FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A000900070010-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: July 31, 1973
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Rele.2003/ M01133A0 00070010-2
1JU oci/IC 73-0601/1
$1 JUL 1973
7 i rector, Bureau of intelligence and "esearch,
epartrnt of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
rv^puty Cirector, Central Intelligence +pnncy
SU iECT; Finished 1 ntel l i gencee Production "'anagement,
1. In the, interest of best servingri the consumer of intelligence,
it is important that the various production offices 'ocus their efforts
on matters which are appropriate to their mission and on which,
therefore, they can to expected to have the c?reatest expertise. A,
survey of selected areas of State/CI",j ?I: finished intelligence
production, Oich is sta arized at Tab ?., indicates that this is
generally the case, but there are areas of duplication and instances
in which the producer was other than the most "appropriate" ar;r-ncy.
At least part of the reason for this is that there is currently no
ntelilpence proctproduction managers what I t?leence production is in , rk or contemplated by other producers.
2. In order to provide production managers with a continuing
community--wide schedule of finished intelligence production, both
pronosedi and I n work, I recorend establ i shpt of an I ntel l i npnce
Production ^egistry File within CSI?iS. This file would provide a
listing by country, region, and/or special subject of nronosed
finished intelligence production by each addressee agency. The file
would indicate the title of the proposed publication with sufficient
title expansion to identify content, the anticipated publication date,
project officer and some other administrative data. When participation
by more than one agency would result in an improved product, the
proposed production would
reb i stry file notification of the nrovi de
a basis for initiation of coordination to create a ccxunity product or
enable several agencies to address those portions of the overall topic
which are within their prinary interest. Indication that a product IS
already in work in one agency could lead another agency having a need
for such a product to cancel its own effort.
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 CONFIDENTIAL
3. The registry file could be undated by secure telephone to a
central point of contact within the IC staff. Initially the COINS
file would be updated twice weekly to show additions, deletions and
changes. Experience with the system would indicate the most desired
frequency for update actions.
4. Your comments on this registry file concept are requested
by 20 August. If these comments are favorable, a test of a manual
file is contemplated to insure the file system will he of maximum
utility prior to undertaking detailed programming for the CtOf'!S file.
(Signed) Lew Allen
Lew Allen, Jr.
1a: jor General, USAF
Deh uty to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community
Attachment
as stated
DCI/IC/PRG/~6/15/73
Rewritten: 9 June 1973
2nd page retyped for changes by Gen. Graham in para 4.:vdm 30 July 1973
Distribution:
orig - D, INR/State
1 - D/DIA
1 - DD/CIA
- D/DCI/IC
PRG subject
1 - DSG/IC
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Survey of State/CIA/DIA Finished Intelligence
Production in Selected Areas
April 1972 - April 1973
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: Intelligence production is generally.
accomplished by the most appropriate producerand almost all pro-
duction is at least accomplished by=an appropriate producer3. Although
only a very small percentage of production is done by agencies whose
"appropriateness" is questionable4 (30 out of 832 documents), there is
a considerable duplication in the "most appropriate" and "appropriate"
categories because the criteria for these categories were made inten-
tionally broad to accommodate the wide range of interests of the pro-
ducing agencies, particularly the CIA. For example, production on
the Soviet Union revealed extensive overlap. Some questionable appro-
priateness of production occurs when the agency of primary concern does
not produce. DIA's production on military subjects in the Middle East
was very limited (four) while CIA did a number of pieces on those
subjects (30). The category of "questionable appropriateness" would
have been reduced to near zero had the producing agencies produced
within areas of their primary interest and competence while avoiding
production in areas of lesser competence. There is, however, no
systematic way for production managers to know what production is
proposed or in work by other agencies.
IBased on CIA CRS AEGIS file holdings on the Soviet Union, Latin
America, Southeast Asia and the Middle East
2Criteria:
a. Production on a subject under DCID authority.
b. Production on a subject clearly within the responsibility of
the producing agency and production for which the producer has the
greatest competence within the intelligence community.
Criteria:
a. Production does not violate DCID authority.
b. The producing agency has some responsibility for such
production and a considerable degree of competence on the subject.
4Criteria:
a. Production violates DC~D authority. (No product in this
sample review violated DCID authority. )
b. The producing agency has little direct responsibility for
such production and limited competence in the subject area.
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 ~4~proved For Release 2003/d41 .1 01 -
Survey o ate/CIA/1DI.A Finished Intelliryence Production in Selected Areas
_April 1972 Anri1 1 973
25X1A
Middle East
Latin America
Southeast Asia
Number of Finished Intelligence Publications
Total Pub-- Most Appropriate Appropriate Production A ro
lications Producer Producer pre
ateness Questi tionable
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