 1971.
Young, Hunt and Liddy reviewed the profile and considered it
inadequate. On August 12, 1971, they met with the Chief of the
Psychiatric Staff to discuss what could be done to improve it. He
stated that the information given to him was insufficient. Liddy said
that Ellsberg had been under the care of a psychiatrist named
Dr. Fielding and that more information was available, but he did
not specify what it was. Young and Liddy made the suggestion,
rejected by the CIA psychiatrist, that the Agency could interview
Ellsberg's former wife. Liddy and Hunt also stated that they wished
to "try Dr. Ellsberg in public."
The Agency psychiatrist had known Hunt when he was with the
Agency and had rendered services to his family. At the end of the
meeting, Hunt took him aside and asked him not to tell anyone at the
Agency of his presence. Later, the psychiatrist telephoned Hunt to
say he could not conceal his presence, and he subsequently discussed
it, as well as the substance of the meeting, with the other doctors
involved.
It was after the meeting with the psychiatrist that Hunt, Liddy,
Young and Krogh decided that an effort should be made to obtain
Dr. Fielding's file on Ellsberg. This led to the Fielding break-in of
September 3,1971, discussed in the following section.
Meanwhile, also on August 12, 1971, Ehrlichman and Young met
with Helms and the Director of Security apparently to impress on
them the importance of the Pentagon Papers investigation and the
problem of leaks, as well as the status of Young as Ehrlichman's
representative.
The Agency shortly received additional materials of the same
nature from Hunt; there is no evidence, however, that they included
any psychiatric reports. On August .20, 1971, the doctors met with
the Deputy Director of Support to discuss this project. They concluded
that the new material did not assist in preparing a personality assess-
ment, that Ellsberg's former wife should not be interviewed, that
the prospective use of the study as well as Hunt's participation were
matters of concern, and that these matters should be taken up with
the Director of Central Intelligence. The doctors hoped, however, that
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inasmuch as no significant new material had been received, the matter
would simply come to an end at this point.
On August 23, 1971, the psychiatrist called Young to acknowledge
receipt of the material. Young told him Hunt would contact him. No
further work was done on the profile.
On September 30, 1971, however (some few weeks after the break-in
at Dr. Fielding's office), Young called to reactivate the project and
set up a meeting with the psychiatrist. On October 12, 1971, additional
materials of the same kind as before were received from Hunt. They
did not include, so far as could be ascertained, any psychiatric reports.
On October 27, 1971, the psychiatrist met with Yoting, Liddy and
Hunt and was asked to prepare a new profile incorporating the addi-
tional information supplied.
A second profile was then prepared. The doctors were still con-
cerned that the Agency might be exceeding its charter but believed
that the question had been considered and resolved by the Director.
On November 8, 1971, the profile was sent to Helms who reviewed it.
On November 9,1971, Helms wrote to Young :
I have seen the two papers which [the psychiatrist] prepared for you. We
are, of course, glad to be of assistance. I do wish to underline the point that
our involvement in this matter should not be revealed in any context, formal or
informal. I am sure that you appreciate our concern.
The psychiatrist himself delivered the profile to Young's office on
November 12, 1971. Young, Hunt and Liddy were all present to receive
it and a brief discussion of its contents was held.
At this point, the CIA's activities in connection with the psychologi-
cal profile appear to have ended. Only after the Fielding break-in was
disclosed by testimony to the Watergate Grand Jury in April 1973
did these activities come to light.
Conclusions
The preparation of a psychological profile of an American citizen
who is not involved in foreign intelligence activities is not within the
Agency's statutory authority. Although Ellsberg, by leaking the
Pentagon Papers, may have jeopardized sources and methods of in-
telligence ;for which the Director is responsible, no evidence appears
to have been presented to the Agency that the profile was desired for
the purpose of protecting intelligence sources and methods. Indeed,
by the time the second profile was prepared, at least one of the CIA
doctors had reason to believe it might be leaked to the public-a
highly improper activity and one not connected with the CIA's proper
area of responsibility.
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The Agency was induced to accept this assignment by pressure from
the White House in the name of the President and purported na-
tional security. This request came from Young, who had previously
served as the National Security Council's liaison to the Agency, but
all of the CIA officers involved knew that it was of doubtful propriety.
However, the investigation has disclosed no evidence indicating that
the Agency had prior knowledge of the break-in into Dr. Fielding's
office or generally of efforts to secure additional information on Ells-
berg by unlawful means. As a result of the Agency's normal practice
of compartmentation, i.e., restricting knowledge of an activity to
those participating in it-evidently followed with particular care in
the case of the White House projects because they were regarded as
sensitive-there apparently was no communication between the two
Directorates with which Hunt was dealing during the period. While
the Directorate of Support was preparing the profile, the Operations
Directorate was giving Hunt assistance, and neither seems to have
known what the other was doing.
Only Director Helms appears to have had some knowledge of both
activities, but the evidence indicates that his information was general
and fragmentary and that he knew neither of Hunt's involvement in
the profile project nor of the photographs of Fielding's office produced
as a result of the technical support given Hunt. Although it would
seem inappropriate to place responsibility on the Director on the
basis of hindsight for failing to connect two seemingly unrelated series
of events, it is clear to the Commission that procedures should be es-
tablished which would allow sufficient information about White House
requests to be gathered together at one point so that, in the future, the
propriety of Agency participation can be judged with the benefit of
all of the relevant facts.
In any event, the Commission concludes that the Agency is subject
to criticism for proceeding with the preparation of a project con-
sidered to be of doubtful authority without consultation with its
own counsel and other responsible White House officials. Moreover,
the Agency's medical officers, in spite of their repeatedly expressed
reservations, were negligent in failing to insist that those reservations
(and all underlying facts) be presented to the Director, particularly
after learning of the purpose to use the profile to try Ellsberg in
public.
The Commission realizes that requests such as that for the profile
confront the Director with a dilemma between his obligation to serve
the President and compliance with his understanding of the Agency's
statutory limitations; at times, as hereafter discussed, a Director may
well have to conclude that he has no alternative but to submit his resig-
nation. They also confront Agency staff with a similar dilemma
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between obeying orders and acting within what they understand to be
the Agency's authority. At the very least, the staff must make certain
that their superiors have all the facts and considerations before them
before they make their final decision.
D. The Break-in of Dr. Fielding's Office
On September 3, 1971, three Cuban emigres, under the command
of Hunt and Liddy, broke into the office of Dr. Fielding, Ellsberg's
psychiatrist. One of the Cubans was at the time a paid informer of
the CIA in Miami; another had served the CIA as a contract agent
for several years until 1966. Hunt and Liddy had previously recon-
noitered the Fielding office, using the CIA-supplied camera and dis-
guises. Their objective was to obtain psychiatric information useful
in the preparation of the profile which the CIA had been asked to pre-
pare.
Suspicions have arisen from these circumstances and charges have
been made that the CIA was involved in the Fielding break-in or at
least acquired prior knowledge of it. The relevant facts are reviewed
in this section.
Following receipt of the first Ellsberg profile, which they regarded
as unsatisfactory, Young and Krogh, in a memorandum to Ehrlich-
man, proposed an operation to obtain Ellsberg's psychiatric file. Hunt
and Liddy made the reconnaissance of Dr. Fielding's office on August
26, 1971, referred to above. After their return, a so-called "covert
operation" to obtain the file was authorized by Ehrlichman. Hunt
went to Miami and recruited Bernard Barker and he in turn recruited
Rolando Martinez and Felipe de Diego for the operation.
Both Barker and Martinez had a long history of association with the
Agency. Barker was an American citizen who had lived in Cuba. He
had joined the Cuban police force in the 1950's as a result of which he
lost his American citizenship. While in the Cuban police, he was re-
cruited by the Agency which helped him escape to the United States
in 1959. Barker worked for Hunt during the Bay of Pigs period
helping to organize a Cuban government-in-exile. He continued to
serve in various CIA operations relating to Cuba until 1966, when the
Agency no longer needed him and terminated his contract. Barker had
entered the real estate business in Miami but made it clear to the
Agency that he would be willing at any time to return to its service.
There is, however, no record of any contacts or connections between
Barker and the Agency after 1966.
Martinez was recruited by the Agency in Miami in 1961. Until 1969,
he participated in a large number of maritime operations relating to
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Cuba and compiled what the CIA considered a distinguished record.
When these operations ended, Martinez obtained a real estate license
and went to work for Barker. The Agency, in recognition of his serv-
ices, had continued his contract payments until early 1970. At that
time, the Agency had planned to terminate him but agreed to pay him
$100 per month for a year to help him make the transition to civilian
life. In return he was required to report monthly to a CIA case officer
in Miami on developments in the Cuban community. In July 1971 it
was agreed that the retainer would be continued for one more year
because of Martinez' ability to report illegal attempts by Cuban exiles
to infiltrate Cuba, but it was intended that it should end in July 1972.
There is no record that Felipe de Diego, the third participant, ever
had a CIA connection of any kind.
In April 1971, Hunt, on the occasion of a business trip to Miami, had
renewed his acquaintance with Barker. Barker introduced Hunt to
Martinez and de Diego and together they attended the tenth anniver-
sary commemoration of the Bay of Pigs in Miami on April 17, 1971.
In August 1971 Hunt contacted Barker and asked him to recruit a
crew to undertake what he described as an important security opera-
tion.
On September 3, 1971, Barker, Martinez and de Diego broke into Dr.
Fielding's office in Beverly Hills. Hunt and Liddy supervised the op-
eration. The file cabinets in the office were pried open but, although the
testimony has been conflicting, it appears that no files on Ellsberg were
found. The office was left in a shambles to cover the group's tracks by
making it appear that someone looking for drugs had broken in. That
night the Cubans returned to Miami; Hunt and Liddy left Los Angeles
the next morning.
Shortly after the break-in, the Los Angeles police picked up one
Elmer Davis who was wanted on several charges. In return for the
dismissal of other charges, he pleaded guilty to the Fielding burglary,
although there is no evidence he had had any part in it, and the police
file on it was thereafter closed. As a result, the burglary received no
publicity, and it was not until John Dean and Hunt testified before the
Watergate Grand Jury in April 1973 that the facts of this operation
came to light.
The Agency, of course, had in its files xerox copies of the pictures
taken by Hunt in August which showed Dr. Fielding's office building
with his name on the wall above his parking space. Those copies had
been placed in a folder in the safe of the Acting Chief of the Technical
Services Division on August 27, 1971, and appear to have been exam-
ined only by him and his technician. The medical staff working on the
Ellsberg profile evidently was not aware of them. The pictures were
discovered after the Watergate break-in and turned over to the De-
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partment of Justice in January 1973. There is no evidence that anyone
in the Agency was aware of their significance until the Fielding
break-in was disclosed to the Watergate Grand Jury in April 1973.
In addition, personnel in the Agency had certain contacts, described
below, with participants in the break-in after it took place, but there
is no evidence that as a result the Agency received any information
about it.
Hunt, of course, had contacts with the CIA psychiatrist in October
and November in connection with the preparation of the final version
of the profile (discussed above). Hunt also met the Deputy Director
for Plans for lunch in October 1971 to ask him to continue the existing
cover arrangement with Mullen Company in Europe. In preparation
for the lunch, the Deputy Director for Plans was briefed on the tech-
nical support which had been given Hunt in July and August by the
Technical Services Division and was briefly shown the xerox copies
of the Hunt photographs in the files.
He and the Chief of TSD glanced at the pictures which, according
to their testimony, meant nothing to them. At the lunch, the conversa-
tion was confined to the Mullen matter. Hunt did not talk about his
other activities. Shortly thereafter, Hunt asked an officer in the Euro-
pean Division for some unclassified information concerning a French
security leak in 1954, which was supplied. There is no evidence of
further Agency contacts with Hunt during the period immediately
following the break-in.
Martinez served as a paid informer of the Agency's Miami Station
during the period both before and after the break-in. Although he
saw his case officer about once a month, there is no evidence that he
ever disclosed anything about his activities for Hunt. Martinez testified
that late in 1971 he casually mentioned to his case officer that Hunt
had been in Miami and was working for the White House. The case
officer later told him that he had run a name check on Hunt at the
Station (as indeed he had) and that there was no information respect-
ing Hunt's being employed by the White House. Martinez took that
response to mean that Hunt was on a secret CIA. mission of which the
Miami Station was not to know. On the strength of his past experience
with maintaining the secrecy of CIA operations, he therefore disclosed
none of the Hunt-related activities to his case officer.
Conclusions
The investigation has disclosed no evidence to suggest that the
Agency knew or suspected that Hunt had participated in a burglary
or other illegal operations in the period in which the Fielding break-in
occurred.
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As discussed above, only Director Helms knew that the Agency was
preparing the Ellsberg profile at the time when it was also providing
certain technical support to Hunt. The Commission has found no
evidence, however, that either the Director or any other Agency em-
ployee had knowledge of facts sufficient to disclose the plans for or
the carrying out of the Fielding break-in.
E. White House Efforts to Declassify CIA Files
During 1971, a major effort was undertaken by the White House
staff on instructions from the President to declassify documents and
files of historical interest. Within the White House, the declassifica-
tion campaign, although inherently legitimate, was also sought to be
used for political purposes by providing materials embarrassing
to critics of the administration. The White House staff at first, and
finally President Nixon, brought pressure to bear on the CIA to turn
over to the President highly sensitive materials ostensibly for legiti-
mate government purposes, but in fact for the President's personal
political ends. These events, which took place during the same time
period in which CIA support for Hunt was sought and the Ellsberg
profile was ordered, and which involved the same group of White
House aides, are reviewed in this section.
During 1971, the White House staff, largely through David Young,
conducted a major campaign to bring about the declassification of the
many files and documents of historical interest which no longer re-
quired classification. A parallel effort was made to improve the security
of those government papers requiring continued classification.
With the publication of the Pentagon Papers in June 1971, these
activities gained added significance and urgency. While the Adminis-
tration was concerned over the breach of security caused by the leak
of the Pentagon Papers, it was also concerned over what it considered
to be an unfairly selective disclosure of embarrassing historical data.
By declassifying additional sensitive files relating to prior events-
mainly the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, and the fall of the
Diem Government in South Vietnam-it sought to obtain material
helpful in neutralizing critics of the Administration's policies and
particularly Senator Edward Kennedy, who in 1971 was regarded as
Nixon's principal challenger. Beginning in June 1971, Colson and
Young urged on Haldeman and Ehrlichman a campaign in which
disclosures embarrassing to past administrations would be used for
the political, advantage of the Nixon Administration. That program
involved the use of the Pentagon Papers as well as the declassification
of other files.
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Colson set Hunt to work examining the Pentagon Papers and other
"overtly printed documentation . . . [to determine] the most useful
in demonstrating the collective bad judgment of the Kennedy Admin-
istration and/or a number of its high-level appointees." The State
Department was directed to turn over various files and cables, includ-
ing those dealing with the fall of the Diem Government. Hunt and
Colson interviewed Lucien Conein, a retired CIA employee formerly
stationed in Vietnam, whom the Pentagon Papers identified as active
in dealings with Vietnamese officials. at the time of the overthrow and
death of President Diem.
On September 20, 1971, Ehrlichman, Young, and Krogh met to
review the program of obtaining previously classified CIA materials
on the fall of the Diem Government, the Bay of Pigs, and the Cuban
Missile Crisis. The agenda for that meeting describes the materials
and the "exposure" to be given them through "briefing of selected
newsmen," "Senate Foreign Relations Committee inquiry" and "other
Congressional investigations." It states, opposite various listed items
under each of the three subject heads, that Ehrlichman was to see
Helms to obtain materials not previously turned over by CIA. A
handwritten notation states that Young was to see Helms to "set up
appointment for tomorrow."
On September 22, 1971, Ehrlichman met with Helms, advised him
that the President wanted to declassify the documents relating to
Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis and the Lebanon
landings, and asked to have the CIA's files on these matters turned
over to him. Helms directed an internal review of these papers to
make an assessment of the impact of their possible declassification.
Meanwhile on September 24, 1971, Colson sent a memorandum to
Ehrlichman entitled, "Rekindling the Pentagon Papers Issue". Colson
suggested various strategies in Congress to keep the Pentagon Papers
issue alive and "each day hopefully creating some minor embarrass-
ment for the Democrats." He also recommended other steps including
"program[ming] Lucien Conein to write a letter to Senator Mathias
complaining that he has been muzzled by the CIA, was paid money
to get out of town and instructed to talk to no one." He concludes by
urging that "we should very soon release declassified documents re-
lating to the Lebanon crisis, the Cuban missile crisis and perhaps one
or two others. Releasing of declassified documents will keep press
interest alive in the whole issue. We should start doing it soon to
avoid the charge of election year politicking."
On October 1, 1971, Ehrlichman again met with Helms at the
Agency. Helms showed Ehrlichman the files which he proposed to
turn over in response to the earlier requests and asked that they be
returned as soon as possible. He declined, however, to release the files
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relating to Vietnam. The other files were delivered to Ehrlichman that
day.
On October 8, 1971, Helms was called to a meeting at the White
House with the President and Ehrlichman, apparently because he had
declined to release the Vietnam file. A contemporaneous CIA memo-
randum states that Nixon and Ehrlichman assured Helms that the
President was interested in helping the CIA and had no intention
of releasing CIA papers, but needed to know the specific background
of these matters to meet possible press questions and to handle further
Soviet negotiations that might touch on agreements reached during
the Cuban Missile Crisis. Both Ehrlichman and Helms have testified
that Helms was not told of the President's intention to use the infor-
mation in these files for political purposes. The memorandum states
that Helms replied that he worked for only one President at a time
and that any papers in this possession were at the President's disposal.
He then handed the requested Vietnam file to Nixon who slipped it
into his desk drawer.
On November 16, 1971, Ehrlichman lunched with William Colby,
who had become the CIA's Executive Director-Comptroller, and re-
affirmed the President's desire to declassify documents on these subjects.
Nothing more came of the program, however, and no action was taken
on declassification of these files. So far as is known, none of the
information in the documents was disclosed by the White House.
Conclusions
The White House demand for sensitive CIA files-cloaked in what
appear to be at least in part false representations that they were
needed for valid government purposes when, in fact, they were wanted
to discredit critics of the administration-as thoroughly reprehen-
sible. It represents another serious instance of misuse of the Agency by
the White House.
So far as the Agency knew, the demand was for a proper purpose-
there is no evidence that it had notice of the intentions revealed in
later-discovered White House documents. Senior officials of the Agency
did, however, consider the surrender of these files to be a highly sensi-
tive matter, giving it great concern. The most sensitive of these files
was turned over by the Director only upon direct request from the
President.
The Commission recognizes that the Director cannot be expected to
disobey a direct request or order from the President without being
prepared to resign. The instances in which resignation may be called
for cannot be specified in advance and must be left to the Director's
judgment.
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The Commission believes that in the final analysis the proper
functioning of the Agency must depend in large part on the judg-
ment, ability and integrity of its Director. The best assurance against
misuse of the Agency lies in the appointment to that position of
persons of such stature, maturity and integrity that they will be able
to resist outside pressure and importuning. The Director should be
able not only to manage the Agency, but also to reassure the public
that he will do so properly.
F. CIA's Relation to Events Preceding the
Watergate Break-in
The origins of Watergate go back to a program for political es-
pionage in connection with the 1972 Presidential campaign on which
Hunt and Liddy began to work early that year. That program had
various facets of which espionage directed against the headquarters
of the Democratic National Committee was one.
