WHITE HOUSE/NSC INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A000900040001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 23, 1973
• Content Type: MFR

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23 March 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
25X1A SUBJECT: White House/NSC Intelligence Requirements
Background
The mission statement of Monday, 19 March 1973 was to develop('
a definition of the consumer intelligence requirements. This is a
large order and should be approached with measured steps and with
attention to White House requirements before all others. The Andrew
W. Marshall memorandum of 6 February to Bronson Tweedy outlines most
of the problems and I will not reiterate.
Interviews
and I interviewed Tom Latimer, Dick Kennedy,
Chip Pickett, and Dave McManis. I spent another two hours with
McManis on the mechanics of providing current intelligence to the
President and Dr. Kissinger. In addition to the aforementioned
interviews, I drew upon a year of experience as the DIA liaison
to the White House and NSC Staff.
Findin s
1. The White House is not satisified with current intelligence
support to the President and Dr. Kissinger.
a. The PDB consistently fails to meet the intelligence
requirements/interests of the President.
b. The WHSR staff prepares an intelligence brief for
the President by drawing upon "a few" of the articles carried
in the PDB, CIB, INTSUM, and OPSINT but drawing upon message
traffic for most material. An expanded version of this is
prepared for Dr. Kissinger.
c. McManis has no confidence that the PDB will improve.
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2. McManis identifies a White House requirement for coordinated
intelligence community judgments on current events and states that
they are nigh impossible to obtain in less tgan 2 to 3 days.
3. Summaries on intelligence products are unsatisfactory. They
are usually too long and seldom convey the thrust of the paper. NOTE:
This is raised by many sources and Andy Marshall is talking with a
research firm on this problem.
4. Special groups such as DiBona on the energy problem and
Schultz/Dam/Flanigan on CEP are probably not receiving the community
support that is available.
5. Widespread complaints that the intelligence community fails
to report on events of national inteAest, particularly in the economic
field. NOTE: This is another sympt*om of the lack of "feedback" from
WH/NSC to the community.
6. INR products are not valued highly. Frequent criticisms
were "biased," 'Aushy judgments," and lacking intellectual discipline.... t"
(t v
yI )y r, F.,- .II & X11 1 1 %.1 V I IV \..J VV. N116n .11 ViI* M11\.a Vi(1 'JI V-IYV YJ V11 J*4* I . ~~ O r
subjects (Vietnam cited most often) are distracting and not c?V,,'~.
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differences of substance. The differences are highlighted by o 1
V
different methodologies or emphasis and the consumer wastes a. lot of
time doing his own analysis.
Recommendations
1. This DCI Staff element should assume a liaison function to
identify and coordinate the intelligence community support Ito:
a. WH/NSC Staff
b. Special groups/individuals such as DiBona on the
energy problem, Schultz/Dam/Flanigan in CEP and CIEP, etc.
c. Defense Department
d. State Department
e. Justice Department and the FBI
f. Treasury Department and the BNDD
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2. This DCI liaison function should:
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a. Identify intelligence requirements.
b. Recommend DCI tasking of appropriate element of
intelligence community to support requirement.
c. Stress use of established production elements and
USIB structure.
d. Supervise intelligence support arrangements
3. This staff should become familiar with current intelligence
production activities in INR, DIA, and CIA to include departmental
intelligence as well as products for external/national use.
4. Watch the quality of the President's Daily Brief -- McManis
is not confident that it will improve.
5. The DCI and staff must provide policy feedback to the intelligence
community in order to provide focus to the production effort.
a. The DCI must deliberately provide production guidance
based upon Presidential interest perceived in WSAG and 40 committee.
b. General Graham must provide formals or informal guidance/
supervision to community research and production effort based
upon NSCIC Working Group experience.
c. This staff will learn of national interests requiring
intelligence support through liaison contacts and supervising
intelligence support arrangements.
6. Longer range problems bearing on support of national
intelligence requirements:
a. Improved IDHS and analyst communications among
DIA, INR, and CIA will improve timely response to crisis
situations and reduce expenses of competitive exercise to
publish separately on special events.
b. Develop consumer polling techniques to facilitate
quality control and consumer reaction to intelligence production
elements.
c. Training courses in advanced analytical techniques must
be developed and incorporated into existing intelligence schools.
e. Management policies for encouraging innovative approaches
to collection, analysis, and production must be formulated.
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Excerpt from MOR, 12 March 1973, by Subj: Conversation 25X1A
with Andrew Marshall, NSC Staff, on NSCIC Working Group matters and
Related Concerns (filed NSCIC WG Projects - B)
(O4)
"3...... HeA feels none of the studies really addresses two problem
areas which are of concern to policy levels of government.
a. First, he feels there is a lack of shared perception
as to how policy makers view the world and particularly the
role of force in that world.
b. Second, he considers the total exclusion of intelligence
from participation in the planning process during crisis situations
is a distinct handicap. He believes intelligence should have
something to offer during the period when policy is being
designed, in monitoring the on-going situation, and in providing
a feed-back of the effectiveness of actions called for by
policy decisions, but intelligence does not really contribute
in these areas.
4. During the crisis periods which were studied (India-Pakistan,
Arab-Israeli and Jorday-Fedayeen) the DCI had access to what was going
on, in Andy's view, but there is no indication that he felt he could
advise intelligence producers concerning what he learned while
attending WSAG meetings and similar conferences.
8. Andy talked at some length about differences between the
view which intelligence officers seem to have and that of policy level
officials of the role of force and the deployment of military forces
as levers to influence crisis situations. He felt this was clearly
evident in the deployment of naval forces to the Bay of Bengal in
the India-Pakistan war. The United States used these moves as a way
of communicating U.S. intent and concern, but the intelligence
community, particularly State and CIA, seemed to have the view
that such moves were inherently ineffective or should not be done
and, therefore, intelligence did not contribute as it should have in
assessing the results. Andy said also that Dr. Kissinger's request
for an estimate of the consequences of particular outcomes of the
1 India-Pakistan crisis got a poor reply which did not deal with his
concerns."
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