NATIONAL SITUATION REPORT TEST PROJECT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A000800050021-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: February 21, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community
SUBJECT: National Situation Report Test Project
1. The attached two MFR's provide you with the "state of play"
on the National Situation Report test project.
2. As you can see, progress is slow primarily because DIA sees
its role in intelligence production endangered by the development of
a national-level crisis product which is managed and edited at a
location other than the Pentagon.
3. I am going to attempt to defuse Danny's concerns with
regard to this matter. In the meantime, PRD's tack is to sidestep
this major stumbling block and concentrate on working out the details
of test procedures.
4. I will keep you informed.
Chief, Product eview Division
Intelligence Community Staff
Attachments - As Stated
Distribution:
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IC 75-1360
21 February "1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Working Group Meeting: National Crisis SITREP
1. On 18 February 1975, the National SITREP working group held
its second meeting to discuss test procedures.* A draft of these
procedures, prepared by DIA, was used as the basis for these discus-
sions.
2. With some minor adjustments all conferees accepted the
National Situation Report's format prepared by DIA. INR expressed
concern about its length, but was reassured once it was explained
that the format was a checklist for the analyst rather than an out-
line that must be blindly followed regardless of the circumstances
of the crisis. OCI's fears that the sequence of subjects in the
proposed format could not be adjusted and that the "Outlook" section
was too rigid in its methodology also were assuaged. It was agreed
that the order of the presentation of subject matter would-be de-
termined by the situation itself, and that the "Outlook" section's
assessment would represent the community's best estimate of what will
happen without requiring adherence to a rigid format.
3. Conferees concentrated upon two principal issues: (a) which
agency will draft the various sections of the national situation
report; (b) who will be the final authority in determining what will
appear in the National SITREP?
4. On the first issued OCI/CIA suggested that any agency should
be permitted to prepare a draft on any subject. DIA, while not con-
testing CIA's point directly, believed that as a matter of practicality
and for better management, one agency should be assigned drafting
responsibility for a specific section, e.g. DIA would be responsible
for the military situation, CIA for political and economic matters.
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5. With regard to the second question--who will have final
authority for determining the contents of the national SITREP--DIA
.expressed its reservations about a crisis manager having final edi-
torial authority over an agency's submission.
6. Full agreement was not achieved on either of these points.
However, all conferees agreed that for purposes of this test:
a. Agencies will be assigned responsibility for the
preparation of draft paragraphs of the National Situation
Report. These assignments will be made, primarily on the
basis of each agency's mission.
b. Assignment of this responsibility will not preclude
other agencies from expressing dissenting views or drafting
additional material, e.g. DIA might offer the crisis manager
a draft paragraph on a political subject based upon a unique
DIA-source which was received too late to be available to the
principal drafting agency of the political paragraph of the
National Situation Report.
c. The crisis manager/National SITREP editor will make
every effort to minimize changes in the text of drafts sub-
mitted by agencies with principal drafting responsibility.
However, final authority for the contents of the product must
rest with the crisis manager/National SITREP editor.
7. The--DIA representative noted that the Director,_'DIA desired
to make changes in the USIB-approved testing procedures. The changes
proposed that: (a) at least one test embody a military crisis format
and that the task of putting to ether the SITREP for this test be
conducted at the Pentagon (NMIC); (b) that an actual situation ap-
proaching crisis proportions be used'for the test.
8. As these requests by Director, DIA require actions which
exceed the authority of the Working Group, they have been forwarded to
the Chief, PRD, IC Staff for further discussion with Director, DIA.
9. In the absence of the chairman of the National SITREP Working
Group, PRD/IC agreed to prepare an MFR of the meeting, a revised draft
of the test procedures based upon the original DIA draft as amended by
the Working Group and to di
t
ib
s
r
ute these to the conferees.