This investigation has disclosed no evidence that the Agency pro-
vided support for the espionage program which culminated in the
Watergate break-in.
As has been discussed, however, four of the participants in the
break-in-Hunt, Martinez, Barker and McCord-had ties to the
Agency. Martinez continued on the CIA payroll as an informer until
after his arrest. Hunt had dealings with the Agency in the summer
and fall of 1971 in connection with the White House projects pre-
viously discussed. And he continued to be employed by Mullen, which
had a CIA relationship, and to be associated with Bennett in several
projects with political or espionage overtones.
These and connected circumstances have led to suspicions and allega-
tions of CIA involvement in or prior knowledge of the Watergate
break-in. In this section we review the relevant facts in the light of
these charges.
1. Hunt's Contacts with the CIA
Hunt's contacts with the Agency in connection with his request for
a disguise and related support and with the Ellsberg profile have
been discussed above. The Commission has found no evidence to indi-
cate that the Agency acquired notice in the course of these contacts
that Hunt was engaged in or planning illegal activities.
These contacts ended in November 1971, and thereafter Hunt had
what appear to have been only a few sporadic and insignificant con-
tacts with Agency personnel.
Hunt called the Agency's External Employment Affairs Branch
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on a few occasions to ask them to refer him to persons having certain
qualifications needed for his projects. At one time Hunt asked to be
referred to a firm qualified to locate possible hostile electronic listening
devices. On another occasion he asked to be referred to an electronics
expert. The Agency referred a man named Thomas Amato, experi-
enced both in electronics and picking locks--the record is not clear
whether Hunt had requested the latter capability. In any event, the
Agency employee who routinely made the referral was not told by
Hunt of his purpose, and he has stated that he did not consider that
any illegal activity was contemplated.
Hunt, at the suggestion of Barker and Martinez, interviewed a
Cuban refugee who had been close to Castro, using Martinez' tape
recorder. He believes that he may have sent a transcript gratuitously
to the Agency, but it, has no record of it.
Hunt frequently played tennis with a long-time friend who was a
CIA officer and may have had other occasional social contacts with
CIA employees. There is no record, however, of any communications
between him and the Agency disclosing facts which might have indi-
cated that he was planning or pursuing illegal activities.
Hunt, of course, had been in contact with Martinez in connection
with the Fielding break-in and, later, the two Watergate break-ins.
As previously discussed, Martinez reported to his case officer in Miami
on an average of once a month. Although he had mentioned Hunt in
passing on two occasions in 1971, for reasons discussed, Martinez chose
not to disclose Hunt's activities. '
Nonetheless, the case officer's superior, the Miami Chief of Station,
had been disturbed when he later learned that the case officer had not
promptly reported the reference to Hunt's name, a name that meant
nothing to the case officer. The Chief felt that he should be advised of
the presence of any former CIA officers in his territory. His lingering
and undefined concern over Hunt was evidently in his mind in March
1972, when he met Martinez in connection with another intelligence
requirement. In the course of that conversation, Martinez again men-
tioned that Hunt had been in and out of Miami on a foreign business
deal. Separately, he asked the Chief of Station whether he was certain
that he was aware of all CIA activity in the Miami area.
These repeated references to Hunt, in whom the station chief from
past experience had limited confidence, and Martinez' unusual question
led the station chief to contact his superior at CIA Headquarters. He
cabled that Martinez had reported that Hunt had been in the Miami
area twice recently contacting old friends and although "on the surface
Hunt seems to be trying to promote business deals of one sort or
another," he had indicated that he was a White House counsellor "try-
ing to create the impression that this could be of importance to his
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Cuban friends." The cable asked that Hunt's White House employ-
ment be checked out.
On receipt of this cable it was discussed with the Associate Deputy
Director for Plans who stated that he had previously learned from the
Deputy Director for Plans that Hunt was a White House consultant
supposedly engaged in domestic activities having nothing to do with
foreign intelligence and that it was neither necessary nor proper for
CIA to check into Hunt's activities since domestic activities were
involved.
As a result of this advice from the Associate Deputy Director, pre-
mised not only on concern that the Agency should not become involved
in domestic political activity but also on his estimate of Hunt's erratic
judgment, a strongly worded letter was sent to the Miami Chief of
Station advising that Hunt "undoubtedly is on domestic White House
business, no interest to us, in essence, cool it." Neither the Associate
Director nor the parties to these communications apparently knew of
the prior support to Hunt or of the Ellsberg profile.
After receipt of this letter, the station chief, through the case
officer, asked Martinez to write up for him in Spanish a summary of
his contacts with Hunt. Martinez was disturbed but complied when
the case officer told him to write something that he would not be
afraid to have shown to him later. The station chief placed it in the file.
The summary failed to disclose anything beyond what Martinez had
previously reported and gave no hint of any questionable activities.
Martinez met his case officer again in May and on June 6, but said
nothing further relating to Hunt's activities.
The station chief testified that while he had been distressed over
the blunt response from Headquarters, and uneasy over Martinez'
question respecting his knowledge of CIA activities, he had no reason
to suspect Hunt of unlawful activities. His basic concern was that he
should know what a former Agency employee was doing in his terri-
tory. He did not suspect that Martinez, of whom he thought as a boat
captain, was engaged in domestic espionage activities. As for the
officers in Headquarters, their overriding concern appeared to have
been not to become involved in a domestic investigation and, in par-
ticular, not to cross paths with the White House.
Although Martinez was the one person in regular contact with the
CIA who had knowledge of Hunt's improper activities, the Commis-
sion has found no evidence to indicate that he provided the Agency
with information about those activities.
2. Bennett's Contacts with Hunt and the CIA
During the period preceding Watergate, Hunt continued to be em-
ployed by Mullen Co. and was in regular contact with Robert Bennett,
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its president. Mullen continued to provide cover for CIA officers
abroad and Bennett and Hunt had a few meetings with the case offi-
cer respecting these arrangements.
Bennett learned of several of Hunt's planned or executed political
activities in this period, not including, however, the Fielding or
Watergate operations. By June 1972, Bennett had come to doubt
Hunt's reliability and judgment and had determined that Hunt
should eventually leave Mullen, but lie decided to take no action
until after the election. According to Bennett. nothing had come to his
attention that he considered sufficiently serious to jusify the risk of
White House displeasure should he discharge Hunt. There is no evi-
dence that lie learned anything that gave him notice of Hunt's illegal
activities until they became public knowledge.
The following paragraphs summarize Bennett's relevant contacts
with Hunt during this period.
At Colson's request, Hunt interviewed Dita Beard, public relations
representative of ITT Corp., in her Denver hospital room in
March 1972. A memorandum attributed to Beard had been published
indicating that ITT had offered a large contribution to the Republican
Party if the 1972 convention were to utilize the Sheraton Hotel facili-
ties in San Diego. Bennett had received a tip from the Hughes organi-
zation that the memorandum might be a forgery and passed it to Hunt
or Colson. Hunt, using the wig furnished by the CIA in August,
interrogated Beard, attempting to establish that the memorandum
was a forgery. On his return lie gave a statement to Colson. Arrange-
ments were made in the Senate for the release of a statement in a form
useful to the media. Beard's lawyer called on Bennett, who himself
had had no prior participation in this matter, to assist in its prepara-
tion. There is no evidence of any CIA knowledge of or involvement
in these events.
At one time Hunt approached Bennett with a proposal to obtain
the assistance of the Hughes organization for a burglary in Las Vegas
to secure purported information about Senator Muskie. Bennett, at
Hunt's request, introduced Hunt to a Hughes organization employee,
but later learned that Hunt's proposal had been rejected. It was ap-
parently in this connection that Hunt had called the Agency's Exter-
nal Employment Affairs Branch for referral of a technician. It was
also this proposal which first gave Bennett concern with respect to
Hunt's judgment; lie assumed, however, that Hunt, being attached to
the White House staff, would be adequately supervised and controlled.
There is no evidence that CIA had knowledge of or any part in this
plan.
During this period Bennett was asked by Hughes' attorneys to get
a bid for surveillance of Clifford Irving, who was then writing a book
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describing his earlier preparation of the fraudulent Hughes biogra-
phy. Hunt got an estimate from James McCord and gave it to Bennett
who passed it to the attorneys. They rejected it as too high. There is
no evidence that the CIA had knowledge or was involved.
Bennett, active in Republican politics, participated in the reelec-
tion campaign and assisted in the formation of a number of commit-
tees to receive contributions. Neither Hunt nor Liddy evidently had
any part in this effort; Bennett merely delivered Hughes' campaign
contribution to Liddy. There is no evidence that the CIA had knowl-
edge of or was involved in this activity.
Bennett's nephew, Fletcher, wanted a summer job and he referred
him to Hunt. Hunt sought to recruit him to serve as a spy at Muskie
Headquarters. Fletcher turned him down but referred Hunt to a
friend, Tom Gregory, who took the job. Gregory was not related to
Bennett but did visit Bennett and Fletcher occasionally and told them
generally of his activities. According to Bennett, however, he was not
told of any illegal activity until June 14, two days before Watergate,
when Gregory told Bennett that Hunt had asked him to bug the office
of Frank Mankiewicz in McGovern Headquarters. Gregory declined
and went home. This plan evidently was not carried out. There is no
evidence that Bennett (or the CIA) learned of the first Watergate
break-in which had taken place in May 1972 or of the plans for the
second Watergate operation until it became public knowledge.
Bennett's contacts with the CIA during the pre-Watergate period
apparently were confined to the Mullen Company cover arrangements.
There is no evidence that Bennett personally performed services for
the CIA or had other operational contacts with the Agency. His com-
munications with the case officer prior to Watergate evidently were
limited to matters relating to the cover arrangements. There is no
evidence that Bennett discussed Hunt with the case officer prior to the
Watergate break-in.
In the days immediately following Watergate, a number of com-
munications passed among Hunt, Liddy, and Bennett. Among other
things, Hunt asked Bennett for help in finding him a lawyer. Liddy
called Bennett to locate Hunt and pass messages to him. Nothing has
been found in these communications suggesting Bennett's involvement
in the Watergate operation.
Shortly after Watergate, the office of the United States Attorney
questioned Bennett, and the evidence indicates that he responded
truthfully to the questions, including disclosing the firm's relation-
ship to the CIA. When he later appeared before the grand jury, he
was asked few questions by the prosecutor. Having previously dis-
closed the facts concerning the CIA relationship, he did not vol-
unteer them either to the grand jury or to the FBI when he was later
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interviewed by it. These events, which occurred within the three weeks
following Watergate, along with other comments and observations by
Bennett, were reported by the CIA case officer to his superiors after
he met with Bennett on July 10, 1972. A copy of the handwritten re-
port was sent to the Director. At this time, the CIA was gravely con-
cerned over the impact of the Watergate investigation on the security
of the Mullen cover and the information received from Bennett was
considered important for that reason. The case officer's report reflects
that at the time the Agency was also concerned over the disclosures
being made by an ex-employee named Philip Agee which threatened
the Mullen cover, among other things. This development was treated
as highly classified by the Agency and had not been disclosed to Ben-
nett. It was referred to as the "WH flap" for the reason that Agee's
disclosures dealt mostly with the Agency's Western Hemisphere oper-
ations. All of these matters were then being reviewed within the
Agency in connection with the question whether the cover arrange-
ments with Mullen should be terminated as no longer secure.
This investigation has disclosed no evidence indicating that the
Agency, through Bennett, was implicated in the Watergate break-in.
3. Miscellaneous Contacts and Relations
Various miscellaneous contacts and relationships have been men-
tioned as giving rise to suspicion of CIA involvement or advance
notice of the Watergate break-in.
One of these is the fact that James McCord, another retired CIA
employee, participated in the break-in. McCord had retired in Janu-
ary 1970 to form his own security firm and had become Director of
Security of the Committee to Reelect the President early in 1972. He
also had been in contact with the External Employment Affairs Branch
for referrals to qualified ex-employees. In April 1972, he began to work
with Hunt on plans for the break-in. There is no evidence that the
Agency participated in or gained advance knowledge of the Water-
gate break-in through McCord.
Another concerns alleged telephone calls to and from the Agency
immediately after the arrests of the burglars. The Watergate burglars
were arrested at 2 :30 A.M. on June 17, 1972. The first contact with the
Agency, according to its records, occurred at 5 P.M. that day when an
inquiry about the arrested men was received from a Washington Post
reporter. That call was followed by calls from the Secret Service for a
check on the aliases and from the FBI advising of the identification of
McCord and Hunt, two ex-employees. This news was relayed to the
Acting Director of Security who promptly called the Director of Se-
curity at 8:45 P.M. The Director returned to the Agency and then
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called Helms at 10 P.M. to report that former Agency employees (Mc-
Cord and Hunt) were involved in the burglary.
There is no evidence in the communications by Agency personnel
immediately following the break-in to suggest that any Agency em-
ployee had advance knowledge of the break-in.
Conclusions
The Commission concludes, on the basis of this investigation, that
there is no evidence either that the CIA was a participant in the
planning or execution of the Watergate break-in or that it had advance
knowledge of it.
G. The Agency's Response to the Post-Watergate
Investigations
Within hours of the arrest of the Watergate burglars on June 17,
1972, it became known that McCord, Martinez and Barker had con-
nections with the Agency. Hunt's connection was disclosed not long
afterward. Inasmuch as the burglary had occurred within the District
of Columbia, it fell within the jurisdiction of the FBI, and the FBI's
attention soon focused on the CIA and its possible involvement in the
Watergate operation. The Agency also became an object of White
House efforts to inhibit the FBI investigation and to keep the arrested
burglars silent. And eventually, the CIA came under the scrutiny of
the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
(under Senator Ervin).
The manner in which the Agency responded to these investigations,
its failure to make timely disclosure of information in its possession,
and its destruction of certain tapes, has led to suspicions and allega-
tions concerning its involvement in the Watergate operation or the
subsequent cover-up. In this section, we examine the relevant events
in the light of these charges.
1. CIA Attempts to Limit the Scope of the FBI Investigation
From the outset of the post-Watergate investigation, the Director
took the position that insmuch as the CIA had not been involved in
Watergate, it should not become involved in the investigation. He has
testified that he was particularly concerned over disclosing information
to FBI field offices because leaks had occurred there immediately after
Watergate, and he was concerned over the failure of the FBI to dis-
close the purposes for which it sought information from CIA.
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Within the first ten days after the break-in, the Agency nevertheless
responded to certain requests from the FBI field office in Alexandria,
Virginia. Helms, however, attempted to handle such requests directly
with Acting FBI Director, L. Patrick Gray, and confine them as much
as possible. In a memorandum dated June 28, 1972, he reported having
urged Gray that this should be done because the CIA was not involved
in Watergate and requested that the FBI "confine themselves to the
personalities already arrested or directly under suspicion and that they
desist from expanding this investigation into other areas which may
well, eventually, run afoul of our operations."
There is no clear explanation why Helms wrote this memorandum.
There is no evidence that he in fact made that request to Gray. Accord-
ing to Gray and Helms, Gray had called Helms on June 22, 1972, to
inquire about possible CIA involvement in the Watergate operation.
Helms simply told him that although the CIA knew the people who
had been arrested, it was not involved in the operation.
On June 23, 1972, Helms and Lt. General Vernon A. Walters, the
Agency's Deputy Director, were called to the White House to meet
with Ehrlichman and H. R. Haldeman, the President's Chief of
Staff. At this meeting, Haldeman suggested that the CIA ask the
FBI to limit its investigation on the grounds that it might jeopardize
the security of CIA operations. Helms, however, stated that he knew
of no CIA operations that might be affected, and that he had so
informed Gray on the preceding day. Haldeman, nevertheless,
directed Walters to call on Gray with the suggestion that further
investigation of activities in Mexico involving moneys found on the
Watergate burglars would endanger CIA operations. Walters then
saw Gray and, after referring to Helms' call to him of the preceding
day, passed on that suggestion. Walters has testified that he considered
this to have been a reasonable request, assuming, in the light of his
own past experience, that it must have been intended to protect highly
sensitive operations presumably known only to the White House.
Walters was not asked at the meeting to have the FBI restrict its
investigation in other ways.
During the following days, Walters had several meetings with
John Dean, Counsel to the President, who, at the direction of Ehrlich-
man and Haldeman, suggested the possibility that the FBI investiga-
tion might expose CIA operations and asked what could be done about
it. He also asked whether the CIA could pay the salaries and bail of the
jailed burglars. Walters firmly rebuffed the suggestions implied in
the questions. Helms had a further telephone conversation with Gray
in which he advised him that the CIA had no interest in the Mexicans
the FBI was then investigating.
On June 28 Helms left on a three week trip out of the country,
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leaving the memorandum previously quoted. During his absence, in-
formation continued to be transmitted to the FBI through Walters.
William E. Colby, then the Executive Director, handled the in-house
coordination of the responses to the investigation.
During October and November 1972, the United States Attorney
requested information concerning the CIA's connection with various
activities of the Watergate defendants in order to prepare for the
coming trial. Inquiries on this subject had earlier been made by the
FBI. The United States Attorney was particularly concerned that
the defendants might claim that they were acting on orders of the
CIA. The Agency provided information in response to specific in-
quiries but sought to restrict it to the Attorney General and the
Assistant Attorney General. Eventually, information respecting
Hunt's request for support in July and August 1971 and the Agency's
response was supplied to the United States Attorney.
The Agency, however, volunteered no information and withheld
some appearing to have a bearing on these matters. For example,
in July 1972 and again in December 1972 and January 1973, the
Agency received letters from McCord relating to the attempts to
involve the CIA in the defense of the Watergate burglars at their
forthcoming trial. The letters reflected McCord's efforts to resist pro-
posals that the Watergate burglars should implicate the CIA in order
to bolster their defense. Helms obtained advice from the CIA's Gen-
eral Counsel that he was under no obligation voluntarily to turn the
letters over to the FBI (which did not know of them) and on the
strength of that advice, retained them in the Agency's files.
In July 1972, xerox copies of Hunt's pictures of Fielding's office, as
well as of the alias identification given Hunt (contained in TSD's
"Mr. Edward" file) were turned over to Helms and Colby. In spite of
the well publicized fact that the originals of some of these alias mate-
rials had been found on the arrested Watergate burglars, and in spite
of requests from the Assistant Attorney General for information about
Agency support to Hunt, the Agency apparently did not deliver these
materials to the Department of Justice until January 1973. Other
material held by the Agency's management and not disclosed or deliv-
ered until 1973 included the tape of the Cushman-Hunt conversation.
of July 22, 1971.
Not only did the Agency continue to hold material relevant to the
investigation, but it undertook no comprehensive in-house investiga-
tion of its own into its connections with the activities of the men who
were coming to trial. No general effort was made until May, 1973,
to collect all relevant information and documents from Agency
employees.
On December 15, 1972, Helms and Colby went to the White House to
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report to Ehrlichman and Dean on the status of the FBI and Depart-
ment of Justice investigations. Colby's memorandum of the meeting
records the CIA's efforts "to respond [to inquiries] at the highest level
only". It also reports on the United States Attorney's efforts to learn
the name of the person who authorized Hunt's request for support in
July 1971, and states that Colby sought to avoid answering these ques-
tions but was eventually compelled to disclose Ehrlichman's name.
Colby and Helms also showed Dean the package of information (pos-
sibly containing the xerox copies of the Hunt photos and alias mate-
rials) which had been prepared for delivery to the Assistant Attorney
General. The memorandum states : "It was agreed that these would
be held up." It was also agreed that Cushman would be asked to call
Ehrlichman to discuss his recollection of who had made the July 1971
phone call to him.
