DCI'S PERSPECTIVE OF THE INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT
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Document Page Count:
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Approved For. Release 2004/09ii
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
4SEPi73
MEMORANDUM FOR: Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee
SUBJECT: DCI's Perspective of the Intelligence
Environment
1. The attached paper outlines my views of the world
environment in which the intelligence community will be working
over the next several years. Further, it outlines the key
intelligence problems as I see them.
2.. I have asked USIB principals to disseminate this document
widely among their intelligence officers. Copies have also been
sent to th' President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
and to the National Security Council Intelligence Committee.
I will shortly forward to members of USIB some specific substantive
intelligence objectives related to this view of the environment
and to the goals and objectives which I intend to pursue in
compliance with Presidential directives. I will also forward to
you specific objectives related to management and resource
objectives.
25X1
L. Colby-
Attachment
Copies
25X1
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Distribution on DCI's Perspective of the Intelligence Environment,
August 1973, No. 73-0554
printed 200 copies plus a few extra unnumbered
Copy 1 - DCI
2 - DDCI as IRAC member
3 and 4 - ASD(I) as IRAC member
5 - D/INR/State as IRAC member
25X1 6 adn 7 - OMB, as IRAC member
10 thru 14 - Chairman, NSCIC
15 - Attorney General as NSCIC member
16 - Dep. Sec of State as NSCIC member
17 - Dep Sec of Defense as NSCIC member
18 and 19 - Chairman, JCS as NSCIC member
25X1
20 thru 184, plus 190 and 191 - USIB Secretariat for dissemination
to USIB and within CIA
(192 Subject Copy)
Internal IC
185 and 186 - PEG
187, 188, 189 - CCG
25X1
D/DCI/IC - unnumbered copy
I i- copy 0
PRG staff circulating - unnumbered copy
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SECR.T
No. 73-0554
27 July 1973
THE DCI'S PERSPECTIVE OF THE INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT
SECRET
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SECRE
No. 73-0554
27July 1973
THE DCI's PERSPECTIVE OF THE INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT
1. TRENDS IN THE WORLD SITUATION
A. General
1. The pace of change in foreign political, economic, and military
affairs has increased in recent years, in large part because of Presidential
initiatives in the field of foreign affairs. This rapidly changing environment
will necessitate changes in the emphasis and priorities of intelligence activi-
ties. During the next few years we will have to meet a growing demand for
foreign political and economic intelligence. In particular, information con-
cerning economic threats to our national interest and our access to key
natural resources will take on ever-increasing importance.
2. Nevertheless, for the next few years, it appears that military intelli-
gence will retain a high priority. Until recently, our high interest in the
strategic weapons program of the USSR stemmed from the traditional
military need to keep track of enemy capabilities; now there is the need to
monitor Soviet compliance with SAL agreements. But the growing need for
other categories of military intelligence will decrease the relative importance
of the Soviet strategic weapons program. SALT 11, MBFR, CTB and any
agreements arising from those efforts will add to the demand for military
intelligence, as will the still unsettled situations in Southeast Asia and the
Middle East.
B. The USSR-PRC-US Triangle
3. Very few matters of importance in world affairs will arise in the
70's which will not be affected by the relationships among the US, USSR
and PRC. Two major developments produced the current relationships: the
USSR achieved strategic nuclear parity with the US, and the Sino-Soviet
conflict entered the phase of military confrontation. These factors have
combined in various ways to reinforce trends in both the USSR and PRC
toward policies of detente vis-a-vis the Nest. The desire of each communist
power to prevent the other from gaining relatively greater favor with the US
has tended to produce restraint in the face of strong US initiatives. Both
have issued unmistakable signals indicating that a continued US military
presence in Asia is desirable. Such behavior and attitudes seemed unbeliev-
able a few years ago.
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No. 73-0554
4. While the Soviets appear to have accepted strategic parity as a
modus virendi with the US, they retain the option of building on their
current capabilities in an effort to achieve strategic superiority. Should they
desire to do so, the size and nature of their strategic attack forces would
permit them to make qualitative improvements (e.g., high accuracy MIRV's)
which could put the US at a serious strategic disadvantage. Such a develop-
ment, coupled with a sharp improvement in Soviet strategic defenses, could
make the disadvantage critical, although such a major relative improvement
appears unlikely. In view of its potential importance to national security,
this possibility must be a leading concern to the intelligence community.
