NATIONAL/TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01082A000500150018-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: May 8, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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8 May 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Graham
SUBJECT National/Tactical Intelligence Interface
Review
1. The attached papers are comments
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on
a
the present national/tactical intelligence situation and
plan based on several discussions he and I have had on the
best way to proceed in the second phase. I am also attaching
a copy of how I believe we should time the second phase in
the "objectives" paper.
2. Marty's comments on the present situation are
sound but tell you little you did not already know.
3. The plan seems a reasonable approach as long as we
test it out on one area (or U&S Command) on a trial basis to
see how it works. Besides, to tackle the world all at once
would give JCS and the Services a tremendous amount to
swallow in one gulp. The approach I have Pat Hannifin's
informal agreement to would be to try I Ia test. It
is reasonably representative and would not be as massive as
Europe or Pacific.
4. Although it depends on continued JCS/Service
cooperation, the Milestones listed in the Objective may be
attainable. The test approach enables us to come up with a
piece of paper a lot sooner than we could get one if we took
on the world. right away.
&WIA
dmaAjavW
AOOW o~,
Rear Admiral, USN
Director, Coordination
Staff/Secretariat
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SUBJECT A Plan for The Tactical/ National
Intelligence Interface Study
1. The Starting Point:
a. The JCS paper on the tactical/ national intelligence
interface, now awaiting SecDef approval, barely scratches the surface
of the tactical/ national intelligence problem. Of the six points that
the JCS were to address in their study (outlined in paragraph 5 of the
Memorandum of Agreement of 2 November 1973), only two were approached,
and these only partly.
b. The principal criterion for identifying the non-CDIP
assets that were to be considered in the study was simply whether or
not an asset was dedicated to its parent organization or other combat
units. If it was "dedicated, " it was excluded.
c. The JCS considered only Programs 1, 2 and 5
intelligence assets. The whole world of intelligence R&D, and major
headquarters staffs and their productiop,_caability were not considered.
The examination of the major Defense programs that were addressed
was cursory, at best. Asa result the JCS initial effort will provide
the IC Staff little or no new information on so-called tactical intelligence
assets
d. The JCS made no effort to identify the intelligence
requirements of the operating forces, or the support available from
national sources (although total CIRIS data was available to them).
There could be, therefore, no judgment regarding how non-CDIP and
national assets might be mutually supporting.
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e. Substantively, we are where we started on 2 November
1973. Culturally, significant progress has been made. First, however
imperfect the JCS effort, it is more than has ever before been officially
released outside the JCS arena. The precedent is set; substantial
progress is probable. Second, the JCS action officers and their
principals have had a considerable education. They have faced the
fact that the DCI has a legitimate need to know, and they have been
forced to examine intelligence support relationships to the commands.
f. Service reluctance to be forthcoming on the tactical
side of the study stems from legitimate concerns. These are, essentially:
(1) concern that command force support intelligence assets could be
largely diverted from their primary missions to satisfy national needs;
(2) concern that intelligence funding could be centralized across-the-
board, taking from the Services the responsibility for resource decisions
for intelligence support assets integral to the operating forces; and
(3) concern that if made visible at the OSD or DCI level, force support
intelligence assets would be traded for national assets that could not
support the forces in a timely and usable manner.
2. The Next Phase:
a. Clearly, if the study continues on its present course.
we will end _up with mangy words.-and no_ ubstance. To change direction,
we have to either overcome or bypass the traditional Service hang-ups
regarding intelligence assets integral to the operating forces.
b. A head-on collision would be impractical. The JCS
have withstood since at least 1963 all attempts to identify and categorize
force support intelligence assets, even within the Defense arena.
Although it appears certain that the DCI would prevail eventually, it
would be a long and frustrating battle.
c. We should bypass the problem of identifying the
so-called tactical intelligence assets, and concentrate next on the in-
-depth identification of the intelligence needs of the operating forces ,
and the national capabilities that can be applied to their satisfaction --
points three and four under the scope of the Agreement. It seems
inevitable that a reasonable inventory of non-CDIP assets would be a
fall-out. An honest examination of the tactical intelligence needs must
of necessity touch the organic assets available for their satisfaction.
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ILLEGIB
d. There is a danger that the examination of command
intelligence needs could be as cursory as the initial JCS effort to
inventory assets. We must make certain that we identify specific
requirements, and that the factors of accuracy and timeliness, as well
as information needs, are considered for each level of command capable
of sustained, independent combat operations. Participation by the U&S
and component commands is necessary.
e. The determination of national assets that can support
field commanders will require an examination of not only technical
capabilities, but details of their present and contingency missions, and
the circumstances under which they could be diverted. During this
examination, questions will arise regarding the usefulness of some of the
national requirements and the priorities assigned to them. The USIB
and its committees will have to be prepared to resolve these problems.
3. Gettin on With It:
a. It will take time to do the next phase well; months
will be required to sift through the EEI of the tactical commands and
match to them the appropriate national capabilities. To abbreviate the
scope of this phase, or work only from generalized statements of
priorities and capabilities (such as the JCS intelligence objectives and
the CIRIS data) would defeat the purpose of the study and deny the
national intelligence leadership the understanding of substantive
tactical intelligence needs necessary to make judicious resource
judgments regarding force intelligence support assets.
b. (U) A plan for the next phase is attached.
