COMMENTS ON THE 'PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE 1975 - 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110017-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: June 6, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
FROM: DDCI
SUBJECT: Comments on the "Perspectives for Intelligence -
1975-1980"
I think that these perspectives provide superb guidance at
the executive level. I do have a few comments:
1. Covert action, political influence (abroad), and agents
of influence (abroad) do not seem to have received the mention
I feel they deserve.
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3. More firm emphasis on Russian and Chinese language
training than in 16.b.
4. Interrelation of procedures, improved communication
and periodic evaluations are vitally necessary. I hope we can
do this without homogenization.
Generally I feel that these perspectives provide, as I have
said, superb guidance concerning the key targets in the coming
years but I detect a tone of passiveness as to what can be done
to avoid certain unfavorable events that seem to be flowing
towards us.
V. &.-. 6 a1z: -
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
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DCI
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DDCI
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S/MC
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DDS&T
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DDI
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DDM&S
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DDO
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D/DCI/IC
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D/DCI/NIO
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OGC
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OLC
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IG
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Compt
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D/Pers
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D/S
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DTR
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Asst/DCI
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AO/DCI
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7. The Third World will present a variety of problems,
A number of local disputes will preoccupy not only the
leaders of individual countries but the international community.
Examples are relationships between India and Pakistan, black
and white Sub-Sahara Africa, and Southern Arabia. Several
existing disputes will continue to be a matter of concern to
the international community and be the seeds of potential
larger scale involvement (Arabs. and Israel, North and South
Vietnam, North and South Korea, Taiwan). A number of Third
World countries will become increasingly antagonistic toward
the great powers and their local presence in the economic,
political and cultural spheres, e.g., in Africa, Latin America
and South Asia. In this respect some identity of interest may
grow between nations divided by the Cold War, developing into
collaboration against both superpower complexes, e.g., Cuba
and the Caribbean, the Arab nations, the rising Black nations
of Africa, and the nations of the Malay Archipelago, Inter-
nally, many Third World nations will suffer serious damage
from tribal and regional differences, economic extremism, and
ideological zealots (India, Cambodia, Ethiopia, et al). Some
of the Third World will find an outlet for its frustrations in
self-defeating assaults on great power economic relationships
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and in hamstringing the effectiveness of a variety of
international forums.
8. Social change will cause turbulence and possibly
create power vacuums in a number of areas. These will stem
from increased expectations and a perception of the growing
economic gap between less developed countries (and classes
within countries) and the developed world. Areas particularly
susceptible to this process will be the Persian Gulf, certain
other Arab states such as Morocco, India, possibly the Malay
Archipelago (including the Philippines) and the Caribbean.
Internally this turbulence may be temporarily stilled by
authoritarian governments, but they will have difficulties
in maintaining themselves over the longer term and transferring
power to successors, The resulting turbulence can present
temptations to neighboring states to exploit long-standing
differences or to great powers desirous of extending their
influence. Such turbulence will also exist within advanced
nations, as economic, racial, ideological, or regional minori-
ties turn to violence and terrorism to press their claims
against more and more delicately tuned and interdependent
societies.
9. The acceleration of events will be a characteristic
of the years ahead. This will come from improved communication
and transporation, sharply reducing the time available to
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reflect on, negotiate, and resolve international problems,
It will also raise many local events to international pro-
minence and inflate national or political pride, posing
further handicaps to successful negotiations, There will be
a resulting tendency towards shorter attention spans for
individual situations and a need for simultaneous perception
and management of a multiplicity of international. relation-
ships. Acceleration will also mark the process of change.
To a major degree this will occur in the fields of science
and technology, but the pace there will have substantial effects
on the pace of sociological, industrial, and institutional
change., with resultant political and economic impacts. Iden-
tification and accurate assessments of such changes and their
effects will be needed on an increasingly rapid or even immediate
basis.
Part II - The Role of Intelligence
1, The primary charge on intelligence during the years
ahead will be to provide accurate data and assessments with
respect to the variety of complicated problems facing the United.
States. These must be in formats which will facilitate their
communication to those responsible for decisions about U.S.
policy. In particular, the need will be for early warning,
because of the acceleration of events, to permit the resolution
through negotiation of matters which. might otherwise involve
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political, economic or military contest or unrest, The
acceleration of events and the explosion of information will
also require a major effort by intelligence to process raw
information into manageable form and to devise adequate
techniques for presentation to assist consumers in the
identification of the essential elements of foreign situations,
the reliability of our assessments and the likely impact of
alternative policy decisions, Intelligence will be increasingly
expected to provide assessments of the intentions and likely
courses of action of foreign powers, in addition to exact facts.
and the basic capabilities available to them.
