PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE PLANNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01082A000800120001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 25, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR : Director, PRG/IC
SUBJECT : Perspectives for Intelligence Planning
For the intelligence problems in which I have either an
interest or competence, the draft is too general to have much
relevance to intelligence planning that I could propose as we
look into the next decade. I realize that the draft may have
relevance to important and hard decisions about the allocation
of significant resources to strategic intelligence objectives.
Stated another way, it-is my impression that a world outlook
of this type is useful regarding strategic intelligence
problems. Most other intelligence problems are regional in
character and require a look at the future of the world region
by region.
mes ri c t i e
NIO/Energy
SECRET.
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 DCI/IC 74-0614
22 March 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/Energy
tive that it be future oriented and track with NIE judgments. He
does not want a long and discursive paper, and has indicated that
the length and outline of this draft are about right.
Perspectives for Intelligence Planning
1. The Director has asked that this document be updated to
project-as we see it now-the environment in which the US Intelli-
gence Community can be expected to operate during the remainder
of this decade. The attached draft attempts to' respond to his direc-
2. For your information, this will be Part I of Colby's "Per-
spectives" paper. He wants this part to point as specifically as
possible to the developments during the next several years that
are going to require new or improved intelligence capabilities.
In Part II he can then identify in a broad sense the activities which
he expects the Intelligence Community to take.
3. The DCI has asked that the NIOs critique this draft with the
hope that he can turn to it again shortly after his return. We are
prepared to proceed in whichever manner is more convenient for
each NIO. While your written changes would be most helpful, if
you prefer to discuss your suggestions orally with us, we will then
endeavor to incorporate them in a redraft.
is prepared to undertake this task.
4. Either way, we hope we can hear from you before COB
27 March.
Direct PRG IG
cc: D/DCI/NIO
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I. TRENDS IN THE WORLD SITUATION
A. The Great Power Adversaries
1. Relations among the world's major powers are shifting
into new and sometimes novel configurations. Tensions between the
US and each of its two principal adversaries, the USSR and China,
are easing, and the character of the relationship between East and
West in Europe is changing in a perhaps fundamental way. At the
same time, the cold war between China and the Soviet Union shows
little or no promise of imminent thaw, and partly because of the
improving climate of relations between the two superpowers, ties
between the US and Western Europe have begun to fray.
2. Few matters of importance in world affairs will arise in
the 1970s which will not be affected by the state of relations between
the US, the USSR, and China. Two basic circumstances will shape
the course of these relations: the USSR's progress in achieving
strategic parity with the US, and the course of the military confronta-
tion between China and the Soviet Union in Asia. Recently these factors
have combined in various ways to reinforce the trend in both Moscow
and Peking toward policies of detente vis-a-vis the West. Specifically,
for example, the desire of each Communist power to prevent the other
from gaining relatively greater favor with Washington has encouraged
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both to proceed with some restraint vis-a-vis the US, even in the
face of strong US initiatives. This competition is expected to continue.
3. Moscow's intentions and motivations in the areas of
strategic arms limitation and mutual and balanced force reduction
will continue to defy easy assessment. On the one hand the Soviets
apparently will adhere to an overall foreign policy aimed at far-
reaching detente with the US and its allies. On the other hand
Moscow can be expected to pursue vigorously weapons development
programs that portend substantial improvements in Soviet military
capabilities. Indeed the qualitative advances in prospect for Soviet
strategic offensive forces, coupled with improvements in Soviet
strategic defenses, could enable the USSR to gain a decisive advantage
over the US.
4. Acute Sino-Soviet hostility and the degree of restraint
vis-a-vis the West which is encouraged by that hostility are not
necessarily fixed elements in the three-power relationship. The
Chinese are obviously devoting much energy to increasing their
military defenses vis-a-vis the Soviet Union; and Chinese nuclear
power is reaching a level precluding any rational Soviet decision to
resort to military action against Peking'. It is possible that, inde-
pendently of developments in the military sphere, the post-Mao (and
perhaps post-Chou) regime in Peking will seek a lessening of Sino-
Soviet tension. Chances of a fu
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China and the USSR seem remote as long as the Soviets show no
inclination to reduce their military forces along the Chinese border.