S. Aspects of the Sino-Soviet confrontation are changing daily. The
Chinese are devoting a great deal of their energies to building military and
political defenses against the Soviet Union. The Soviets are continuing to
improve their capabilities for military contingencies along their borders and
are trying to contain China through political and military actions all around
China's borders. The seeds of armed conflict are firmly planted. While there
are differing views as to the likelihood of a major Sino-Soviet armed clash, it
is the most likely of postulated wars between major powers. It is not likely,
however, that the Chinese, in an inferior military position, would delib-
erately precipitate a war. The Soviets might.
6. At some point in the 1970's, Chinese nuclear power will reach the
point where Peking need no longer fear a rational Soviet military'action.
With a nuclear balance no longer overwhelmingly favorable to the USSR, the
two communist powers may move toward reconciliation. During the same
time frame Peking might develop a limited nuclear capability against the
United States. These developments could sharply reduce China's need to rely
on US goodwill to counterbalance the Soviets. Further, the advanced age of
Mao, Chou EnLai and other key Chinese leaders is almost certain to result in
a succession problem in the near future, the outcome of which could
radically change the foreign policy of the PRC.
.7. Any fundamental change in the nature of the Sino-Sovict con-
frontation will have a profound impact on US policy. Intelligence related to
this subject will require more priority than it now enjoys.
-2-
EL L
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C. The Multipolar World
8. The new pattern of relationships among the three great powers has
thrust two other important power cent: rs into the area of prime intelligence
interest - Western Europe and Japan. Five years ago these power centers saw
themselves essentially threatened by one superpower and protected by the
other. Now they find themselves courted by both superpowers and believe
they are not much threatened by either. This provides their governments a
sharply increased, flexibility in serving their own national interests which are
not always aligned with those of the US. From time to time economic
rivalry distorts the image of the United States as political and military ally.
This tendency is also evident among other previously staunch allies of lesser
power as well, e.g., Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, and in Latin
America. In combination, new world relationships raise the spectre of serious
economic threats to US interests.
9. Because of this trend, we will be called upon to provide better
political, economic, and military intelligence on key Free World countries.
Improvement in this area will come largely from improved collation and
analysis of available information, but some new collection eff6f will also-Te
required. The impact of multi-national commercial and financial firms on
international affairs is heavy now and is growing. We must face the thorny
problem of a probable need by the US government for reliable and timely
information on their actions and operations. Intelligence on the Free World
is an enormously complicated subject involving a variety of international
agreements. We must elicit policy guidance on intelligence consumer needs
and relate them to available or required resources.
D. NATO-Warsaw Pact
10. For some time now Soviet initiatives for detente with Western
Europe have been pressed - and greeted - with varying degrees of en-
.thusiasm. The attraction of detente for the Soviets is always tempered by
their concern for maintaining hegemony in Eastern Europe. And, while both
West and East European political leaders have long desired an easing of
tensions, some on both sides fear that permanent cession of Eastern Europe
to strict Soviet dominance may be one result. Also, the continued cohesion
of the NATO alliance and its effectiveness as a deterrent to Warsaw Pact
military pressures is by no means assured. A confident measure of the
relative military strength - particularly conventional strength - of the two
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No. 73-0554
alliances is a key intelligence problem. We must find ways to insure high
confidence levels in our estimates in this area so that we and our NATO allies
have a clear and mutual understanding of the nature of the threat.
E. The Third World
11. We can expect conflicts of various size and of varying impact on US
interests to continue or to arise in the Third World throughout the 1970's.
Some of them will be aided and abetted by either the USSR or PRC.
12. The Soviets will probably become more active in the affairs of the
smaller states. The traditional Russian (Tsarist or Soviet) drive to establish a
strategically secure warm water route to the Soviet Far East has been
reinforced by the Sino-Soviet conflict. Thus, Soviet interest and presence in
the Suez-Indian Ocean-Southeast Asia Straits route to the Far East can be
expected to persist and to grow. Further, the achievement of nuclear parity
reduces the risks to the USSR of a confrontation with US interests in the
Third World. At the same time it releases resources which Moscow could use
to build up its nascent military capability to stand its ground in distant areas.
Competition with the Chinese will further impel the Soviets into activity in
the Third World.