10. Any proposed revisions to the test procedures vided t
th
o
e Manager of the National SITREP test
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(Room 6 G 11, CIA Hqs Bldg., Telephone
Thursday, 27 February 1975.
not later than
Colonel, USMC
Attachment
Procedures for Initial Test
National Situation Report (NSR)
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21 February 1975
PROCEDURES FOR INITIAL TEST
NATIONAL SITUATION REPORT (NSR)
1. GENERAL.
a. The initial feasibility test for the National SITREP (NSR)
is scheduled during the hours 0700-1300, 12 March 1975, and will use
in the main, the real-world situation in Indo-China and Thailand.
b. For the purposes of this test, OCI/CIA will have primary
editorial responsibility, assemble, and publish the final draft of
the National SITREP. DIA, State/INR, and NSA will participate, to
the degree possible, by establishing task force-type organizations
during the test period and by designating an approving authority for
coordination.
2. DRAFTING PROCEDURES.
a. For the purposes of this test, DIA will be primarily responsi-
ble for Section II "Military Situation," CIA for Section III, "Political/
Economic Situation;" and State/INR will, in the main, respond to Section
IV, "U.S. and Friendly Actions..." Normally, Sections I ("Summary") and
V ("Outlook") will be the responsibility of the National Situation Report
editors, but they may exercise this responsibility by requesting draft
support from specific intelligence agencies depending upon the subject
matter of the crisis.
b. Nothing in the above paragraph should be construed to preclude
independent submissions of original material by any agency o' any
subject.
3. COORDINATION PROCEDURES.
a. Coordination, as used herein, means the right to dissent/dis-
agree with another agency's submission by written comment appended to
the NSR.
b. During the initial test, the NSR editor will exercise final
judgment over that which appears in the National SITREP. To facilitate
coordination and meet publication deadlines, submissions normally will
be submitted to the editor not later than one hour before publication.
The editor will then compile all inputs and send draft SITREPs out for
coordination.
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c. At the discretion of the editor, late breaking intelligence
may be added to the SITREP and labelled as uncoordinated intelligence.
d. In any case, each National SITREP will contain a clear
reference explaining the currency of its information, i.e., an "as of
time" expressed in terms of EST/EDT.
e. To the degree possible various agencies' analysts should ex-
change information and views prior to submitting copy to the NSR editors
in order to facilitate the final coordination process.
f. Crisp judgments should not be sacrificed to bridge real ana-
lytical differences. If agreement cannot be quickly reached, analysts
should then move to dissent.
g. Agency dissents should be terse and concentrate on new evi-
dence or insights which would place a new dimension on the primary
submission, i.e., dissent should not merely refute the original posi-
tion.
h. The NSR editor may not exclude a dissent if the original view
which triggered the dissent is included in the SITREP.
4. COMMUNICATIONS.
a. The WASHFAX net (LDX) will be the primary means used to pass
textual and graphic material.
b. The NSA "Meet-me-Bridge" will be used as the secure conferencina
system between agencies.
c. IC Staff will publish necessary changes to the "Crisis Manage-
ment Communications Card."
d. Analysts will use their normal: communications links to
coordinate intelligence on a desk-to-desk basis.
5. CONTROL PROCEDURES.
a. The IC Staff will act as control and will station observers
with each agency's task force to observe operations during the test.
b. The IC Staff will act as national consumers to task the
National SITREP system as appropriate.
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PRo0PO5~ED FORMAT FOR THE NATIONAL SITREP
(This format is intended as a checklist for analysts and
supervisors. It is not an exact outline that must be rigidly
followed, i.e. paragraph order can be changed according to the
importance of the subject matter at the moment and paragraphs
may be deleted or abbreviated according to circumstances.)
I. Summary - Short resume of significant developments since last
SITREP. First SITREP provides all essential background and
pre-crisis history.