A limited improvement in relations is unlikely in and of itself to
significantly affect either power's attitude toward detente.
B. The US and Other Major Power Centers
5. The evolving pattern of relations among the three great
powers, the climate of detente in East-West relations, and the growth
of a general sense of West European self-assertiveness will continue
to thrust another major power center, Western Europe, into the area
of prime intelligence interest. The Europeans are likely to be
increasingly preoccupied with their own Community concerns, less
agitated about the Soviet military threat (at least in the near and mid-
term), and will pursue their own national interests (both economic
and political) with less regard for those of the US and sometimes for
those of the-Atlantic Community as .a whole. Events which exacerbate
their apprehension about the durability of the US commitment to
Europe and increase their suspicions of US motives vis-a-vis the
USSR will reinforce tendencies to pursue the concept of a common
West European defense system. Severe problems on the economic
front such as inflation and access to energy will complicate the process
of reaching agreement on Community policies. Popular pressures on
already weakened governments are unlikely to reinforce those otherwise
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disposed toward finding solutions in a broader Atlantic context.
6. Moreover, serious issues will attend the development
of detente in Europe. The West Europeans--though suspicious of
ultimate Soviet intentions--will endeavor to expand economic rela-
tions with the USSR and Eastern Europe and to achieve a general
political relaxation in Europe. Thus, in the era of Ostpolitik, the
cohesion and effectiveness of NATO are by no means assured. The
Soviets, while continuing to seek credits and technology in the West,
will not sacrifice their dominance in the East for the sake of.detente.
The East Europeans, particularly the Romanians, will be torn between
their hopes for the kind of greater autonomy East-West rapprochement
could bring and their fears that the West might, in the name of.detente,
concede to Moscow the permanent right to rule its own* sphere in
Eastern Europe.
7. Elsewhere, Japan, like Western Europe, will move
further away from its close association with the US and become a
factor of even greater consequence in world affairs. It will continue
to play an important worldwide economic role, a gradually growing
political role in Asia, and a special economic and political role vis-
a-vis both China and the USSR. Smaller states aligned with the US,
including Canada, Australia, and several key Latin American countries,
are likely to become even more self-reliant and less inclined to follow
the US lead. _4_
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C. Turbulence in the Third World
8. The evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Soviet
role in the Middle East will remain major concerns of the US for some
time to come. US attention is now focused on the development of a
peace settlement, Arab use of oil resources as a political weapon,
and the supply of arms and technology to the Arabs, particularly from
the USSR and France.
9. The Soviets probably will not jeopardize Middle East
peace negotiations since these offer at minimum the reopening of the
Suez Canal. In economic terms the Soviets will benefit substantially
from this development. In the Indian Ocean a gradual increase at
least in the Soviet Naval presence is expected, and the Soviets will
be better able to make surge deployments in local crises. Yet the
Soviets will be apprehensive about the potential loss of influence in
the aftermath of a settlement. They will continue to use military
aid to preserve that influence and also, in some cases, to gain access
to naval and air support facilities.
10. It is unlikely that the fighting in Southeast Asia will
cease before 1980, if then. All countries in the area face ongoing
or latent insurgencies. Defeat by insurgents of the forces of the
incumbent governments--especially those of South Vietnam, Thailand,
and the Philippines--could have serious consequences for US interests.
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Elsewhere, in the Third World, the large non-aligned countries,
such as India and Indonesia, and the strategically located states,
such as Somalia and Singapore, will continue to attract Soviet
interest and, where Moscow finds it feasible, a Soviet presence..
Competition in these areas with the US and in some instances China
will persist and perhaps grow.
