USIB COMMITTEE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN WEAPON SYSTEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A000400190011-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: July 28, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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2 8 JUL 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT USIB Committee Responsibilities for
Analysis of Foreign Weapon Systems
1. Your decision is needed as to how the USIB committee
structure should deal with intelligence on foreign weapon
systems. The problem arises primarily from four factors:
a. Dissatisfaction with the manner in which'
responsibilities for analysis of weapon systems-related
information is now divided between the SIC and GMAIC.
b. The desire of the SIC to be relieved of
responsibility for covering current weapons systems to
permit a better focus on advanced technologies and new
physical discoveries and their possible application to
future weapons.
c. The proposal of the GMAIC chairman that his.
committee handle all weapon systems.
d. The counter-proposal of General Graham that a
new USIB committee be formed, with a DIA representative
as chairman, to deal with those weapon systems now
under SIC jurisdiction.
2. Several decision options are suggested:
a. Continue the present division of weapon
system responsibilities as between GMAIC and SIC. It
was dissatisfaction with this arrangement which led to
the present consideration of.the problem.
b. Continue both GMAIC and SIC in weapon systems
analysis, but change existing responsibilities.
Dr. Proctor favors making a renamed GMAIC responsible
for strategic delivery systems,(ballistic missile
submarines and inter-continental bombers as well as.
ballistic missiles and space systems) with SIC respon-
sible for all other weapon systems.
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c. Leave GMAIC responsibilities as at present
and form a new committee to analyze those weapon systems
elements. which are now the responsibility of SIC, some
of which involve tactical systems. This would require
no realignment of working groups since all of the SIC
sub-elements would be moved to the new committee. This
arrangement would take care of General Graham's problem,
provided DIA chaired the new committee.
d. Set up a new committee and redivide respon-
sibilities so that GMAIC would have strategic weapon
systems and the new committee all tactical weapon
systems. This would give each committee chairman a
.fairly small span of control as regards sub-committees.
But there would be gray areas. Which committee, for
instance, would study a missile system integrated into
the strategic defenses inside the USSR when the same
missile system also is an element of the tactical
forces based outside the Soviet Union? Furthermore, in
the early stages of a weapon system development,- it is
often difficult to determine whether it is intended to
be of a strategic or tactical nature. Lastly, there
would be considerable duplication between, the committees,
e.g., both 'committees would be studying submarines,
aircraft, and cruise missiles, albeit of different
types.
e. Form one committee to study all aspects of
weapon and space systems. This is the proposal of the
GMAIC: chairman. The'chairman's span of control would
be considerable under this option. There is virtue in
such control, but also problems in that the existing
chairman's power is already subject to criticism from
DIA and the military services. It would also be
necessary to establish new working groups. A single
committee would, however, facilitate the setting of
priorities for study and provide better protection
against gaps in analysis and unnecessary overlap. This
solution is favored within GMAIC by CIA, State and
ERDA, but opposed by DIA and the military services. A
single committee is favored by Sayre Stevens, George
Carver, Howard Stoertz and
3. If a single weapon and space systems committee is
established, alternative sub-structures are as follows:
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a. Formation of two primary sub-elements: a
strategic weapon systems sub-committee-headed by a CIA
officer and a tactical weapon systems sub-committee
chaired by the Defense Department representative. This
arrangement would have the same problem of gray areas
cited in paragraph 2d above for a two-committee arrangement.
b. Establishment of a number of sub-committees
or working groups to carry out detailed analysis by
technical discipline rather than by operational (i.e.,
strategic or tactical) mission. All ballistic missiles,
both strategic and tactical, would be handled by a
single working group, all aircraft by a single working
group, etc. Sub-committee and working group chairmen
would be drawn from appropriate elements of the Intelli-
gence Community. as agreed between the chairman and
vice-chairman of the committee.
c. Under either arrangement, the chairman of the
new committee would be allowed to establish ad hoc
working groups from time to time to handle any special
matters which did not lend themselves to analysis by
one of the extant working groups.
4. Of the various options, we recommend adoption of a
single weapon and space systems committee (para. 2 e) with
sub-committees and working groups organized by technical
discipline (para. 3 b). Further, we recommend chairmanship
of this new committee be as follows:
a. In order to provide an orderly 'transition
from the present to the new working arrangements, the
initial chairman should be the present chairman of
GMAIC, who would serve a minimum of one year, with a
nominee of the Director, DIA, serving as vice-chairman.
b. Thereafter, the chairman would normally serve
a three-year term, with the chairman and vice-chairman
positions rotating between CIA and DIA nominees.
co Designation of chairman and vice=chairman of
the committee would be as mutually agreed between the
DCI and the Director of DIA.
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5. The recommended alternative in paragraph 4 recognizes
that interagency relationships are an important element of
any system for committee handling of weapon systems analysis.
Any solution must involve elements of compromise. The
arrangement which is set forth in paragraph 4 also would go
.far toward solving the substantive problems which have
existed because of the split_r.esponsibilities between GMAIC
and SIC. It would facilitate the setting @f priorities for
study and provide better assurance of overall coverage
without unnecessary redundancy. This proposal may not be
wholly acceptable to General Graham since it does not give
DIA the control of a committee studying tactical weapon
systems. Nevertheless, the proposal does give DIA a more
direct and important role in the management of USIB com-
mittee matters dealing with the weapon systems which are of
important concern to the Department of Defense. In my view,
General Graham will live gracefully with such an arrangement.
6. On receipt of your guidance, we will develop the
necessary changes in'the DCIDs for USIB consideration.
/s/ Samuel V. Wilson
Samuel V. Wilson
Lieutenant General, USA
D/DCI/IC
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Distribution:
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1--DR
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 INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
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25 July 1975
This recommendation for GMAIC provides a
further alternative for your consideration with
the DCI and moves away from our earlier
posture of supporting a two-committee concept.