In January 1973, this package of information was finally turned
over to the Department of Justice.
Conclusions
While the Agency has a legitimate concern to protect sensitive in-
formation against disclosure, its response to the investigation of the
Watergate burglary cannot be justified by any requirements for
secrecy. The Agency failed to turn over to the Department of Justice
information in its possession which it should have known could be
relevant to the ongoing investigation and preparation for the first
Watergate trial in January 1973. Much of the information requested
could have been provided with little, if any, risk to the security of
Agency activities. Some of it was eventually provided, but only after
some delay. The Agency is subject to serious criticism for this conduct.
The basis for the Agency's action appears to have been the Director's
opinion that since the Agency was not involved in Watergate, it should
not become involved in the Watergate investigation. The Commission
considers this to be no justification for the Agency's failure to aid an
investigation of possible violations of law by employees or ex-em-
ployees with whom it had had recent contacts. The provision of the
Agency's charter barring it from exercising "police, subpoena [and]
law enforcement powers" does not excuse that failure.
The Commission has found no evidence, however, that leads it to
believe that officers of the Agency actively joined in the cover-up con-
spiracy formed by the White House staff in June 1972. There is no
evidence that the Agency sought to block the FBI investigation. Gen-
eral Walters' statement to Gray concerned only the investigation in
Mexico, and he has stated that it was based on his belief, supported
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by prior experience, that the White House had knowledge of some
highly classified activity in Mexico not known to others. Subsequent
cover-up overtures by the White House were firmly rejected by him.
Later reluctance of Agency management to disclose the identity of
White House personnel and provide materials to the Department of
Justice are subject to the criticism previously made. The evidence does
not indicate, however, that Agency personnel ever knew of or partici-
pated in a plan of the White House staff to abort or impede investi-
gation into possible violations of law by members of that staff.
2. Destruction of Helms' Tapes and Transcripts
About January 17, 1973, seven months after the Watergate break-in
Director Helms received a letter from Senator Mansfield, dated Janu-
ary 16, 1973, requesting that the Agency retain "any records or docu-
ments which have a bearing on the Senate's forthcoming investigation
into the Watergate break-in, political sabotage and espionage, and
practices of agencies in investigating such activities." At the time the
letter arrived, Helms and his secretary were in the process of cleaning
out his files preparatory to his departure from the Agency.
Approximately a week after receipt of this letter, Helms' secretary
asked him what should be done about the voluminous tapes and tran-
scripts which were then in storage. The tapes were produced by a
recording system installed in the offices of the Director, the Deputy
Director and what was then an adjoining conference room (the
French Room). This system had been installed some ten years earlier.
It was removed from the Deputy Director's office in February 1972
and from the office of the Director in January and February 1973.
The taping system permitted the recording of telephone calls and
of room conversations on activation by the occupant of the office. Helms
used it occasionally, apparently considering it as an efficient way to
prepare a memorandum to assist his recollection. Cushman used it
only rarely and Walters, who followed him, not at all.
The tapes were transcribed routinely and the transcripts were
retained by the respective secretary. Prior to January 1973, tapes
were from time to time erased or, if worn out, destroyed.
About January 24, 1973, Helms, in response to his secretary's ques-
tion, told her to destroy his remaining tapes and transcripts and she
so instructed the technicians in charge of the system. At that time
there were approximately three file drawers of transcripts covering
his years as Director. Both Helms and his secretary made a cursory
review of them and recalled none to have related to Watergate. They
were then destroyed. Along with the tapes and transcripts the logs
identifying them were also destroyed. No tapes were erased.
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Director Helms has testified that he considered this destruction of
what he regarded as his personal notes to be a routine part of vacating
his office. He said that he felt that the Agency had produced whatever
Watergate-related materials it had and that these tapes and tran-
scripts had nothing to do with anything he considered relevant to
Watergate. He also stated that he assumed that anything of per-
manent value had been transferred from the tapes to the Agency's rec-
ords, and he felt obligated that records of confidential conversations
between him and others should not become part of Agency files.
Conclusions
It must be recalled that in January 1973 the Watergate affair had
not yet assumed the dimensions which subsequent revelations gave it.
Neither the activities of the Plumbers nor the extent of the White
House involvement in the cover-up had come to light. Accordingly,
destruction of Helms' personal office records cannot be judged with
the benefit of hindsight, derived from subsequent revelations.
For the same reasons, however, Helms stated interpretation of
what was Watergate-related presumably was narrower than it would
have been after all the facts disclosed to the Watergate Grand Jury
in April, 1973, and other information had come to light. Hence, no
comfort can be derived from Helms' assurances that no Watergate-
related material was destroyed, since what was destroyed had not been
reviewed for relevance in light of the later disclosures.
The destruction of the tapes and transcripts, coming immediately
after Senator Mansfield's request not to destroy materials bearing on
the Watergate investigation, reflected poor judgment. It cannot be
justified on the ground that the Agency produced its Watergate-
related papers from other files; there is no way in which it can ever
be established whether relevant evidence has been destroyed. When
taken together with the Agency's general non-responsiveness to the
ongoing investigation, it reflects a serious lack of comprehension of
the obligation of any citizen to produce for investigating authorities
evidence in his possession of possible relevance to criminal conduct.
3. Miscellaneous Matters Concerning the Investigation
a. Pennington
In the foregoing sections we have discussed the response to the
Watergate investigation at the level of the Director's office. A separate
failure to respond properly occurred within the Office of Security.
In August 1972, the FBI's Alexandria field office, in the course of
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its Watergate investigation, asked for information about one Penning-
ton, said to have been an employee who may have been McCord's
supervisor a number of years ago. The inquiry was received by an of-
ficer of the Office of Security who customarily dealt with the FBI.
The officer had personnel files checked and furnished the FBI with
information concerning one Cecil B. Pennington, a retired employee
of the Office of Security who had had no connection with McCord. The
FBI shortly thereafter advised that this was not the person in whom
it had an interest.
Meanwhile, officers in the Office of Security knew that one Lee Pen-
nington was a long-time friend of the McCords who, shortly after
the Watergate arrests, had helped Mrs. McCord burn some of Mc-
Cord's papers and effects at his house, probably including McCord"s
retirement records which showed his past Agency employment.
In addition, some members of the Security Research Staff within
the Office of Security also knew that Lee Pennington had for years
been a secret informer of that staff who was paid $250 per month to
supply clippings, legislative developments and other miscellaneous
information. Whether this fact was then known to the Director of
Security or his Deputy is disputed.
The undisputed fact, however, is that information in the Office of
Security on Lee Pennington was treated as "sensitive" and was delib-
erately withheld from the FBI when the inquiry about Pennington
was received. That information did not come to light until January,
1974, when a proposed response to a Senate inquiry was passed through
the Office of Security. That response stated that all information con-
cerning Watergate had been disclosed. Officers who had handled the
prior Watergate investigation advised the Inspector General's office
of the Pennington file and the facts were then disclosed to the Senate
Select Committee.
Investigation has not disclosed any link between Pennington's burn-
ing of McCord's papers and the Agency. So far as can be determined,
no one at the Agency either directed this action or knew of it in
advance. Pennington was not acting for the Agency or with its knowl-
edge or consent but rather seems to have acted simply to help Mrs.
McCord dispose of papers which McCord said he considered to be
both personal and a fire hazard. McCord had received several bomb
threats and was also concerned about his papers and effects falling into
the hands of newspapers. The Commission has found no evidence to
justify inferring from these events that the CIA was involved in the
destruction of files of McCord having possible relevance to Watergate.
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b. Payment of Bennett's Attorney's Fees
About June 1973, Robert Bennett, President of the Mullen Com-
pany, was again called before the grand jury in connection with ques-
tions raised by the recent revelations. Bennett felt that the security
problems raised by the Mullen-CIA cover relationship made it neces-
sary for him to obtain the assistance of counsel. When he received a
bill for some $800, he asked the Agency to pay half of it, and it agreed.
The investigation has disclosed no evidence of any motive or purpose
by the Agency in this connection to withhold information from the
grand jury. Nor does the evidence of this transaction indicate any
involvement of the CIA or Bennett in Watergate.
Conclusions
The failure to provide information about Pennington to the FBI
was in this case the responsibility of officers at the operational level,
apparently acting without direction from above. For the reasons dis-
cussed in connection with the preceding sections, their conduct was
unjustified and subject to criticism.
At the same time, however, there is no evidence that this decision
was intended to cover-up any possible connection between the CIA and
Watergate-no evidence of such connection has been found.
The Commission concludes that there is no evidence indicating that
the CIA either had advance knowledge of or participated in the break-
ins into Dr. Fielding's office or the Democratic National Committee at
the Watergate.
The Commission also concludes that in providing the disguise and
alias materials, tape recorder, and camera to Hunt, as well as in pro-
viding the Ell?berg profile, the Agency acted in excess of its authorized
foreign intelligence functions and failed to comply with its own in-
ternal control procedures.
The Agency provided these materials in response to demands from
highly-placed members of the White House staff and, except in the
case of the Ellsberg profile, without knowledge that they were in-
tended for improper purposes. Those demands reflect a pattern of
actual and attempted misuse to which the CIA was subjected by the
Nixon administration.
Finally, the Commission concludes that the Agency was delinquent
when it failed, after public disclosure of the improper White House
activities, to undertake a thorough investigation of its own and to
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respond promptly and fully to the investigations conducted by other
~fl
departments of the government.
Recommendation (26)
a. A single and exclusive high-level channel should be estab-
lished for transmission of all White House staff requests to the
CIA. This channel should run between an officer of the National
Security Council staff designated by the President and the office
of the Director or his Deputy.
b. All Agency officers and employees should be instructed that
any direction or request reaching them directly and outside of
regularly established channels should be immediately reported
to the Director of Central Intelligence.
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Chapter 15
Domestic Activities of the
Directorate of Operations
The Directorate of Operations is the CIA component with primary
responsibility for the collection of foreign intelligence overseas and
for the conduct of other covert operations outside of the United States.
In support of these missions, the Directorate engages in a variety
of activities within the United States. The major domestic activities
of the Directorate, including those which raise questions of compliance
with the Agency's legislative authority, are discussed in the following
sections.
This chapter does not describe all of the Directorate's domestic
activities which the Commission has investigated. The national inter-
est in the continued effectiveness of .the CIA in the foreign intelligence
field requires that a number of those activities be protected from dis-
closure. Our investigation of these activities has produced no evidence
(other than that described in this report) that these activities exceeded
the Agency's authority. Very few of these activities continue. To the
extent that they do, the Commission is satisfied that they are subject
to adequate controls.
Nor does the Commission report include detailed information on
the activities of the CIA's Miami Station which, commencing in the
early 1960's, conducted a broad range of clandestine foreign intelli-
gence, counterintelligence and operational activities directed at areas
outside the United States. Many such activities were conducted with
the United States as a base, but the CIA contends, and the Commission
has found no evidence to the contrary, that these activities were not
directed against American citizens. Since 1966, the scope of the sta-
tion's activities and the number of its personnel have been gradually
reduced and by 1972, except for some collection of foreign intelligence,
these activities had been discontinued. Since the Miami operations
were the result of a particular series of events not likely to be repeated,
and since they have been largely discontinued, the Commission con-
(208)
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eluded that its resources were better utilized in investigating and
analyzing other activities.
A. Overt Collection of Foreign Intelligence within the
United States
While the importance of clandestine collection should not be under-
estimated, many of the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle which is "finished
foreign intelligence" can be overtly collected by a well-organized
information gathering system. Analysis of intelligence failures dur-
ing World War II demonstrated that a significant volume of this
information was available from the American public and could have
been collected by overt methods within the United States. At that
time, however, numerous agencies were engaged in domestic collection
of foreign intelligence. Their activities were largely uncoordinated.
With the formation of the CIA in 1947, responsibility for the overt
collection of foreign intelligence within the United States was cen-
tralized in the Agency as a service of common concern to the entire
intelligence community. This responsibility is presently discharged
by a separate division of the Agency. Through officers stationed in
various locations throughout the United States, this division collects
foreign intelligence information from United States residents, busi-
ness firms and other organizations willing to assist the Agency. Con-
tacts with potential sources of foreign intelligence information are
overt and officers identify themselves by true name as CIA employees.
Only in a few instances have officers of the division used alias creden-
tials for personal protection when responding to unsolicited offers of
assistance from foreign nationals or other unknown persons.
Although its collection activities are openly conducted, this division
attempts to operate discreetly. Each of its facilities is listed in the
local telephone directory, but the offices themselves often do not bear
a CIA designation. In addition, the division goes to substantial lengths
to protect the fact that an individual or organization is contributing
intelligence to the CIA and to protect proprietary interests in any
information which is provided.
Generally, the division's procedure consists of contacting United
States residents with whom it has an established relationship to seek
out available information on specific subjects for which the division
has had requests from other components of the Agency. A typical
example is the debriefing of an American citizen who has traveled
abroad and who, because of a particular expertise or itinerary, could
have acquired significant foreign intelligence information.
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Most of the United States residents contacted by this component of
the Agency are American citizens. Division regulations prohibit con-
tacts with certain categories of individuals including Fulbright Schol-
ars, past or present Peace Corps (ACTION) members, United
Nations employees or contractors or representatives of foreign govern-
ments. Although not prohibited from doing so, the division will not
approach American br foreign students but will interview them if they
initiate the contact.
The success of the CIA in collecting such information is entirely
dependent upon the voluntary cooperation of the American public.
The CIA contends, and the Commission has found no evidence to the
contrary, that it neither exerts any pressure to elicit cooperation nor
promises or grants favors in return for information. Sources of in-
formation are not compensated, but on rare occasions the Agency will
pay a portion of a proven source's travel expenses to an area where
his presence might fulfill intelligence requirements.
The collection of intelligence within the United States requires that
the CIA maintain various records with respect to the individuals and
organizations that have provided information or are promising sources.
In addition to a master index of approximately 150,000 names, division
headquarters presently maintains approximately 50,000 active files.
Many of these files reflect relationships with prominent Americans who
have voluntarily assisted the Agency, including past and present
Members of Congress. A substantial sampling of these files indicates
that their contents are limited to: (1) copies of correspondence relat-
ing to the individual or organizational source's relationship with the
division; (2) intelligence reports contributed by the source; (3) in
the case of an organization, a summary of its relationship with the
division including any stipulations or limitations imposed by the or-
ganization's committing official; and (4) the results of a federal
agency name check obtained through the CIA's Office of Security in
the event CIA representatives wish to discuss classified matters or con-
template a continuing relationship with a contact. If such a name check
produces derogatory information, the Agency may terminate the rela-
tionship but it takes no further action. However, a copy of the report in
such a case is retained in the individual's contact file.
The CIA asserts that this division's domestic collection efforts are
devoted entirely to the collection of foreign economic, political, mili-
tary and operational information, directly related to the United States
foreign intelligence effort. In general, this appears to be true. How-
ever, this investigation has disclosed several instances in the past where
the division provided other components of the CIA with information
about activities of American citizens within the United States.
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1. American Dissidents
The first and most significant instance began in March 1969, when the
division established a new file or "case" entitled "Activities of United
States Black Militants." Field offices were instructed to forward to
headquarters, by memorandum, information which came to their at-
tention "concerning the activities of United States Black Militants
either in the United States or abroad."
A contemporaneous CIA memorandum indicates that this case was
opened to establish a formal procedure for processing and transmitting
to the FBI the increasing volume of unsolicited information received
by the field offices with respect to militant activities. In written in-
structions, the Director of the division informed all field offices that
he did not intend that such information be actively collected, "since
this is primarily an FBI responsibility." Investigation indicates that
field offices did not actively seek such information. The very few re-
ports which were filed contained information received primarily from
"call-ins" who found the division's offices in local telephone direc-
tories.
Initially, the case with respect to militant activities had no relation-
ship to Operation CHAOS, which had already been initiated by the
Counterintelligence Staff's Special Operations Group. However, the
division's reports were disseminated to an Operation CHAOS repre-
sentative who quickly recognized the division's capacity to provide
useful information with respect to a broader range of dissident or
militant groups. Accordingly, in December 1969, the Special Opera-
tions Group requested that the division broaden its base to include the
activities of "radical student and youth groups, radical under-
ground press and draft evasion/deserter support movements and
groups." An Operation CHAOS officer briefed division field chiefs on
the Special Operations Group's interest on this information. A memo-
randum of that meeting explained that :
CI's interest is primarily to ascertain the details of foreign involvement/sup-
port/guidance/training/funding or exploitation of the above groups or move-
ments, particularly through coverage of the foreign travel, contacts and activities
of the Americans involved.
Although the emphasis was clearly on information establishing a
foreign link with these groups, the division's field officers were also re-
quested to report-for background purposes-on the purely domestic
activities of these groups and their members. The Operation CHAOS
representative explained that this purely domestic information was
necessary to compile a data base essential to full understanding of pos-
sible connections between these groups and hostile elements abroad.
Shortly after the briefing, the Director of the division again cau-
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tioned all field chiefs that collection of this type of information is an
FBI responsibility and should be undertaken only "when these sub-
jects are surfaced . . . during the course of your other activities."
This admonition was repeated in virtually all of the Director's memo-
randa to field offices with respect to this case. The reports made avail-
able for the Commission's examination appear to have been obtained
by field officers primarily in the course of fulfilling other intelligence
requirements. However, there are some indications to the contrary.
During 1970, officers of the Special Operations Group and the divi-
sion conferred on a number of occasions to discuss what one memo-
randum described as "over-aggressive positive actions" by the
division's personnel in the collection of CHAOS information. The
possibility of active collection of CHAOS information was succinctly
stated by a field officer in a memorandum dated June 26, 1970:
To be sure, this case, as originally conceived, was to be only a passive effort
on the part of the field, but there is a natural tendency when an interesting re-
port is received to request additional details, then the actions begin. At that
point, we are put in the position of investigating or reporting, if you like, the
activities of United States citizens in the United States that are inimical to the
national security interests of this Country. But that is clearly the function of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, not of CIA.
A number of other officers began to question the propriety of the
division's efforts with respect to dissident groups-particularly the
collection of purely domestic information about United States citizens.
These expressions of concern prompted the Director of the division
to prepare a memorandum for the field officers in which he described
the dilemma this requirement posed-and the division's rationalization
for its collection of purely domestic information. That draft memo-
randum dated June 6,1971, reads in part as follows :
The second type of information concerns the activities of United States radical
groups, but does not contain any obvious foreign implications. Such information
is considered of primary interest to the FBI under its domestic security charter.
However, the division has been directed to collect both types of information,
with the emphasis on that pertaining to foreign involvement.
We also accept the second type of information when it is offered, because its
acquisition is essential to our understanding of the entire radical movement
(including the involvement of foreign governments). We do not actively solicit
this information, however, since active collection against United States citizens
is incompatible with CIA's charter. In addition, information of a purely domestic
nature is of secondary interest to our consumers in CI Staff.
We recognize that CIA's deliberate acceptance and use of such information
(even for background purposes) may seriously be questioned. Several thought-
ful . . . [division] officers in the field and in Headquarters have already voiced
uneasiness over this aspect of the case. We have concluded, however, that our
activity is logically justified in that it provides essential support to the Agency's
legitimate mission of overseas counterintelligence.