11. South Asia, Latin America, and southern Africa (where
black- and white-dominated nations confront each other) are all
areas where eruptions are possible and where US interests may be
involved. In South Asia, the situation in Pakistan and the relationship
between Pakistan and Afghanistan remains unsettled. And in Latin
America, the USSR's military presence in the Caribbean and its
influence in Peru and the emergence of increasingly nationalistic
and often anti-US regimes pose potentially acute problems for the US.
In the Balkans, the passing of Tito might tempt the Soviets to try
to return Yugoslavia to the orthodox Communist fold.
D. Emerging Worldwide Problems
12. New kinds of international problems--such as the pace
of technological change--and fresh perceptions of some old problems--
such as the availability of vital natural resources and the overall impact
of environmental pollution- -demand, inter alia, the collection of new
categories of information. Certain specific developments in recent
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SIGNATURE
Remarks :
Attached is a copy of the revised draft
"Perspectives" paper you and each
Group Chief have copies. No distribution has be
made outside of IC.
is planning to have a brainstorming
session with the Group Cgiefs next Tuesday or
Wednesday to discuss proposals to be added
as specific guidance items at Part III where th
text indicates such are to be inserted.
I know you will be on leave then, but thought
.the Group CTuiefs needed a little time to get
ideas together (which is why I did not propose
Monday.)
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DCI PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE PLANNING
INTRODUCTION
1. This statement of perspectives for planning presents
an overview of the major demands which will confront the US
Intelligence Community during the next several years. It
identifies areas in which redirection or changes in emphasis
are anticipated, and indicates the actions'which are to be
taken.
2. Current-year guidance is provided by the "Key
Intelligence Questions" and the program for their evaluation,
by the DCI's memorandum of 6 September 1973 on "Objectives
for the Intelligence Community," which the President has
approved, and by the DCI's "National Foreign Intelligence
Program Management Objectives for FY 1974," dated 14 December
1973, which was issued after consultation with the Intelli-
gence Resources Advisory Committee.
Part I. "Trends in the World Situation," is a
projection of political/economic/military/technological
developments which are expected to have an impact on the
needs of important intelligence consumers to which the
Community must respond.
4. Part II, "Intelligence Priorities," discusses the
substantive priorities, by country, provided by the current
Attachment to DCID 1/2 as planning guidance for the 1975-
1979 period.
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5. Part III, "The Intelligence Imperatives," sets
forth the action which the Intelligence Community must take
and the programs it must support to respond to the interna-
tional environment which is described in Parts I and II.
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L TRENDS IN THE WORLD SITUATION
A. The Great Power Adversaries
1. Relations among the world's major powers are shifting
into new configurations. Tensions between the US and each of its
two principal adversaries, the USSR and China, are easing, and the
character of the rivalry between East and West in Europe is changing
At fhe- sane //WP_,
ties between the US and
Western Europe are being frayed by the sometimes conflicting imperatives
,id . . .
of Atlanticism and European unity. At the 1+- A the cold war between
China and the Soviet Union shows little or no promise of imminent thaw,
2. Few matters of importance in world affairs will arise in
the 1970s which will not be affected by the state of relations between the
US, the USSR and China. In a climate of virulent Sino-Soviet tension, the
desire of each Communist power to prevent the other from gaining rela-
tively greater favor with Washington will encourage both to proceed with
some restraint vis-a-vis the US. But acute Sino-Soviet hostility may not
remain a fixed element of the three-power relationship. It is possible,
for example, that Mao's death will ease the way in both Peking and Moscow
toward accommodation, especially if either or both have been disappointed
in their dealings with the US. To be sure, chances of a fundamental
reconciliation seem very remote. But even 'a limited detente, s-wt
(,1 it
movement toward a less risky more controlled form of competition-
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v5 zx ;.+rrs..~Yi~60o@n8eer-se~s~i-0 '4toec~ i third parties- from
G o u rl f ; i' f O i l 'd1 o at), _~ C A%? i1 6v~t,~S,
exploiting Sino-Soviet cleavages, could have important po-lzcy'"
implications for the US and much of the rest of the world as well.
