DRAFT DDCI SPEECH FOR NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE 16 OCTOBER 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01066A001400380004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 2, 1970
• Content Type: SPEECH

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2 OCTOBER 1970
DRAFT DDCI SPEECH FOR
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
16 OCTOBER 1970
GENERAL MCPHERSON, GENTLEMEN:
THE IDEAL SUMMARIZATION OF THE ROLE OF THE IN-
TELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
FORMULATION WOULD BE THE STATEMENT THAT THE INTEL-
LIGENCE COMMUNITY fl,& , NO ROLE IN IT.
EVER SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTRAL IN-
TELLIGENCE AGENCY IN 1947, HOWEVER, WE HAVE BEEN AC-
CUSED SO LOUDLY, SO GLIBLY, AND SO PERSISTENTLY OF
MAKING UNITED STATES POLICY--OR AT LEAST OF HAVING
AN INDEPENDENT ONE OF OUR OWN--THAT THIS SIMPLE
STATEMENT, HOWEVER TRUE, WILL NOT SUFFICE.
THE STATEMENT IS, ADMITTEDLY, A SIMPLIFICATION
WHICH MUST BE QUALIFIED. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
DOES HAVE A ROLE, BUT IT IS STRICTLY ONE OF SUPP RAT,
IT IS OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO FURNISH THE INFORMATION
ON WHICH THE POLICY-MAKERS WILL BASE THEIR DECISIONS?
NOT TO TAKE PART IN THE DEBATE.
THIS LIMITED SUPPORT ROLE IS IMPLICIT IN THE
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, WHICH IS THE CHARTER
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FOR THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND FOR THE IN-
TELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AS IT EXISTS TODAY.
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IS AN AD-
VISER--N2I A MEMBER--OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUN-
CIL. WHICH IS THE PRESIDENTS TOP FORUM FOR POLICY
DECISIONS. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY UNDER-
TAKES SUCH ACTIVITIES AS THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUN-
CIL MAY DIRECT. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IS
NOT REPRESENTED IN THE CABINET.
ALL THIS RESTS
ON STATUTE OR PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE.
As I INTEND TO SHOW YOU, FURTHERMORE. THE BASIC
GROUND RULES UNDER WHICH THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
ABSTAINS FROM THE ADVOCACY OR FORMULATION OF POLICY
ARE VITAL TO EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE WORK. EVEN IF
THERE WERE NO SUCH RESTRICTIONS IN LEGISLATION AND
IN REGULATIONS.
IN FEBRUARY. 1946--BEFORE THE CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCY EXISTED--THERE WAS A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
GROUP WHICH TOOK OVER FROM THE WARTIME OFFICE OF
STRATEGIC SERVICES. IN THE ABSENCE AT THAT TIME OF
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A NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, THE C.I.G. TOOK ITS OR-
DERS FROM A "NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY" REPRE-
SENTING THE ARMED SERVICES AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE.
THE FIRST DRAFT NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY
DIRECTIVE--UNDER WHICH THE C.I.G. WAS TO OPERATE--
STIPULATED THAT THE DIRECTOR OF THE C.I.G.. ADMIRAL
SOUERS, SHOULD HAVE ACCESS TO "NECESSARY INFORMATION
AS TO POLICIES. PLANS. ACTIONS. CAPABILITIES AND IN-
TENTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH REFERENCE TO FOR-
EIGN NATIONS."
BEFORE THE DIRECTIVE WAS ISSUED. ADMIRAL SOUERS
SUCCESSFULLY URGED THAT THOSE WORDS BE ELIMINATED.
EVEN AT THAT EARLY DATE, IT WAS THE CONSENSUS OF
THE INFANT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY THAT THE WISEST
COURSE OF ACTION WAS STAY AS FAR AWAY AS POSSIBLE
FROM ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE FORMULATION OF THE "POLI-
CIES, PLANS ...AND INTENTIONS" OF OUR OWN GOVERNMENT.
FOR 15 YEARS. IN FACT. WE MANAGED TO SHUN THIS
FORBIDDEN FRUIT OF THE TREE OF KNOWLEDGE. ON THE
BASIS THAT WE HAD NO NEED-TO-KNOW. AND THAT IF WE
DIDN'T EVEN KNOW ABOUT POLICY. WE COULD NOT BE AC-
CUSED OF MAKING POLICY.
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THIS WAS WISHFUL THINKING, OF COURSE, BECAUSE
THERE IS APPARENTLY NOTHING THAT CAN STOP THE ACCUSA-
TIONS BY OUR DETRACTORS; BEING THE SILENT SERVICE, WE
HAVE BEEN HANDY WHIPPING BOYS.
THE PRINCIPLE, HOWEVER, THAT WE DID NOT G-2 THE
POLICIES AND ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
WAS AND STILL IS ESSENTIAL, AND IT WAS MODIFIED DUR-
ING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS IN 1962, AS I SHALL DIS-
CUSS LATER, ONLY BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT'S REQUIREMENTS
IN REGARD TO REPORTING CHANGED OUR NEED-TO-KNOW.
IN THIS COURSE, YOU HAVE ALREADY DEVOTED ONE OF
YOUR SYLLABUS TOPICS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
AND ITS MACHINERY, AND YOU HAVE SIMILARLY COVERED THE
WORKINGS OF THE CIA AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
I ASSUME, ACCORDINGLY, THAT I NEED NOT GO INTO THESE
MATTERS IN DETAIL. IF I COVER SOME OF THE SAME GROUND,
IT WILL BE ONLY TO RELATE THEM TO THIS QUESTION OF
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR POLICY FORMULATION.