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Before the memorandum was distributed, a copy was provided for
review by Operation CHAOS personnel who objected to a written
discussion of their oral requests for this type of information. Unable
to obtain the Special Operations Group's approval of such a memo-
randum, the division informed all field officers on March 23, 1971, that
thereafter collection of information was to be "focused exclusively
upon the collection of information suggesting foreign involvement in
United States radical "activities" as well as the identification of persons
who could be enlisted by the Operation CHAOS group for penetration
of related dissident groups overseas. Field officers were instructed to
refer information or sources with information which is "purely domes-
tic in its implications" to the local FBI office and not to forward such
information to CIA headquarters.
The division's collection efforts with respect to dissidents ceased for
all practical purposes in 1973 and the case was formally closed in
August 1974. The Commission was provided access to files which, ac-
cording to the division, contain all of its reports with respect to dissi-
dents. In all, these files contain approximately 400 reports, copies of
which were furnished to the Special Operations Group. Many of the
reports merely transmit a newspaper clipping or other publication.
2. Foreign Telephone Call Information
The Commission's investigation has disclosed only one other in-
stance where the division has collected information on activities of
American citizens for use by the CIA. During 1972 and 1973, the di-
vision obtained and transmitted to other components of the Agency
certain information about telephone calls between the Western Hem-
isphere (including the United States) and two other foreign countries.
Some of the calls involved American citizens within the United States.
The information obtained by the division was limited to the names,
telephone numbers and locations of the caller and the recipient. The
contents of the calls were not indicated. Shortly after the program
commenced, the Office of the General Counsel issued a brief memo-
randum stating that receipt of this information did not appear to vio-
late applicable statutory provisions.
The Commission could not determine any specific purpose for the
initiation or continuance of the program. Although the Agency con-
tends that no use was ever made of the data, a March 25, 1972, memo-
randum indicates that the names of the Americans participating in
such calls were at least checked against other CIA records to deter-
mine if they were of "possible operational interest." The memorandum
states :
A review of the parties in the United States involved in these calls discloses
that those of possible operational interest are primarily in the CHAOS field,
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i.e., persons connected with such groups as Black Panthers, Revolutionary
Union, Committee for Concerned Asian Scholars, Committee for a New China
Policy, etc.
Collection of this material by the division was terminated in May
1973, and the CIA claims that all information obtained by the Agency
has been destroyed.
The Commission has discovered no other evidence that the division
attempts to collect intelligence information with respect to United
States citizens or their activities, through surveillance or otherwise.
However, such information is occasionally reported to field officers in
the course of normal collection activities. For example, established
sources or one of numerous "call-ins" periodically report the identities
of United States citizens allegedly involved in espionage, drug traf-
ficking or other criminal activity. Written regulations require that
the source or a report of the information be promptly referred to the
FBI, or other appropriate law enforcement agency. No further action
is taken by the division or other components of CIA. Nor is a copy of
the information retained in Agency files unless directly related to the
function of the Office of Security, in which case it is transmitted to
that Office.
Conclusions
The CIA's efforts to collect foreign intelligence from residents of
the United States willing to assist CIA are a valid and necessary ele-
ment of its responsibility. Not only do these persons provide a large
reservoir of foreign intelligence; they are by far the most accessible
source of such information.
The division's files on American citizens and firms representing ac-
tual or potential sources of information constitute a necessary part of
its legitimate intelligence activities. They do not appear to be vehicles
for the collection or communication of derogatory, embarrassing or
sensitive information about American citizens.
The division's efforts, with few exceptions, have been confined to
legitimate topics. The collection of information with respect to Amer-
ican dissident groups exceeded legitimate foreign intelligence collec-
tion and was beyond the proper scope of CIA activity. This impro-
priety was recognized in some of the division's own internal memo-
randa.
The Commission was unable to discover any specific purpose for the
collection of telephone toll call information, or any use of that informa-
tion by the Agency. In the absence of a valid purpose, such collection
is improper.
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B. Provision and Control of Cover for CIA Personnel
Many CIA activities-like those of every foreign intelligence serv-
ice-are clandestine in nature. Involved CIA personnel cannot travel,
live, or perform their duties openly as CIA employees. Even in coun-
tries where the CIA works closely with cooperative foreign intelligence
services, Agency personnel are often required by their hosts to conceal
their CIA status.
Accordingly, virtually all CIA personnel serving abroad and many
of the Agency's professional personnel in the United States assume a
"cover." Their employment by the CIA is disguised and, to persons
other than their families and coworkers, they are held out as employees
of another government agency or of a commercial enterprise.
Cover arrangements frequently have substantial domestic aspects.
These include the participation of other United States government
agencies, business firms, and private citizens and creation and man-
agement of a variety of domestic commercial entities. Most CIA em-
ployees in need of cover are assigned "official cover" with another
component of the federal government pursuant to formal agreements
between the CIA and the "covering" departments or agencies. Where
official cover is unavailable or otherwise inappropriate, CIA officers or
contract employees are assigned "nonofficial" cover, which usually
consists of an ostensible position with CIA-created and controlled
business entities known as "proprietary companies" or "devised facili-
ties." On occasion, nonofficial cover is provided for a CIA officer by a
bona fide privately owned American business firm.
So-called "proprietary companies" and "devised facilities" are legal-
ly constituted corporations, partnerships, -or sole proprietorships,
owned by the Agency and operf tied by CIA personnel or contract
employees.
Proprietary companies generally are commercial entities with actual
assets. These not only provide cover for employees but also for activities
or operations required to be performedby the Agency.
Devised facilities are created for cover purposes only, involve no
investment of operating funds, and engage in no substantial economic
activity.
A separate office of the Agency is charged with responsibility for
ensuring that proprietaries and devised facilities comply in all respects
with the laws of the state, county, or other jurisdiction under which
they are organized.
The CIA utilizes the services of United States citizens with security
clearances who are willing to assist with the necessary paperwork
and serve as officers and directors of proprietaries and devised facili-
ties. Citizens rendering professional services are paid their ordinary
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fees, and all cooperating citizens are fully aware that their assist-
ance is being rendered to the CIA.
Other than administrative activities necessary to maintain cover
and the activities of the operating proprietaries discussed below,
United States commercial entities formed by the Agency engage in
no significant domestic activities. They do not engage in any meaning-
ful economic activity in competition with privately-owned United
States firms. Most CIA officers under nonofficial cover are stationed
abroad.
Another aspect of the Agency's cover activities involves arrange-
ments by which activities of the Agency are attributed to some com-
mercial entity wholly unrelated to the Agency. Activities of this kind
are funded and carried out in the same manner as many other Agency
activities, and a high degree of security is maintained. The Commis-
sion's investigation in this area has disclosed no improper activities
by the Agency.'
The functions of the office responsible for all CIA cover arrange-
ments were substantially enlarged in 1973, in order to provide effective
centralized control and supervision. That office operates pursuant to
written regulations which restrict the use of certain agencies, depart-
ments or other organizations for operational purposes; these restric-
tions are applied also to the use of those organizations for "cover"
purposes.
Among other restrictions are prohibitions on "cover" arrangements
with the FBI, Secret Service, Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA), state and local police and other law enforcement bodies.
The Agency also is bound by restrictions on the operational use of
members of ACTION, Fulbright Scholars and employees of certain
foundations and of private detective agencies. The Agency interprets
these as generally prohibiting the use of foundations and charitable
and student organizations. In addition, approval of the Deputy Di-
rector for Operations is required for the use of certain other categories
of individuals deemed sensitive.
One salutary effect of the recent enlargement of responsibilities has
been the centralization and tightening of control over the issuance and
use of alias documentation of the type provided by the Agency to
1 Among the suspected cover operations investigated by the Commission was the alleged
operation by the Agency of the vessel, Glomar Explorer. A number of allegations have been
published concerning this matter, including allegations of possible violations of Federal
securities and tax laws. Since these matters are currently under investigation by appropri-
ate regulatory bodies, the Commission has not investigated them.
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E. Howard Hunt. Use of U.S. alias documentation, such as driver's
licenses and credit cards, has been severely limited and requires ap-
proval of senior officers under the overall control of the Agency.
Alias documentation may be issued to other agencies only with ap-
proval of the Deputy Director of Operations. All such documentation
must be accounted for every six months.
In 1969 the statement of functions of the office responsible for cover
arrangements was revised to eliminate the authority, formerly held, to
use charitable organizations and individuals for inserting funds into
organizations and programs supported by the Agency.
Finally, the occasional provision of cover to other agencies has been
terminated.
Growing public familiarity with the Agency's use of cover has led
to a tendency to identify many government and some private activities
with the CIA-frequently without justification.
This has had an unfortunate tendency to impair the usefulness of
some non-Agency related government activities. In addition, it has
progressively tended to narrow available cover arrangements for the
Agency.
Conclusions
CIA's cover arrangements are essential to the CIA's performance
of its foreign intelligence mission. The investigation has disclosed no
instances in which domestic aspects of the CIA's cover arrangements
involved any violations of law.
By definition, however, cover necessitates an element of deception
which must be practiced within the United States as well as within
foreign countries. This creates a risk of conflict with various regu-
latory statutes and other legal requirements. The Agency recognizes
this risk. It has installed controls under which cover arrangements
are closely supervised to attempt to ensure compliance with applicable
laws.
C. Operating Proprietary Companies
In addition to the proprietary companies created solely to provide
cover for individual CIA officers, CIA has used proprietary com-
panies for a variety of operational purposes. These include "cover"
and support for covert operations and the performance of adminis-
trative tasks without attribution to the Agency.
It has been charged that certain of these Agency-owned business
entities have used government funds to engage in large-scale com-
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mercial operations, often in competition with American private enter-
prise. There was a limited factual basis for these allegations in the
past, but the investigation has disclosed that the Agency has liquidated
or sold most of its large operating proprietaries. The remainder en-
gage in activities of limited economic significance, providing little if
any competition to private enterprise.
By far the largest part of the Agency's proprietary activity consisted
of a complex of aviation companies, including Air America, Southern
Air Transport, and Intermountain Aviation, Inc. These companies,
which at one time owned assets in excess of $50 million, provided
operational and logistic support as well as "cover" for the Agency's
foreign covert operations, primarily in Southeast Asia.
The investigation has disclosed that some of the services provided
by the air proprietaries were competitive with services of privately
owned firms, both at home and abroad. However, most of the aviation
companies have been liquidated or sold and the rest are expected to
be disposed of shortly. This will end the Agency's commercial involve-
ment in the aviation field. Proceeds of these liquidations and sales
are not used by the Agency; they are returned to the United States
Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.
Another major proprietary activity consisted of the operation of
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which beamed broadcasts to
Eastern Europe. These stations, originally owned and operated by
the CIA, provided both facilities and "cover" for the CIA's educa-
tional and cultural activities.
Although these stations were funded by the CIA, they appealed
for contributions to the public without disclosing their CIA connection.
However, ownership and control of these stations was turned over
to the State Department, which operates them today without conceal-
ing the government connection.
The major remaining proprietary activity of the Agency involves
a complex of financial companies. These companies enable the Agency
to administer certain sensitive trusts, annuities, escrows, insurance
arrangements, and other benefits and payments provided to officers
or contract employees without attribution to the CIA. Their assets
presently total approximately $20 million, but the financial holdings
of the companies are being reduced.
Most of these funds are invested abroad in time deposits and other
interest-bearing securities. Less than 5 percent of these funds are
invested in securities publicly traded in the United States, but these
investments are being liquidated and the proceeds returned to the
Treasury. At no time has one or any combination of these companies
owned a controlling interest in any firm with publicly traded securi-
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ties. The investigation has disclosed no evidence of any violations of
law by the CIA in connection with the making or management of
these investments.
The Agency continues to maintain a limited number of small pro-
prietaries as well. Their purpose is primarily to provide cover for
the activities of certain officers, agents, and contractors and to make
nonattributable, purchases of equipment and services. These compa-
nies are distinct from the so-called devised facilities in that they are
engaged in actual commercial or professional activities, although of
modest proportions. Generally, they have fewer than 10 employees.
The Agency also provides small amounts of subsidies and opera-
tional investments to firins engaged in activities abroad useful to its
missions.
With few exceptions, the CIA's operating proprietaries have been
unprofitable and have required continuing budgetary support. Reve-
nues derived from operations have been offset against operating
costs. Only two proprietaries are reported to have generated signifi-
cant profits : Air America in the performance of United States gov-
ermnent contracts in Southeast Asia, and several of the financial
companies in return on investment. In both cases, profits were, in
the past, retained for use by the proprietary companies pursuant to
the General Counsel's opinion that these funds need not be returned
to the Treasury.
The creation, operation and liquidation of operating proprietaries
is closely controlled by high Agency officials. All such projects must
have the approval of the Deputy Director of Operations or his assist-
ant. Sensitive or substantial cases must be approved by the Director
of Central Intelligence. Each requires an administrative plan which
must have the concurrence of the Deputy Director of Operations,
the Office of General Counsel, the Office of Finance and certain other
senior officers. Expenditures or reimbursements must be approved by
responsible senior operating and finance officers. All projects are sub-
ject to annual review as a part of the budget process and regular
audits are made.
A related activity of the Agency has been to support foundations,
principally the Asia Foundation, which also served as both a vehicle
and cover for educational and cultural activities abroad. The Agency's
connection with that foundation has been terminated.
The Agency in the past has also provided a lesser measure of sup-
port to other foundations and associations thought to be helpful to
its mission. A prime example was the National Student Association,
which sponsored American students who participated in international
meetings and activities. Until 1967, when Ramparts magazine re-
vealed the fact, CIA offered some support to that activity. A resulting
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report by a committee under then Deputy Attorney General Nicholas
DeB. Katzenbach led to directions to CIA to terminate support of
American foundations and voluntary associations. So far as the Com-
mission has been able to determine, the Agency has complied.
Conclusions
Except as discussed in connection with the Office of Security (see
Chapters 12 and 13), the Commission has found no evidence that any
proprietaries have been used for operations against American citizens
or investigation of their activities. All of them appear to be subject
to close supervision and multiple financial controls within the Agency.
D. Development of Contacts With Foreign
Nationals
Another significant domestic activity of the CIA consists of efforts
to develop contacts with foreign nationals who are temporarily within
the United States. This activity is within the United States, and its
primary purpose is to develop sources of information. As far as the
Commission can determine, coercive methods, such as blackmail or
compromise, have not been used.
The CIA enlists the voluntary assistance of American citizens in
its efforts to meet and develop contacts with foreign nationals. These
citizens are not compensated for their services, but may be reimbursed
for any expenses they incur. They are fully aware that they are assist-
ing or contributing information to the CIA. At all times, they are free
to refuse or terminate their cooperation.
Prior to requesting the aid of an American citizen in this manner,
the Agency occasionally obtains a name check through its Office of
Security, but does not otherwise investigate such persons. In most
cases it will maintain a file on such an individual containing biographi-
cal information and a brief history of the person's cooperation with
the division. No records are kept by this division with respect to
persons who decline to assist the Agency.
Under a written agreement with the FBI, any information of an
internal security or counterintelligence nature which comes to the
division's attention in the course of these activities is immediately re-
ferred to the Bureau.
The Commission's investigation has disclosed no evidence that the
division in question has been used to collect information about Amer-
ican citizens or their activities at home or abroad.
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Until recently, the Agency component with responsibility for de-
veloping contacts with foreign nationals was known as the Do-
mestic Operations Division. The Commission has made an investiga-
tion of recent press allegations that, during the late 1960's, the New
York office of the Domestic Operations Division conducted covert
activities against emigre and dissident groups, including wiretapping,
break-ins, surveillance, infiltration and preparation of psychological
profiles. The investigation has disclosed no evidence to support these
allegations nor any evidence that the division engaged in such activi-
ties elsewhere.
Conclusions
These activities appear to be directed entirely to the production
of foreign intelligence and to be within the authority of the CIA. We
found no evidence that any of these activities have been directed
against American citizens.
E. Assistance in Narcotics Control
Through the Directorate of Operations, CIA provides foreign in-
telligence support to the government's effort to control the flow of
narcotics and other dangerous drugs into this country.
Inasmuch as arrest and prosecution of traffickers, including Ameri-
can citizens, is a necessary element of narcotics control, concern has
been expressed that CIA's participation in the control effort involves
the Agency in domestic enforcement activities expressly excluded
from the CIA's authority.
The Commission's investigation has disclosed that the CIA has at-
tempted to insure that it does not thus become involved in the exercise
of police or law enforcement powers or in other activities directed
against American citizens, either within the United States or overseas.
CIA's involvement in the narcotics field began in October 1969
with President Nixon's formation of the White House Task Force on
Narcotics Control. The Task Force was given the mission of formu-
lating and implementing a program to stem the increasing flow of
heroin and opium into the United States. The Director of Central
Intelligence was appointed to the Task Force and CIA was requested
to use its existing intelligence gathering apparatus-to the maxi-
mum extent possible-to provide narcotics-related intelligence to other
agencies who in turn were involved in diplomatic, enforcement and
treatment initiatives coordinated by the Task Force.
In September 1971, President Nixon elevated narcotics control to a
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higher priority, establishing the Cabinet Committee on International
Narcotics Control (CCINC) to succeed the Task Force. The CCINC
was charged with responsibility for properly coordinating all United
States diplomatic, intelligence and enforcement activities aimed at
curtailing the flow of illegal narcotics and dangerous drugs into the
country. The Director of Central Intelligence was appointed as a mem-
ber, and the Agency was promptly delegated responsibility for coordi-
nating all United States clandestine foreign intelligence gathering
with respect to narcotics.
In addition to coordinating clandestine collection, the CIA provided
the other components of the CCINC with a wide range of foreign intel-
ligence information directed at two basic objectives :
To convince foreign nations to curtail production and trafficking ; and
To provide foreign and domestic law enforcement agencies with the
identities and methods of operation of the major foreign drug traffickers.
To this end, the CIA cooperated with the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration in the establishment of the Major International Narcotics
Traffickers (MINT) Register, a list of major foreign traffickers, and
a related system for collating intelligence information about them.
The Commission's investigation disclosed that, from the outset of
the Agency's involvement in the narcotics control program, the Direc-
tor and other CIA officials instructed involved personnel to collect
only foreign intelligence and to make no attempt-either -within the
United States or abroad-to gather information on American citizens
allegedly trafficking in narcotics.
These instructions appear to have been respected. Indeed, at CIA
insistence, the names of American citizens are excluded from the
MINT Register. However, the identities of Americans allegedly
trafficking in narcotics or information with domestic law enforcement
implications is unavoidably obtained by CIA in the course of its
foreign intelligence activities. The Agency has established written
procedures for the prompt dissemination of this information to the
appropriate law enforcement agencies at the local level. The informa-
tion is not retained in CIA files.
For a period of approximately six months, commencing in the fall
of 1973, the Directorate monitored telephone conversations between
the United States and Latin America in an effort to identify foreign
drug traffickers.
The intercept was undertaken at the request of the National Secu-
rity Agency and was not conducted by the CIA component with re-
sponsibility for narcotics intelligence collection.
A CIA intercept crew stationed at an East Coast site monitored
calls to and from certain Latin American telephone numbers con-
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tamed on a "watch-list" provided by NSA. Magnetic tapes of nar-
cotics-related conversations were then furnished to NSA. While the
intercept was focused on foreign nationals, it is clear that American
citizens were parties to many of the monitored calls.
The General Counsel of CIA was not consulted until approxi-
mately three months after the program was commenced. He promptly
issued an opinion that CIA's conducting the monitoring program
was illegal, and the program was immediately terminated.