3. f 4 Moscow's attitudes toward agreements with
an
the West e strategic arms limitations and mutual force
reductions are complex, tentative pd no doubt mixed. The Soviets
lish to adhere to an overall(policy of detente. But they will also
pursue. a variety of ambitious weapons development programs w-'h c
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portend substantial improvements in ;4 _.+~.:: . capabilities. Indeed,
in the absence of a new agreement constrainingg 4 strategic
buildup, the USSR is likely by the early 1980s to surpass US forces
(as currently programmed) in numbers of missile reentry vehicles,
6 increase its existing superiority in missile throw-weight, anddretain
its advantage in numbers of strategic missiles. It might over the same
period substantially improve its strategic defenses, perhaps by the
development of a laser air defense system. It simply remains to be
seen to what extent detente considerations will lead the USSR to moderate
its strategic programs or subject them to negotiated limitations.
4. The consequences of detente for Soviet foreign policy also
remain to be worked out. In .Third World areas, the USSR will have to
decide, sometimes in reaction to local crises, how hard and at what
risk to push its interests in opposition to US,policies. In Western Europe,
Moscow will have to balance its desire to reduce US influence against its
_jn Eastern
fear sA`bX&~~`h02ffi1~C2A~12
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Europe, it will have to weigh the danger that stability will be
jeopardized in a period of reduced tensions and greater East-
West contacts.
5. The degree of restraint the Chinese show toward
the West will continue to reflect Peking's perceptions of the threat from
the north. As China continues to expand its deployment of strategic
weapons (MRBMs and IRBMs)--it already possesses the beginnings
of a credible second-strike force--Peking's confidence in its deterrent
strength will grow and its concern over a Soviet attack decline.
Cinaa smaintain good relations with the
West, and its willingness to implicitly sanction the US- presence in parts
of Asia, will perhaps diminish apmme% dS c.L
CC1SPyiC' .
if ~t-
6. Butrthe future of detente is uncertain, k~^is not-'&o
6Y no m& ns cer lM n
maqr^that its foundations will ooo crumble, even- o ~)
in the face of changes in the USSR's military posture and in the state of
the Sino-Soviet relationship.. The economic and technological needs and
aspirations of both Communist powers and the impact of changes 4n the
world economic scene on the US, among others, will continue to provide
powerful incentives for reduced levels of tension.'
B. The US and Other Major Power Centers
7. Long-established patterns of US-European relations are
clearly in process of fundamental readjustment- -brought on by the
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atmosphere of East-West detente and the strong belief in Europe itself
that indefinite dependence on the US is neither desirable nor feasible.
How this conviction will work itself out in practice--as between the
impulse for European unity and the continuing need for Atlantic ties--
will be a central question in the US-European relationship for years to
nod ih evt' J
come. The
cohesion and effectiveness of NATO are P Rommi ..a assured d,{
I Id A I? I III __N
The issues"knotty enou'Pgiin tiiemseTves,
are likely to be exacerbated
by Soviet efforts to exploit them and by a number of coincidental pres-
sures arising from inflation and energy problems, the unhealthy political
condition of many European governments, and disagreements within the
European Community itself.
8. Important issues will also face the Soviet Bloc. Moscow,
while continuing to seek credits and technology in the West, will not
sacrifice its dominance in the East for the sake of detente. The East
Europeans, particularly the Romanians, will be torn between their hopes
for the kind of greater autonomy East -West rapprochement could bring
and their fears that the West might, in the name of detente, concede to
Moscow the permanent right to rule its own sphere in Eastern Europe.
In the Balkans, the passing of Tito might tempt the Soviets to try to
return Yugoslavia to the sit fold.
9. Elsewhere, Japan, like Western Europe, will move further
away from its close association with the US and should become a factor
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of even greater consequence in world affairs. It will play an important
worldwide economic role, a gradually growing political role in Asia,
and a special economic and political role vis-a-vis both China and the
USSR. Less powerful states aligned with the US, including Canada,
Australia, and several Latin American countries, are likely to become
even more self-reliant and disinclined to follow the US lead. At the
same,,time these states will probably become increasingly important
to the US as sources of raw materials and potential political support.