CENTURIES AGO, THE ANCIENT GREEKS GOT THEIR ES-
TIMATIVE INTELLIGENCE FROM THE DELPHIC ORACLE. SOME
OF THESE ESTIMATES HAVE BEEN PRESERVED FOR US BY THE
HISTORIANS AND PLAYWRIGHTS OF THAT ERA, AND THEY SHOW
THAT THE DELPHIC ORACLE WAS AWARE OF ONE OF THE MOST
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ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTES FOR ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
THAT WANTS TO STAY IN BUSINESS: CREDIBILITY. IT WAS
TRUE THEN, AND IT IS TRUE NOW1 THAT AN INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE HAS NO PURPOSE, NO VALUE, AND NO FUTURE IF
IT IS NOT BELIEVED BY THOSE IT SERVES.
THE DELPHIC ORACLE, OF COURSE, WORDED ITS PRE-
DICTIONS IN SUCH A WAY THAT EACH ONE PERMITTED TWO
DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSITE INTERPRETATIONS. WHATEVER
HAPPENED, THE ORACLE COULD CLAIM TO HAVE BEEN RIGHT,
IF PERHAPS MISUNDERSTOOD.
OUR MODERN CUSTOMERS CAN HARDLY BE EXPECTED TO
TOLERATE THIS SAFETY MECHANISM, BUT CREDIBILITY MUST
STILL BE OUR STOCK IN TRADE. AND THIS IS WHAT DIC-
TATES THAT WE MUST ONLY SUPPORT--NEVER PARTICIPATE
IN--THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS.
LET US SUPPOSE THAT THE PRESIDENT AND HIS AD-
VISERS FACE A CHOICE BETWEEN COURSE A AND COURSE B.
THE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
IS TO PROVIDE A COMPLETELY OBJECTIVE SUMMARY OF THE
FACTS--AND THE WHOLE KNOWN RANGE OF FACTS--RELEVANT
TO THE CHOICE. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WILL RU
RECOMMEND ONE COURSE OR THE OTHER.
THE MINUTE THAT WE ADVOCATE COURSE A, THE PRO-
PONENTS OF COURSE B ARE GOING TO SUSPECT, IF NOT
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BELIEVE. THAT THE INTELLIGENCE REPORTING HAS BEEN
RIGGED AND THE ESTIMATIVE JUDGMENTS SLANTED TO SUP-
PORT THAT ADVOCACY. CREDIBILITY GOES OUT THE WINDOW.
WE MUST CONCEDE, OF COURSE. THAT THE FACTS THEM-
SELVES ARE NOT NECESSARILY IMPARTIAL. IN HISTORY'S
FIRST RECORDED INTELLIGENCE RECONNAISSANCE MISSION.
THE DOVE CAME BACK TO THE ARK WITHOUT SAYING A WORD.
BUT THE OLIVE BRANCH WAS A CLEAR POLICY RECOMMENDA-
TION TO NOAH TO PREPARE TO DISEMBARK.
THE DIVIDING LINE IS EVEN HAZIER WHEN THE ES-
TIMATORS ARE ASKED FOR CONTINGENCY PAPERS. THESE
ARE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS POSED BY THE POLICY-MAKERS
ABOUT THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF. OR REACTIONS TO
SPECIFIC PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION BY THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT. THIS IS INDEED THIN ICE FOR THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THE RESPONSIVE CONCLUSIONS
ARE SOMETIMES SO CLEAR-CUT AND SO DEFINITIVE THAT
THEY ARE TANTAMOUNT TO TACIT POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS.
A WEATHER FORECAST OF RAIN IS OBJECTIVE. BUT IT IS
ALSO IN EFFECT A TACIT RECOMMENDATION TO TAKE A RAIN-
COAT. THESE PAPERS ARE UNDERTAKEN, HOWEVER. AT THE
SPECIFIC REQUEST OF THE POLICY-MAKER. AND THE CON-
CLUSIONS MUST BE BASED ON A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF
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6LL THE RELEVANT FACTS AVAILABLE. To PRESERVE CREDI-
BILITY, RIVAL ADVOCATES AMONG THE POLICY-MAKERS CAN
ALWAYS CHECK WITH THEIR OWN REPRESENTATIVES WITHIN
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE
QUESTION ACTUALLY HAS BEEN GIVEN A COMPREHENSIVE,
OBJECTIVE, AND IMPARTIAL REVIEW IN THE ESTIMATIVE
PROCESS.
THIS BRINGS UP ANOTHER POINT--THE NEED FOR A
CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONTROLLED SCHIZOPHRENIA ON THE
PART OF DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. THE DE-
PARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ARE
POLICY-MAKING ELEMENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.
THEIR OFFICERS RIGHTFULLY CAN BE AND OFTEN SHOULD
BE ADVOCATES OF A PARTICULAR POLICY OR COURSE OF
ACTION. SOME OF THESE OFFICERS, HOWEVER, ARE ALSO
DESIGNATED BY THEIR DEPARTMENTS TO BE PARTICIPATING
MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
WHAT WE MUST INSIST UPON IS THAT THESE PARTICULAR
OFFICERS DEVELOP A SPLIT PERSONALITY. AT THEIR DESKS
IN THE PENTAGON OR THE STATE DEPARTMENT BUILDING.
THEY WILL OFTEN BE CALLED ON TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
FORMULATION OF POLICY, AND THEY MAY WELL BECOME AR-
DENT ADVOCATES. WHEN THEY COME OUT TO LANGLEY,
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HOWEVER, AND FUNCTION ON THE UNITED STATES INTELLI-
GENCE BOARD OR SOME OTHER INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP
AS INTEGRAL MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY,
THEY MUST NEITHER MAKE. NOR ADVOCATE POLICY.
IT WOULD BE TOO MUCH TO EXPECT OF MERE HUMANS,
I SUPPOSE, THAT THE ADHERENTS OF COURSE A WOULD NOT
SEE TO IT THAT THE ESTIMATE INCLUDES EVERY SINGLE
FACT THAT SUPPORTS THEIR RECOMMENDATION, BUT WE CAN
FIND COMFORT IN THE FACT THAT THE COURSE B BOYS ARE
JUST AS BUSY ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE TABLE. AND
THE ULTIMATE SAFETY DEVICE MUST CONSIST OF COORDINA-
TION BY A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACTING AS REFEREE,
WITH NO POLICY AXE TO GRIND AND A VESTED INTEREST IN
PRESERVING A REPUTATION FOR CREDIBILITY.
