WARNING PAPER FOR THE NSCIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01082A000200030003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 23, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: General Wilson
IC 74-2098
23 October 1974
SUBJECT: Warning Paper for the NSCIC
1. The attached draft needs more work on it.
has not seen it. The paragraph on NSDM 242 has already been
overtaken by events; we are working on a revision.
2. Tab A is Lehman's draft with our suggested changes.
3. The statements on the mission and structure of the new
strategic warning mechanism are based on the discussion at the
22 October meeting with Mr. Colby. You should be aware that at
the 23 October ad hoc committee meeting the State representative
dissented from the mission statement, and the DIA representative
was holding strongly to the position that the Watch mechanism, per se,
should be eliminated and the function delegated by the DCI to DIA.
4. Also, DIA knows that the DCI (read IC Staff) is preparing a
report to the NSCIC on the warning problem. In view of the currently
apparent differences between the DCI and DIA, they are understandably
nervous about what the report will contain.
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IC /PRD
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
lO- IC Registry
1 F PRD Subject
1 - PRD Chrono
Deputy Chief, PRD
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 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, NSCIC
SUBJECT: Intelligence Warning
INTRODUCTION
1. In the broadest sense, the function of intelligence is to provide
the policy maker with a forecast of future international developments
that are likely to have a significant effect on U.S., national interests.
This is done on a continuing basis through the production of current
intelligence and estimates.
fa 3f i, Lr.
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Within this broad
general responsibility to forecast,
inteliigencehas also a special responsibility to warn the policy
maker of potential developments that are perceived to represent
a special threat to U. S. national interests. Implicit in warning
intelligence 'is the assumption that something might occur which
requires a U. S. response and, thus, the special, focused attention
of the policy maker.
3. Within the overall responsibility of the community to provide
warning lies the more specialized responsibility to provide warning
of military attack against the U. S. or its allies. An even more
specialized responsibility is warning of nuclear attack. (See Tab A
for a graphic display of the progression from the intelligence
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community?s "steady state" forecasting role to its role in providing
alerts and strategic warning. )
4. Until recently, the intelligence community has had no established
mechanism to provide explicit warning to the policy maker except
for the USIB Watch Committee. This was established in 1954, in
response to the so-called Pearl Haarbnr syndrome, to provide warning
of imminent military attack against the-U. S.--Fivers the narrowness
of its charter, it has had little occasion to produeeAwogs during
the 20 years of its existence. Its weekly reports, containing
4ssentially negative threat assessments, have been of little, if
any, value to the policy maker. And even with some loosening over
time of -its reporting criteria, ea g. , to cover military developments
in Vietnam, the policy maker has been left unwarned, in any
explicit sense, of a wide range of critical developments military,
.technological, 'Political, and economic -? which have deserved his
focused attention. He has been left largely to his own devices to
glean from the mass of finished intelligence products constantly
available to him which items deserve his special attention. The
intelligence producer, after the event, has usually been able to
demonstrate that in one way or another he forecasted the event.
But he has generally assumed no responsibility to warn.
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THE ALERT MEMORANDUM
5. In order to fill this gap in the community's procedures, I
am in the process of developing a new intelligence art form, the
Alert Memorandum (AM). Its purpose will be to provide me with a
medium explicitly to warn the members of WSAG of a foreign
development of special gravity in terms of U. S. national interests.
6. In recognition of the fact that warning is a responsibility of
the whole community, no special group or office will be established
to produce this document. An alert memorandum can be proposed
by any element of the community; it will be produced by the appropriate
National Intelligence Officer in conjunction with whatever elements of
the community he wishes to call on to do the job. To the extent that
time permits, it will be coordinated among the USIB agencies.
STRATEGIC WARNING
7. The possibility of a military attack against the U. S. or its
allies, because of its extreme gravity, requires, in my view, an
additional, discrete, and specialized effort.