C. Turbulence in the Third World
10. The evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Soviet role
in the Middle East, and Arab oil policies will remain major concerns
of the US. Specifically, US interest in the Middle East will for some
time focus on: the development of a peace settlement; the supply of oily
the sale of arms in the area, c~p+cz?i' _,b by the USSR. '91; US v. dl 0'
on acceptable political terms and at prices the world can afford r;and
Pa r /7'c
Tzetrri internal political stability, especially in the
friendly oil producing countries) vii A&o remain GR M4as
WCc?tj1.
11. The Soviets will complicate Middle East peace negotiations
by supporting the more extreme Arab demands, but will probably not seek
to sabotage them outright. A gradual increase in the Soviet Naval presence
is expected in the Indian Ocean if the Suez Canal reopens, and the Soviets
will in that event also be better able to make surge deployments in the
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area during local crises. Moscow will continue to use military aid
as a means to preserve its influence in the Middle East and South
Asia--perhaps compensating for a loss of influence in one area
(e, g., Egypt) by emphasizing activities and programs in and her
(e, g. , Syria)--and will in some areas press for access to naval and
air support facilities.
12. It is unlikely that the fighting in Southeast Asia will
cease before 1980, if then. All countries in the area face ongoing
.or latent insurgencies. It is by no means certain that the forces of
the incumbent governments of South Vietnam, Thailand, and the.
g& J, of / fW?,( 0 e lnsWrq e4 s
Philippines will be but their defeat in any
one of these countries, should it come to pass, could have serious
consequences for US interests. Elsewhere in the Third World, the
large non-aligned countries, such as India and Indonesia, and the
strategically located states, such as Somalia and Singapore, will
continue to attract Soviet interest and, where Moscow finds it feasible,
a Soviet presence. Competition in these areas with the US and in some
instances China will persist and perhaps grow.
13. South Asia, Latin America, and southern Africa are all
areas where instability and the forces of nationalism could impinge
on US interests. In South Asia, the situation in Pakistan and the relation-
ship between Pakistan and Afghanistan remain unsettled. India and
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Bangladesh are both entering a period of intensified domestic political
turbulence, of the sort which might lead to international complications.
In Latin America, the USSR's presence in the Caribbean and its
influence in Peru and, in general, the emergence of increasingly self-
assertive and nationalistic regimes will continue to pose problems for
the US. The confrontation of black and white-dominated states in
southern Africa could jeopardize US economic interests and
complicate aspects of US policy in Africa and Europe.
y
14. The problem of nuclear proliferation is likely to increase
during this decade. By 1980 at least'one of three states--Israel, India,
and Taiwan--will have openly become a nuclear power and this might
encourage other countries to follow suit. The option will be available
to West Germany, Japan, Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa. Beyond
this, fissile materials for a few nuclear weapons probably will be
available to any country or organization willing to purchase them from
illicit sources.
15. Other emerging international problems ``such as e,w for d-
wide rate of inflation, the pace of technological change, and the political
implications of bot / AEand fresh perceptions of some old 'problems +such
as the availability of vital natural resources, food supply, and the overall
impact of environmental pollution$Jwill probably demand more attention
fromAhe
pp intelFot
ae e case o l a
rove ik-P, & 1WOffo'ft66f200 stain
I-7-
S1 C'R T..T
D. Emerging Worldwide Problems
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specific developmentsJthe growth of the multinational
corporation, the potential for extracting resources from the seas,
the pressures of worldwide population growth, and the increasing
willingness of small countries with enormous resource wealth to
challenge the economic practices and positions of much larger and
stronger statesv jrwill affect US world interests in unfamiliar
sort of development seems more and more likely to have repercussions
of international import. All over the world, and in all types of societies,
there,'is a growing tendency among ethnic and discrete cultural groups
to demand,. often violently, that their institutions and aspirations be
accorded special recognition; this is a tendency which could easily
become more disruptive as the decade progresses.
and uncertain, though consequential, waysA Finally, a quite different
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B. Economic Intelligence
Economic intelligence is harder to define, more fluid, and the need
for it less predictable than is the case for other types of intelligence.