MY POINT IS THAT WHEN THERE IS CONTROVERSY IN
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OVER WHAT THE U.S. POLICY OR
COURSE OF ACTION SHOULD BE, THE OPPOSING ADVOCATES
MUST HAVE AN IMPARTIAL SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE INFORMA-
TION WHICH ALL CAN TRUST. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
CAN FURNISH THAT OBJECTIVE FOUNDATION, AND COMMAND
THE NECESSARY CREDIBILITY, ONLY IF IT NEVER ENGAGES
TO FOLLOW AN ACTUAL EXAMPLE, THE DECISION-MAKING
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PROCESS FOR U.S. POLICY UNDER CURRENT PROCEDURES
STARTS WITH A NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM,
OR NSSM.
THE NSSM ORIGINATES IN THE NSC STAFF UNDER DR.
HENRY A. KISSINGER, THE PRESIDENT'S ASSISTANT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, WHO STATES THE PROBLEM
AND OUTLINES WHAT IS TO BE DONE, BY WHOM, AND WHEN,
THE BASIC DOCUMENT IS DRAFTED, USUALLY BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, IN THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP.
ONE OF THESE, CALLED THE POLITICAL-MILITARY GROUP,
DEALS WITH PRIMARILY MILITARY MATTERS. THERE ARE
FIVE OTHERS BROKEN DOWN BY GEOGRAPHIC AREAS, WHICH
ARE IDENTICAL WITH WHAT WERE CALLED INTERDEPARTMENTAL
REGIONAL GROUPS IN THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION. THEY
ARE CHAIRED BY THE APPROPRIATE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE. THE CIA REPRESENTATIVE IS USUALLY THE AP-
PROPRIATE DIVISION CHIEF FROM OUR OPERATING SIDE,
THE DIRECTORATE OF PLANS, BUT HIS FUNCTION IS LIM-
ITED TO INTELLIGENCE INPUT.
THE NSSM ITSELF STATES THE PROBLEM, LAYS OUT
THE FACTS, AND THEN LISTS A SERIES OF OPTIONS, WITH
PROS, CONS. AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES, BUT WITHOUT
MAKING A FINAL RECOMMENDATION AMONG THE OPTIONS.
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WHEN THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP IS SATISFIED
WITH THE NSSM, IT IS FORWARDED FOR REVIEW AT A HIGHER
LEVEL. IN THE CASE OF DEFENSE POLICY, IT GOES TO
THE DEFENSE POLICY REVIEW GROUP, CHAIRED BY DR.
KISSINGER AND COMPRISING THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS, THE UN-
DER SECRETARY OF STATE, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL IN-
TELLIGENCE, THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL
OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS.
NSMMS WHICH ARE NOT PRIMARILY MILITARY GO TO
THE NSC SENIOR REVIEW GROUP, ALSO CHAIRED BY DR.
KISSINGER. I AM THE CIA REPRESENTATIVE, AND OTHER
MEMBERS ARE SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES FROM STATE, DE-
FENSE, AND JOINT CHIEFS, AND THE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY
PLANNING. THE HEAD OF USIA USUALLY ATTENDS.
THE PAPER MAY SHUTTLE BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN
THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP AND THE REVIEW GROUP
SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE IT IS CONSIDERED READY FOR
PRESIDENTIAL CONSIDERATION. ULTIMATELY, IT COMES
BEFORE THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AS A DOCUMENT
STATING A PROBLEM AND EVALUATING ALL THE POSSIBLE
COURSES OF ACTION. IT IS A POLICY DOCUMENT WHICH
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STOPS SHORT OF MAKING A RECOMMENDATION: THE DECISION
IS UP TO THE PRESIDENT.
WHEN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETS AROUND
THE LONG OVAL TABLE IN THE CABINET ROOM, THE DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IS USUALLY SEATED ALL BY HIM-
SELF AT ONE END OF THE TABLE, MAY I REPEAT--AS AN AD--
VISER. HE GENERALLY OPENS THE MEETING WITH A SHORT,
CONCISE BRIEFING ON THE INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS OF THE
SUBJECT UNDER CONSIDERATION.
Now, THERE HAS BEEN, AS I SAID, AN INTELLIGENCE
INPUT ALL THE WAY THROUGH, AT EVERY STAGE OF THE NSSM
PROCESS. IT COMES NOT ONLY FROM THE CIA PEOPLE ON
THE VARIOUS PANELS, BUT FROM THE DEPARTMENTAL INTEL-
LIGENCE COMPONENTS SUPPORTING THE REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE OPERATING DEPARTMENTS SUCH AS DEFENSE AND STATE.
IT CONTRIBUTES TO THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM, AND
TO THE EVALUATION OF THE VARIOUS OPTIONS.
THIS INTELLIGENCE INPUT, HOWEVER, IS ORIENTED
TO POSSIBLE U.S. COURSES OF ACTION, AND IT IS SUB-
ORDINATED TO A DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES.
THE DIRECTORS BRIEFING TO THE NSC, ON THE OTHER
HAND, IS ORIENTED TO THE PROBLEM--NOT TO THE ANSWERS--
AND I THINK IT IS RELEVANT TO OUR EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN
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DETACHMENT FROM POLICY THAT, WHILE WE ARE REPRESENTED
IN THE NSSM PROCESS BY OUR OPERATING AND COLLECTION
PEOPLE, THE DIRECTOR NORMALLY CALLS ON THE INTELLI-
GENCE PRODUCTION SIDE, AND SPECIFICALLY THE OFFICE
OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, TO HELP IN THE PREPARATION
OF HIS BRIEFING FOR THE NSC.