8. Generally, U. S. policy interests will require warning of
military events -- whether Communist-initiated or not -- more often
and at an earlier stage of development than strictly political,
technological, or economic events. 'Providing such warning,
however, is extremely difficult 'because frequently no indications
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exist of the intent to employ military measures until a very short
period before the action is taken. While the decision to launch some
military actions (e. g. , Hitler's invasion of Poland and the Arab
initiation of the October War) almost certainly occurs some time
before the, actions are adopted, in many cases (a. g. , Czechoslovakia
in I9-and Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974) the decision to use
force is not made until almost immediately before the action is taken.
9. In cases such as these the use of force (or initiation of
Capabilities are augmented, sometimes behind a screen of deliberate
addressed by a potential aggressor's top policy-making body.
hostilities) becomes, early on, one of a range of serious options
deception, to keep this option open and
option, to e. , to strike, may not be made until very late in the
process rather than at the outset. There will be no evidence early
in the game of firm intent to go to war -- not because intelligence
is deficient but because no such firm decision has yet been made. A
warning keyed to hard evidence of an attack decision -- i. a., a firm
"intent to go to war" -- will in these instances inevitably come very
close to the actual initiation of hostilities, too late for counter-action.
ake it genuinely, or
increasingly, viable. But the actual decision to exercise this
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In this sort of situation, the Intelligence Community needs to give
formal warning when a potential adversary first begins to weigh
initiating hostilities as .a serious practical option. The final
decision point may come much later long after capabilities are
already augmented -? or not at all. (See Tab B a detailed description,
and graphic representation, of how the Japanese kept their options
open up until a few hours prior to the Pearl Harbor attack.)
10. Indeed the final decision point is often so much an immediate
or tactical' matter that no single system can be expected to bear the
1entire burden of giving? each warning. Moat likely the warning(s)
would be reflected by various elements of the Community in one or
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principal. Only if time permitted would consultation between Community
agencies take places though the recent introduction of the National
operations intelligence Watch officer's Net (NOIWON) has improved
the possibilities of such consultation.
11. The community's strategic warning mechanism (the Watch
Committee of USIB and the National Indications Center) is in the
process of 1teing revised. In Its new form it will consist of a small
national-level oversight committee and a small staff consisting of
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analysts drawn from the major production elements of the community.
The committee chairman will be responsible directly to me but will
work in close coordination with the specialized warning n ehanisms
of the Department of Defense. The staff will be co-located with
the NMIC and will rely on the NMIC to perform the 24-hour watch
functions formerly performed by the NIC.
12. The mission of the new Strategic Warning Committee and
Staff will be to assist me in carrying out my responsibility for
providing strategic warning to the National Security Council. They
will be responsible for providing the earliest possible warning of
military action against the U. S. or its allies. They will also be
sponsible for poviding warning of military action in developing
crisis situations, in any area, which could involve U. S. farces.
If, for example, Arab-Israeli tensions suddenly increased and
culminated in a Syrian attack against Israel, the strategic warning
mechanism would not be responsible for providing warning of this
event. The responsibility would rest with the community at large
and the NIOs to produce an Alert Memorandum. The Strategic
Warning Committee and Staff would, however, be responsible for
following the situation closely, even before the Syrian attack, to
determine whether any indications existed of a Soviet military role
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in the crisis. The personnel of the Watch mechanism would not
only scan the current traffic for signs of Soviet military movement,
but would bring to bear their special understanding of Soviet alert
and combat readiness procedures, mobilization laws, war games
or exercises, civil defense doctrine and practice, and other similar
material of a type rarely needed for day-to-day intelligence reporting
but absolutely vital when there is a threat of employment of military
force by a major Communist state.
And because this expertise
presumably, would be unique to the strategic warning, mechanism. no
other element of the Community..would attempt to compete with it.
other Community Efforts to Improve Warning
13. A community effort to address the nuclear dimension of the
warning problem was set in train by NSDM 242, "Policy for Planning
the Employment of Nuclear Weapons, " issued in January 1974. Ah,
Ad Hoc Interagency Crisis Management Task Force (ICMIF), chaired
by J-3 and with representation from the Secretaries of State and
Defense, the DCI (IC Staff), JCS, NSC Staff, ASD(I), and DIA. The
ICMTF in turn created separate groups to concentrate on crisis
management communications and on contingency planning. The
revised NSDM 242, awaiting Dr. Kissinger's a*p roval, would
engender further organizational measures.