_.-F. Middle East
13. The state of Arab-Israeli hostilities and Soviet efforts to expand
their influence in the area will continue to be major targets of US intelli-
gence attention in the Middle East. Arab control of oil resources and the
leverage this could provide the radical regimes in world markets is a problem
of increasing concern to policyniakers. Moreover, Soviet interest in Middle
Eastern oil is likely to grow. At some point, the Soviets could try to deny
Middle Eastern oil to the Nest and Japan. And, in the 1980's, they might be
interested in it for their own use or for the use of other Bloc countries.
.14. The Soviets have placed their bets on the radical Arab nationalists
in the area. The cement holding their Arab allies together in an anti-US
stance is the hatred of Israel; thus, the Soviets would not welcome a real
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the other hand, they want the Suez
Canal opened. This goal would be set back by open warfare - particularly if
their clients were to lose again - and can be served only by some limited
form of agreement between the hostile parties. ?.
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G. Southeast Asia
16. It is unlikely that all fighting will cease in Southeast Asia before
1980. All countries in the area face on-going or latent insurgencies. Defeat
by insurgents of any of the local governments - especially those of South
Vietnam, Thailand or the Philippines -- could have serious consequences for
US interests, as could Sino-Soviet competition in this area. For some time to
come, intelligence will. be called upon to provide the extensive reporting
necessary to keep abreast of or anticipate developments in Southeast Asia.
H. Other Potential Trouble Spots'
17. The Balkans, South Asia, Latin America, and the confrontation of
black and white dominated nations of Africa bear the seeds of serious impact
on US interests. In the Balkans, the passing of Tito might tempt the Soviets
to try to return Yugoslavia to the orthodox communist fold. In South Asia,
an attempt to further dismember Pakistan could drag the great powers. into
confrontation. In Latin America, pressures from radical regimes could
become intolerable to neighboring states or to US interests;. In Africa,
frustrated black nationalism could cause an eruption of open hostilities. We
must provide enough intelligence to permit warning and accurate evaluation
of crises in these areas.
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No. 73-0554
H. PRIMARY INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS
A. Warning
18. Tactical warning of the imminence of hostile attack against the US,
its deployed forces, or its major allies is primarily a military problem
associated with military operational decisionmaking.-. Strategic warning,
warning of impending political or economic crises, coups or hostile action
involving third countries is a national intelligence problem associated more
broadly with decisionmaking by our national leaders. The two types of
warning have become mixed over the years. We need to delineate functions
and establish priorities, if we are to insure that adequate political, economic
and military intelligence is available to provide warning to US policymakers
prior to the onset of a crisis in any area of the world.
19. To this end, we should systematically reexamine our total warning
intelligence effort. The efficiency and reliability of our programs to collect
and analyze strategic warning indicators bear directly on the community's
need for tactical warning expenditures. We must clarify the relationship
between warning intelligence and normal current intelligence. And we must
determine our degree of confidence in the ability of the strategic warning
system to yield adequate evidence of hostile intentions and heightened
? probabilities of hostile action.
20. We need to maintain a clear awareness of the balance between
resources committed to providing warning of various levels of hostilities and
the likelihood of such hostilities occurring. Our warning systems were
predicated on the Soviet Union's capacity and possible intent to build up
missile and bomber forces capable of launching a rational massive strategic
attack against the US. This underlying planning factor should be reexamined
given the implications of arms limitation agreements.
B. Current Intelligence
21. Many of our principal national level consumers are not being well
served by our current intelligence efforts. We must devise methods for
getting meaningful evaluations of current intelligence items to key con-
sumers as events occur and as intelligence comment is required by the user.
c
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22. We are issuing an excessive number of current infelligence products.
and I intend to reduce that number. In times of crisis, we have deluged
decisionmakers with current items, for the most part uncoordinated and
sometimes contradictory. We must improve our system to provide a timely
and concise analysis of the situation, directed to the policy issues under
consideration, without submerging justifiable divergent judgments.
C. Estimates and Net Assessments
23. Our system for producing estimates for national-level users needs
improvement. Users of these products have criticized them in the past for
imprecision of judgment, general wordiness, and slow response. The NIE
machinery should be made more responsive to the needs of the consumer -
essentially the NSC-and it should provide community input to all NSC
requirements (NSSN1s, WSAG, SRG, etc). In addition to the recent USIB
redefinition of the national estimates products, I am considering other ways
to increase the involvement of the user and to sharpen the focus and
judgments of national estimative intelligence.