IN THE BACK-AND-FORTH DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWS,
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE PARTICIPATES
ONLY WHEN HE IS ASKED FOR HIS OPINION OR FOR SOME
ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE DETAIL. THERE IS, OF COURSE,
NOTHING LIKE A FINAL VOTE, AND THE PRESIDENT'S DE-
CISION NORMALLY IS MADE KNOWN AT SOME LATER POINT
IN A NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MEMORANDUM DIRECTING
THE HEADS OF APPROPRIATE DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES TO
TAKE SPECIFIC ACTIONS.
I HAVE DISCUSSED THE NSSM PROCESS IN SOME DE-
TAIL BECAUSE IT AFFORDS A NICE CLEAN CASE HISTORY
OF HOW THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FITS INTO A STAND-
ARD OPERATING PROCEDURE OF PROBLEM, ANALYSIS, AND
DECISION. THERE HAVE BEEN, HOWEVER, SOMETHING LESS
THAN 90 NSSMS--MANY OF WHICH HAVE NOT REACHED THE
NSC--IN SOME 633 DAYS OF THE CURRENT NSC MECHANISM-
AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR THE POLICY MAKER IS A
CONSTANT, DAILY BUSINESS.
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THE POLICY MAKER EXPECTS AND GETS FROM THE IN-
TELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ENCYCLOPEDIC BASIC INTELLIGENCE
WHICH GIVES HIM ALL THE BACKGROUND, STATISTICAL.
FUNDAMENTAL INFORMATION HE MAY NEED ABOUT A FOREIGN
COUNTRY; ESTIMATIVE INTELLIGENCE WHICH SEEKS TO PRE-
DICT THE DEVELOPMENTS IN AN EXISTING PROBLEM AREA,
OR FORECAST AN IMPENDING CRISIS BEFORE IT IS UPON
US: AND CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WHICH KEEPS HIM UP TO
DATE DAY-BY-DAY. OR EVEN HOUR-BY-HOUR IF NEED BE.
A GREAT DEAL OF THIS. OF COURSE, IS ON PAPER,
SOME OF IT FILED AWAY. SCANNED BUT UNSTUDIED, AGAINST
THE CONTINGENCY OF A CRISIS IN NEPAL. LIECHTENSTEIN,
OR COSTA RICA. THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL TRADE. HOWEVER.
IN "TWO-LEGGED MEMORANDA"; AT THE HEIGHT OF THE RE-
CENT JORDANIAN CRISIS. FOR EXAMPLE. SPECIAL GROUPS
WERE MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE IN THE MIDDLE OF
THE NIGHT, AND AS OFTEN AS THREE TIMES A DAY. IN
EACH CASE REQUIRING AN INTELLIGENCE INPUT.
BASIC INTELLIGENCE--WITH THE INFORMATION EX-
PLOSION AND THE BUDGET SQUEEZE OF RECENT YEARS--HAS
BECOME A SPECIAL PROBLEM.
THERE ARE LIMITS TO THE VOLUME OF INFORMATION
THAT THE POLICY MAKER CAN ABSORB. AND WITH GROWING
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RESPONSIBILITIES AND SHRINKING BUDGETS, THERE ARE
CERTAINLY ALSO LIMITS TO THE AMOUNTS OF PROPERLY
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE THAT THE COMMUNITY CAN PRO-
DUCE.
BUT WHAT ARE WE TO LEAVE OUT? THIS PROBLEM HAS
FOR THE PAST COUPLE OF YEARS BECOME THE PROVINCE OF
A GROUP CALLED THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES
BOARD, WHICH I HAVE THE DUBIOUS PRIVILEGE OF CHAIR-
ING. MY ASSOCIATES ARE DR. RAY CLINE, DIRECTOR OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND
RESEARCH, AND MR. ROBERT FROEHLKE, THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ADMINISTRATION. WE HAVE
BEEN CHARGED BY MR. HELMS TO MATCH INTELLIGENCE
RESPONSIBILITIES WITH INTELLIGENCE ASSETS.
IT IS INEVITABLE THAT OUR ATTENTION SHOULD FOCUS
ON SUCH BASIC INTELLIGENCE AS THE NATIONAL INTELLI-
GENCE SURVEY, WHICH ALREADY AMOUNTS TO SOMETHING LIKE
A DOZEN TIMES THE VOLUME OF THE ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITAN-
NICA. THANKS TO ISLAND GROUPS, OCEAN BASINS, AND
TERRITORIES, THERE ARE SOME 155 OF THESE SURVEYS
AT LATEST COUNT--MORE SURVEYS THAN THERE ARE COUN-
TRIES IN THE WORLD TODAY. THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
SURVEY ON THE SOVIET UNION AMOUNTS TO A TOTAL OF
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4,300 PAGES. THE DIRECTOR HAS BEEN KNOWN TO REFER
TO SUCH INTELLIGENCE AS THE "PENGUIN CLASSICS." BE-
CAUSE, IN THE WORDS OF AN EARLY ROBERT BENCHLEY BOOK
REVIEW "THIS BOOK TELLS ME MORE ABOUT PENGUINS THAN
I CARE TO KNOW."
IS THERE REALLY A NEED FOR AN N.I.S. OF 17 SEC-
TIONS ON
THE CIA OFFICE
OF BASIC AND GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE PUTS AN UNCON-
SCIONABLE AMOUNT OF MAN-HOURS, FUNDS, HEAT AND SWEAT
INTO PUBLISHING THESE SURVEYS, HARASSING THE COLLECTORS
FOR INFORMATION, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AT LARGE
,FOR DRAFTING, EVEN THE FIELD FOR COORDINATION. THE
RESULT IS OFTEN MORE THAN THE POLICY MAKER CARES TO
KNOW1 BUT IT IS A RISKY STATEMENT TO SAY THAT IT IS
MORE THAN HE WILL NEED TO KNOW.