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A PLAN FOR THE TACTICAL/ NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE STUDY
1. This plan for the second phase of the tactical/national
intelligence interface study addresses national intelligence support to
tactical commanders, and the establishment of data base for non-CDIP
intelligence assets. It is responsive to the third and fourth steps of
the scope of the study stated in paragraph 5 of the Agreement of
2 November 1973, and to steps a. and b., paragraph 2, of the D/DCI/IC
memorandum of 15 April 1974 on the Tactical/ National Intelligence Inter-
face.
2. This plan covers three tasks to be accomplished simultane-
ously by separate working groups. These tasks are: (a) identify
the intelligence requirements of the operating forces, (b) identify the
capabilities of the national intelligence assets, and (c) establish a non-
CDIP intelligence data base. The working groups for the substantive
tasks will include representatives of each of the military services, the
J-5 JCS, the DIA, the NSA=, the DMA and the DIS. DIA will chair
the Tactical/ National Intelligence Requirements Working Group. The IC
Staff will chair the National Intelligence Capabilities Working Group. The
non-CDIP intelligence data base will be created by the Research and
Analysis Branch of the IC Staff in collaboration with the J-5 JCS, and
with the assistance of the Services and intelligence agencies, as necessary.
All members of the working groups will, as a minimum, have access
to the compartmented information specified in the D/DCI/IC memorandum
of 15 April 1974.
3. Tactical /National Intelligence Requirements
Working Group
a. Identify the peacetime, contingency and wartime essential
elements of information (EEI) for each command capable of independent
and sustained combat and having an operational mission in a SIOP-tasked
unified or specified command area of operations.
b. Translate the EEI into statements of intelligence needs in
terms of timeliness, accuracy, and areas of operations; consolidate
like needs where appropriate.
c. For each statement of intelligence need, identify the
national and non-CDIP intelligence assets tasked in war and contingency
plans for its satisfaction.
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d. Coordinate the statements of intelligence needs and intelli-
gence tasking with the SIOP-tasked unified, specified and component
commands, and their subordinate commands, as appropriate.
e. Prepare for the Chairman, JCS, and for the D/DCI/IC
a comprehensive report of findings for each SIOP-tasked unified and
specified command, identifying the forces and their intelligence needs by
areas of operations within the unified and specified command area of
responsibility.
4. The National Intelligence Capabilities Working Group:
a. Identify each national intelligence asset, and its specific
targets, with a mission in or against the areas of responsibility and
intelligence interest of the SIOP-tasked unified and specified commands
for peacetime, contingency or wartime operations.
b. Determine the capability for timeliness and accuracy
of each identified asset to provide information or to produce intelligence
with respect to each of its targets for each operational environment.
c. Determine the additional targets in each SIOP-tasked
unified and specified command area of interest and responsibility that can
be tasked to national intelligence assets with no degradation to their
primary missions; consider accuracy and timeliness of reporting.
d. Identify the peacetime national intelligence missions that
could be safely reduced or terminated in wartime and in contingency
situations, and the additional targets in unified and specified command
areas of interest and responsibility that could be undertaken in their
place.
e. Coordinate the statements of national intelligence asset
capabilities with the operators of the individual systems and the
consumers of their products, as appropriate.
f. For each national intelligence asset, identify the restrictions
that may preclude the dissemination of information/ intelligence to tactical
commanders, and recommend procedures to overcome the restrictions.
g. Prepare for the Chairman, JCS, and for the D/DCI/IC
a comprehensive report of findings on the capabilities of each national
intelligence asset against targets in the SIOP-tasked unified and specified
command areas of interest and responsility, the restrictions that may
limit their usefulness to tactical commanders, and recommendations to
mitigate or overcome such restrictions.
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5. The Non-CDIP Intelligence Data Base:
a. Design and establish a CIRIS-compatible program to
manipulate the data on non-CDIP intelligence assets that are generated
by this study, and to correlate them with parallel data in the CIRIS
data base.
b. Design and implement an extention of the CIRIS program
to accommodate the detailed data on national intelligence assets that
are generated by this study.
c. Provide data support to the substantive working groups,
as required.
6. I Coordination by the substantive working groups with
field commanders and project operators should begin on 1 September
1974. Completed reports of findings should be delivered to the Chairman,
JCS and to the D/DCI/IC by 1 December 1974.
7. The subsequent phase of this study effort will address the
contribution that non-CDIP intelligence assets can make to national
intelligence needs .
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7 May 1974
OBJECTIVE NO. 10
Make further progress in improving the relationship between
national and tactical intelligence assets in the interest of providing
maximum support for both:national intelligence users and the
operational field commands without unnecessary redundancy in use of
resources. (This is seen as a three-year program.)
MILESTONES
1 July 1974 Working in concert with the Joint Chief of
Staff, establish: (1) a joint national/
tactical intelligence requirements task
group to identify the peacetime, contingency
and wartime essential elements of information
of a representative military field commander;
(2) a national intelligence capabilities task
group to determine and quantify the capabili-
ties of national intelligence systems to
satisfy the intelligence needs of military
commanders; (3) a joint task group to design
and establish a common data base to incorporate
identified tactical and national intelligence
resources and to support the two substantive
task groups.
1 September 1974 Initiate combined functioning of the require-
ments task group and the capabilities working
group.
1 October 1974 Complete statement of the representative
military commander's intelligence require-
ments and the national intelligence capabilities
to respond to those requirements. Utilizing
lessons learned in representative command test
effort, initiate requirements/capabilities
study of remaining areas.
1 February 1975 Initiate combined functioning of the require-
ments and capabilities working groups
1 July 1975 Formulate recommendations in consultation with
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary
of Defense to enhance assurance that the needs
of national intelligence and of military
operations are met without unnecessary
duplication.
A-10
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SECRET