24. In whatever form we produce intelligence, we must make the
product useful for policy formulation. It is not our function to become
advocates of particular policies, but it is our duty to prepare balanced
intelligence judgments within the framework of policy options under consid-
eration. The attitudes and actions of the United States government as a rule
have a major impact on the actions of foreign governments. To ignore this in
our estimates is to produce poor intelligence.
D. Arms Control Intelligence
25. SALT: Intelligence must provide continuing assurance to US offi-
cials of Soviet compliance with the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement,
and it must be watchful for political or other indicators to provide timely
warning of a Soviet violation. Our collection capabilities to detect testing
and deployment should be adequate for monitoring the physical :indications
of compliance. Far more difficult will be the task of discerning Soviet
intentions, particular) if this should inr?olve preparations and actions to
conceal violations.
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27. The mobility of theater forces (as contrasted with fixed weapons .
systemssuch as ICBM's) further compounds the problem. Current and future
technical collection systems are unlikely to improve this situation much.
Intelligence from human sources will be called upon to bear an increasingly
critical share of the collection burden in this area.
E. International Trade and Finance
28. Balance of payments problems and attacks on the dollar in world
money markets highlight the fact that, in a relatively stable nuclear parity
environment, concern for military security must be matched by concern for
economic security. We will be called upon for continuing support to policy
level needs Tor economic data on China and the Soviet Union
positions and intentions of countries involved" in negotiations with the
United States and factors which will affect the US competitive position in
international trade.
29. Analytic capabilities of the intelligence offices involved with eco-
nomic intelligence are being strengthened. Efforts are unde+vay to improve
coordination among the various agencies concerned with this problem.
Collection, too, must be improved. We need more extensive exploitation of,
open-source materials and COMINT.
30. The intelligence community has identified nearly 100 countries
which are important to US efforts to suppress illicit drug traffic. Intelligence
on drug traffic in five of these countries - France, Turkey, Mexico, Burma
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and Thailand - is of major importance to the US. It is of considerable
importance in nineteen other countries. So long as the drug problem con-
tinues to be of major concern in the United States, the intelligence c:oin-
munity can expect to be involved in some way in acquiring information
abroad relating to the control of drug traffic and the illicit production of
drugs.
31. The world situation being as uncertain as it is, there is no assurance
that all of the intelligence problems which will be of importance to the
United States during the balance of this decade can be identified at this time.
US policy-makers might be faced in the future with complex issues, multi-
national in scope and not susceptible to solution by normal country-to-
country negotiations. Environmental crises, international terrorism, hijack-
ing, marine pollution -- the list of possibilities is.quite extensive. It is obvious
that we must maintain an array of skills and sufficient flexibility to deal with
new problems in a way which satisfies policy level needs as they arise.
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Secret
DIRECTOR of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Perspective of the
Intelligence Environment
August 197 3
Secret
No. 73-0554
Fyn ::i '~a ib 6'.,g Copy
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
25X1
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RE C, R'F, T
No. 73-0554
August 1973
THE DCI'S PERSPECTIVE OF THE INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT
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Page
1. TRENDS IN THE WORLD SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. The USSR-PRC-US Triangle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
C. The Multipolar World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
D. NATO-Warsaw Pact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
E. The Third World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
F. Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
G. Southeast Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
H. Other Potential Trouble Spots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
II. PRIMARY INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
A. Warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
B. Current Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
C. Estimates and Net Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
D. Arms Control Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
E. International Trade and Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
F. Narcotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
G. Some New Global Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
25
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25X1
THE DCI's PERSPECTIVE OF THE INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT
1. TRENDS IN THE WORLD SITUATION
A. General
1. The pace of change in foreign political, economic, and military
affairs has increased in recent years, in large part because of Presidential
initiatives in the field of foreign affairs. This rapidly changing environment
will necessitate changes in the emphasis and priorities of intelligence activi-
ties. During the next few years we will have to meet a growing demand for
foreign political and economic intelligence. In particular, information con-
cerning economic threats to our national interest and our access to key
natural resources will take on ever-increasing importance.
