THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01066A001400440003-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: PAPER

SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/03/24: CIA-RDP80M01066A001400440003-8
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
I. INTELLIGENCE
A. A very old profession. Joshua sent spies into Jericho; Moses
sent agents into the land of Canaan. Even earlier--aerial reconnaissance
and meteorological mission flown by a dove Noah launched from, the Ark.
B. World War II
1. Pearl Harbor.
2. Report in July 1946 of Joint Congressional Committee on the
Pearl. Harbor attack.
3. Comments restricted to military intelligence--recommended
"That there be a complete integration of Army and Navy intelligence
agencies in order to avoid the pitfalls of divided responsibility which
experience has made so abundantly apparent. . . . "
4. Intelligence versus Information.
IDA (Dr. Belden) analysis of Pearl Harbor--information
abundant but intelligence poor due to breakdown in human communica-
tion; only one mechanical breakdown.
II. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
A. Established by President Truman's letter of 22 January 1946.
Approved For Release 2005/0k4onRDP80M01066A001400440003-8
. AT
 SECRET
B. Memoir,g by Harry S. Truman, Volume Two: Years of Trial
and Hope:
"A PRESIDENT HAS TO KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON ALL
AROUND THE WORLD IN ORDER TO BE READY TO ACT WHEN
ACTION IS NEEDED. THE PRESIDENT MUST HAVE ALL THE
FACTS THAT MAY AFFECT THE FOREIGN POLICY OR THE
MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. . . .
"BEFORE 1946 SUCH INFORMATION AS THE PRESIDENT
NEEDED WAS BEING COLLECTED IN SEVERAL DIFFERENT
PLACES IN THE GOVERNMENT. THE WAR DEPARTMENT HAD
AN INTELLIGENCE DIVISION--G-2--AND THE NAVY HAD AN
INTELLIGENCE SETUP OF ITS OWN--THE ONI. THE DEPART-
MENT OF STATE, ON THE ONE HAND, GOT ITS INFORMATION
THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, WHILE THE TREASURY AND
THE DEPARTMENTS OF COMMERCE AND AGRICULTURE EACH
HAD CHANNELS FOR. GATHERING INFORMATION FROM DIFFERENT
PARTS OF THE WORLD- -ON MONETARY, ECONOMIC, AND
AGRICULTURAL MATTERS.
"DURING WORLD WAR II THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTI-
GATION HAD SOME OPERATIONS ABROAD, AND IN ADDITION THE
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, WHICH WAS SET UP BY
Approved For Release 2005/0 RDP80MO1066AO01400440003-8
. ~ ft-
fitt 2
Approved For Release 2005/03/24: CIA-RDP80MO1066AO01400440003-8
 Li g
Approved For Release 2005/3 24 : CIA-RDP80MO1066AO01400440003-8
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT DURING THE WAR AND PLACED UNDER
THE DIRECTION OF GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN, OPERATED
ABROAD TO GATHER INFORMATION.
"THIS SCATTERED METHOD OF GETTING INFORMATION FOR
THE VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT FIRST
STRUCK ME AS BEING BADLY ORGANIZED WHEN I WAS IN THE
SENATE. OUR SENATE COMMITTEES, HEARING THE WITNESSES
FROM THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, WERE OFTEN STRUCK
BY THE FACT THAT DIFFERENT AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT
CAME UP WITH DIFFERENT AND CONFLICTING FACTS ON
SIMILAR SUBJECTS. IT WAS NOT AT FIRST APPARENT THAT
THIS WAS DUE TO THE UNCOORDINATED METHODS OF OBTAINING
INFORMATION. SINCE THEN, HOWEVER, I HAVE OFTEN THOUGHT
THAT IF THERE HAD BEEN SOMETHING LIKE COORDINATION OF
INFORMATION IN THE GOVERNMENT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE
DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, FOR.THE JAPANESE TO SUCCEED
IN THE SNEAK ATTACK AT PEARL HARBOR. IN THOSE DAYS THE
MILITARY DID NOT KNOW EVERYTHING THE STATE DEPARTMENT
KNEW, AND THE DIPLOMATS DID NOT HAVE ACCESS TO ALL THE
ARMY AND NAVY KNEW. THE ARMY AND THE NAVY, IN FACT,
HAD ONLY A VERY INFORMAL ARRANGEMENT TO KEEP EACH
OTHER INFORMED AS TO THEIR PLANS.
Approved For Release 2005/ ;qIA-RDP80MO1066AO01400440003-8 3
 4~: ~I~ I
Approved For Release 2005/03/24: CIA-RDP80M01066A001400440003-8
"IN OT-IER WORDS, THERE HAD NEVER BEEN MUCH
ATTENTION PAID TO ANY CENTRALIZED INTELLIGENCE
ORGANIZATION IN OUR GOVERNMENT. APPARENTLY THE
UNITED STATES SAW NO NEED FOR A REALLY COMPREHENSIVE
SYSTEM OF VOREIGN INTELLIGENCE UNTIL WORLD WAR II
PLACED AMERICAN FIGHTING MEN ON THE CONTINENTS OF
EUROPE, ASIA, AND AFRICA AND ON THE ISLANDS OF THE
ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC.