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THERE ARE STILL SOME BRITISH SKIPPERS WHO WILL
CONFIRM PROFANELY THAT OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR THE
BOTCHED BRITISH LANDINGS IN NORWAY IN 1940 WAS BASED
IN PART ON WOODCUTS OF NORWEGIAN SCENIC ATTRACTIONS
IN THE 19TH CENTURY, AND A GOOD SHARE OF THE U.S.
MARINES WHO DIED ON TARAWA IN 1943 WERE LOST BECAUSE
WE DIDN'T HAVE ENOUGH ACCURATE INFORMATION ON THE
REEFS, SANDBARS, AND BEACHES TO KNOW WHAT KINDS OF
LANDING CRAFT COULD BEST GET THEM ASHORE WITH THE
MINIMUM DANGER OF GROUNDING.
As CHAIRMAN OF THE NIRB, I MIGHT BE TEMPTED
TO CUT BACK SHARPLY ON THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
SURVEYS TO MEET THE BUDGET AND MANPOWER SQUEEZE,
AND IN FACT WE HAVE HAD TO APPLY SOME LIMITATIONS:
OF THE 154 SHELF-FEET OF BASIC INTELLIGENCE WHICH
HAVE BEEN FILLED SINCE THE NIS PROGRAM BEGAN, WE
ARE NOW KEEPING ONLY ABOUT 80 FEET CURRENT. THIS
STILL MEANS, HOWEVER, THAT WE ARE KEEPING THE PRO-
GRAM UP TO DATE ON A TOTAL OF 90 COUNTRIES, AND AS
A MARINE, I'M NOT ABOUT TO DEEP-SIX AN INTELLIGENCE
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PRODUCTION PROGRAM WHICH INCLUDES A CHAPTER ON "COASTS
AND LANDING BEACHES" FOR PRACTICALLY EVERY SPOT IN
THE WORLD THAT CAN BE REACHED BY BOAT.
THERE ARE, OF COURSE, COUNTLESS ENCYCLOPEDIAS,
GUIDE BOOKS1 ATLASES AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS OFFERING
A GREAT DEAL OF BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT FOREIGN COUN-
TRIES, BUT WHEN THERE IS A CRISIS, THE U.S. POLICY
MAKER NEEDS INSTANT INTELLIGENCE, NOT MERELY FOR-
MATION. TRAVEL BOOK WRITERS DO NOT HAVE TO BE AC-
CURATE: THEY WILL NOT, AS A RULE, PROBE FOR INFOR-
MATION WHICH A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS SECRET:
AND THEY ARE WRITING FOR TOURISTS WHO ARE NOT PAR-
TICULARLY INTERESTED IN POTENTIAL LANDING BEACHES
AND DROP ZONES. BASIC INTELLIGENCE IS TAILORED FOR
THE GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE FACING A MAJOR CRISIS, AND
CONTAINS THE CONSENSUS OF THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY BASED ON EVERY AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCE, COVERT OR OVERT.
I DON'T THINK I NEED TO GO INTO SUCH DEPTH ON
THE ESTIMATES AND THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE THE POLICY
MAKER NEEDS FROM THE COMMUNITY. I AM SURE THAT THE
PANEL YOU HAD HERE YESTERDAY DESCRIBED THEM IN CON-
SIDERABLE DETAIL. I WOULD LIKE, HOWEVER, TO DISCUSS
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BRIEFLY SOME OTHER DESCRIPTIVE TERMS FOR THE FINISHED
INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT.
IT IS1 OF COURSE, COMPREHENSIVE OR "ALL-SOURCE,"
INCLUDING INPUT RANGING FROM THE MOST SENSITIVE METH-
ODS AND SOURCES TO THE OVERT, AMPLIFIED BY BACKGROUND
AND EXPERT ANALYSIS. IT IS IMMEDIATE, BECAUSE THE
COMPONENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OPERATE ON
A 24-HOUR BASIS, SEVEN DAYS A WEEK, WITH AN INTER-
LOCKING NETWORK OF OPERATIONS CENTERS AND WATCH OF-
FICES. IT IS AS NEAR "REAL TIME" AS WE CAN GET IT,
BECAUSE IT HAS TO BE IN AN ERA WHEN A NUCLEAR WAR-
HEAD CAN REACH AN INTERCONTINENTAL TARGET IN HALF
AN HOUR. ALL OF THESE ATTRIBUTES FALL WITHIN THE
STOCK DEFINITION FOR CURRENT INTELLIGENCE.
BUT THE SUPPORT THE COMMUNITY GIVES THE POLICY
MAKER IS ALSO NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, AND JII INTEL-
LIGENCE.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IS DEFINED WITHIN THE COM-
MUNITY AS "ALL INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED FOR THE FORMU-
LATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY WHICH CONCERNS
MORE THAN ONE DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY, AND WHICH TRAN-
SCENDS J?E EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE OF A SINGLE DEPART-
MENT OR AGENCY." IN OTHER WORDS, IT REPRESENTS THE
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AGREED, COORDINATED VIEW OF THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY
BOARD IN LATE 1957--THEN KNOWN AS THE KILLIAN COM-
MITTEE--RECOMMENDED THAT TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POS-
SIBLE ALL INTELLIGENCE PROVIDED TO THE POLICY MAKERS,
AND IN PARTICULAR THE DAILY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN, SHOULD BE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
THERE IS AN INEVITABLE CLASH BETWEEN CURRENCY
AND COORDINATION. THE FORMAL COORDINATION OF A NA-
TIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY, FOR INSTANCE, FROM THE
TIME IT IS DRAFTED UNTIL EVERYBODY IN WASHINGTON
AND IN THE FIELD HAS AGREED TO EACH WORD AND PUNCTUA-
TION MARK, MAY TAKE SIX MONTHS. YET HARDLY A NIGHT
PASSES WITHOUT AN ITEM THAT HAS TO GO INTO THE BUL-
LETIN, OR A SITUATION REPORT FROM A TASK FORCE ES-
TABLISHED TO KEEP TABS ON A CRISIS, WHICH MUST BE
HANDLED IN A GREAT DEAL LESS THAN SIX HOURS--NOT
SIX MONTHS.