It tends to support the compromise solution we
provided in our original draft (I pulled the one
you sent to the Director back to give the boys one
more chance) but at the same time is biased
toward something of less than acceptable posture
by DIA. If the proposal meets with your approval
and in the light of Danny's own commitment to
buy a compromise we might get away with the
proposal in paragraph 4. However, I am still
not certain that we want to specifically recommen
paragraph 2. e. for adoption nor 3. b. either,
but I am impressed that 3. b. is probably
the best arrangement substantively that we
could hope to achieve with a good possibility
of Danny's agreement.
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 nrnnCT L~~. ()
DCI/IC-75-06)49
16 JUL 9S
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT USIB Committee Responsibilities for
Foreign Weapon Systems
1. Your decision is needed as to how the USIB committee
structure should deal with intelligence on operational foreign
weapon systems. The problem arises primarily from four factors:
a. Dissatisfaction with the manner in which
responsibilities for analysis of weapon systems-related
information is now divided.
b. The desire of SIC to be relieved of responsibility
for operational weapon systems to enable a better focus on
scientific and technical intelligence.
c. The proposal of the GMAIC chairman that his
committee handle all weapon systems.
d. The counter-proposal of General Graham that a new
USIB committee be formed, with a DIA representative as
chairman, to deal with those weapon systems now under SIC
jurisdiction.
2. Five decision options are suggested:
a. Continue the present division of weapon system
responsibilities as between GMAIC and SIC. It was dis-
satisfaction with this arrangement which led to the present
consideration of the problem.
b. Continue both GMAIC and SIC in weapon systems
analysis, but change existing responsibilities. Dr. Proctor
favors making a renamed GMAIC responsible for strategic
delivery systems (ballistic missile submarines and inter-
continental bombers as well as ballistic missiles and
space systems) with SIC responsible for all other weapon
systems.
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c. Leave GMAIC responsibilities as at present
and form a new committee to analyze those weapon systems
elements which are now the responsibility of SIC, some of
which involve tactical systems. This would require no
realignment of working groups since all of the SIC sub-
elements would be moved to the new committee. This
arrangement would take care of General Graham's problem,
providing DIA chaired the new committee. C There are
political considerations which lend further credibility
to DCI in selection of this alternative
d. Set up a new committee and redivide responsi-
bilities so that GMAIC would have strategic weapon
systems and the new committee all tactical weapon systems.
This would give each committee chairman a fairly small
span of control as regards sub-committees. But there
-would be gray areas. Which committee, for instance,
would study a missile system integrated into the strategic
defenses inside. the USSR when the same missile system also
is an element. of the tactical forces based outside the
Soviet Union?
e. Form one committee to study all aspects of
weapon and space systems. This is the proposal of the
GMAIC chairman. The chairman's span of control is
considerable under this option, which could be a serious
drawback. It would also be necessary to establish new
working groups.. A single committee would, however,
facilitate the setting of priorities for study and provide
better protection against gaps in analysis and unnecessary
overlap. This solution is favored within GMAIC by
CIA, State and ERDA, but opposed by DIA and the military
services. A single committee is favored by Sayre Stevens,
George Carver, Howard Stoertz and
3. We.suggest you give serious weight to acceding to
DIA chairmanship of a weapons committee. While there are some
substantial drawbacks, we believe it is important to assure
DIA involvement and commitment to the DCI and USIB in fields
of their primary concerns in particular. The interplay
between the committees forces an important relationship and
provides for a more open coverage of the subject matter.
We see. no reason why NI01.could.not be equally serviced by
a DIA chairman--although:',this alternative, of course, expands
the USIB_committee structure further.
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4. As a compromise, Option e--a single USIB Foreign
Weapon Systems Committee--with the following sub-elements
goes a good distance toward meeting the DIA request:
a. The initial chairman will be a CIA officer,
with a Department of Defense representative as vice
chairman.
b. The chairman will serve a three-year term,
with the chairman and vice chairman positions rotating
between CIA and the Department of Defense. (There is a
precedent for this since of the
Air Force was chairman of GMAIC in 1958-1961.)
c. Designation of a Defense Department representative
as chairman or vice chairman of the committee will be as
mutually agreed between the DCI and the Director of DIA.
d. The Foreign Weapon Systems Committee will have
two primary sub-elements: a 'strategic weapon systems
sub--committee headed by a CIA officer and a tactical
weapon,. systems sub-committee chaired by a Defense Depart-
ment representative. Other sub-committees, panels and
working groups may be formed as necessary. Appointment
of the sub-committee chairmen will, be subject to DCI
approval.
5. The suggestions in both paragraphs 3 and 4 recognize
that inter-agency relationships are an important element of
any system for committee handling of weapon systems analysis.
Any solution must involve elements of compromise.
6. On receipt of your guidance, we will develop the
necessary changes in the DCID's for USIB consideration.
S
Lie enant General, USA
Dep y to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community
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 App*ff Eq11 H 0SDt,1MMV N11AR
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16 JUL 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: New USIB Committee on
Foreign Weapons Systems?
I try hard to provide you with clean,
unequivocal recommendations, but I'm
falling short in the present instance.
My own tilt is apparent in paragraphs
3 and 4. Graham would prefer the former,
will live gracefully with the latter.
Could you please place a check
mark beside your preference. We will
take it from there.
25X1
Sa ue Mon.
Lieu nant . eneral, USA
Dep ty toy the DCI for the
In lligence Community
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E O%U`."NG
USIA COMMITTI E RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN WEAPON
CIS--_._.._.-__ _--
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COMMENTS (Number cock comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a lino across column after coch eomrn nt.)
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