All of the CIA's clandestine collection with respect to narcotics is
conducted overseas. A limited amount of overt collection of this in-
formation is conducted within the United States, focusing primarily on
economic, agricultural and scientific information, most of which is
obtained from legal drug manufacturers.
In addition to the gathering of foreign intelligence, the CIA has
provided a limited amount of technical or other operational assist-
ance to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). On frequent
occasions, and in response to requests from this agency, the CIA
has provided various types of electronic and photographic equipment,
alias documentation, and loans of "flash money" for use by enforce-
ment agents to establish bona fides with narcotics dealers. The CIA has
also conducted a very limited number of training sessions for federal
narcotics agents covering such subjects as the use of intelligence and
operational techniques for clandestine collection.
The Agency has adopted and apparently adhered to strict controls
on the rendering of technical assistance or issuance of alias documenta-
tion to DEA. Such materials are issued only for use in investigation
of illicit narcotics activities overseas, and DEA is required to con-
form to all CIA regulations governing requests for and use of such
items. All requests for alias documentation must be approved by the
Deputy Director for Operations and both DEA headquarters and the
user of the documents must sign receipts. The CIA requires that both
equipment and alias documentation be promptly returned. In most
cases, DEA requests for assistance have been made and honored over-
seas where DEA has lacked the necessary facilities and technical ex-
pertise. The number of these requests has decreased sharply as DEA
has developed its own technical capabilities.
Conclusions
Concerns that the CIA's narcotics-related intelligence activities
may involve the Agency in law enforcement or other actions directed
against American citizens appear unwarranted.
The monitoring of telephone calls, while a source of valuable in-
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formation for enforcement officials, was a violation of a statute of the
United States. The fact that before the operation was halted it was con-
ducted for over three months without the knowledge of the Office of
the General Counsel demonstrates the need for improved internal
consultation. (See Recommendation 10).
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Chapter 16
Domestic Activities of the Directorate
of Science and Technology
In the past two decades, the CIA has placed increasing emphasis
upon gathering foreign intelligence through technical and scientific
means.
In 1963, Director John McCone sought to coordinate the scientific
development of intelligence devices and systems by creating the
Science and Technology Directorate within the CIA. Most of the
scientific and technological endeavors had been previously under-
taken by the Plans (now Operations) Directorate.
The Science and Technology Directorate is presently responsible
for all of the research and development engaged in by the CIA in
all fields of science and technology. Projects range from complex
satellite systems to the development of miniature cameras and
concealed listening devices.
The Directorate also is engaged in developing countermeasures to
neutralize new scientific and technological devices developed by for-
eign intelligence services.
Private industry provides much of the research and development
of new intelligence gathering devices on a contractual basis.
In addition to engaging in research and development, some branches
of the Science and Technology Directorate provide operational sup-
port in the field for use of intelligence gathering devices developed by
the Directorate.
Other branches of the Directorate themselves engage in the task
of foreign intelligence-gathering abroad, utilizing technical intel-
ligence gathering devices not developed for use by operations agents.
The Commission investigated a number of projects of the Science and
Technology Directorate which have affected persons living within
the United States.
Most such activities were lawful and proper, although there have
been scattered improprieties described below.
(225)
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A. The Testing of Scientific and Technological Develop.
ments Within the United States
While the research and development of new CIA scientific and
technical devices is naturally undertaken within the United States,
the evidence before this Commission shows that with a few excep-
tions, the actual devices and systems developed have not been used
operationally within this country.
However, the Agency has tested some of its new scientific and
technological developments in the United States. One such program
included the testing of certain behavior-influencing drugs. Several
others involved the testing of equipment for monitoring conversations.
In all of the programs described, some tests were directed against un-
suspecting subjects, most of whom were U.S. citizens.
1. The Testing of Behavior-Influencing Drugs on Unsuspecting
Subjects Within the United States
In the late 1940's, the CIA began to study the properties of certain
behavior-influencing drugs (such as LSD) and how such drugs might
'be put to intelligence use. This interest was prompted by reports that
the Soviet Union was experimenting with such drugs and by specu-
lation that the confessions introduced during trials in the Soviet
Union and other Soviet Bloc countries during the late 1940's might
have been elicited by the use of drugs or hypnosis. Great concern
over Soviet and North Korean techniques in "brainwashing" con-
tinued to be manifested into the early 1950's.
The drug program was part of a much larger CIA program to
study possible means for controlling human behavior. Other studies
explored the effects of radiation, electric-shock, psychology, psychi-
atry, sociology and harassment substances.
The primary purpose of the drug program was to counter the use
of behavior-influencing drugs clandestinely administered by an
enemy, although several operational' uses outside the United States
were also considered.
Unfortunately, only limited records of the testing conducted in
these drug programs are now available. All the records concerning
the program were ordered destroyed in 1973, including a total of
152 separate files.
In addition, all persons directly involved in the early phases of
the program were either out of the country and not available for
i A few audio-surveillance devices developed by the Science and Technology Directorate
have been used by the office of Security in the course of investigations of persons within the
United States. In addition, several devices developed by the Agency have been used by other
federal agencies in operations conducted within the United States.
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interview, or were decreased. Nevertheless, the Commission learned
some of the details surrounding several tests of LSD conducted on
unsuspecting subjects between 1953 and 1963.
The possibility, and the importance, of testing potential behavior-
influencing drugs (including LSD) on human subjects was first sug-
gested in 1953. It was also suggested at that time that Agency train-
ees might be utilized as test subjects. Any such testing was to be
carefully supervised and conducted only in the presence of a quali-
fied physician.
Following laboratory testing of LSD and other potential behavior-
influencing substances, a few tests were run on voluntary participants.
Commencing in 1955, under an informal arrangement with the Fed-
eral Bureau of Drug Abuse Control, tests were begun on unsuspecting
subjects in normal social situations. Testing was originally con-
ducted on the West Coast. In 1961, a similar testing program was
initiated on the East Coast.
In 1963, the Agency's Inspector General learned of this program
and questioned the propriety of testing on unsuspecting subjects: The
Inspector General reported that in a number of instances, test sub-
jects became ill for hours or days following the application of a
drug. There was one reported incident of hospitalization, the details
of which could not be learned by the Commission because of the de-
struction of the records and the unavailability of witnesses.
The Commission did learn, however, that on one occasion during
the early phases of this program (in 1953), LSD was administered
to an employee of the Department of the Army without his knowl-
edge while he was attending a meeting with CIA personnel work-
ing on the drug project.
Prior to receiving the LSD, the subject had participated in discus-
sions where the testing of such substances on unsuspecting subjects was
agreed to in principle. However, this individual was not made aware
that he had been given LSD until about 20 minutes after it had been
administered. He developed serious side effects and was sent to New
York with a CIA escort for psychiatric treatment. Several days later,
he jumped from a tenth floor window of his room and died as a
result.2
The General Counsel ruled that the death resulted from "circum-
stances arising out of an experiment undertaken in the course of his
official duties for the United States Government," thus ensuring his
survivors of receiving certain death benefits. Reprimands were issued
by the Director of Central Intelligence to two CIA employees respon-
sible for the incident.
2 There are indications in the few remaining Agency records that this individual may have
had a history of emotional instability.
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As a result of the Inspector General's study of this drug program in
1963, the Agency devised new criteria for testing substances on human
subjects. All further testing of potentially dangerous substances on
unsuspecting subjects was prohibited. Between 1963 and 1967, some
testing of drugs continued, but only on voluntary subjects, primarily
inmate volunteers at various correctional institutions. In 1967, all
projects involving behavior-influencing drugs were terminated.
It is presently the policy at CIA not to test any substance on unsus-
pecting persons. Current practice in all experimentation is to adhere
strictly to Department of Health, Education and Welfare guidelines
concerning the use of human subjects, and all current CIA contracts
carry language to that effect.
2. The Testing of Communications Intercept Systems Within the
United States
Monitoring of foreign conversations is an important aspect of
modern intelligence collection. Several new systems developed
by the Agency for use overseas have been tested in the United
States. In the process of this testing, private communications, presum-
ably between United States citizens, have sometimes been overheard.
In many cases conversations were overheard but not recorded. In
other cases, conversations were recorded for evaluation purposes but
the recordings were kept only until the testing was concluded, at which
time they were destroyed.
No evidence was found that any such tests were ever directed against
persons for the purpose of learning the content of any communication.
In most instances, the speakers were never identified. Nor was any
evidence found that the Agency disseminated or ever attempted to
exploit the contents of any intercepted or recorded conversations.
3. Other Testing Within the United States
Various branches of the Science and Technology Directorate are
involved in the testing of other new devices and procedures such as
chemical warfare detection equipment, new means of measuring physi-
ological responses in humans and photographic interpretation systems.
Conclusions
It was clearly illegal to test potentially dangerous drugs on unsus-
pecting United States citizens.
The testing of equipment for monitoring conversations should
not be directed against unsuspecting persons in the United States.
Most of the testing undertaken by the Agency could easily have
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been performed using only Agency personnel and with their full
knowledge.
Recommendation (27)
In accordance with its present guidelines, the CIA should not
again engage in the testing of drugs on unsuspecting persons.
Recommendation (28)
Testing of equipment for monitoring conservations should not
involve unsuspecting persons living within the United States.
B. Other Selected Activities of the Science and
Technology Directorate
1. The Manufacture and Use of Documents
The Agency maintains a capability for producing and providing to
its agents and operatives a wide range of "alias" credentials. Most such
documents purport to be of foreign origin. Some, however, are docu-
ments ordinarily issued by other branches of the U.S. government or
by private United States businesses and organizations.
Among the United States "alias" documents furnished from time
to time to Agency personnel and operatives are Social Security cards,
bank cards, professional cards, club cards, alumni association cards
and library cards. The Agency has recently stopped producing alias
driver's licenses, credit cards and birth certificates, unless needed in
it particularly sensitive operation and approved in advance by the
Deputy Director of Operations.
While the Agency does not produce false United States passports,
it has in the past altered a few by the addition of entries to evidence
travel which had not actually occurred.
The purpose of alias documents is to facilitate cover during CIA
operations. These documents are not "backstopped," i.e., manufac-
tured with the consent and knowledge of the company or organiza-
tion whose card is being manufactured. They are useful only as flash
identification. Only the Social Security Administration has been told
that the Agency is manufacturing its cards.
The Commission found no evidence that any Agency employee has
ever used false documentation of this kind to his personal advantage.
Conclusions
Alias credentials are necessary to facilitate CIA covert operations
overseas, but the strictest controls and accountability must be main-
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tained over the use of such documents; recent guidelines established
by the Deputy Director for Operations appear adequate to prevent
abuse in the future.
2. Overhead Photography of the United States
In 1966, the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Tech-
nology commenced a formal study on the use of aerial intelligence
photography for civilian purposes. This study was commenced with
the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence and in coopera-
tion with the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, the
Agency for International Development and the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration.
In 1967 the study resulted in the establishment of a steering commit-
tee in the office of the President's Science Adviser, with membership
from the United States Geological survey, the Department of Com-
merce, the Department of Agriculture, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration and other interested civilian agencies. This
committee was designed to act as an interface, by which the intelli-
gence community could assure the public that it was not involved in
selecting or determining the end use of its aerial photographs of
domestic areas.
The Director of Central Intelligence agreed to provide photography
to civilian agencies pursuant to the steering committee's request, pro-
vided there would be no interference with intelligence needs nor any
significant cost increase.3
The photographs of the United States actually turned over to
civilian agencies were taken primarily for military mapping purposes.
Since that time, aerial photography systems have been used for
such diverse civilian projects as mapping, assessing natural disasters
such as hurricane and tornado damage and the Santa Barbara, Cali-
fornia, oil spill, conducting route surveys for the Alaska pipeline,
conducting national forest inventories, determining the extent of snow
cover in the Sierras to facilitate the forecast of runoff and detecting
crop blight in the Plains States. Limited equipment testing and per-
formance evaluation is also conducted, using photographs taken of
areas within the United States.
In 1973, the Office of the President's Science Adviser was abolished,
and the special steering committee controlling the civilian use of
aerial photography ceased to exist. Efforts are underway to establish a
new committee to undertake this activity.' In the meantime, the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence has entered into agreements with several
3 While the Agency engineered and developed most of the operational aerial photography
systems, it is no longer responsible for the operational aspects of those systems.
4 The President has recently announced his intention to reestablish the Office of the
President's Science Adviser.
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federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency,
which permits them access to classified overhead photography.
Conclusions
The Commission can find no impropriety in permitting civilian
use of aerial photography systems.5 The economy of operating a
single aerial photography program dictates the use of these photo-
graphs for appropriate civilian purposes.
Recommendation (29)
A civilian agency committee should be reestablished to oversee
the civilian uses of aerial intelligence photography in order to
avoid any concerns over the improper domestic use of a CIA-
developed system.
5 It is arguable that at least one present use of aerial photography is law enforcement
in nature and outside the scope of proper CIA activity. This use involves photography with
infrared sensors to detect areas of high concentrations of industrial pollutants in the air
and in various bodies of water. Data obtained from this activity could conceivably be used
as the basis for a criminal action brought under environmental legislation. The Commission
believes, however, that the legislators, when they prohibited the CIA from engaging in law
enforcement activities in their 1947 enactment of the National Security Act, could not have
contemplated the systems presently in use. It should be noted that the CIA did turn down
a request from the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Unit of the Treasury Department to help
locate moonshine stills in the North Carolina mountains using infrared photography, on the
ground that such activity was law enforcement in nature.
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Chapter 17
CIA Relationships with Other
Federal,State and Local Agencies
Because of its practice of occasionally lending assistance to various
federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, questions have been
raised as to whether the CIA has engaged in internal security func-
tions or exercised police or law enforcement powers contrary to the
restrictions of the National Security Act.
Like other arms of the government, the CIA frequently has occasion
either to give assistance to or receive assistance from other federal,
state and local agencies.
For example, in gathering foreign intelligence, the Agency might
gain access to information concerning international drug traffic which
would be of interest to the Drug Enforcement Administration. Or it
might receive information of interest to the FBI and the local police
concerning the security of government installations. CIA operations
touch the interests of many other agencies as well.
This Chapter will explore some of the relationships between the
CIA and other agencies over the years-in order to determine
whether the CIA has exceeded its authority in connection with those
relationships.
A. Relationships With Other Federal Agencies
1. Federal Bureau of Investigation
Many counterintelligence operations undertaken by the FBI also
have positive foreign intelligence ramifications. Likewise, legitimate
domestic CIA activities occasionally cross the path of ongoing FBI
investigations. Consequently, regular daily liaison has customarily
been maintained between the CIA and the FBI to coordinate the
activities of these two federal agencies.
As a part of such liaison, the CIA furnishes to the FBI much routine
information obtained by the CIA in the course of its legitimate foreign
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intelligence gathering activities. Included is information concerning
suspected criminal activities within the United States and information
relevant to the country's internal security. Likewise, the FBI furnishes
information to the CIA relating to foreign intelligence matters. From
time to time, the CIA and the FBI have cooperated in joint operations
touching on both agencies' areas of interest.
The relationship between the CIA and the FBI over the years has
not been uniformly satisfactory. At the policy-making level, it has
ranged from workable, at its best, to almost nonexistent at its worst.
In February 1970, following a seemingly insignificant incident in
Denver, all formal liaison between the two agencies was completely
severed by the FBI. Formal liaison at the policy level was not restored
until November 1972-though a working relationship at lower levels
was always maintained.
The Commission is informed that the relationship between the CIA
and the FBI has improved considerably in the last few years. Never-
theless, the relationship needs to be clarified and outlined in detail in
order to ensure that the needs of national security are met without
creating conflicts or gaps of jurisdiction. A better exchange of ideas
and more effort by each agency to understand the problems facing the
other are essential if the responsibilities of both agencies are to be met.
Recommendation (30)
The Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the
FBI should prepare and submit for approval by the National
Security Council a detailed agreement setting forth the jurisdic-
tion of each agency and providing for effective liaison with respect
to all matters of mutual concern. This agreement should be con-
sistent with the provisions of law and with other applicable rec-
ommendations of this Report.
2. Narcotics Law Enforcement Agencies
The CIA, through a field office in Virginia, carried on at least one
domestic operation as a cooperative effort with the Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) (now the Drug Enforcement
Administration). The operation was an attempt to help BNDD pre-
vent corruption within its ranks by developing sources of information
within the Bureau.
The operation began in late 1970 when the Director of BNDD asked
the Director of Central Intelligence for assistance in building a "coun-
terintelligence" capacity within BNDD. The request was apparently
supported by Attorney General Mitchell.
BNDD stated that it was vitally concerned that some of its em-
ployees might have been corrupted by drug traffickers. According to
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the CIA officer in charge of the Agency's field office involved, BNDD
reported that it did not have the "know-how" to set up a covert opera-
tion or to establish a counterintelligence unit. It therefore turned to
the CIA for assistance.
The CIA recruited officers for BNDD through a proprietary cor-
poration. The CIA officer in charge performed the contact and inter-
view work. He screened applicants by telling them that a corporate
client engaged in the field of law enforcement wanted people to work
as research consultants. If the applicants were interested and met the
physical requirements for -age and size, they were then subjected to
further screening. If they passed the security checks and evaluations
and were still interested, then the recruits were introduced to the
Chief of the Office of Inspections of BNDD. They then learned, for
the first time, what job was to be offered to them.
If the applicant was acceptable to BNDD, the CIA provided a short
course in clandestine trade crafts and the employee was turned over
to BNDD. The CIA relinquished all control over and contact with
the employee once he entered upon his duties with BNDD.
The CIA recruited a total of 19 agents for BNDD in the period
between December 1970 and July 1973, when Director Colby termi-
nated the CIA's participation.
In addition to recruiting an internal security unit for BNDD, the
CIA also assigned two of its agents, working under cover of a com-
mercial corporation, to operate for BNDD between January 1972 and
the termination of the project in July 1973. They were directed by
BNDD and were not under the operational control of the CIA. The
CIA did, however, provide for the salary and administrative require-
ments of the agents, for which the CIA was reimbursed by BNDD.
These activities violated the 1947 Act which prohibits the CIA's
participation in law enforcement activities. The Commission there-
fore concludes that Director Colby was correct in his written directive
terminating the project. The Director and the Inspector General
should be alert to prevent involvement of the Agency in similar enter-
prises in the future.
3. The Department of State
For over 20 years, the CIA conducted -a training school for foreign
police and security officers. The school, operated within the United
States under cover of a private commercial corporation, trained for-
eign police in highly specialized arteas of law enforcement. The CIA
school offered training in fingerprinting, security, criminal investiga-
tion, instruction methods and patrol operations, among others.
The Agency training operation began in 1952 with courses taught
in the United States for foreign security personnel. The school was
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not very extensive in nature and operated out of a farmhouse in
Virginia.
In addition, in 1960 the State Department, operating in coopera-
tion with the CIA, opened a school in the Panama Canal Zone for
Latin American police officers. The CIA supplied the faculty while
the other costs of the school were borne by the State Department and
the Agency for International Development's Office of Public Safety.
The school concentrated on teaching security methods and modern
techniques of crime solving.
In 1963, the State Department closed its Canal Zone police training
school, and the activities carried on there were transferred to the
United States. A commercial contractual arrangement for the training
service was established with a domestic private corporation which was
a CIA front. The relationship between the CIA and the private cor-
poration was unknown to the Administrator of the AID, although
the person in charge of the Office of Public Safety apparently knew
he was dealing with a CIA proprietary. The school was shut down
and the cover corporation disbanded in 1973.