As international economic affairs have become increasingly important to
U.S. policymakers perceptions of the demands for the collection, analysis
and evaluation of economic information have broadened, to encompass all
foreign economic developments having a substantial effect on U.S. national
interests. While economic intelligence can include almost any kind of
foreign economic information, the focus of attention within the Intelli-
gence Community will be on analysis and evaluation specifically related
to US policy concerns. Open sources and overt reporting will provide the
primary data, and special intelligence collection undertaken only when
open source data is inadequate and there is a clear need supported by
consumer requirements.
Some of the requirements for economic support will be reasonably
stable -- for example, economic research on denied areas -- but others
will change as a result of changing world market conditions and policy
concerns. Even so, the priority of certain important elements of economic
intelligence needs can be forecasted.
Over the coming five years, as indicated in the DCID 1/2 Attachment,
r "w the economic intelligence topic of continuing highest priority will be
2
the dynamics of economic. policy formulation in
Also very high on the priority list will
be trade policies, the balance of payments adjustment process and inter-
national monetary reform activities of these same countries.
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C. Military Intelligence
As the only country capable of putting the physical survival of
the United States at risk, the Soviet Union will continue to be the
focus of the highest priorities assigned to the collection and analysis
of military intelligence throughout the 1975-1979 period. Much of this
intelligence will directly relate to Soviet. planning for and deployment
of forces to which the SALT arrangements apply.
Military intelligence on Chinese Communist forces will be next in
order of importance, with third place going to the major Eastern European
countries of the Warsaw Pact -- Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland.
Continued presence of U.S. forces in Korea will give military intelligence
on North Korea high importa;zce, but somewhat less than that accorded to
the forward area of the Warsaw Pact, where U.S. interest in MBFR develop-
ments and the requirement to monitor compliance with any MBFR agreement
is expected to remain high.
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D. Science and Technology
As is true now and has been for the past two decades, the Soviet
Union will by all odds be the most important U.S. target for scientific
and technical intelligence in the 1975-1979 period. Soviet RDTEE on
military systems and its programs in basic science and applied technology
are seen as more important to U.S. interests than such activities in any
other country, and the USSR shares top priority importance with the PRC
in nuclear science and technology.
The Peoples Republic of China will be clearly the second most important
target for scientific and technical intelligence activities.
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III. THE.INTELLIGENCE IMPERATIVES
1. The environment within which foreign intelligence
activities of the United States will be conducted and the
priorities which apply to the various intelligence needs
have been described in Parts I and II. Given these longer
range perspectives, the question is how they will impact on
Intelligence Community planning, methods of analysis, alloca-
tion of resources, and managerial attentions. Designing the
responses calls for continuing attention to identification
of changing consumer needs and to the means and methods by
which intelligence analysis is conducted and the intelligence
product communicated as an input to the decision-making
equation. This involves both an accurate awareness of
changing world patterns and interdependencies as described
in this paper and the decision processes used by those
intelligence serves.
2. This section, therefore, presents in as specific a
manner as possible planning guidance applicable to collection,
processing, analysis and production on the major substantive
problem areas with which the Intelligence Community must
deal over the next several years.
A. Strategic Intelligence on the Great Powers
3. US information on the Great Powers' strategic
posture has advanced considerably with the advent of an
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array of expensive and highly technical collection systems.
But there are still many uncertainties about the technical,
military, economic, and political programs, plans and intentions
of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The
Intelligence Community will have a continuing task of reducing
these uncertainties so as to buttress the objectives of SALT
and NBFR negotiations to achieve an acceptable stabilization.
The equation in this balance will depend on the reliability
and timeliness of intelligence monitoring.