14.---MTh tie theoretical level, a veteran analyst in the National
Indications Center has produced a Handbook of Warning Intelligence
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(3 vols.. 1972-74). It is the first of its kind, and has assisted' many
in the Community both in understanding the many forms of warning
and in identifying the particular expertise which should be associated
with the strategic warning function.
15. Other projects related to warning are:
a. The establishment by the ASD(I) of an Intelligence and
cornimissioned several major warning studies, such as War
State, IC Staff and CIA, as well as ASD(I). ASD(I) has also
and Warning in ASD(I). This has led to the formation of an
Indications and Warning Functional Review Group. which
presently includes representatives from J-3, J-5, NSA, DIA.
Warning Review Panel chaired by the Director of Indications
in Europe (WINE), done by the
warning hardware requirements, done by
b. An ARPA/RCA research project into computer-aided
measurement of USSR/PRC force posture, which DIA envisions
as part of a modernized NMIC.
c. Special attention by the Studies Analysis and Gaming
Agency (SAGA) to warning and deception on behalf of the JCS.
d. The establishment of a Current Intelligence Staff in
INR to facilitate the rapid transmission of warning to various
policy levels in the State Department.
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e. The establishment by CIA of a Committee on Internal
Organization for Crisis Management.
f. The IC Staff's promotion of conferencing networks
(NOI`N'ON, NOIAN, CONTEXT, Meet-Me), which hopefully
will improve the technical support aspects of warning.
g. The IC Staff's compilation of a Crisis Directory,
intended to link watch centers In operational, intelligence,
and related government agencies.
w. E. Colby
Director
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If one accepts the warning process as described above, particularly
with respect to the interactions between decision makers, then we must
review the meaning of intentions.
We often hear the statement that "we knew of the enemy's capability
but were not told of his intention." There has been a tendency to believe
that our opponent has a single intention, to take a specific action. In
reality anyone's intentions can be buried in many options. The selection
of a particular option is influenced by the opponent's actions (or non-
actions) at any time.
Parhaps'an example would illustrate the phenomenon of intention.
Let us take the case of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Over the
decade of the 1930's Japan built up a capability to dominate the West
Pacific area. Also during this period Japan started a war with China.
As a result the United States eventually reacted by,economic actions such
as freezing Japanese assets and later, imposing the oil embargo. While
US-Japanese negotiations were underway, the Japanese continued, as an
..option, to plan an attack on Pearl Harbor. The US-Japanese negotiations
were not perceived by the Japanese as fruitful. As a result the Pearl
Harbor attack plan was taken another step toward execution when the
Japanese task force left home waters on 24 November 1941.
Even after negotiations were terminated at the end of November the
commander of the Japanese task force approaching Pearl Harbor.wasnot
authorized to execute the attack until certain conditions had been sat-
isfied, one of which was that he had not been detected. (Those events
are depicted in Figure 2_) If he were detected by the the US fleet he
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 was to signal them that he was simply on an exercise and then was to
return toA~ M01082A000200030003-8
If indeed, the US fleet had detected the Japanese task force and
they had withdrawn , what can one say about the Japanese intention to
attack Pearl Harbor? Certainly the intention existed as one of the po-
tential options, but that single intention could not have been predict-
ed by our intelligence with absolute certainty because the Japanese had
not yet made up their minds to. attack.
However, if US intelligence analysts had issued a warning estimate
that stated there was, say, a 30% probability of a Japanese attack this'
might have produced the decision to increase our reconnaissance efforts
to a level sufficient to detect the approaching Japanese fleet.- If-the
Japanese had detected our reconnaissance they would have followed orders
and returned to Japan. In a case such as this warning would have served
as a.deterrent to attack. Ironically, in this case, we-Might have never
known whether the Japanese had the intention to attack or were merely on
an exercise.
In summary, the best any intelligence system can do is to describe
where the opponent is on the decision stairway illustrated.in Figure 2.
One cannot predict the opponent's intention when he has not yet made tip
his own mind as to which option to select. A good decision maker will,
of course, keep as many options open as he can as long as he can.
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