II. Military Situation
A. Enemy actions and plans
B. Friendly actions and plans
C. Third party actions and plans
OR
A. Belligerent actions and plans
B. Actions and plans of countries friendly to U.S.
A. Political/economic developments affecting the military
situation
1. Belligerents Enemy
2. Friendly to U.S. Friendly
3. Third party OR Third Party
4. International organizations
B. Political/Economic Developments affecting the general
C. Third party actions and plans
III. Political and Economic Situation
situation
1. Belligerents
2. Friendly to U.S.
3. Third party
4. International organizations
Enemy
Friendly
Third Party
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IV. U.S. and Friendly Actions Bearing on Enemy/Belligerent Third
Party/International Organization Actions (Deals only with those
actions which explain a later action or counteraction by any
country, organization, or group.)
V. Assessments - Emphasis should be placed on assessing the meaning
of events and what they portend. A short-term outlook will be
published at least daily during a crisis. The outlook assess-
ment may include: (a) the objectives and intentions of the
parties involved, (b) their relative capabilities; (c) their
points of confrontation and (d) their probable course(s) of
action. The main purpose of this section will be to give the
community's best estimate of the future course of events.
NOTE: All times cited in the text will be Eastern Standard Time and
each SITREP will contain a footnote indicating the difference
in hours between EST and that standard time which obtains in
the crisis area.
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14 February 1975
SUBJECT: Working Group Meeting: National Crisis SITREP
1. On 6 February 1975, OCI/CIA,
chaired a meeting with representatives from CD, I
State/INR, and IC/PRD to discuss the USIB directed feasi-
bility test for the National Crisis Situation Report.* It
was decided, tentatively, that the first test would be held
on 12 March and that the working group would meet again on
18 February to lay out test procedures.
2. Specifically, the group will address three issues:
(1)- the SITREP format, (2) drafting responsiblities, and (3}
coordination procedures. DIA will draft, and distribute
before Tuesday's meeting, a straw-man format and will indicate
those subjects for which DIA would assume primary drafting
responsibilities.
3. Much of the discussion centered on the general
issue of coordination. All agreed that communications would
pose serious difficulties since the LDX system, to be used
during the first test, is often burdened by other, higher
priority traffic (e.g. NID or NIB items). Thus, the group
decided to schedule the test, at least the first test,
during hours of low LDX usage. '
4. Another issue under the rubric of coordination
involved the question, what is a SITREP? More precisely,
what kind of intelligence should a SITREP contain? State/INF,
seemed to believe that a crisis situation report merely
listed facts and events to inform the reader of the latest
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events and thus, coordination of this type of information
would not pose major obstacles. IC/PRD pointed out that, in
fact, SITREPs during previous crises--the October War and
Cyprus--did much more than that. Fairly consistently they
attempted to explain the meaning of events and on occasion
to estimate the future course of the crisis. Our point was
that coordination would likely be a good deal less simple
than INR assumed, because it would be made over judgments
and interpretations of facts and not just over the facts
themselves. There seemed to be general agreement on this
point from others but the question, what is a SITREP, was
not settled.
5. Another coordination question concerned "check-
writing" capabilities. OCI/CIA was concerned that coordination
procedures might affect timeliness if crisis task force
representatives, rather than higher supervisors, did not
have the authority to pass on items. DIA commented that the
level at which items could be coordinated would depend
largely on the implications of the item. If it were a
Judgment with serious implications for US interests, for
example, (e.g., that the Soviets were probably going to
intervene militarily in the Middle East), then higher authorit-y
in DIA would likely have to approve coordination. For the
most part, however, DIA task force representatives could
write that agency's checks.
6. Finally,.the meaning of coordination was discussed-
.While a precise definition was not rendered, all seemed to
support the IC/PRD position that coordination is not just
agreement, it is also dissent, which as general rule should
be included in the published item.
7. Two other topics, not immediately germane to the
test but relevant to any future efforts to establish a
National SITREP, were discussed. ' One concerned where the
report would be produced, and the other whether the advent
of a National SITREP was really a first step in a larger
effort to centralize direction and control of community
intelligence assets. The latter was voiced by DIA and is
related to its concerns that a National SITREP has major
implications for DIA's roles and missions. It was noted
that the testing presently being considered had no such long
term goals in mind, and PRD made clear that the IC Staff was
not entering this test with "a position" or any pre-conceived
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