In the collection field, the Community must:
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6. Processing. Processing and exploiting information
acquired by technical sensors on Soviet and PRC targets
poses two problems which need a heavy dose of management
attention: (1) Improvement of techniques for gleaning from
the mass of potentially useful data that which is actually
needed by intelligence analysts; and, (2) better means of
assuring that the. processed output is in a format which
enhances its utility to the analysts. Increased attention
needs to be paid to technical processing capabilities in
order to enhance the usefulness of the processed output both
to analysts and to intelligence consumers.
7. To cope with processing problems which it faces,
the Community must:
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8. Analysis. New methods of analyzing both technical
data and information obtained through more traditional
reporting methods will be of critical importance to effective
utilization of the information. which is likely to be available
to analysts concerned with the USSR and the PRC. Assessment
of the data needed to keep the United States abreast of what
the USSR and the PRC are accomplishing at the frontiers of
technology -- particularly as such research relates to
development of new or improved strategic capabilities -- is
one of the more important analytical tasks of the Intelligence
Community.
9. To improve the quality and sophistication of its
analysts, the Intelligence Community must:
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10. Production. The production of finished intelligence
must relate directly to identified consumer requirements.
The better the collection and processing of data and the
better the analytical effort the better can the final product
be -- provided it is closely geared to what the consumer
needs at that particular time. The problem of production
offices, therefore, is to insure that they are: (1) capable
of making optimum use of information which collectors and
processors make available; and (2) sensitive to consumer
needs so as to insure that intelligence is produced on such
subjects and at such times as to insure maximum utility of
the product to the decision-making process.
11. Specific production outputs cannot be pre-planned
very far into the future in a changing world situation, so a
capability for flexibility in the application of production
resources is highly important. To enhance the effectiveness
of products relating to the USSR and the PRC production
organizations must:
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14. To enable the US to acquire the information it
a. INR/State and CIA must carefully identify
those political intelligence needs which can be met
only by a SIGINT effort or clandestine operations as
guidance for NSA and CIA collection.
b. The USIB Economic Intelligence Committee
should take the lead in working out with involved
State, Treasury, Commerce and Agricultural Department
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agencies, in particular, arrangements which will insure
a properly coordinated effort to acquire the economic
data needed by the United States.
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15. Processing. Serious technical processing problems
are not expected to be encountered in the handling of informa-
tion relating to the major non-Communist countries, with the
possible exception of the SIGINT field. To cope with such
SIGINT problems:
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16. Analysis. The volume of overtly available informa-
tion and the need to exploit selectively only that data
which is of significance will be the primary problem confronting
analysts. To insure a high quality of effort, the following
is indicated:
a. Production organizations should develop
analysts with a view to motivating them to make a
career of their speciality. Key cadres are going to be
needed, even though they may include only a few personnel,
who know individual key countries in great depth. The
Community must be able to turn to selected analysts
with confidence that they can deal with recognized
authority on matters with relate to the country on
which they have specialized. These cadres of analytical
specialists must be capable of providing sophisticated
estimates and forecasts, with increased attention to
non-military categories of intelligence.
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17. Production. Increasing requirements can be expected
for products specifically oriented toward providing intelli-
gence to support US positions in international. conferences,
particularly those dealing with trade policies, international
monetary arrangements, defense alliances, and the Law of the
Sea. Close liaison with high level consumers so as to
insure early identification of product needs, and emphasis
on the development of analysts who have expertise in depth
on these topics should enhance the performance of intelligence
production organizations in meeting these requirements.
C. Reaction to Crises
18. The needs for intelligence on the undeveloped
countries and on those countries just now moving into the
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crises which will affect basic US security and policy interests.
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19. Considerable attention is being devoted in the
Department of Defense to improving US capabilities for
security posture management on a worldwide basis, and because
of the Intelligence Community's responsibilities for the
provision of warning, it must work intimately with the
agencies which deal directly with posture management problems.