THAT IS PROBABLY WHY THE CODIFIERS IN THE COM-
MUNITY HAVE YET TO COME UP WITH A DEFINITION FOR NA-
TIONAL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE. IT WOULD BE AN INHERENT
PARADOX. AND YET, THIS IS PRECISELY WHAT WE HAVE TO
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ACHIEVE IN OUR CURRENT INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS.
COORDINATION SOMETIMES PERFORCE BOILS DOWN TO
CONSULTATION, AND IN THE ULTIMATE RESORT, THERE WILL
BE TIMES--USUALLY FOUR OR FIVE A.M.--WHEN THE ANALYST
WHO HAS BEEN ROUSTED OUT OF BED TO MEET A SHORT DEAD-
LINE IS GOING TO HAVE TO RESORT TO TELEPATHY, IN
THE OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, HE IS ENJOINED
TO WRITE AS THOUGH HIS OPPOSITE NUMBERS IN DIA AND
STATE WERE LOOKING OVER HIS SHOULDER, AND EXERCISE
THEIR PROXIES FOR THEM. THIS ALL COMES BACK AGAIN
TO THE VITAL PRINCIPLE OF CREDIBILITY. IF WEDNESDAY
MORNINGS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN HAS TO CARRY
A NOTE FROM DEFENSE OR STATE TAKING SHARP ISSUE WITH
AN ITEM IN TUESDAY MORNINGS BULLETIN PREPARED UNI-
LATERALLY BY CIA, IT WILL NOT BE LONG BEFORE THE
BULLETIN WILL NO LONGER SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE AS
FAR AS THE POLICY-MAKER IS CONCERNED.
IN THIS CONNECTION, YOU MAY HAVE NOTICED THAT
FOR SEVERAL YEARS NOW CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDA
AND OTHER CIA INTELLIGENCE REPORTS PREPARED FOR DIS-
SEMINATION TO THE POLICY-MAKERS HAVE BEEN CARRYING
A FOOTNOTE ON THE FIRST PAGE STATING PRECISELY WHAT
COORDINATION HAS BEEN INVOLVED.
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AS FOR "Uf INTELLIGENCE, THIS IS A LABEL WE
HAVE BORROWED FROM THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES,
THE STANDARD NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, FOR
EXAMPLE, MAY DEAL WITH SOVIET CAPABILITIES. IF THESE
ARE BALANCED AGAINST CAPABILITIES, IT IS CALLED
A "NET ESTIMATE," AND BY EXTENSION, WE USE "NET IN-
TELLIGENCE" TO DESCRIBE REPORTS WHICH GO BEYOND FOR-
EIGN INTELLIGENCE ON SOME PROBLEM OR CRISIS TO CRANK
IN RELEVANT INFORMATION ON U.S. POLICIES, PLANS,
CAPABILITIES, INTENTIONS, OR OBJECTIVES.
HARKING BACK TO WHAT I SAID AT THE OUTSET ABOUT
OUR "AGE OF INNOCENCE" IN THE EARLY YEARS OF CIA,
WHEN WE DID OUR UTMOST AS A MATTER OF POLICY TO KEEP
INTELLIGENCE REPORTING FREE OF ANYTHING THAT EVEN
TOUCHED ON THE UNITED STATES, THIS POLICY ENDED
ABRUPTLY AND "NET INTELLIGENCE" CAME INTO BEING
DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS IN 1962. PRESIDENT
KENNEDY MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE FOUND IT INCONVENIENT?
TO PUT IT MILDLY--TO HAVE TO READ ONE PIECE OF PAPER
FROM THE CIA ON WHAT THE RUSSIANS AND CUBANS WERE UP
TO, A SECOND FROM STATE ON WHAT THE UNITED STATES
PROPOSED TO DO, AND A THIRD FROM DEFENSE ON WHAT
WAS AVAILABLE TO DO IT WITH.
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ADMITTEDLY, THIS DOES NOT APPLY TO MOST FINISHED
INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION. THERE ARE AMPLE REGULATIONS,
RESTRICTIONS, CAVEATS AND CLASSIFICATIONS THAT RE-
QUIRE THE REGULAR PUBLICATIONS AND DEPARTMENTAL IN-
TELLIGENCE REPORTS TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN OPERATIONAL
REPORTING AND POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE. THERE IS STILL
THE REQUIREMENT FOR CAUTION TO KEEP OBJECTIVE RE-
PORTING FREE OF POLICY ADVOCACY, AND AN EVEN MORE
STRINGENT REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT THE MEN WHO ARE
INVOLVED IN OPERATIONS--BE THEY INTELLIGENCE OR
MILITARY--FROM UNNECESSARY DISCLOSURE.
BUT SINCE 1962, THERE HAVE BEEN A VERY FEW,
TIGHTLY-HELD "PIECES OF PAPER"--AS OPPOSED TO THE
"PUBLICATIONS" HEMMED IN BY THE NORMAL RESTRICTIONS?
DESIGNED TO GIVE THE VERY HIGHEST LEVEL OF POLICY
MAKERS WHAT THEY WANT--THE COMPREHENSIVE, AGREED,
ACROSS-THE-BOARD NATIONAL AND NET INTELLIGENCE AP-
PRECIATION. PRIMARILY, THERE IS THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF, IN WHICH THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL IN-
TELLIGENCE IS REPORTING DIRECTLY TO THE PRESIDENT
AND THREE OR FOUR OF HIS TOP COLLEAGUES.
I DON'T WANT TO GET THIS OUT OF PERSPECTIVE.