"THE WAR TAUGHT US THIS LESSON- -THAT WE HAD TO
COLLECT INTELLIGENCE IN A MANNER THAT WOULD MAKE
THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE WHERE IT WAS NEEDED AND
WHEN IT WAS WANTED, IN AN INTELLIGENT AND UNDERSTAND-
ABLE FORM. IF IT IS NOT INTELLIGENT AND UNDERSTANDABLE,
IT IS USELESS."
III. TWENTY YEARS LATER
Centralization essential because:
1. Any intelligence estimate needs to consider military,
political, sociological, economic, scientific, and all other types
of information in one single package.
2. This is an age of specialization.
3. The information explosion.
4. Speed of communication.
. RDP80M01066A001400440003-8 4
Approved For Release 2005/Q#4 -* -
~: it
 Approved For Release 2005/03/24: CIA-RDP80M01066A001400440003-8
CIA MISSION
(Chart -- CIA mission set forth in National Security Act of 1947)
NSCIDs (8) and DCIDs (37).
(Chart -- CIA program)
(Chart - "The CIA did it. Pass it along. ")
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
(Chart -- The Intelligence Community)
THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
(Chart -- Relationships of DCI to President and Intelligence Community)
USIB Functions
The United States Intelligence Board meets at least once a week--
sometimes more often--and concerns itself with a wide variety of
matters. I think there are three in particular which pretty well
define the responsibilities and functions of USIB.
First, USIB establishes--and periodically reviews--the national
priorities for the guidance of the intelligence community in choosing
the targets and assigning assets for our intelligence effort.
Second, the Board continuously reviews the activities of the
members of the community to determine whether they are in accord
with those priorities, and to make sure that we are doing everything
possible to close gaps and to avoid unnecessary duplication.
Approved For Release 2005/03/24: CIA-RDP80M01066A001400440003-8
r
S e;
F'- T
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/03/24: CIA-RDP80M01066A001400440003-8
Third, the Board reviews in great detail the National Intelligence
Estimates which the Director of Central Intelligence submits to the
President and the National Security Council. The National Security
Council has defined national intelligence as information affecting the
national security "which transcends the exclusive competence of any
one agency or department" of the Government. These estimates are
generally drafted within CIA, but they are National Intelligence Esti-
mates, and therefore must reflect the considered judgment of the
entire intelligence community. This starts with the participation of
all appropriate elements of the community at the outset, in the drafting
process, and is ensured by the USIB review at the end of the line.
VII. HOW DOES THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MAKE ITS CONTRIBUTION
IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY?
Let me say first of all that when it comes to decision-making,
we believe and in fact we insist that the role of intelligence is one
of supplying objective, substantive intelligence. It may be hard fact.
It may be an intelligence appreciation- -our best judgment of the
situation. It may be estimative --again, our best judgment of how
the situation is likely to develop.
Approved For Release 2005/03g
QIA-
HE I" RDP80M 01066A001400440003-8
? 6
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/03/24: CIA-RDP80M01066A001400440003-8
VIII. PRODUCTIPN
(Chart -- What do we produce? for whom?)
A. National Intelligence Surveys
B. Reports and Memoranda
C. National Intelligence Estimates
The Board of National Estimates deserves special mention.
It is a body of very senior, very knowledgeable men of varied
experience, who have no other duty than to study and seek answers
to the fundamental questions of national security. The Board is
composed of about a dozen such men, relieved of all administrative
duties and daily chores, coming from extensive backgrounds in the
military, diplomatic, legal, academic, and intelligence professions.
Their sole function is to hear and consider evidence and argument
from the entire intelligence community, and then to recommend to
the Director and to USIB what estimate the Director shall submit
to the President and his advisers on matters of critical importance
to national security.
We seek a careful and thoughtful judgment which will be of the
greatest possible assistance to the policy-maker, but I want to stress
that we do not strive for unanimity. We could achieve apparent
unanimity by overriding the dissenting minority in a vote, or by
Approved For Release 2005/0
9RDP80 M 01066A001400440003-8
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/03/24: CIA-RDP80M01066A001400440003-8
watering down the estimate to the common denominator--to the
narrowed area of complete agreement in the thinking of the entire
intelligence community. This, however, would be a disservice to
the policy-maker. All we ask is that dissents be based on honest
differences of opinion on how the available facts are to be evaluated
and interpreted, not on personal convictions or prejudices, hunches,
or parochial interests.
a. NIEs -- 37 during 1966.