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21. Processing. The primary problems which may arise
in the processing portion of the cycle arise from the fact
that data relevant to the early stages of a developing
crisis may appear on communications links to which SIGINT
collectors do not give high processing priority. To reduce
the risk of this occurring:
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22. Analysis. Analytical competence in the anticipa-
tion of crisis situations and during the actual crisis
depends both on the availability of analyst cadres steeped
in the factors which bear on the situation and on their
access to all pertinent information on a timely basis.
Automated and integrated data support for analysts is particu-
larly important in crisis periods because of the compression
of time for reaction. The Intelligence Community must keep
abreast of the state-of-the-art in this field.
a. All major production organizations should
insure the availability of specialized cadres of analysts
thoroughly familiar with the situation in areas where
crises of import to the United States may occur.
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b. The R&D Advisory Council of the IRAC should
advise the Intelligence Community as to state-of-the-
art technology in automated data support which may be
particularly applicable to the support of analysts in
crisis situations.
c. The USIB Information Handling Committee
should investigate. means whereby the information flow
into and out of Warning and Indications Centers can be
improved.
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23. Production. Production related to. response to
crisis situations must maintain immediate currency in reporting
factual developments and also provide intelligence users
with current analyses of the situation. This requires an
operating environment which is geared to rapid output of
reports and to fast coordination of analyst comments. In
support of such capabilities:
a. The Intelligence Community must cooperate
fully in support of programs underway to use secure
communications nets as a means of speeding the production
of coordinated factual bulletins and timely analyses.
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b. Production organizations must be mindful that
while open media can compete, in many instances, with
the Intelligence Community in factual repo~_?ting, the
Community has a unique responsibility for interpretation,
and continuing attention is needed during crisis situa-
flow of interpretative analyses to
high level users of intelligence.
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D. Emerging Worldwide Problems
24. The new intelligence problems now calling for
increased intelligence collection and analytical attention
tend to be worldwide in nature - the availability of and
trade in scarce natural resources, crop prospects, environ-
mental data, Law of the Sea matters, illicit narcotics
traffic, anti-US terrorism, etc.
25. The basic problems here are twofold: First,
developing a capability for selective acquisition of the
needed information, much of which is available through overt
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sources but much, also, calling for selective application of
SIGINT, imagery and clandestine activities; and, second,
building cadres of key specialists with the expertise needed
for meaningful analysis.
27. Processing. No processing difficulties unique to
the emerging worldwide intelligence problems currently are
foreseen.
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28. Analysis. The growing requirement for specialists
of recognized authority in relatively narrow intelligence
.fields is nowhere more important than in the analysis of the
problems the Intelligence Community faces in a number of new
fields. In terms of the overall intelligence effort, the
emerging new problems probably will not require the applica-
tion of large amounts of intelligence resources, but the
need for cadres of true experts in each of the emerging
problem areas call for selective recruitment and specialized
training efforts.
a. All major production organizations must give
attention to selective recruitment of analysts whose
training and background is such as to strengthen their
capabilities to cope with problems in these new areas
of interest -- particularly in the field of natural
resources, environmental problems, international trade
and international monetary arrangements.
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29. Production. If adequate care is taken to assure
the availability of analytical expertise on key elements of
the kinds of worldwide intelligence problems which are now
emerging, no unusual production difficulties are anticipated.
Customers of the finished products will have widely varying
needs, however, and continuing effort will be required to
maintain the liaison with users which will be necessary to
ensure that the products are directly responsive to policy
.needs for intelligence inputs.
E. Conclusion
30. The actions considered necessary to respond to
anticipated future requirements have been identified.
Within the major elements of the Intelligence Community
approaches now need to be defined and related both to new
investment and to personnel recruitment and training needs
so that the necessary resource adjustments can be projected.
31. Problems of the scope and variety of those which
have been described involve all management levels, but
planning to accomplish the actions indicated should begin
with establishment by senior managers of well-defined objectives
and the means needed to measure performance against those
objectives. Such performance yardsticks should include the
use of meaningful evaluation systems to measure the cost
effectiveness of particular intelligence activities..
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