IT IS THE EXCEPTION, RATHER THAN THE RULE, FOR THE
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PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF, FOR EXAMPLE, TO REPORT ON
STATE OR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES, BUT THERE HAS TO BE A
CHANNEL OF SOME KIND FOR DOING THIS ON THE RARE OC-
CASIONS WHEN IT IS RELEVANT AND NECESSARY TO AN UN-
DERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION. DURING THE CUBAN MIS-
SILE CRISIS, FOR EXAMPLE, IT WAS OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE
TO REPORT MEANINGFULLY ON SOVIET SHIPS APPROACHING
THE QUARANTINE LINE WITHOUT SAYING WHERE THAT QUARAN-
TINE LINE WAS. THERE WAS NO CORRESPONDING NEED, HOW-
EVER, TO REPORT ON THE ASSEMBLY OF TROOPS IN FLORIDA,
THE DETAILED DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES, OR THE
VARIOUS DEMARCHES BEING MADE BY U.S. DIPLOMATIC REPRE-
SENTATIVES--EXCEPT INSOFAR AS THE ANSWERS THE DIPLO-
MATS RECEIVED MIGHT AVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE POSITIVE
INTELLIGENCE PICTURE.
THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RELEVANT NET INTELLIGENCE
HAS ENLARGED THE DIRECTOR'S NEED-TO-KNOW BACK TO THE
LEVEL THAT ADMIRAL SOUERS DECLINED 24 YEARS AGO, BUT
IT BOILS DOWN TO ONE BASIC PRINCIPLE THAT COVERS BOTH
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND NET INTELLIGENCE.
IN A TIME OF CRISIS, THE PRESIDENT IS LIKELY
TO BE RECEIVING CONFLICTING ADVICE FROM A WIDE VA-
RIETY OF SOURCES. To CHOOSE AMONG THEM, IT IS ES-
SENTIAL THAT HE BE ENABLED TO START OUT WITH A
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FOUNDATION OF DEE U1 QE AGREED FACTS
FINALLY, THE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR
SUPPORTING THE POLICY-MAKER FROM TIME TO TIME TAKE
ONE HIGHLY SPECIALIZED FORM OF REPORTING ON U.S.
CAPABILITIES--THE ASSESSMENT OF OUR OWN CAPABILITIES
IN THE FIELD OF INTELLIGENCE.
WHEN WE WARN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF A POTENTIAL
DANGER, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE COMMUNITY SHOULD
ALSO STATE WHAT THE CHANCES ARE THAT WE WILL HAVE
ADVANCE WARNING OF THE ACTUAL EVENT. THIS IS ABOUT
THE ONLY WAY WE CAN CLOSE SOME OF THE GAP BETWEEN
ASSESSING THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES, AND PREDICTING
HIS INTENTIONS.
WE CAN ASSESS IN CONSIDERABLE AND AUTHORITATIVE
DETAIL THE RECIPROCAL CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIETS AND
THE CHINESE CONFRONTING EACH OTHER ACROSS THEIR LONG
BORDER FROM THE PACIFIC OCEAN TO THE PAMIR MOUNTAINS.
IT IS CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULT--AND OF CORRESPOND-
INGLY GREATER USEFULNESS TO THE POLICY-MAKER--TO GIVE
HIM AN ESTIMATE OF OUR PROSPECTS FOR TIMELY FORE-
KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR RESPECTIVE INTENTIONS.
SIMILARLY, THERE ARE EXTENSIVE AREAS OF THE
WORLD WHERE COUPS ARE ENDEMIC, AND COUP RUMORS ARE
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A DIME-A-DOZEN. WE SERVE THE POLICY-MAKER BEST WHEN
WE CONCENTRATE ON HOW RIPE CONDITIONS ARE FOR A COUP
IN A GIVEN COUNTRY. AND REMIND HIM AT THE SAME TIME
OF THE LIMITED PROSPECTS THAT WE CAN CALL THE SHOT
PRECISELY IN ADVANCE OF A SUCCESSFUL COUP. THE CON-
SPIRATOR WHO EXERCISES ENOUGH SECURITY TO CATCH HIS
GOVERNMENT NAPPING IS ALSO LIKELY TO KEEP US FROM
PINPOINTING THE TIME AND PLACE. AT BEST. WE WILL
PROBABLY HAVE WARNED THAT THERE IS ENOUGH UNREST.
THE PLOTTERS ARE STRONG ENOUGH. AND THE GOVERNMENT
IS WEAK ENOUGH FOR A COUP TO SUCCEED AT ANY TIME.
FOR ONE LAST CURRENT AND SPECIFIC EXAMPLE. I
WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SUP-
PORT OF NATIONAL POLICY FORMULATION IN CONNECTION
WITH THE U.S.-SOVIET STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS.
THIS SUPPORT BEGAN. OF COURSE. LONG BEFORE THE
INITIAL MEETINGS AT HELSINKI.
FUNDAMENTALLY. IT IS HARD TO BELIEVE THAT IT
WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO
SUGGEST SUCH TALKS IN THE FIRST INSTANCE WITHOUT A
GOOD SOLID DECADE OF HARD INTELLIGENCE ON THE MAGNI-
TUDE AND PRECISE COMPOSITION OF THE SOVIET MILITARY
ESTABLISHMENT. IT WOULD BE A RASH POKER PLAYER
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INDEED WHO WOULD BET AT HIGH STAKES WITH ALL HIS OWN
CARDS EXPOSED, WHEN HE KNOWS NOTHING ABOUT THE OP-
PONENTI S HAND. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CAN
DICKER EFFECTIVELY ON THE LIMITATION OR REDUCTION
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WEAPONS ONLY
IF IT KNOWS WITH REASONABLE CERTAINTY JUST HOW MANY
OF THESE WEAPONS THE SOVIETS HAVE, AND HOW EFFECTIVE
THEY ARE.
SECONDLY, STARTING BEFORE ANY FORMAL PROPOSAL
FOR SALT TALKS, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAD TO
INFORM THE POLICY MAKERS, AND KEEP THEM INFORMED ON
A CONTINUING BASIS, ABOUT THE FORCES AT WORK IN THE
USSR--POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC--FOR AND
AGAINST THE LIKELIHOOD OF ANY APPRECIABLE SOVIET
INTEREST IN SUBSTANTIAL ARMS LIMITATION.