Examples: "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack"
"Communist China's Advanced Weapons Program"
b. SNIEs -- 17 during 1966. (Contingency SNIEs -- 4)
Examples: "Security Conditions in the Philippines"
Contingency SNIE dated 4 February 1966 to
estimate how DRV capabilities to support the insurgency in
the South would be affected by increasing the scope and inten-
sity of the bombing of North Vietnam, and how long it would
take for the impact to be felt in the South.
Contingency SNIE dated 27 October 1966 to
estimate foreign reactions to various U. S. courses of action
affecting American forces stationed in Europe. Alternatives:
Maintain U. S. ground forces in West Germany at the present
level or effect a substantial reduction.
Approved For Release 2005/0tflff -RDP80M01066A001400440003-8
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/03/24: CIA-RDP80M01066A001400440003-8
D. Current Intelligence
1. The Watch Committee of USIB concentrates on the very
highly specialized field of what we call indications intelligence,
looking for the indicators which might give us early warning of
hostile intentions against the United States or its allies. There
is a full-time activity staffed jointly by the intelligence community--
the National Indications Center--at work in the Pentagon. It keeps
track of possible indicators and reports those which may be
significant--or for that matter the absence of any significant
indicators--to the Watch Committee. The Watch Committee has
a regular weekly meeting, timed so that the conclusions will be
ready for the weekly USIB meeting, but in times of crisis the
Watch Committee may meet one or more times a day.
2. Operations Center.
3. Current Intelligence Bulletin and Daily Brief for the
President.
IX. SUMMARY
To summarize, the intelligence community of the United States
Government comprises all the intelligence components of the various
departments and agencies, operating under the direction and control
of the United States Intelligence Board and the Director of Central
Intelligence as the principal intelligence officer of the President.
Approved For Release 2005/03/24: CIA-RDP80M01066A001400440003-8
SECRET
 SEGHE'T
Approved For Release 2005/03/24: CIA-RDP80M01066A001400440003-8
It is oijr job to decide what information we need to collect, to
assign specific collection responsibilities to the various elements
of the community in accordance with their particular capabilities,
to monitor their performance, to assemble and collate .the infor-
mation collected, and to bring the best brains in the country, in or
out of Government, to bear on it.
We then furnish the intelligence appreciations required by the
decision-makers in formulating policy and give them timely warning
and expert analysis of developments bearing on the national security
of the United States. We support policy--we do not formulate policy--
we do not advocate policy.
X. SUPERVISION
(Chart -- Supervision of CIA activities)
A. Executive Branch
1. Special Group for Covert Action ("303" Committee)
Four members under the chairmanship of the Special
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
Other members are the Director of Central Intelligence,
Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Under Secretary
of State for Political Affairs.
Approved For Release 2005/03/ ,DP80M01066A001400440003-8
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/03/24: CIA-RDP80M01066A001400440003-8
2. Sepior Interdepartmental Group (SIG)
Established in March 1966 to assist the Secretary of State
in the direction, coordination and supervision of interdepart-
mental activities of the U. S. Government overseas. Seven
members under the chairmanship of the State Department
(Under Secretary Katzenbach). Other members are the
Director of Central Intelligence, Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Director of AID, Director of USIA, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs.
3. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
First established in 1956 as the President's Board of
Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, this body of
distinguished private citizens is to conduct an objective
review of the foreign intelligence activities of the U. S. and
periodically report its findings to the President. Paramount
are their reports pertaining to the quality of the foreign
intelligence provided to the policy-makers, the performance
of CIA, and the functioning of the other principal U. S.
intelligence elements.
4. Bureau of the Budget
Cleared personnel who handle and control Agency budget.
Approved For Release 20
I . t fit 05/0 :~~'4-RDP80M01066A001400440003-8 11
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/03/24: CIA-RDP80MO1066AO01400440003-8
B. Congressional
CIA Subcommittees
a. Appropriations
b. Armed Services
C. Other Congressional Relationships
1. Foreign Relations Committee
2. Joint Atomic Energy Committee
3. Internal Security Subcommittee
4. Briefings during 89th Congress:
a. Appropriations and Armed Services Subcommittees
b. 30 other Committees
c. Many individuals
XI. PROFESSIONALISM
A. Education
Of the Agency's ' 7 5 top officials:
Doctorate 20%
Masters 28%a
Bachelors 45%
B. Agency Experience
Over 10 years 61%
Over 15 years 31%
Approved For Release 2005/OSEC-R f-RDP80M01066A001400440003-8
 ul~ LC IEf
Approved For Release 2005/03/24: CIA-RDP80M01066A001400440003-8
C.
Foreigp Language Capability
1.
Professional employees on duty:
One foreign language
69%
Three or more foreign languages
34%
2.
New professional employees:
At least one foreign language
75%
Approved For Release 2005/03/ DP80M01066A001400440003-8