2. Nevertheless, for the next few years, it appears that military intelli-
gence will retain a high priority. Until recently, our high interest in the
strategic weapons program of the USSR stemmed from the traditional
military need to keep track of enemy capabilities; now there is the need to
monitor Soviet compliance with SAL agreements. But the growing need for
other categories of military intelligence will decrease the relative importance
of the Soviet strategic weapons program. SALT II, MBFR, CTB and any
agreements arising from those efforts will add to the demand for military
intelligence, as will the still unsettled situations in Southeast Asia and the
Middle East.
B. The USSR-PRC-US Triangle
3. Very few matters of importance in world affairs will arise in the
70's which will not be affected by the relationships among the US, USSR
and PRC. Two major developments produced the current relationships: the
USSR achieved strategic nuclear parity with the US, and the Sino-Soviet
conflict entered the phase of military confrontation. These factors have
combined in various ways to reinforce trends in both the USSR and PRC
toward policies of detente vis-a-vis the West. The desire of each communist
power to prevent the other from gaining relatively greater favor with the US
has tended to produce restraint in the face of strong US initiatives. Both
have issued unmistakable signals indicating that a continued US military
presence in Asia is desirable. Such behavior and attitudes seemed unbeliev-
able a few years ago.
SECRET
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25X1 SECRE
4. While the Soviets appear to have accepted strategic parity as a
modus vivendi with the US, they retain the option of building on their
current capabilities in an effort to achieve strategic superiority. Should they
desire to do so, the size and nature of their strategic attack forces would
permit them to make qualitative improvements (e.g., high accuracy MIRV's)
which could put the US at a serious strategic disadvantage. Such a develop-
ment, coupled with a sharp improvement in Soviet strategic defenses, could
make the disadvantage critical, although such a major relative improvement
appears unlikely. In view of its potential importance to national security,
this possibility must be a leading concern to the intelligence community.
5. Aspects of the Sino-Soviet confrontation are changing daily. The
Chinese are devoting a great deal of their energies to building military and
political defenses against the Soviet Union. The Soviets are continuing to
improve their capabilities for military contingencies along their borders and
are trying to contain China through political and military actions all around
China's borders. The seeds of armed conflict are firmly planted. While there
are differing views as to the likelihood of a major Sino-Soviet armed clash, it
is the most likely of postulated wars between major powers. It is not likely,
however, that the Chinese, in an inferior military position, would delib-
erately precipitate a war. The Soviets might.
6. At some point in the 1970's, Chinese nuclear power will reach the
point where Peking need no longer fear a rational Soviet military action.
With a nuclear balance no longer overwhelmingly favorable to the USSR, the
two communist powers may move toward reconciliation. During the same
time frame Peking might develop a limited nuclear capability against the
United States. These developments could sharply reduce China's need to rely
on US goodwill to counterbalance the Soviets. Further, the advanced age of
Mao, Chou EnLai and other key Chinese leaders is almost certain to result in
a succession problem in the near future, the outcome of which could
radically change the foreign policy of the PRC.
7. Any fundamental change in the nature of the Sino-Soviet con-
frontation will have a profound impact on US policy. Intelligence related to
this subject will require more priority than it now enjoys.
SECRET
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SECRET
I
C. The Multipolar World
8. The new pattern of relationships among the three great powers has
thrust two other important power centers into the area of prime intelligence
interest - Western Europe and Japan. Five years ago these power centers saw
themselves essentially threatened by one superpower and protected by the
other. Now they find themselves courted by both superpowers and believe
they are not much threatened by either. This provides their governments a
sharply increased flexibility in serving their own national interests which are
not always aligned with those of the US. From time to time economic
rivalry distorts the image of the United States as political and military ally.
This tendency is also evident among other previously staunch allies of lesser
power as well, e.g., Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, and in Latin
America. In combination, new world relationships raise the spectre of serious
economic threats to US interests.
9. Because of this trend, we will be called, upon to provide better
political, economic, and military intelligence on key Free World countries.
Improvement in this area will come largely from improved collation and
analysis of available information, but some new collection efforts will also be
required. The impact of multi-national commercial and financial firms on
international affairs is heavy now and is growing. We must face the thorny
problem of a probable need by the US government for reliable and timely
information on their actions and operations. Intelligence on the Free World
is an enormously complicated subject involving a variety of international
agreements. We must elicit policy guidance on intelligence consumer needs
and relate them to available or required resources.