THIRD, ONCE THE SALT TALKS BECAME A REASONABLE
POSSIBILITY, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH LOOKED TO THE IN-
TELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR OUR KNOWLEDGE AND OUR JUDG-
MENTS ON THE PROBABLE SOVIET PROPOSALS, BARGAINING
POSITIONS, AND OBJECTIVES. THAT MUCH IS STANDARD
INTELLIGENCE, FAIRLY DISTINCT FROM U.S. POLICY IN-
VOLVEMENT, BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE WERE EXPECTED TO
ASSESS THE PROBABLE SOVIET REACTION TO U.S. PROPOSALS,
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AND FOR THIS. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAD TO KNOW
IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL WHAT THE UNITED STATES IN-
TENDED TO PROPOSE.
THERE IS ALSO A REQUIREMENT FOR CONTINUING COM-
MUNITY ANALYSIS AND CURRENT INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO
THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION DURING THE TALKS IN
HELSINKI AND VIENNA, COVERING EVERYTHING RELEVANT
TO THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT CAN HARDLY
COME AS A SURPRISE THAT THERE ARE INTELLIGENCE EX-
PERTS ATTACHED TO THE DELEGATIONS ON BOTH SIDES OF
THE TABLE.
AND FINALLY. THERE IS THE SPECIALIZED SUPPORT
I JUST TOUCHED ON, CONSISTING OF THE ASSESSMENT OF
PERTINENT U.S. INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES.
JUST AS IT WOULD BE RISKY TO NEGOTIATE ARMS
LIMITATION WITHOUT KNOWING THE ENEMY'S EXISTING
STRENGTH, IT WOULD BE FOOLHARDY--GIVEN THE LIMITED
SOVIET REGARD FOR INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IN THE
PAST--TO CONCLUDE A TREATY WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF
OUR ABILITY TO MONITOR RUSSIAN COMPLIANCE WITH THE
AGREEMENTS REACHED.
A YEAR AGO. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COMPLETED
FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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A BASIC STUDY OF OUR ABILITY TO DETECT BY NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE MEANS--MEANING. IN THIS CASE, UNILAT-
ERALLY--POSSIBLE SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF A STRATEGIC
ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT. THIS ASSESSMENT WAS PRE-
PARED, UNDER THE DIRECTION OF DR. KISSINGER'S NSC
STAFF, BY REPRESENTATIVES OF CIA, DIA, THE OFFICE
OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF, AND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY.
THIS SO-CALLED VERIFICATION PANEL HAS BEEN
KEPT BUSY EVER SINCE, REVIEWING, REVISING, AND AM-
PLIFYING THE BASIC STUDY TO CONCENTRATE ON SPECIFIC
PROBLEM AREAS, AND TO RELATE TO THE VARIOUS OPTIONS
THE UNITED STATES WILL PROPOSE AND THE COUNTER-
PROPOSALS FROM THE SOVIETS.
LET ME EMPHASIZE THE WORLD "SPECIFIC." THIS
IS NO SIMPLE MATTER OF SAYING THAT OUR KNOWLEDGE OF
ICBM DEPLOYMENT IS GENERALLY STRONG, OR THAT THERE
ARE GAPS IN TIMELY INTELLIGENCE ON SOVIET RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT. IF WE ARE TO SERVE THE MEN WHO ARE
MAKING THE DECISIONS AND CARRYING ON THE NEGOTIATIONS,
WE MUST TELL THEM WITH THE GREATEST PRECISION POS-
SIBLE JUST HOW RELIABLY WE CAN COUNT LAUNCHERS AND
MONITOR NEW ICBM TESTS, WHAT OUR CHANCES ARE OF
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DETECTING THE RETROFITTING OF INTERCONTINENTAL MIS-
SILES IN INTERMEDIATE SILOS, AND HOW MUCH WARNING
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COULD GIVE OF A PROGRAM
TO UPGRADE SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES INTO AN EFFECTIVE
ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM.
THIS, IN FACT, CARRIES US INTO AN AREA THE
PURIST MIGHT CALL POLICY RECOMMENDATION, AS LONG
AS HE WILL CONCEDE THAT IT IS1 AFTER ALL, INTELLI-
GENCE POLICY. WE WOULD BE REMISS IN OUR SUPPORT OF
THE POLICY MAKER IF WE DID NOT POINT OUT CERTAIN
SUPPLEMENTARY VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS THAT MIGHT
BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE SOVIETS TO SUPPORT THE
MONITORING OF COMPLIANCE. AN OBVIOUS EXAMPLE--
BEYOND WHICH THE SUBJECT MATTER GETS TOO SENSITIVE,
SPECULATIVE, AND OPERATIONAL TO DISCUSS IN DEPTH--
WOULD BE PROVISION FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION.
To SUMMARIZE, THE ROLE OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY IN NATIONAL POLICY FORMULATION CONSISTS
OF--AND IS.LIMITED TO--SUPPORT OF THE DECISION-MAKERS
IN THE FORM OF COMPREHENSIVE, COORDINATED, RELEVANT
FACTS AND AGREED, ANALYTICAL, ESTIMATIVE JUDGMENTS.
IT WOULD BE IDLE TO DENY THAT THE SUM TOTAL
THRUST OF THE FACTS AND OF THE CONTINGENCY ESTIMATES
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THE POLICY MAKERS REQUEST, IN SOME CASES, TEND TO
WEIGH IN HEAVILY ON ONE SIDE OF A POLICY DEBATE,
BUT IT MUST BE THE FACTS WHICH TAKE SIDES--NOT THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
By CHARTER, BY DIRECTIVE, AND BY SELF-INTEREST,
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS FORBIDDEN ANY PARTISAN
ADVOCACY WHATSOEVER IN THE FORMULATION OF NATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY, AND WITHOUT THIS PROHIBITION, IT
WILL HAVE NO CREDIBILITY, NO USEFULNESS, AND NO
FUTURE.
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