In addition to operating the foreign police school, the CIA provided
the faculty for special courses on countermeasures against terrorists-
also in cooperation with the AID Office of Public 'Safety. During the
20-year period of its operation of the police training school and par-
ticipation in the special courses, the CIA graduated a total of about
5,000 foreign student police officers.
The CIA proprietary corporation was also a licensed firearms and
police equipment dealer. The records of the corporation show that its
gross sales of police equipment to foreign police officers and police de-
partments varied from between a low of about $6,000 in one year to a
high of $48,000 in another year. Most of the sales, according to the
CIA officer in charge of the program, were to the students enrolled in
the course who purchased police equipment upon completing their
training.
The Commission has concluded that providing educational programs
for foreign police was not improper under the Agency's statute. Al-
though the schools were conducted within the United States through a
CIA proprietary, they had no other significant domestic impact.
Engaging in the firearms business was a questionable activity for a
government intelligence agency. It should not be repeated.
4. Funding Requests from Other Federal Agencies
On at least one occasion, the CIA was requested to fund a project
having no intelligence relationship, apparently because its inclusion
in the CIA's secret budget provided an opportunity to hide the
expenditures.
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In the spring of 1970, the CIA was requested by members of the
White House staff to contribute funds for payment of stationery and
postage for replies to persons who wrote President Nixon after he ini-
tiated the invasion of Cambodia. Although CIA officials at first ex-
pressed reluctance to use CIA funds for this purpose, the Agency
eventually forwarded two checks totaling $33,655.68 to the White
House to reimburse its costs. Because of the unique CIA budgetary
scheme, no one other than the CIA's internal Audit Staff ever re-
viewed this unusual expenditure.
This use of CIA funds for a purpose unrelated to intelligence is im-
proper. Steps should be taken to ensure against repetition of this
incident.
B. State and Local Police
The primary point of contact between the CIA and state and local
law enforcement agencies is, and historically has been, through the
Office of Security. Personnel security matters, such as the arrest of
Agency employees for criminal offenses, the involvement of employees
in automobile accidents, and police assistance requested by employees
to resolve such personal problems as burglaries of their belongings,
provide the most frequent reasons for CIA dealings with police
agencies.
The Agency's closest contacts have been with police departments in
the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area-particularly with the Wash-
ington Metropolitan Police Department, because of the wide range of
CIA activities carried on in Washington-and the Fairfax County,
Virginia, Police Department, because of the physical presence of
CIA Headquarters within that county. Liaison with other surrounding
suburban police departments has been maintained to a lesser extent.
Morever, CIA historically has maintained limited contacts with a
large number of state and local police departments throughout the
country, some on an ad hoc basis and others on a continuing basis.
In addition to its ordinary liaison activities, the CIA has on occasion
provided other assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies.
It has also received significant assistance from such agencies. The
following are examples.
1. Assistance Given to State and Local Police
Since 1966, the Office of Security has conducted or arranged for a
number of briefings, demonstrations, seminars and training courses
for representatives of various police departments throughout the
United States. These sessions were generally conducted at facilities
operated by the Agency in the Washington, D.C., area. Most of the
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courses lasted a day or two and covered such subjects as declassifica-
tion of materials, foreign weapons, counter-audio measures, explo-
sive devices and detection techniques, basic theories of intelligence
and clandestine collection methodology. However, one course in lock-
picking, photography (including covert photography, telephotog-
raphy and photoanalysis) and positive surveillance (both physical
and audio) lasted approximately three weeks. This course was given
on at least four separate occasions in 1968 and 1969.
Director Helms supported and approved all of these training pro-
grams. All, however, were terminated in 1973 upon the passage of an
amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, which
prohibits CIA assistance to the Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
ministration and evidences congressional disapproval of direct CIA
assistance to state and local police departments in general.
Since its inception, the CIA has had a policy against providing
assistance in the form of Agency personnel to state and local law en-
forcement agencies for police-related activities. However, there have
been some deviations from that general rule.
On at least three occasions between 1969 and 1971,1 the Office of
Security provided several men and radio-equipped vehicles to the
Washington Metropolitan Police Department to assist the police in
monitoring crowds during anti-war demonstrations. Such assistance
was rendered at the request of an officer of the police department.
In December of 1970, CIA was asked to provide (and did provide)
an Arabic interpreter to the Fairfax County Police Department in
connection with a homicide investigation. In addition to interpreting,
this CIA officer agreed to assist in the actual investigation by pretend-
ing to'be another police officer in the hope that he might overhear con-
versations in Arabic carried on by prospective witnesses being con-
fronted by the police. He was provided police identification, including
a badge and service revolver, to aid in this investigation.
In 1972, the CIA assisted the Washington Metropolitan Police De-
partment on an actual police surveillance. In the course of a surveil-
lance training exercise for Metropolitan Police personnel, a police in-
former suspected by the Washington police of having engaged in
improper activities was surveilled without her knowledge. Nine CIA
agents and six Agency automobiles were utilized in the operation.
The Commission has discovered no other instances where the CIA
has provided manpower to any state or local police departments to
assist in operations which were of a law-enforcement nature.
The Office of Security has sometimes loaned electronics gear and
other equipment (including photographic and riot control equipment)
I The 1969 Presidential Inauguration, the anti-war moratorium demonstrations in No-
vember 1969, and the 1971 May Day Demonstrations.
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to police departments for training or for use in police operations. In
addition, the CIA has, on at least one occasion, assisted local police in
installing an electronic listening device for use in an actual police oper-
ation. Once in the late 1960's, small quantities of explosives were given
to the Fairfax County Police Department for use in training dogs to
locate explosives.
Other miscellaneous assistance rendered by the CIA to state and local
law enforcement agencies includes providing police with technical
advice, alias documentation, laboratory assistance, and access to certain
CIA facilities for highly sensitive police operations. Further details
appear in Appendix VII.
2. Assistance Received from State and Local Police
The CIA receives a great deal of routine assistance from state and
local law enforcement agencies, primarily from police departments in
the Washington metropolitan area. Examples of such assistance in-
clude name checks to determine whether CIA applicants for employ-
ment have criminal records, checks to determine the registered owners
of vehicles with known license tags, forwarding information concern-
ing planned activities or demonstrations directed against CIA facili-
ties, and providing police protection for CIA facilities located within
a local police department's jurisdiction. The CIA has received this
type of assistance for many years. It is generally the same assistance
that state and local police give to all government agencies.
Because of the extraordinary security precautions exercised by the
CIA, it has also made arrangements with state and local police, in all
areas of the country where it maintains facilities, to be notified of the
arrest of any CIA employee. The CIA uses this information only for
preventing breaches of security ; there is no evidence suggesting that
CIA has ever attempted to intervene in a police investigation con-
cerning one of its own employees.
Only one instance has been discovered where local police actively
participated in a CIA operation. In 1971, three police officers from
the Fairfax City Police Department accompanied Office of Security
personnel while they surreptitiously entered a business establishment
in Fairfax, at night, without a warrant, to photograph some papers.
(This investigation is among those discussed in Chapter 13.)
The CIA has sometimes received permission from local police au-
thorities to use their facilities or personnel in activities not related to
actual CIA operations. For example, between 1951 and 1955, the CIA
received some assistance-in the form of manpower-from a number
of state police departments. Since the CIA was rapidly expanding at
that time, and since it was therefore unable to conduct all of the neces-
sary security background investigations of prospective CIA personnel,
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the police from several states agreed to conduct these investigations for
the Agency. The state police forces of Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio and
Washington conducted approximately 341 investigations during this
period.
In 1969, arrangements were made with the Washington Metro-
politan Police Department to allow the CIA to conduct certain train-
ing exercises using police facilities and personnel. These exercises in-
volved the contrived "arrest" of CIA trainees by a Washington police
officer and the lengthy interrogation of those trainees at Washington
Police Headquarters by Office of Security personnel. The object of the
training was to determine whether CIA trainees, scheduled for covert
assignments overseas, would "break" when placed under such pres-
sures-and to give them experiences similar to those which they might
be expected to encounter on their assignments.
Approximately four such training exercises-each involving four
or five trainees-were conducted through 1974. On at least one occa-
sion several years ago, a similar training exercise was conducted in
cooperation with the Fairfax County Police Department.
The CIA has occasionally obtained badges and other identification
from local police for the purpose of maintaining cover during CIA
operations. Such "cover" has been obtained from police departments
in Washington, D.C., Fairfax County (Virginia), and New York
City, among others. The evidence before this Commission has shown
that the CIA's use of "police cover" has been extremely limited, and
we have found no evidence of abuse. (For more detail, see Appendix
VII.)
Except for the one occasion when some local police assisted the
CIA in an unauthorized entry, the assistance received by the CIA
from state and local law enforcement authorities was proper.
The use of police identification as a means of providing cover, while
not strictly speaking a violation of the Agency's statutory authority
as long as no police function is performed, is a practice subject to
misunderstanding and should be avoided.
3. Gifts and Gratuities Given to Local Police Officials
For several years, it has been the practice of the Office of Security
to offer gratuities to police officials who have been of particular as-
sistance to the CIA. Gratuities have ranged from candy, liquor and
twenty-five dollar gift certificates at Christmas, to providing free
transportation for vacationing police officials at costs up to eight hun-
dred dollars.
In 1971 the Office of Security made a gift to the police department
of Lewes, Delaware, of some radios, flashlights, mace, ammunition
and other items in recognition of police assistance to Director Helms,
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a summer resident of Lewes, whose life was believed to be in danger at
the time. In addition, the Office has on several occasions given retire-
ment gifts to local police officials who have been particularly helpful
to the Agency. On several occasions, police officials have been flown
to a CIA training facility in southern Virginia for an all expenses
paid weekend of relaxation and entertainment.
Most of the gifts and gratuities given to local police officials by the
Office of Security were paid for out of a confidential fund made avail-
able to the Director of Security for his own miscellaneous use. Ex-
penditures from this fund did not require the approval of any higher
authority.
The primary purpose of such "courtesies" to officials of state and
local police departments was to recognize the cooperation which those
officials or their departments had given the CIA. There is no evidence
that any gratuities given to local police officials and paid for out of
CIA funds were conditioned upon the recipient's providing the Of-
fice of Security with any particular assistance.
Conclusions
In general, the coordination and cooperation between state and local
law enforcement agencies and the CIA (primarily the Office of Secu-
rity) has been excellent. Both the Agency and local police officials
have given assistance to each other in a spirit of cooperation based
upon a desire to facilitate their respective legitimate aims and goals.
Most of the assistance rendered to state and local law enforcement
agencies by the CIA has been no more than an effort to share with
law enforcement authorities the benefits of new methods, techniques
and equipment developed or used by the Agency. In compliance with
the spirit of a recent act of Congress, the CIA, in 1973, terminated
all but routine assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies.
In view of these recent statutory changes, assistance is now being
provided to state and local agencies by the FBI. There is no impro-
priety in the CIA's furnishing information concerning new techniques
and developments to the FBI.
On a few occasions, the Agency has allowed its employees to become
involved in actual police investigations. In spite of these lapses, how-
ever, the Agency has generally been careful to avoid operations which
might be considered police or law enforcement activities.
The assistance received by the CIA from state and local law en-
forcenment authorities did not involve the Agency in any improprieties.
However, any practice of giving gratuities to cooperative police
officials should be terminated.
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Chapter 18
Indices and Files on American
Citizens
The collection of information about people is a major function of
the CIA. Biographical information is collected not only in response
to specific requirements but also to accumulate background of likely
relevance to be drawn on when needed. The collection of this informa-
tion is incidental to the CIA's normal activities, and the inclusion of
information about persons who may be American citizens is largely
incidental to collecting information about people generally.
For these reasons, biographical information is stored by a number
of components throughout the Agency. The nature of the indices and
files varies with the missions and capabilities of those maintaining
them.
The Operations Directorate maintains a central index of names
and certain biographical and subject files in connection with the
intelligence collection activities of its various divisions and staffs. In
addition, separate project and case files are maintained by these divi-
sions and staffs.
The other major source of biographical files is in the Administra-
tion Directorate, where files are maintained by the Office of Security
and by other administrative branches such as the personnel and medi-
cal offices.
Biographical files also are maintained- in the Intelligence Direc-
torate, but few, if any, names of Americans are believed to be in them.
Finally, miscellaneous files on Americans may be found in the
offices of the General Counsel and the Legislative Counsel and in
other offices which handle dealings with Americans.
The following sections describe the types of files maintained by the
CIA which are most likely to contain information on American
citizens.
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A. Indices and Files of the Operations Directorate
Biographical files are generated by the Directorate of Operations
as a result of the indexing of names of persons appearing in docu-
ments and communications received by the Directorate. Generally,
those documents and communications relate to persons who are of
intelligence or counterintelligence interest to the Agency, either be-
cause of their actual or possible association with foreign intelligence
activities, or because they are actual or potential sources or operatives.
The names of United States citizens have been indexed along with
the names of others, based on these criteria. The fact that such names
are included does not appear to reflect an effort to conduct surveil-
lance or other investigations of Americans ; rather it appears to be
the normal result of the Agency's foreign intelligence activities.
Names from Operation CHAOS files have not been included in the
central index.
The first step in the process of keeping the biographical index and
files involves the indexing of incoming documents.
The Operations Directorate maintains a central index and file of
documents received, most of which are in the normal course routed
through the central index and file. Certain sensitive documents, how-
ever, may not be indexed centrally. Each document received is reviewed
and names of intelligence interest are entered into the biographical
index.
The criteria for indexing a name have changed over the years. In the
early years of the Agency, virtually every name in a document was
indexed. Eventually the Agency accumulated some 15 million bio-
graphical references in its index.
Since the early 1960's, however, the criteria have limited indexing
to persons of counterintelligence interest (i.e. those suspected of work-
ing on behalf of a hostile intelligence service) and persons of interest
as actual or potential sources of information or assistance.
The number of references has since that time been progressively re-
duced to its present level of about 7,500,000 names (including an in-
determinate number of duplicates). Of these, an estimated 115,000
names are of persons who are either known or believed to be United
States citizens.
The fact that a name has been entered into the index does not mean
that a file exists on that person. Files are opened only at the direction
of a division or staff and only when it appears that the person will
be of continuing intelligence interest. In that case, a so-called per-
sonality (or 201) file is opened; i.e., a manila folder is prepared to
hold relevant documents accumulating on that person.
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The Operations Directorate has a total of some 750,000 personality
files. Of these, the Agency estimates that 57,000 files are of American
citizens and an additional 15,000 are of persons who may be Ameri-
can citizens.
No file-by-file review has been made to determine how many of these
files contain what might be regarded as derogatory information. How-
ever, an analysis by the Agency of a group of files opened on American
citizens in 1974, as reported to the Commission's staff, showed that
seventy percent of these files were opened on persons who were sources
of information or assistance to the Agency, nineteen percent related to
Americans of possible use to the Agency, and eleven percent related to
Americans who were of foreign counterintelligence interest.
Until 1974, the indexing process made no distinction between United
States citizens and others. At that time, regulations were issued re-
stricting the indexing of United States citizens to those involved in
"foreign activity detrimental to the national security interests of the
United States" such as "espionage, counterintelligence, sabotage, sub-
version, covert propaganda, psychological or unconventional warfare
or paramilitary operations," "terrorist activity and narcotics traffick-
ing," participation in the "illegal apparatus of foreign communist
parties," or "other international clandestine activity."
The indexing is done by clerks who determine whether to index
a name on the basis of directions contained in the document, supplied
by either its originator or its recipient. These persons are expected to
comply with the indexing criteria.
In the past, a major source of index references to United States
citizens was FBI reports. Whenever an FBI field office felt a report
on an individual might be of counterintelligence interest, a copy was
routinely furnished the Agency. Many of the names appearing in these
raw reports were indexed with relatively little attempt to determine
their potential relevance to the CIA. Thus a large number of generally
unevaluated index references to Americans were placed in the system.
FBI reports are no longer indexed without a prior determination
by an appropriate division or staff that indexing criteria are in fact
met. In addition, efforts are being made to work out a procedure under
which only reports meeting specified criteria will be sent by the FBI
to the CIA.
Names of Americans are also contained in the communications traf-
fic from overseas CIA stations to Headquarters which passes through
the indexing process. The information developed by the Commission
indicates that in large part these references are to Americans who are
actual or potential sources of information or assistance to the Agency.
Of course, names of Americans might turn up in other documents as
well. Frequently, the citizenship of a person is not known or disclosed
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in the document, so that it is impossible to determine whether the name
indexed is that of an American.
An index reference on a person contains a limited .amount of bio-
graphical data along with references to the filed documents from
which it was derived. It may also contain a very brief summary of
some of these documents.
Four years ago, the entire index was computerized, and today the
information contained in it is accessible by computer. Access is re-
stricted, however, to those officers in the Operations Directorate who
are specially authorized for that purpose.
Many of the Agency's files on Americans were opened because a
security clearance was required or because the person was involved
directly or indirectly in some Agency operation. For example, it is
estimated that there are more than ten thousand files on American
employees or contractors involved in the Agency's airline operations,
which are now being phased out. The Agency believes that many more
of these files on Americans are of persons who have had some tangen-
tial relationships with the Agency or whose utilization may at one
time have been considered by the Operations Directorate but never
became a fact.
Most of the files on Americans appear to be inactive. In 1974, only
some 250 of these files were on loan to one or another of the divisions or
staffs of the Directorate which hold files of active intelligence interest.
Under present regulations, no file may be opened on an American
citizen without the written approval of one of the three top ranking
officers of a division or staff. In addition, each division and staff is
required to make a monthly report to the Deputy Director of Opera-
tions on all files opened on Americans.
All of the existing files on Americans are now undergoing review
by the divisions and staff responsible for the particular file. Material
which does not meet current criteria is placed in sealed envelopes with
the announced intention that the envelopes are to be destroyed at the
end of the current investigations.
The Directorate also maintains certain specialized indices and files
which may contain the names of persons who happen to be American
citizens. It has in its index references to documents of the CIA's pred-
ecessor agencies. It also has separate files on persons suspected of
affiliation with Soviet and other foreign intelligence services, persons
engaged in certain kinds of international travel, and persons who by
reason of particular affiliations may be potential foreign intelligence
sources.
Finally, other components of the Directorate maintain files on
American citizens working with those components.
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B. Indices and Files of the Administration Directorate
The Administration Directorate maintains biographical files on a
large number of U.S. citizens and foreigners living within the United
States who have knowingly entered into some type of relationship
with the Agency.
The vast majority of these files concern employees, former employees
and applicants for employment. Records on these persons must neces-
sarily be maintained, as in any other government agency or private
business.
In addition, because of the special nature of its activities, the CIA
maintains contact with (and therefore records concerning) many other
persons and business firms throughout the country who provide the
Agency with needed assistance.
Due to the security restrictions under which the Agency operates,
a wide variety of security files must also be maintained on all persons
working with or for the Agency who may come into contact with
classified information. Some of these persons are aware of the Agency's
interest in them; others are not. All files relating to security matters
are compiled and maintained by the Office of Security; the others are
maintained elsewhere within the Administration Directorate.
The following is a description of the types and kinds of files main-
tained by the Administration Directorate on persons living within the
United States :
1. Indices and Files Outside the Office of Security
Administration Directorate files on CIA employees, former em-
ployees and applicants for employment include applicant records
(many of which contain considerable biographical data in the form
of voluntary personal history statements) ; personnel files such as
records of job assignments, performance assessments, insurance rec-
ords, commendations and retirement records; financial files such as
payroll and travel records ; training files ; medical files ; and other mis-
cellaneous files.