10. For some time now Soviet initiatives for detente with Western
Europe have been pressed - and greeted -- with varying degrees of en-
thusiasm. The attraction of detente for the Soviets is always tempered by
their concern for maintaining hegemony in Eastern Europe. And, while both
West and East European political leaders have long desired an easing of
tensions, some on both sides fear that permanent cession of Eastern Europe
to strict Soviet dominance may be one result. Also, the continued cohesion
of the NATO alliance and its effectiveness as a deterrent to Warsaw Pact
military pressures is by no means assured. A confident measure of the
relative military strength - particularly conventional strength - of the two
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SECRET
alliances is a key intelligence problem. We must find ways to insure high
confidence levels in our estimates in this area so that we and our NATO allies
have a clear and mutual understanding of the nature of the threat.
11. We can expect conflicts of various size and of varying impact on US
interests to continue or to arise in the Third World throughout the 1970's.
Some of them will be aided and abetted by either the USSR or PRC.
12. The Soviets will probably become more active in the affairs of the
smaller states. The traditional Russian (Tsarist or Soviet) drive to establish a
strategically secure warm water route to the Soviet Far East has been
reinforced by the Sino-Soviet conflict. Thus, Soviet interest and presence in
the Suez-Indian Ocean-Southeast Asia Straits route to the Far East can be
expected to persist and to grow. Further, the achievement of nuclear parity
reduces the risks to the USSR of a confrontation with US interests in the
Third World. At the same time it releases resources which Moscow could use
to build up its nascent military capability to stand its ground in distant areas.
Competition with the Chinese will further impel the Soviets into activity in
the Third World.
13. The state of Arab-Israeli hostilities and Soviet efforts to expand
their influence in the area will continue to be major targets of US intelli-
gence attention in the Middle East. Arab control of oil resources and the
leverage this could provide the radical regimes in world markets is a problem
of increasing concern to policymakers. Moreover, Soviet interest in Middle
Eastern oil is likely to grow. At some point, the Soviets could try to deny
Middle Eastern oil to the West and Japan. And, in the 1980's, they might be
interested in it for their own use or for the use of other Bloc countries.
14. The Soviets have placed their bets on the radical Arab nationalists
in the area. The cement holding their Arab allies together in an anti-US
stance is the hatred of Israel; thus, the Soviets would not welcome a real
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the other hand, they want the Suez
Canal opened. This goal would be set back by open warfare -- particularly if
their clients were to lose again -- and can be served only by some limited
form of agreement between the hostile parties.
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16. It is unlikely that all fighting will cease in Southeast Asia before
1980. All countries in the area face on-going or latent insurgencies. Defeat
by insurgents of any of the local governments -- especially those of South
Vietnam, Thailand or the Philippines -- could have serious consequences for
US interests, as could Sino-Soviet competition in this area. For some time to
come, intelligence will be called upon to provide the extensive reporting
necessary to keep abreast of or anticipate developments in Southeast Asia.
H. Other Potential Trouble Spots
17. The Balkans, South Asia, Latin America, and the confrontation of
black and white dominated nations of Africa bear the seeds of serious impact
on US interests. In the Balkans, the passing of Tito might tempt the Soviets
to try to return Yugoslavia to the orthodox communist fold. In South Asia,
an attempt to further dismember Pakistan could drag the great powers into
confrontation. In Latin America, pressures from radical regimes could
become intolerable to neighboring states or to US interests. In Africa,
frustrated black nationalism could cause an eruption of open hostilities. We
must provide enough intelligence to permit warning and accurate evaluation
of crises in these areas.
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II. PRIMARY INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS
A. Warning
18. Tactical warning of the imminence of hostile attack against the US,
its deployed forces, or its major allies is primarily a military problem
associated with military operational decisionmaking. Strategic warning,
warning of impending political or economic crises, coups or hostile action
involving third countries is a national intelligence problem associated more
broadly with decisionmaking by our national leaders. The two types of
warning have become mixed over the years. We need to delineate functions
and establish priorities if we are to insure that adequate political, economic.
and military intelligence is available to provide warning to US policymakers
prior to the onset of a crisis in any area of the world.