2. The USSR. The USSR will remain as the major intel-
ligence target. Its military power, its economic role in the
world, its political policies will continue to pose major
problems for American leadership. Intelligence will be expected
to provide precise data on Soviet military capabilities and
economic activity. It will be expected also to supply reliable
information on Soviet political dynamics and intentions. These
must be supplemented by clear and accurate assessments of
likely Soviet courses of action in the political, economic and
military fields. While a small percentage of this material
will become available through open exchange and access, vast
fields of highly important information will be kept by the
Soviets within a closed society, requiring extraordinary efforts
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to obtain them. A particular requirement will be accurate
and demonstrable monitoring of arms limitations agreements
made with the Soviet Union. In the military field special
attention will be focused on Soviet research and develop-
ment, in particular with respect to weapons systems which
could substantially affect the balance of power (anti-
submarine warfare, satellite systems, strategic deception,
etc.). The readiness of Soviet forces will be a constant
subject of attention. Intelligence will be required to main-
tain a base-line capability for tactical intelligence coverage,
for rapid augmentation in case of local or general confronta-
tion or conflict. Trends and factions in Soviet leadership
and political doctrine will be a major subject of interest,
to assist in negotiations and to warn of undesirable develop-
ments ahead. The Soviet role abroad, either directly through
diplomatic means or indirectly through party or subversive
means, will be a matter of particular attention with respect
to the turbulence of the Third World. Soviet policy, power
and determination will be of importance in Eastern Europe as
well as in some of the areas of great power competition or
exploitation of local power vacuums (Persian Gulf, India, etc.).
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6. Intelligence will increasingly be looked to to warn
of and explain baffling new situations, osin
P g problems to
American interests. An example will be to identify the causes
of social change, turbulence, and political terrorism in Third
World countries, so the component elements of these problems
can be isolated, negotiated. about or countered with appropriate
mechanisms. This may require intelligence to develop new
categorizations of behavior and motivation to reflect the
differences between societies, cultures and national personali-
ties.
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7. A few of the major problems which will be either
the subject of dispute or negotiation, or sometimes both,
and consequently will be priority intelligence requirements,
can be listed:
(a) Economic interrelationships in monetary,
trade, and resource control, especially with respect
to long-term inflation, energy demand and supply, and
population growth. Patterns of commercial and business
activity (the multinational corporations, foreign invest-
ment, etc.). The division of return between raw material,
processing and finishing operations, and environment con-
trol.
(b) Communications and transportation, including
movement of goods, information and persons,
(c) Arms limitations, nuclear proliferation and
crisis avoidance.
(d.) Jurisdiction, exploitation, and relationships
in the oceans and on sea beds.
(e) Space exploitation. and the use of space with
respect to national territories.
Part III - Implications for Intelligence Planning
A. Collection vs. Exploitation
1. Over the past decade, management focus and the
allocation of resources have been directed especially to the
application of advanced technology to the collection and, to a
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lesser degree, the processing of intelligence data. This
has been highly successful, resulting in major substantive
advances in our knowledge, particularly :with regard to the
military capabilities of the Soviet Union. This investment
has made a major contribution to the negotiations required
for detente.
2. This forward technological progress will soon
reach a plateau with new capabilities in the photo and SIGINT
fields. This plateau will present _large problems of
success.
3. Within the time frame of this document, an
important and pervasive problem facing the intelligence Commu-
nity will be to ensure efficient exploitation of the enormous
amounts of data it will be collecting. Exploitation means not
only sifting, selecting and processing the most relevant data,
but also the application of advanced techniques of transfer of
data to the point of ultimate use, to analysis and production
and to the presentation of the end products to the ultimate
users of intelligence.
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and reducing manpower and investment on lower
priority material.
(b) Development of`improved methods of
analysis and production.
(c) Development of improved methods of
presentation.
B. Demands vs. Resources
5. Another problem of
great magnitude facing the
Community over the next five to ten years will be the changing
(and in all probability increasing) demands for intelligence
while available resources for intelligence decrease in real
terms.
6. In the past, the major portion of our intelligence
effort has necessarily been deployed against the military capa-
bilities of the Soviet Union and our other adversaries, actual
and potential. Even assuming a period of genuine detente, much
of this military focus must be maintained because of the
importance of this subject to national security and the need
for information on the quality of enemy weapons systems. It
must not only serve to keep us alert militarily, but also
support negotiations and verify arms limitations agreements.
At the same time, the demands for other types of intelligence
are growing. The result is a probable net increase in demand
with a new proportionate mix among political,. economic, military
and technical target objectives.
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7.. This simultaneous shift and increase in
requirements is occurring in a period of serious resource
constraint and continuing inflation. Until very recently
twe;have had the freedom to invest resources in a number of
functional areas simultaneously without undue difficulty.
This is no longer true, We will have to accomplish our
objectives without the benefit of significantly greater
resources. We must find trade-offs in the systems we use,
the areas we cover, and the depth of the data we seek.
8. One area which holds promise for greater
efficiency is the national/tactical interface. Current studies
seek to identify ways by which national programs can more
directly support-tactical requirements, and vice versa. As
more capable and flexible systems come into the national
inventory, they must be made to serve the needs of operational
forces as well as national-level consumers. Modernized systems
and procedures which, by their design, permit-greater mutuality
of effort between national and force support activities should
enable trade-offs achieving net resource savings.
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