These files are generally maintained in the office primarily responsi-
ble for the function involved. In addition, master folders containing
pertinent papers from all of the other offices needed to manage each
employee properly are maintained by the particular component to
which each employee is assigned.
In addition to its relationship with its own employees, the CIA
maintains relationships with numerous other individuals who render
assistance to the Agency. These include agents, informers, consultants,
and persons temporarily assigned to duty with the Agency from other
government agencies.
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The Agency also maintains relationships with businesses and other
governmental and educational institutions (and their representatives)
who have contracts or other dealings with the Agency. Files and
indices documenting these relationships are maintained by various
components of the Administration Directorate for accounting and
record-keeping purposes.
2. Indices and Files of the Office of Security
Office of Security files are maintained primarily to record actions
taken by the Office in granting or denying security clearances to those
persons whose relationship with the Agency gives them access to
classified information. The files of the Office of Security are organized
on the basis of "subjects." All individuals, organizations, businesses
and projects are deemed "subjects" if security files exist on them.
The bulk of the files maintained by the Office of Security consist of
approximately 900,000 security files, each relating to the security
investigation of a specific "subject" of interest to the Agency.' About
one-third of these files are retired. About 90 percent of the security
files relate to individuals, a majority of whom are United States citi-
zens. The remaining 10 percent relate to impersonal "subjects" such
as business firms, organizations and projects.
Security files are maintained on applicants for employment, Agency
employees, former Agency employees, independent contractors doing
business with the Agency, persons supplying the Agency with positive
intelligence information, consultants, non-Agency employees who
work on Agency premises, and other individuals and business entities
whose relationship with the Agency gives them access to classified
information. Among the persons on whom such files are established
are numerous past and present Senators, Congressmen, judges and
other prominent public officials. For example, the Agency presently
maintains security files on 75 sitting Members of Congress.
A few security files are maintained on persons unaware that they
have any relationship to the Agency. For example, the employees of
an independent contractor doing business with the Agency may know
that they are working on a secret government contract (and, in fact,
that they have been investigated for a security clearance), but not that
they are of interest to the CIA. Records of security clearances on those
employees would nonetheless be maintained by the Office of Security.
Likewise, clearance information may be maintained by the Office of
Security on persons whom the Agency is thinking of contacting, or
foreign nationals of potential operational use, even if the Agency sub-
' A few security files are "multiple subject" files, containing information on two or more
subjects in a single file folder. It was estimated by a responsible Agency official that less
than five percent of all security file folders are "multiple subject" security files.
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sequently decides not to contact the individual, or contacts him and he
refuses to assist the Agency.
Security files are established upon the request of any of numerous
officers within the Office of Security. As a practical matter, 95 percent
of all requests to establish new files are routine and are undertaken at
the request of the Clearance Division of the Office of Security, which
ensures that a security clearance is approved before access is granted to
classified Agency information. No centralized control exists for screen-
ing non-routine requests to determine their propriety.
A security file is most frequently created on an individual when, for.
any of a variety of reasons, it becomes desirable to give that individual
access to classified Agency material. Security files on individuals ordi-
narily contain the following types of materials : (1) requests that
an investigation be conducted; (2) biographical data on the subject,
ranging from a few lines on one page to lengthy personal history
statements filled out by certain applicants for employment ; (3) au-
thorizations for the release of high school and college transcripts and
copies of those transcripts; (4) investigative coverage and reports of
those investigations; (5) appraisal summaries reflecting the rationale
for granting or refusing to grant a security clearance ; (6) documenta-
tion of the final action taken by the Office of Security concerning any
given investigation; (7) secrecy agreements and notices of termina-
tion of such agreements ; (8) documentation of subsequent actions such
as the granting or refusing of special clearances, approvals for assign-
ment overseas, notations that polygraph or other special interviews
were performed, notices of transfers and changes in cover assign-
ments; memoranda concerning security violations, and notices of
termination of affiliation with the Agency; and (9) miscellaneous
documents which might bear on the question whether the individual
should have a security clearance.
The reasons for creating security files on ".impersonal" subjects
such as business firms and organizations differ widely. Most of these
files are created at a time when the CIA first contemplates developing
with the business entity or organization a relationship which might
give it access to classified or sensitive information. The files contain
such items as (1) security surveys of a business's premises if it is
contemplated that classified activities will be carried on there, or (2)
lists of persons from a business or organization assisting the Agency
who are cleared to receive classified information or have access to
CIA installations.
Some security files have been compiled on organizations and in-
dividuals thought to pose a threat to Agency personnel, installations
or operations. For example, during the peak of the racial and anti-
war disturbances in Washington between 1965 and 1972, security files
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were accumulated on many dissident groups and their leaders. Other
"impersonal" files were maintained on communist publications and
suspected communist front organizations.
A relatively small number of "impersonal" security files deal with
specific Office of Security projects. These projects range from a
project to provide security during the construction of CIA Head-
quarters at Langley, Virginia, to investigations conducted of Agency
employees or operatives thought to have been security risks. Security
files of this type include descriptions of the project or investigation
involved, assignments to the field, information collected during the
course of the project or investigation, and (some times) the end result
of the projector investigation.
The security files maintained by the Office of Security serve a
variety of purposes.
In order to protect classified information, the Agency must main-
tain a substantial body of knowledge about persons who might be
assigned to sensitive positions.
The files are also used for periodic reviews of persons who occupy
sensitive positions or hold special clearances.
Reports of investigations are occasionally furnished to other gov-
ernment agencies with a legitimate need for the information contained
therein.
All pertinent subjects and references identified in security files have
been card indexed. Approximately 900,000 of these indices are "sub-
ject" indices referencing the subject of a. particular security folder
bearing the name of the individual, business, organization or group on
which the file is maintained.
An additional 950,000 indices are "reference" indices recording
names which appear in documents stored in one of the folders in-
dexed to a subject. An index reference is created when note-worthy
information concerning the referenced individual is developed in
connection with another case, or when it is learned that the referenced
individual is connected with some company, organization or project
which is of interest to the Agency.
Over the years, there have been changing criteria concerning the
type of information which is placed in security files and indices. At
one time, files were established simply to hold a collection of reference
index cards when the total on a given individual had reached a cer-
tain number.
In about 1972, efforts were begun to purge the reference index and
"impersonal" files of information which was of no current value.
Many security files of dubious value or propriety were destroyed.
These purging efforts have been suspended pending completion of
the investigations by this Commission and the Congress.
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The head of the division within the Office of Security responsible
for maintaining all security files recently prepared a list of those ma-
terials which should properly be retained in active security files. All
materials to be filed are now reviewed by a senior clerk for propriety.
As of March, 1974, the head of that division has, for the first time,
been given the authority to challenge any input into the index system
of the Office of Security if he deems the material to be improper. The
criteria for indexing names have also been drastically restricted.
Security files on employees and others are very tightly held within
the Agency. Only a few Office of Security personnel have access to
these files, and then only on a need-to-know basis. No employee-not
even the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of Security-
is ever permitted access to his own security file. This precaution is
taken to protect confidential sources of information, who are assured
at the time they are interviewed about a prospective employee that
whatever they say will never be divulged to the subject of the investi-
gation. Agency officials evidence a very high level of commitment to
honoring those assurances.
Even more tightly held are the records of polygraph examinations
of employees and prospective employees. While polygraph examina-
tions are a routine part of every security investigation conducted by
the Office of Security, the reports are separately and securely main-
tained because of their potential. for embarrassment.
Other relatively voluminous Office of Security files which contain
biographical data on American citizens include records of individuals
holding special and compartmentalized access approvals to various
CIA material, records of persons holding building badges and other
credentials issued under Agency cognizance to employees and other in-
dividuals, and visitor records on approximately 500,000 persons who
have visited Agency installations.
Miscellaneous files maintained by the Office of Security include lists
of individuals with known or suspected foreign intelligence connec-
tions, files associated with the handling of defectors (some of whom
may now be U.S. citizens), lists of individuals from whom crank calls
have been received by the Agency, and lists of persons previously
charged with security violations. The Office of Security formerly
maintained extensive computer lists of approximately 300,000 persons
who had been arrested for offenses related to homosexuality, but these
lists were destroyed in 1973.
No effort was made by the Commission or its staff to personally re-
view all of the thousands of security files and indices maintained on
United States citizens ; spot checking was undertaken, however, on It
random basis.
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C. Office of Legislative Counsel
The Office of Legislative Counsel maintains congressional files for
use in its legislative liaison duties.
These files are reestablished at the beginning of each new session of
Congress; files on retired or defeated members are transferred to the
CIA record center. After five years, they are selectively purged.
Generally, the files contain the following types of documents : corre-
spondence between the member and the CIA, excerpts from the Con-
gressional Record dealing with the member, constituent employment
or personnel requests forwarded to the Agency by the member, short
biographies and political descriptions of the member, and copies of all
foreign cables containing the name of the member.
Conclusions
Although maintenance of most of the indices, files, and records of
the Agency has been necessary and proper, the standards applied by
the Agency at some points during its history have permitted the ac-
cumulation and indexing of materials not needed for legitimate intel-
ligence or security purposes. Included in this category are many of the
files related to Operation CHAOS and the activities of the Office of
Security concerning dissident groups.
Constant vigilance by the Agency is essential to prevent the col-
lection of information on United States citizens which is not needed
for proper intelligence activities. The Executive Order recommended
by the Commission (Recommendation 2) will ensure purging of non-
essential or improper materials from Agency files.
Further, the Office of Security should establish (i) centralized re-
sponsibility to control the opening of new security files not routine
in nature and (ii) specific criteria controlling the nature of materials
to be collected.
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Chapter 19
Allegations Concerning the
Assassination of President Kennedy
Allegations have been made that the CIA participated in the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy in Dallas, Texas, on
November 22, 1963. Two different theories have been advanced in
support of those allegations. One theory is that E. Howard Hunt and
Frank Sturgis, on behalf of the CIA, personally participated in the
assassination. The other is that the CIA had connections with Lee
Harvey Oswald or Jack Ruby, or both of them, and that those
connections somehow led to the assassination. The Commission staff
has investigated these allegations.
Neither the staff nor the Commission undertook a full review of
the Report of the Warren Commission. Such a task would have been
outside the scope of the Executive Order establishing this Commis-
sion, and would have diverted the time of the Commission from its
proper function. The investigation was limited to determining
whether there was any credible evidence pointing to CIA involvement
in the assassination of President Kennedy.
A. The Theory That Hunt and Sturgis Participated in the
Assassination
The first of the theories involves charges that E. Howard Hunt and
Frank Sturgis, both convicted of burglarizing the Democratic Na-
tional Committee headquarters at the Watergate in 1972, were CIA
employees or agents at the time of the assassination of the President in
1963. It is further alleged that they were together in Dallas on the day
of the assassination and that shortly after the assassination they were
found in a railroad boxcar situated behind the "grassy knoll," an area
located to the right front of the Presidential car at the time of the
assassination.
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Under this theory, Hunt and Sturgis were allegedly in Dallas on
November 22, 1963, and were taken into custody by the police, but
were mysteriously released without being booked, photographed or
fingerprinted by the police-although they were allegedly photo-
graphed by press photographers while they were being accompanied
to the Dallas County Sheriff's office.
It is further contended that the persons shown in these press photo-
graphs bear "striking resemblances" to photographs taken of Hunt
and Sturgis in 1972. Portions of two amateur motion picture films of
the assassination (Zapruder and Nix) are alleged to reveal the pres-
ence of several riflemen in the area of the grassy knoll.
The Hunt-Sturgis theory also rests on the assumption that at least
one of the shots that struck President Kennedy was fired from the area
of the grassy knoll, where Hunt and Sturgis were alleged to be present.
The direction from which the shots came is claimed to be shown by
the backward and leftward movement of President Kennedy's body
almost immediately after being struck by that bullet. Taken together,
these purported facts are cited as the basis for a possible conclusion
that CIA personnel participated in the assassination of President
Kennedy, and, at least inferentially, that the CIA itself was involved.
The Commission staff investigated the several elements of this
theory to the extent deemed necessary to assess fairly the allegation
of CIA participation in the assassination. The findings of that investi-
gation follow.
Findings
1. The Allegation that Hunt and Sturgis Were CIA Employees or
Agents in 1963
E. Howard Hunt was an employee of the CIA in November 1963.
He had been an employee of the CIA for many years before that, and
he continued to be associated with the CIA until his retirement in 1970.
Throughout 1963 he was assigned to duty in Washington, D.C., per-
forming work relating to propaganda operations in foreign countries.
His duties included travel to several other cities in the United States,
but not to any place in the South or Southwest. He lived with his
family in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area throughout that
year, and his children attended school there.
Frank Sturgis was not an employee or agent of the CIA either in
1963 or at any other time. He so testified wider oath himself, and a
search of CIA records failed to discover any evidence that he had
ever been employed by the CIA or had ever served it as an agent, in-
formant or other operative. Sturgis testified that he had been engaged
in various "adventures" relating to Cuba which he believed to have
been organized and financed by the CIA. He testified that he had given
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information, directly and indirectly, to federal government officials,
who, he believed, were acting for the CIA. He further testified, how-
ever, that at no time did he engage in any activity having to do with
the assassination of President Kennedy, on behalf of the CIA or
otherwise.
2. The Allegation That Hunt and Sturgis Were Together in
Dallas on the Day of the Assassination
Hunt and Sturgis testified under oath to members of the Commis-
sion staff. They both denied that they were in Dallas on the day of the
assassination. Hunt testified that he was in the Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan area throughout that day, and his testimony was sup-
ported by two of his children 1 and a former domestic employee of the
Hunt family. Sturgis testified that he was in Miami, Florid?, through-
out the day of the assassination, and his testimony was supported by
that of his wife and a nephew of his wife. The nephew, who was then
living with the Sturgis family, is now a practicing attorney in the
Midwest.
With the exception of the domestic employee of the Hunt family,
all witnesses directly supporting the presence of Hunt and Sturgis
in Washington, D.C., and Miami, Florida, on the day of the assassi-
nation are family members or relatives. Less weight can be assigned
to the testimony of such interested witnesses if there is substantial
evidence to the contrary. In the absence of substantial conflicting evi-
dence, however, the testimony of family members cannot be disre-
garded.
Hunt testifies that he had never met Frank Sturgis before they were
introduced by Bernard Barker in Miami in 1972. Sturgis testified to
the same effect, except that he did not recall whether the introduc-
tion had taken place in late 1971 or early 1972. Sturgis further testi-
fied that while he had often heard of "Eduardo," a CIA political
officer who had. been active in the work of the Cuban Revolutionary
Council in Miami prior to the Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961,
he had never met him and did not know until 1971 or 1972 that
"Eduardo" was E. Howard Hunt. Sturgis had also been active in
anti-Castro groups in the Miami area before, during and after Hunt's
assignment on the political aspects of the Bay of Pigs project in 1960
and early 1961.
Other testimony linked Hunt to Sturgis at a date earlier than
1971. One witness asserted that Sturgis is a pseudonym; that his
name is Frank Fiorini; and that he took the name Sturgis from a
fictional character (Hank Sturgis) in a novel written by Hunt in
1 A son who was nine years old at the time could not recall whether his parents were
present or absent that day ; the fourth (and youngest) Hunt child was not born then. Mrs.
Hunt is now deceased.
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1949. (Bimini Run). Sturgis testified that his name at birth was Frank
Angelo Fiorini; that his mother's maiden name was Mary Vona; that
his father's name was Angelo Anthony Fiorini; that his parents were
divorced when he was a child ; that his mother subsequently remarried
a man named Ralph Sturgis; and that at his mother's urging he
legally changed his name in Norfolk, Virginia, sometime in the 1950's,
to take the last name of his stepfather.
A search of the relevant court records disclosed that a petition was
filed on September 23, 1952, in the Circuit Court of the City of Nor-
folk (Virginia) pursuant to which a Frank Angelo Fiorino petitioned
to change his name to Frank Anthony Sturgis. The petition recited
that his mother had divorced his father about 15 years previously and
had married one Ralph Sturgis, that he had been living with his
mother all of his life, that his mother was known as Mary Sturgis,
and that his stepfather also desired him to change his name to Stur-
gis. An order of the Court was entered on September 23, 1952 (the
same date as the petition) changing his name to Frank Anthony Stur-
gis. The order appears in the records of the Circuit Court of the City
of Norfolk, Virginia. In the petition and the order relating to the
change of name, Fiorini was misspelled as Fiorino.
In the light of this documentary evidence, no weight can be given
to the claim that Sturgis took his present name from a character in
a Hunt novel-or that the name change was associated in any way
with Sturgis' knowing Hunt before 1971 or 1972.
The personnel, payroll and travel records of the CIA were checked
with respect to E. Howard Hunt. Daily attendance records for the
period are no longer available because they are destroyed in the ordi-
nary course of the Agency's records disposal system three years after
completion of the audit for each year. What records remain, including
annual leave, sick leave, and travel records, disclose that Hunt had
no out-of-town travel associated with his employment in the month
of November 1963. He used no annual leave and eleven hours of sick
leave in the two-week pay period ending November 23, 1963. The
exact date or dates on which the sick leave was taken could not be
ascertained. There is some indication, however, that some of these
eleven hours of sick leave may have been taken by Hunt on Novem-
ber 22, 1963. He testified that, on the afternoon of that day, he was
in the company of his wife and family in the Washington, D.C., area,
rather than at his employment duties. That was a Friday, and there-
fore ,,t working day for employees at the CIA. Hunt could not recall
whether he was on duty with the CIA on the morning of that day.
Because Sturgis was never an agent or employee of the CIA, the
Agency has no personnel, payroll, leave or travel records relating to
him.
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In examining the charge that Hunt and Sturgis were together in
Dallas on the day of the assassination, the investigators were handi-
capped by the fact that the allegation was first made in 1974, more than
ten years after the assassination. Evidence which might have been
available at an earlier time was no longer available. Contacts with
relatives, friends, neighbors or fellow employees (who might have
known of the whereabouts of Hunt and Sturgis on that particular day)
could not be recalled. Some of these persons are now dead. Finally,
records which might have been the source of relevant information no
longer exist.
It cannot be determined with certainty where Hunt and Sturgis
actually were on the day of the assassination. However, no credible evi-
dence was found which would contradict their testimony that they were
in Washington, D.C., and Miami, Florida, respectively.
3. The Allegation That Hunt and Sturgis Were Found Near the
Scene of the Assassination and Taken to the Dallas County
Sheriff's Office
This allegation is based upon a purported resemblance between Hunt
and Sturgis, on the one hand, and two persons who were briefly taken
into custody in Dallas following the assassination.
The shooting of President Kennedy occurred at about 12:30 p.m.,
Dallas time, on November 22, 1963, while the Presidential motorcade
was passing' Dealey Plaza as it headed generally westward on Elm
Street. Witnesses to the shooting gave the police varying accounts of
where they thought the shots had come from. On the basis of the sound
of the shots, some believed that they had come from the Texas School
Book Depository building (TSBD), which was behind and slightly to
the right of President Kennedy when he was hit. Others thought the
shots had come from other directions. Law enforcement officials under-
standably conducted a widespread search for evidence relating to the
assassination.