19. To this end, we should systematically reexamine our total warning
intelligence effort. The efficiency and reliability of our programs to collect
and analyze strategic warning indicators bear directly on the community's
need for tactical warning expenditures. We must clarify the relationship
between warning intelligence and normal current intelligence. And we must
determine our degree of confidence in the ability of the strategic warning;
system to yield adequate evidence of hostile intentions and heightenec:
probabilities of hostile action.
20. We need to maintain a clear awareness of the balance between.
resources committed to providing warning of various levels of hostilities and
the likelihood of such hostilities occurring. Our warning systems were
predicated on the Soviet Union's capacity and possible intent to build up
missile and bomber forces capable of launching a rational massive strategic
attack against the US. This underlying planning factor should be reexamined
given the implications of arms limitation agreements.
B. Current Intelligence
21. Many of our principal national level consumers are not being well
served by our current intelligence efforts. We must devise methods for
getting meaningful evaluations of current intelligence items to key con-
sumers as events occur and as intelligence comment is required by the user.
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22. We are issuing an excessive number of current intelligence products
and I intend to reduce that number. In times of crisis, we have deluged
decisionmakers with current items, for the most part uncoordinated and
sometimes contradictory. We must improve our system to provide a timely
and concise analysis of the situation, directed to the policy issues under
consideration, without submerging justifiable divergent judgments.
23. Our system for producing estimates for national-level users needs
improvement. Users of these products have criticized them in the past for
imprecision of judgment, general wordiness, and slow response. The NIE
machinery should be made more responsive to the needs of the consumer --
essentially the NSC-and it should provide community input to all NSC
requirements (NSSMs, WSAG, SRG, etc). In addition to the recent USIB
redefinition of the national estimates products, I am considering other ways
to increase the involvement of the user and to sharpen the focus and
judgments of national estimative intelligence.
24. In whatever form we produce intelligence, we must make the
product useful for policy formulation. It is not our function to become
advocates of particular policies, but it is our duty to prepare balanced
intelligence judgments within the framework of policy options under consid-
eration. The attitudes and actions of the United States government as a rule
have a major impact on the actions of foreign governments. To ignore this in
our estimates is to produce poor intelligence.
D. Arms Control Intelligence
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25. SALT: Intelligence must provide continuing assurance to US offi-
cials of Soviet compliance with the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement,
and it must be watchful for political or other indicators to provide timely
warning of a Soviet violation. Our collection capabilities to detect testing
and deployment should be adequate for monitoring the physical indications
of compliance. Far more difficult will be the task of discerning Soviet
intentions, particularly if this should involve preparations and actions to
conceal violations.
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27. The mobility of theater forces (as contrasted with fixed weapons
system such as ICBM's) further compounds the problem. Current and future
technical collection systems are unlikely to improve this situation much?
Intelligence from human sources will be called upon to bear an increasingly
critical share of the collection burden in this area.
28. Balance of payments problems and attacks on the dollar in world
money markets highlight the fact that, in a relatively stable nuclear parity
environment, concern for military security must be matched by concern for
economic security. We will be called upon for continuing support to policy
level needs for economic data on China and the Soviet Union.
positions and intentions of countries involved in negotiations with the
United States and factors which will affect the US competitive position in
international trade.
29. Analytic capabilities of the intelligence offices involved with eco-
nomic intelligence are being strengthened. Efforts are underway to improve
coordination among the various agencies concerned with this problem.
Collection, too, must be improved. We need more extensive exploitation of
open-source materials and COMINT.
30. The intelligence community has identified nearly 100 countries
which are important to US efforts to suppress illicit drug traffic. Intelligence
on drug traffic in five of these countries - France, Turkey, Mexico, Burma
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25
and Thailand - is of major importance to the US. It is of considerable
importance in nineteen other countries. So long as the drug problem con-
tinues to be of major concern in the United States, the intelligence com-
munity can expect to be involved in some way in acquiring information
abroad relating to the control of drug traffic and the illicit production of
drugs.
31. The world situation being as uncertain as it is, there is no assurance
that all of the intelligence problems which will be of importance to the
United States during the balance of this decade can be identified at this time.
US policy-makers might be faced in the future with complex issues, multi-
national in scope and not susceptible to solution by normal country-to-
country negotiations. Environmental crises, international terrorism, hijack-
ing, marine pollution -- the list of possibilities is quite extensive. It is obvious
that we must maintain an array of skills and sufficient flexibility to deal with
new problems in a way which satisfies policy level needs as they arise.
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