Several hours after the shooting, officers of the Dallas Police De-
partment checked all railroad freight cars situated on tracks anywhere
in the vicinity of Dealey Plaza. About six or eight persons, referred
to as "derelicts," were found in or near the freight cars. These persons
were taken either to the nearby Dallas County Sheriff's office, or to the'
Dallas Police Department, for questioning. All were released without
any arrest record being made, or any fingerprinting or photographing
being done by the authorities.
Among the six or eight "derelicts" found in the vicinity of the
freight cars were three men who, according to the arresting officers,
were found in a boxcar about one-half mile south of the scene of the
assassination. They were taken to the Sheriff's office by the Dallas
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police officers, who walked northward along the railroad tracks to a
point west of the Texas School Book Depository, then north to
Houston Street and back south to the Sheriff's office. This somewhat
circuitous route was actually the most convenient one available, ac-
cording to the Dallas policemen. As the police and the "derelicts"
passed the TSBD building and headed for the, Sheriff's office, they
were photographed by several press photographers on the scene.
Copies of five of the photographs showing the "derelicts" were sub-
mitted to the Commission's staff as evidence.
A witness who volunteered his testimony stated on the basis of
hearsay that the three "derelicts" in question were found in a box-
car situated to the near northwest of the assassination scene, which
would have been to the right front of the Presidential car at the time
of the shooting. Between the area in which that boxcar was claimed
by this witness to be located and that part of Elm Street where the
assassination occurred was a "grassy knoll."
It was alleged by other witnesses (who were associated with the
first witness and who also volunteered testimony) that a bullet fired
from the area of that "grassy knoll" struck President Kennedy in the
head. It was also claimed by the same witnesses that one of the three
photographed "derelicts" bears a "striking" facial resemblance to E.
Howard Hunt and that another of them bears a "striking" facial
resemblance to Frank Sturgis. Finally, it was alleged that if those two
"derelicts" were, in fact, Hunt and Sturgis, and if the President was
in fact struck by a bullet fired from his right front, the CIA would
be shown to be implicated in the killing of President Kennedy.
The photographs of the "derelicts" in Dallas have been compared
with numerous known photographs of Hunt and Sturgis taken both
before and after November 22, 1963. Even to non-experts it appeared
that there was, at best, only a superficial resemblance between the
Dallas "derelicts" and Hunt and Sturgis. The "derelict" allegedly
resembling Hunt appeared to be substantially older and smaller than
Hunt. The "derelict" allegedly resembling Sturgis appeared to be
thinner than Sturgis and to have facial features and hair markedly
different from those of Sturgis.
The witnesses who testified to the "striking resemblance" between
the "derelicts" and Hunt and Sturgis were not shown to have any
qualifications in photo identification beyond that possessed by the -
average layman. Their testimony appears to have been based on a
comparison of the 1963 photographs of the "derelicts" with a single
1972 photograph of Sturgis and two 1972 photographs of Hunt.
Over fifty photographs taken of Hunt and Sturgis both before and
after November 22, 1963, were submitted to the FBI photographic
laboratory for a comparison with all known photographs of the "der-
elicts." (The FBI assembled a complete set of all photographs of
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the "derelicts" taken by the three photographers known to have
photographed them.) The comparison was made by FBI Agent
Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt, a nationally-recognized expert in photo identi-
fication and photo analysis.
The report of Agent Shaneyfelt, embodied in a Report of the FBI
Laboratory, dated April 21, 1975, and signed by Clarence M. Kelley,
Director of the FBI, concluded that "neither E. Howard Hunt nor
Frank Sturgis appear as any of the three `derelicts' arrested in
Dallas, Texas, as shown in the photographs submitted."
With respect to Hunt, it was found that he had a much younger
appearance, a smooth and tightly contoured chin, and a more angular
or pointed chin, compared with the "derelict" in question. The latter
was much older, had a chin with protruding pouches and a more
bulbous nose.
With respect to Sturgis, even more distinguishing characteristics
were observed. Sturgis looked like a Latin, whereas the "derelict"
had the general appearance of a Nordic. Sturgis had very black, wavy
hair-and the "derelict" had light or blond and straighter 'hair.
Sturgis had a rather round face with square chin lines; the "derelict"
had an oval face with a more rounded chin. Sturgis and the "dere-
lict" had markedly different ratios between the length of their noses
and the height of their foreheads. They also had different ear and
nose contours.
Hunt is approximately five feet nine inches tall, and Sturgis is ap-
proximately five feet eleven inches tall. The FBI laboratory made an
on-site study in Dallas, using the cameras with which the photographs
of the "derelicts"' were originally taken; it concluded from the study
that the "derelict" allegedly resembling Hunt was about five feet, seven
inches tall, and that the "derelict" allegedly resembling Sturgis was
about six feet two inches tall, with a one inch margin for error in each
direction. The difference between the height of the two "derelicts"
was therefore about seven inches, while the difference between Hunt's
height and that of Sturgis is only about two inches.
The photographs of the "derelicts" in Dallas have been displayed
in various newspapers in the United States, on national television
programs, and in the April 28, 1975, issue of Newsweek magazine. But
no witnesses have provided testimony that either of the "derelicts"
was personally known to be Hunt or Sturgis and no qualified expert
was offered to make such an identification.
4. The Allegation That President Kennedy Was Struck in the
Head by a Bullet Fired From His Right Front
The witnesses who presented evidence they believed sufficient to
implicate the CIA in the assassination of President Kennedy placed
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much stress upon the movements of the President's body associated
with the head wound that killed the President. Particular attention
was called to the Zapruder film, and especially Frame 312 and the
succeeding frames of that film. It was urged that the movements of
the President's head and body immediately following the head wound
evidenced in Frame 313 established that the President was struck
by a bullet fired from the right front of the Presidential car-the
direction of the grassy knoll and the freight car in which "Hunt"
and "Sturgis" were allegedly found.
By Frame 312 of the Zapruder film, President Kennedy had already
been wounded by a bullet which had struck him in the region of his
neck. His body is shown to be facing generally toward the front of
the Presidential car. He is leaning toward the left. His head is turned
somewhat toward the left front, and it is facing downward toward
the floor in the rear portion of the car. His chin appears to be close
to his chest.
At Frame 313 of the Zapruder film, the President has been struck
by the bullet that killed him, and his head has moved forward notice-
ably. At Frame 314 (which is about 1/18 of a second later) his head
is already moving backward. Succeeding frames of the film show a
rapid backward movement of the President's head and upper body,
and at the same time his head and body are shown to be turning
toward his left. Still later frames show the President's body collapsing
onto the back seat of the car.
The evidence presented to the Warren Commission revealed that
the speed of the Zapruder motion picture camera was 18.3 frames per
second. If the film is projected at that speed, the forward movement
of the President's head from Frame 312 to Frame 313 is not readily
perceived. On the other hand, such forward movement is evident
upon careful measurement of still projections of the relevant frames.
It is very short, both in distance and duration. The backward move-
ment and the turning of the President's head toward the left are rapid,
pronounced and readily apparent during a running of the film at
either normal or slow speed.
It was claimed that the movement of the President's head and body
backward and to the left is consistent only with a shot having come
from the right front of the Presidential car-that is, from the direc-
tion of the grassy knoll.
Medical and ballistics experts were consulted. Also considered were
(1) the autopsy report on the body of President Kennedy, and (2)
the report of a panel of medical experts who, in February 1968, at
the request of Attorney General Ramsey Clark, reviewed the autopsy
report and the autopsy photographs, x-ray films, motion picture
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films of the assassination, the clothing worn by President Kennedy
and other relevant materials.
The autopsy report of James J. Humes, M.D., J. Thornton Boswell,
M.D., and Pierre A. Finck, M.D., described the President's head
wounds as follows :
The fatal wound entered the skull above and to the right of the external occipi-
tal protuberance. A portion of the projectile traversed the cranial cavity in a
posterior-anterior direction (see lateral skull roentgenograms) depositing minute
particles along its path. A portion of the projectile made its exit through the
parietal bone on the right carrying with it portions of the cerebrum, skull and
scalp. The two wounds of the skull combined with the force of the missile pro-
duced -extensive fragmentation of the skull, laceration of the superior sagittal
sinus, and of the right cerebral hemisphere.
In February 1968, a panel of physicians met in Washington, D.C.,
at the request of Attorney General Ramsey Clark, to examine the
autopsy report, the autopsy photographs and x-rays, the Zapruder, Nix
and Muchmore motion picture films of the assassination, and various
other evidence pertaining to the death of President Kennedy. Each of
the four physicians constituting the panel had been nominated by a
prominent person who was not in the employment of the federal gov-
ernment. They were :
William H. Carnes, M.D., Professor of Pathology, University
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah; Member of Medical Examiner's
Commission, State of Utah. Nominated by Dr. J. E. Wallace
Sterling, President of Stanford University.
Russel S. Fisher, M.D., Professor of Forensic Pathology, Uni-
versity of Maryland; and Chief Medical Examiner of the State
of Maryland, Baltimore, Maryland. Nominated by Dr. Oscar B.
Hunter, Jr., President of the College of American Pathologists.
Russel H. Morgan, M.D., Professor of Radiology, School of
Medicine, and Professor of Radiological Science, School of
Hygiene and Public Health, The Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland. Nominated by Dr. Lincoln Gordon, Presi-
dent of The Johns Hopkins University.
Alan R. Moritz, M.D., Professor of Pathology, Case Western
Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio; and former Professor of
Forensic Medicine, Harvard University. Nominated by Dr. John
A. Hannah, President of Michigan State University.
After reviewing the autopsy photographs, and making their find-
ings concerning them, the Panel said in its report :
These findings indicate that the back of the head was struck by a single bullet
traveling at high velocity, the major portion of which passed through the right
cerebral hemisphere. and which produced an explosive type of fragmentation
of the skull and laceration of the scalp. The appearance of the entrance wound
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in the scalp is consistent with its having been produced by a bullet similar to
that of Exhibit CE 399.2
After a review of the autopsy x-rays, the Panel's report states :
The foregoing observations indicate that the decedent's head was struck from
behind by a single projectile. It entered the occipital region 25 mm. to the right
of the midline and 100 mm. above the external occipital protuberance. The pro-
jectile fragmented on entering the skull, one major section leaving a trail of
fine metallic debris as it passed forward and laterally to explosively fracture
the right frontal and parietal bones as it emerged from the head.
The Panel discussed its findings as follows :
The decedent was wounded by two bullets both of which entered his body
from behind.
One bullet struck the back of the decedent's head well above the external oc-
cipital protuberance. Based upon the observation that he was leaning forward
with his head turned obliquely to the left when this bullet struck, the photo-
graphs and x-rays indicate that it came from a site above and slightly to his
right.
The absence of metallic fragments in the left cerebral hemisphere or below the
level of the frontal fosse on the right side together with the absence of any holes
in the skull to the left of the midline or in its base and the absence of any pene-
trating injury of the left hemisphere eliminate with reasonable certainty the
possibility of a projectile having passed through the head in any direction other
than from back to front as described in preceding sections of this report.
Certain other evidence relating to the source of the bullets that
struck President Kennedy was noted. This included the following:
a. The ' bullet fragments found in the Presidential car which
were large enough to bear ballistics marks were determined by the
FBI to have been fired by the Oswald rifle found on the sixth floor
of the Texas School Book Depository building, and not from any
other weapon. CE 399 was also fired from that rifle.
b. No physical evidence, such as a rifle, shell casings, bullets, or
damage to the Presidential car, was ever found which would
support a theory that one or more shots were fired from a direc-
tion other than from behind and above the President.
c. Most eyewitnesses testified that three shots were fired. Three
shell casings were found near the window at the southeast corner
of the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository building,
and all of them were determined by the FBI to have been fired
by the Oswald rifle to the exclusion of any other weapon. That
window was also the one in which a man firing a rifle was seen
by witnesses who testified before the Warren Commission. The
2 CE 399 was Warren Commission Exhibit 399, a nearly whole bullet found in Parkland
Memorial Hospital in Dallas on the day of the assassination. It was established by
ballistics experts as having been fired by the rifle found on the sixth floor of the TSBD
building and found by the Warren Commission to have belonged to Lee Harvey Oswald. The
Warren Commission determined that bullet passed through President Kennedy's neck and
then struck Governor Connally, who was sitting directly in front of. President Kennedy, and
who was taken to Parkland Hospital.
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Oswald rifle was found on the sixth floor of the TSBD building
within an hour after the assassination.
d. No witness at the scene was found who saw any other assassin,
or who saw anyone firing, or disposing of a weapon in any other
location, or who heard the bolt of a rifle being operated at any
other location. Three TSBD employees testified before the Warren
Commission that they had been watching the motorcade from open
windows near the southeast corner of the fifth floor of the TSBD
building. One of them testified that he heard not only the three
shots, but also the sound above hint of a rifle bolt in action and
the sound of empty shells hitting the floor. All three of them testi-
fied that "debris" fell down from above them at the time of the
shots, and that they talked to each other at that time about the
shots having come from above them.
e. A shot fired from the direct front of the Presidential car
can be ruled out. Such a bullet would have had to pass through
the windshield of the car unless fired from above the overpass
just ahead of the Presidential car. There were no holes in the
windshield, and the overpass was guarded by two policemen in
the presence of some fifteen railroad employees. None of them
saw or heard any shooting take place from the overpass.
Nonetheless, a re-examination was made of the question whether
the movements of the President's head and body following the fatal
shot are consistent with the President being struck from (a) the
rear, (b) the right front, or (c) both the rear and the right front.
The Zapruder, Nix and Muchmore films, a set of all relevant color
slides of the Zapruder film, the autopsy photographs and x-rays, the
President's clothing and back brace, the bullet and bullet fragments
recovered, and various other materials, were reviewed at the request
of the Commission staff by a panel of experts consisting of :
Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. McMeekin, MC, USA; Chief,
Division of Aerospace Pathology, Armed Forces Institute of
Pathology, Washington, D.C.
Richard Lindenberg, M.D., Director of Neuropathology &
Legal Medicine, Department of Mental Health, State of Mary-
land, Baltimore, Maryland.
Werner U. Spitz, M.D., Chief Medical Examiner, Wayne
County, Detroit, Michigan.
Fred J. Hodges III, M.D., Professor of Radiology, The Johns
Hopkins School of Medicine, Baltimore, Maryland.
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Alfred G. Olivier, V.M.D., Director, Department of Biophysics,
Biomedical Laboratories, Edgewood Arsenal, Aberdeen Proving
Grounds, Maryland.3
The Panel members separately submitted their respective con-
clusions. They were unanimous in finding that the President was
struck by only two bullets, both of which were fired from the rear,
and that there is no medical evidence to support a contention that the
President was struck by any bullet coming from any other direction.
They were also unanimous in finding that the violent backward and
leftward motion of the President's upper body following the head shot
was not caused by the impact of a bullet coming from the front or right
front.
Drs. Spitz, Lindenberg and Hodges reported that such a motion
would be caused by a violent straightening and stiffening of the entire
body as a result of a seizure-like neuromuscular reaction to major dam-
age inflicted to nerve centers in the brain.
Dr. Olivier reported that experiments which have been conducted
at Edgewood Arsenal disclosed that goats shot through the brain evi-
denced just such a violent neuromuscular reaction. There was a con-
vulsive stiffening and extension of their legs to front and rear, com-
mencing forty milliseconds (1/2.5 of it second) after the bullet entered
the brain. In the past two decades, Dr. Olivier and his associates have
conducted extensive tests on the effects of high velocity bullets fired
into live animals, using high speed photography to record the results.
Dr. Olivier reported that the violent motions of the President's body
following the head shot could not possibly have been caused by the
impact of the bullet. He attributed the popular misconception on this
subject to the dramatic effects employed in television and motion pic-
ture productions. The impact of such a bullet, he explained, can cause
some immediate movement of the head in the direction of the bullet,
but it would not produce any significant movement of the body. He also
explained that a head wound such as that sustained by President Ken-
nedy produces an "explosion" of tissue at the area where the bullet
exits from the head, causing a "jet effect" which almost instantly moves
the head back in the direction from which the bullet came.
3 Dr. McMeekin is a forensic pathologist who has done extensive studies in the field of
accident reconstruction, utilizing computer-assisted analysis of the reactions of human body
components to the application of various forces. Dr. Lindenberg is a prominent authority
in the field of neuropathology, i.e., the pathology of the brain and nervous system. Dr. Spitz
is a forensic pathologist who has had extensive experience with gunshot wounds and is an
editor of a textbook on forensic pathology. Dr. Hodges is a specialist in radiology and
surgery associated with the brain and nervous system. In 1973-1974 he served as President
of the American Society of Neuroradiology. Dr. Olivier has conducted numerous experiments
to study the effects on animals and humans of penetrating wounds from high velocity
bullets. Drs. Spitz, Lindenberg and Hodges hold faculty positions in the Medical Schools
of Wayne State University, the University of Maryland, and The Johns Hopkins University,
respectively.
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Drs. Olivier and McMeekin, utilizing enlargement of the film and an
accurate measuring device, made measurements of the movement of the
President's head associated with the head shot. They found that in the
interval between Zapruder Frames 312 and 313, the President's head
moved forward significantly; at Frame 314 (1/18 of a second later) it
was already moving backward and it continued to move backward in
the succeeding frames.
Dr. Olivier was of the opinion that the start of the backward move-
ment resulted from both a neuromuscular reaction and a "jet effect"
from the explosion at the right front of the head where the bullet
exited. Thereafter, the violent backward and leftward movement of the
upper body, he believes, was a continuing result of the neuromuscular
reaction. Dr. McMeekin's report to the Commission contained no ref-
erence to the subject of a "jet effect."
Dr. Olivier credited Dr. Luis Alvarez with originating studies into
the "jet effect" produced by high velocity bullets fired into the head.
Dr. Alvarez is a Nobel Prize-winning physicist at the Lawrence Ber-
keley Laboratories, University of California at Berkeley. -An article
describing his experiments is soon to be published.
Dr. John K. Lattimer of New York and Dr. Cyril H. Wecht of Pitts-
burgh were also interviewed. Each of them has studied in detail the
autopsy photographs, x-rays, and other materials, as well as the mo-
tion pictures of the assassination, and has published the results of his
findings.
Dr. Lattimer testified that there was no medical evidence to
support a theory that the President had been hit by a bullet from
any direction other than from the rear and above. The medical evi-
dence showed that the President had not been hit from the front or
right front. Had a second and nearly simultaneous bullet from the
front or right front hit the President's head after Frame 313 of the
Zapruder film, it would either have encountered no skull (in which
case it would have passed through the brain and exited elsewhere) or it
would have struck the skull. In either case, it would have left evidence
which would be revealed by the autopsy photographs and x-rays.
Dr. Lattimer also testified that he has performed experiments
to test both the damage effects of a bullet fired into the rear of the
head (in the precise area where the President was hit) and the prin-
ciple of the "jet effect.." He utilized a Mannlicher-Carcano 6.5 milli-
meter rifle of the. same model as the one found by the Warren Commis-
sion to belong to Lee Harvey Oswald, and ammunition from the same
manufacturer and lot number as that found to have been used by
Oswald. The results, he said, confirmed both the head injuries shown
in the autopsy photographs and x-rays and the principle of the "jet-
effect." Dr. Lattimer presented to the Commission staff as evidence a
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motion picture film and still photographs showing the results of his
experiments.
I)r. Wecht testified that the available evidence all points to the
President being struck only by two bullets coming from his rear, and
that no support can be found for theories which postulate gunmen to
the front or right front of the Presidential car.
In a 1974 article written by Dr.